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NEO-COMMUNITARIANISM AND SPECONOMY1 AS MODELS FOR
DEVELOPMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
ABSTRACT
Africa’s tragedy has at different times been subjected to various paradigm shifts 
ranging from modernisation to neo-Marxist theories with each paradigm 
identifying different sources of the tragedy. The tragedy, to some scholars, is 
rooted to the crisis of development. But to some African scholars, a key aspect to 
the crisis remains the question of ‘which and whose democracy?’ The central 
issue for investigation in this thesis is the efficacy of ‘best-practice’ political and 
economic templates prescribed by both liberals and socialists for Africa. These 
templates appear to be producing hybridised political order that breeds crises of 
political instability, leadership, economic hardship, violent conflicts etc; with no 
visible solution in sight. There is therefore a need for the reconstruction of 
Africa’s development strategy with unique models based on a foundation of ‘best 
fit’ values nurtured by the indigenous grains of the African societies. The thesis 
adopts critical theory using textual and contextual analysis as its methodology to 
engage literature on liberal, popular, social, and socialist democracy. It also 
engages the Africanist and African debate on democracy to discuss what works 
contextually in Africa and what does not work. The thesis sets out to establish 
how neo-communitarianism and speconomy can collectively serve as models for 
development in the sub-Saharan Africa, that is currently mediated by the 
alienating role of an incoherent public sphere dominated by representations of 
foreign ideologies which do not seek to create a common consciousness in all 
citizens but rather to help maintain and perpetuate a fractured image of the 
Enlightenment.
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Chapter 1 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
1.0 Introduction
The 1950s and 1960s saw most of the sub-Saharan African colonies 
gaining their independence. But the initial euphoria and high hopes proved to be 
short-lived for many of the young nations, as they became plagued by political 
instability, authoritarian leadership, economic hardship, violent conflicts, etc. For 
the purpose of this thesis I refer to this as 'the Africa’s crisis' or as described by 
Leys (2004), the 'Africa’s tragedy'. The crisis, to some scholars, is rooted to the 
crisis of development (Chabal, 1998). But to some other African scholars, a key 
aspect to the political crisis remains the question of 'which and whose 
democracy?' (Beckham, 1989)
This contestation makes a systematic analysis of the protracted 
political and economic crisis in Africa more imperative. Some African scholars 
believe that there is nothing that makes Africa ungovernable neither is 
democracy alien to African cultures. Many studies on Africa’s democratisation 
processes contextualise Africa’s political development in one universal model 
or the other. They thereby wrongly interpret Africa’s political instability either 
as a consequence of ethnic rivalries or the negative consequences of some 
retrogressive cultural values. This error of judgement [mis] leads the proponents 
of the universal theorists to by-pass the central issue involved in the genesis of 
Africa’s political crisis. In this thesis, Africa refers to sub-Sahara Africa.
Scholars such as Harrison and Huntington, who stressed “Culture 
Matters” (2002) in Africa’s political instability failed to see how the same 
culture can facilitate autochthonous political and economic models for 
economic sustainability, political development and democratic consolidation. 
We may be tempted to concede to the culture interpretation of Africa’s political 
crisis, doing this may misguide us to accept that it was because such cultural
[1]
values lack democratic ingredients as Huntington et al aver. Rather, we should 
be conscious that African socio-political crises are embedded in the social 
structures of their post-colonial forms. These are the after-effects of the 
relegation of the African traditional values to the fringes of the political and 
state building processes; and the disarticulation of African politics, economy 
and hybridisation of the traditional patrimonial political system by the colonial 
and the post-colonial forces.
Africa’s political instability have at different times been subjected to 
various interpretations ranging from modernisation to neo-Marxist with each 
interpretation identifying different sources of the Africa’s crisis and which 
subsequently have impact on the ‘best-practice’ thinking of each interpretation. 
Best-practice thinking as explained by Levy (2011) and Booth (2011) is a ‘one 
size-fits all’ approach to governance and development. It involves 
identification in all societies, of uniformity in what drives changes in 
institutions, governance, development, as well as in society while ignoring 
feasible entry points that are country-specific for democracy and development. 
From this approach comes a uniform set of policy prescriptions that are 
ideologically based irrespective of the peculiarities of each country. This 
approach, as applied to the interpretations of Africa’s crises and subsequent 
prescriptions of each interpretation, has profound implications for state state- 
builiding, democratisation processes and development.
The central issue for consideration in this thesis is the examination of 
the efficacy of ‘best-practice’ (Levy, 2011: 60; Booth, 2011: 1) governance 
templates as prescribed by both liberal and socialist democracies for African 
politics and economy. This examination is necessitated by the observation of 
what Boege et al label as ‘hybrid political order’ (2009: 15-36) in the sub- 
Saharan Africa; and thereafter as a way of rectification, reconstruct these 
templates to produce alternative models based on the foundational ‘best fit’ 
values (Booth, 2011) that have been nurtured for several decades by the
[2]
indigenous ferment of the African societies. The best-fit approach implies 
building democracy constructively on the existing institutional arrangements. 
In this wise, the pre-colonial institutions will need to be treated as potential 
resources for democratisation and state building processes rather than being 
swept aside regardless their ability to contribute (Booth, 2011).
Analysis of these best-practice grand theories of democracy is 
situated within both universal and context-specific values. This is done with the 
mission of underlying the reality that these grand theories have principles that 
are historically, conjuncturally and culturally mediated in space and time. It is 
also done to emphasise that the culture of a people defines the nature and 
specific character and content of their governance within space and time. The 
universalism of the grand theories of democracy as a democracy that fixes 
every community into one grand universal model with insufficient attention 
given to the contextual and cultural peculiarities is argued in the thesis to lack 
heuristic value and fails the elementary test of scientific method that requires 
reality to speak for itself. It is a wrong assumption as averred by Clapham, that 
a universal template will be ideal for the development and sustenance of 
democratic structures (Clapham, 1997: 31). Should Africa be compelled to 
mimic what works for the advanced liberal capitalist countries? Booth 
responds negatively to this assertion and sees this as a fault start of governance 
but which unfortunately for several years best-practice governance has meant 
exactly liberal democracy with free market (2011:1).
Despite the availability of abundant evidence of the failure of liberal 
democracy in Africa, African governments still tailor their developmental 
programmes as epitomised by NEPAD1, to reflect what the donor countries and
*New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development. The Constitutive Act of the AU did not 
make provision for NEPAD but the document emerged in July 2001 from the chambers of the 
AU. It emerged by merging the Millennium Partnership for Africa's Recovery Programme 
(MPA) and the Omega Plan, to produce New Africa Initiative (NAI). The NAI was approved in 
July 2001 in Lusaka, Zambia by the AU Summit of Heads of States and Governments. The NAI
[3]
agencies will support. They are inspired by the ‘general notion of what is right’ 
grounded in the universal values of liberal democracy and in so doing pay 
‘insufficient attention to context, timescales and trade-offs’ (Booth, ibid).
This thesis explains what works contextually in Africa and what does 
not work or borrowing from Schmitter and Karl, “what democracy is and what 
is n o r  (Schmitter and Karl, 1991: 75-88). It is a response to the wrong 
assumptions of either socialist or free-market liberal capitalist best-practice 
approach that influences the post-colonial African leaders especially during the 
post- Cold War period.
Some of the sharpest minds in development policy, as explained by 
Grindle (2009) and Levy (2011) regard uniformed best practice approach to 
governance in every society as a wishful thinking. For instance, Levy wonders 
if the purported best practice is not just a wishful thinking. After a careful 
consideration he concludes:
But politics makes the equation considerably more complex.
Achieving best-practice means working backwards from a 
predefined end state. But politics— including stakeholders and 
their power, incentives, skill, and capacity to organize— gets in 
the way and inevitably shapes the dynamics o f reform. A 
country’s economic, social, and political institutions cannot be 
re-engineered from scratch. A country starts from where it is, 
and evolves through search and learning. Changes in one part of 
the system call for adaptations in other parts, in an ongoing 
process. Effective policy-making works with rather than against 
a country’s grain as it nudges forward this often nonlinear 
process. Moving away from the best-practices model requires a 
different way of thinking about policy formulation and 
implementation. The reality is that many countries lack the 
institutions and capacities to implement otherwise desirable 
policies; or the policies may threaten the leaders’ power or the
was edited and its policy framework was finalised by the Heads of State Implementation 
Committee to become NEPAD. NEPAD whose stated goals include promoting accelerated 
development, eradicating poverty and halting the marginalisation of Africa in the global 
process was purely a document developed by the Implementation Committee of the Heads of 
State without any constitutive act.
[4]
political stability. So the craft o f policy making is about finding 
entry points that are feasible and that advance the development 
agenda, at least to some degree (Levy, 2011: 60).
One cannot agree less with Levy. There are no institutional templates 
that are valid for everywhere and for all stages in a country’s development. 
This acceptance implies our preparedness to question the ideological forces, 
vested interests and political pressures that promote institutional mimic at 
global and country levels (Booth, 2011).
For instance, the ‘best-practice’ approach of the free-market liberal 
democratic ideology with the assumption that the way of solving the 
developmental and political crises in Africa is the provision of more political 
democracy through the involvement of civil society is yet to prove effective in 
the sub-Saharan Africa. Democracy was the desirable goal of the pre-colonial 
African empires and kingdoms as will be revealed in this study. However its 
global effectiveness in liberal form requires the enjoyment of same social and 
economic conditions by the people. While liberal democracy has proved to be 
an effective way of governance in the advanced capitalist countries, available 
evidence reveals that such brand of democracy have different effects in 
different kinds of social and economic contexts. It is therefore a mistake to 
keep assuming that liberal democracy will produce the same results in a 
situation where the social and economic contexts are not the same. This is 
where the best-fit approach becomes desirable.
The philosophy upon which most of the post-colonial states rest is
traceable to externally-imposed factors. Nearly, all except Ethiopia which was
later afflicted by the externalist’s influence lacks indigenous philosophical
basis of political existence. The implication of this deficiency is that there is no
neo-colonial African state with an indigenous worldview to propel or support
its own reality (Aseh, 2011). The idea of modem state in the post-colonial
Africa emanates from the transformation of the colonial structures into a neo-
[5]
colonial political structure for the purpose of continuing foreign economic 
objective like the original idea of colonialism. One of the ways of perpetuating 
that desired goal was by dominating the public sphere with ideological 
expressions that failed to support African reality but which destroyed the 
foundation of all indigenous political philosophies.
The proposition of this thesis is that for the foreign founding 
philosophy to be maintained and reproduced in the neo-colonial state there was 
the need to flood the public sphere with ideological mechanisms of public 
mediation for effective epistemic control of the societies. The result of the 
epistemic control is the emergence of a fractured and contested public sphere 
that selectively ‘favours’ certain social categories for the success of the project 
of domination.
This thesis sets out to show how governance is mediated by the 
alienating role of an incoherent public sphere -  dominated by representations 
of foreign ideologies -  which does not seek to create a common consciousness 
in all citizens but rather to help maintain and perpetuate an incoherent image of 
the Enlightenment. This is reinforced by a style of governance that thrives on 
this incoherent public sphere, an understanding of which should illustrate how 
such public sphere encourages hybridised notions that are critical for foreign 
interference, meddling, destruction and domination within the overall project 
of ‘nation building’.
At present, Africa has the worst political scenario. The continent is 
replete with civil wars in countries such as Somalia, Uganda, Burundi and 
Eritrea, with genocide in places such as Darfur. Other states like Ivory Coast, 
Zimbabwe and including those outside the sub-Saharan such as Algeria, 
Tunisia and Libya, all have had one or other type of “illiberal” (Zakaria, 1997) 
government or military dictatorship in place. The causes of this political
[6]
situation are well examined by Lovejoy (1989) and Amin (1972). According to 
them, slavery and colonialism destroyed traditional African structures, 
boundaries, states and societies. Colonial rule, followed by decolonisation 
strategy, neo-patrimonial and authoritarian leadership, neo-colonial policies 
and neo-liberal economic and political conditions further fragmented the 
continent. Africans cannot keep peace because the cultural, religious and 
territorial differences that were once hushed under European rule are now 
exposed again with no effective mechanism to curb the violence; neither are 
they able to return to the pre-slavery era because it was destroyed. Therefore, 
Africa does not have an economic or political base of its own because these 
were destroyed by the slave trade and colonisation. Africa continues to remain 
a dependent continent (Amin, ibid). For Africa to escape from this quagmire 
there is need to reconstruct both the state and democratisation processes based 
on autochthonous values of neo-communitarian democracy and speconomy. 
Speconomy derived from socialised partnership economic system, serves as a 
response to the deficiencies of free market capitalism and centralised socialist 
market. It is an economic system based on cooperative groups in partnership 
with the state over the social ownership and control of the means of production 
and distribution.
Neo-communitarian democracy facilitates the understanding of how 
culturally constructed political processes can inspire and motivate people to 
participate within the context of social, political and cultural frameworks to 
improve on the problem solving capacity of both the state and its politics. Its 
underlying principle is that though states are domestically autonomous 
(Ashley, 1984: 225-86), they are not institutionally separated from their 
economies or societies. It is this principle that makes speconomy a compatible 
economic philosophy of the neo-communitarian state.
1.1 Outline of the chapters.
To address this problem, the thesis is structured in the following order: 
Chapter one focuses on general introduction, statement of the research 
problem, the theoretical framework, method of data collection, limitations of
[7]
the study and outline of the chapters. This is followed by Chapter Two, where 
colonialism and its impact on the pre-colonial structures in Africa are 
examined. Chapter Three is the literature review with emphasis on the debates 
on democracy in general, liberal democracy and African debate on democracy. 
Chapter Four examines the rise and effects of post-colonial dictatorship in 
Africa with focus on one-party system, military rule in Africa, Liberal and 
Illiberal democracy. In Chapter Five, popular struggles for democracy and 
crisis of political transitions in Africa were critically examined while Chapter 
Six discusses communitarianism and communitarian democracy. Illustrative 
cases were used in Chapter Seven for neo-communitarian democracy and for 
the theory of speconomy (socialised partnership economic system) at Chapter 
Eight. This chapter aims at evaluating the commonalities and differences of the 
existing models in order to push forward a new model for studying economic 
development and the state in the sub-Saharan Africa. Chapter Nine contains the 
summary and conclusion to the study.
1.2 Statement of Research Problem
Liberalism and its offshoot, neo-liberalism remain the contemporary 
dominant ideologies in world politics since the end of the Cold War. Liberal 
scholars and policy makers wasted no time to proclaim liberal democracy the 
beginning of a New World Order. For example, George Bush (Snr) sees it as 
marking the end of an Old World Order and the beginning of a new one (Bush 
and Scowcroft, 1998). The liberal intellectuals like Fukuyama, became 
occupied with theoretical justification for the supremacy of liberal ideas over 
all other competing ideologies. Fukuyama asserts in “The End o f  History?” 
(1989) that
The twentieth century saw the developed world descend into a 
paroxysm o f ideological violence, as liberalism contended first 
with the remnants o f absolutism, then bolshevism and fascism, 
and finally an updated Marxism that threatened to lead to the 
ultimate apocalypse of nuclear war. But the century that began 
full o f self-confidence in the ultimate triumph o f Western 
liberal democracy seems at its close to be returning full circle to 
where it started: not to an "end o f ideology" or a convergence 
between capitalism and socialism, as earlier predicted, but to an 
unabashed victory o f economic and political liberalism. The
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triumph o f the West, of the Western idea, is evident first o f all 
in the total exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives to 
Western liberalism... What we may be witnessing is not just the 
end of the Cold War, or the passing o f a particular period of 
post-war history, but the end of history as such (Fukuyama,
1989: 1)
For Fukuyama, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent 
emergence of the USA as the sole global power with neo-liberal economic 
ideology as the dominant ideology, have proved liberal democratic states, such 
as the United States, representing a kind of ideological terminus toward which 
all states were evolving and at which all states would eventually arrive. 
Contributing to this assumption of rebirth of history, Samuel Huntington saw 
the events as the beginning of a new phase of global history in which the 
fundamental conflicts will not be between nation-states, but rather between 
civilizations (Huntington, 1993).
However, it must be noted there are many variants of Liberalism but 
the main themes that run through Liberal thought are that human beings are 
perfectible and that democracy is necessary for that perfectibility to develop 
(Baylis et al 2008). The Liberals reject the idea of state being a central actor or 
a unitary actor but as a set of bureaucracies, each with its own interests. In 
those issue-areas, such as economy, environment, technology, etc; where the 
state acts, the Liberals see multinational corporations and transnational actors 
as more important. Therefore there can be no such thing as a national interest, 
since it merely represents the result of whatever bureaucratic organisations that 
dominate the domestic decision-making process. It must be emphasised also 
that conceptualising and understanding of the liberal concept differ widely. On 
the one hand, as is widely held in Europe liberalism is associated with a free 
market-economy, while on other, it is associated with the political principle of 
pluralism, a view that is predominantly held in other parts of the world 
especially the USA. But whatever interpretation we adopt, the two perceptions 
of the ideology share the same commonality of belief in the universality of
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liberal individualism, privacy, perfectibility, equality and liberty, which is 
regarded as rational and universal. These themes and commonalty are key 
issues that underline the focus of the thesis in its assumptions of the effects of 
universal liberal individualism on the communal values of the sub-Saharan 
African societies. This study examines three key issues:
1. The current debate and concerns about democracy in general and its 
efficacy in explaining the African political crisis.
2. The role of liberal democracy as the grand narrative and its uses in the 
current political practices in Africa
3. The quest for an alternative model of democracy, using the neo­
communitarian model as a veritable option open to African countries
The thrust of the study is how through a critical examination of 
existing literature on democracy, and through the weight of evidence, a new 
conception of democracy, state-building and economic development based on 
the neo-communitarian model can be evolved. The emphasis on market and 
pluralism as the bedrock of liberal democracy over-exaggerates the heuristic 
value of liberal democracy in Africa. As opine by Cliffe and Seddon, the 
appearance of multi party politics is not necessarily the same as democracy 
(1991). The thesis specifically addresses the following questions as stated 
below.
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. How applicable are the various models of democracy to Africa?
2. How can community political participation be engendered other than 
through the party system?
3. Are political parties essential for democracy or pose threats to its 
survival in Africa?
4. Does culture undermine or lubricate democracy?
5. Is there any relationship between culture, party system, political 
leadership and democracy?
6. How can we explain the recurring democratic crises in Africa?
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All these are examined in the context of the utility of liberal democracy in 
Africa.
There is a skewed analysis of ‘Africa’s Tragedy’ (Leys, 1994) through 
various interpretations as indicated earlier on the one hand, and the Berg and 
Bates Reports of 1981 on the other. The incorrect analysis of the crises leads to 
counterfactual conclusion on the factors responsible for the propensity of the 
elite, bad policies and bad governance on democracy (Arrighi, 2002). These 
interpretations need to be corrected. In doing this, the sub-Saharan Africa’s 
experience is located within the broader conundrum from pre-colonialism to 
post-colonial social structures.
This thesis in part sets out to examine the post-cold war trends of 
liberalism in its neo-liberal discourse of democracy that tends to ‘emasculate 
democracy of its social and historical dimensions and present it as an ultimate 
nirvana’ (Shivji, 1987: 1; 2002a). This as argued in the study represents a 
renewed expression of re-colonisation of Africa in a neo-colonial form. The 
post-Cold War renewal project, though shares anti-democratic posture with 
colonialism, but appears to be more ferocious in its political agenda than 
classical colonialism. It is a trend of capital by its nature, driving beyond every 
spatial barrier, where the creation of the physical conditions of exchange 
through the means of communication, through annihilation of space by time 
becomes an extraordinary necessity for it (Marx, 1973: 524). It is a trend that 
expands the reach of power relations across regions and continents with a rise 
of a comprehensive supra-territoriality that spans across all aspects of social 
relations. The trend is led by an unrestrained super-power undermining the 
very basis of democracy, the right of the peoples to self-determination, that is, 
their right to think for themselves.
The thesis as part of its goals examines why the ‘New World Order’ 
has been eluding the sub-Saharan Africa in spite of proclaiming liberal 
democracy as the dominant ideology that will usher in new and prosperous 
order and as successor to the Cold War. The assumed stable democracy and
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rapid economic development it engenders are yet to be felt in the sub Saharan 
Africa.
As a way of conclusion, the thesis hypothesises that the socio­
political, including ethno-identity crises which characterise the democratic 
projects in the entire sub-Saharan Africa cannot be dissociated from the 
integration of the pre-colonial African societies into the ‘conventional process’ 
of democracy which promotes democracy and state building along the model 
of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development states (OECD) 
without consideration for the local grains of such societies. African countries 
could not resist the integration due to the horrendous losses from the over four 
hundred years of slavery that left the continent prostrating and undermining of 
their traditional institutions by over one hundred years of colonisation.
It is demonstrated in the thesis that the conventional perception of 
liberal democracy as the only route to democratic stability for all communities 
including those that are fundamentally different, as is its corollary to the 
promotion of state-building along these lines is far too short-sighted, therefore 
there is a need for alternative models for both the state-building and the 
democratisation process on the one hand; and the economic development on 
the other.
The state-building and democratisation process with an OECD blue 
print has only succeeded in transforming the continent into a terrain of, 
explosive conflicts between ethnic groups, despotic leadership, market- 
dominant minorities and illiberal democracy. The relationship between 
Africa’s political crises and the process of its transformation are inextricably 
bound up with the complications inherent in the free market liberal democracy 
exported to societies that are fundamentally different from the OECD states. 
Liberal democracy is expressed in the thesis that being an ideology that is
[12]
fuelled by individualism and market serves as an engine of political 
conflagration in the sub-Sahara African states.
Some African states such as Botswana have been presented by some 
scholars (Frankel, 2009; Leon, 2010; Knutsen, 2010) such as James Robinson 
(2009), Van Binsbergen (2002), Somolekae (1998), and Holm and Molutsi, 
(1989) as classical examples of stable democracy because they present the 
image of countries where democracy thrives. Moreover they avoided economic 
stagnation during the 1970 -  1980 economic crises. There is a contrary view in 
the thesis that Botswana is far from being a convincing case of thriving 
democracy and that Botswana’s democracy manifests ‘grave-yard stability’ 
that has been systematically institutionalised by the autocratic leadership of the 
ruling Botswana Democratic Party which has been in power since 
independence in 1966, through coercion, co-optation, patronage and cronyism.
The thesis further examines the perennial backlash against democracy 
in Africa in order to underline the contradictions between pre-independent 
African communitarian values and the values of liberal democracy which are 
considered as the aggravating cause for the backlash of democracy in sub- 
Saharan Africa. The ‘third wave’ of democracy in the sub- Sahara Africa in 
the 80s and the current Arab Spring upheavals are all explained as indicators of 
fault-lines in post-colonial Africa’s democratisation and state building 
processes. Many reasons have been advanced for this backlash ranging from 
corrupt leadership, ethno-religious conflicts, negative cultural values, military 
rule, and effects of colonialism on the economic and political structures. Also 
different theoretical perspectives have been used to explain the situation with 
each theory providing ‘what is to be done’. Yet Africa remains in a quagmire. 
As there are justifications for identifying all or some of these reasons as the 
factors responsible for the socio-economic and political crises, there are also 
justifications for the failures of the sub-Saharan African states to yield 
positively to all the prescriptions for solution.
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We cannot ignore the impacts of colonialism on the post-colonial sub- 
Saharan Africa. The failures of sub-Saharan Africa to yield positively to some 
of the prescriptions of the various interpretations of its political and economic 
crises can be traced largely to the effects of combination of democracy with 
market within the liberal context. The hybridised democracy witnessed a 
drastic disarticulation of the African traditional political and social institutions 
by the liberal values that were imported into the African societies during the 
transition of the colonies to independent states. How do we explain liberal 
values and institutions that have become deeply embedded in Europe and 
North America not only lacking legitimacy in the sub-Saharan Africa but 
constituting the source of political instability?
The effects of this hybridised democracy on African societies cannot 
be overlooked in any analysis. Factors such as national question, corrupt 
leadership, inter-elite conflict, military rule and ethno-religious violent 
conflicts are effects of a faulty political arrangement which became visible in 
the history of the sub-Saharan Africa’s political development few years after 
the independence of most of the colonies. They are parts of the colonial legacy 
that are addressed in Chapter Four. That African Kingdoms covered and ruled 
over some parts of sub-Saharan Africa during the pre-colonial period is well 
documented. Apart from Ethiopia, the general traditional form of 
administration was essentially patrimonial with power comparatively diffused 
in either chiefly or centralised kingdoms. According to Ajayi, ‘most people 
pursued their economic, social and cultural lives with little interference from 
government’ while access to their means of subsistence ‘was effectively 
managed by the authorities within the lineage’ (Ajayi, 2000: 28).
Sectors that suffer the greatest impact of this new process include the 
group membership of African societies and the property right. Glendon and
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Yanes declare membership in groups as playing important role for many 
indigenous people (1991). The pre-Colonial Africans never conceptualised 
man as an individual per se but essentially as a part of the collectivity in spite 
of his unique and characteristic idiosyncrasies (Onwuachi, 2007). There is a 
sense of belongingness in kin-centred social processes. The family patterns are 
extended families, and members consequently function collectively towards the 
fulfilment of existence and survival.
In spite of their cultural variations, the pre-colonial African societies 
had well defined ideas of nature, human life, existence and social relations that 
were suitable for their environments. Colonial authorities ignored this peculiar 
interpretation of existence during the transformation of the indigenous societies 
from colonies to post-colonial liberal democratic states. Consequently, there 
was a suppression of the communal values by the individualistic values of 
liberalism. For example the responsibility of providing for individuals basic 
security needs was allocated to ethnic groups and other forms of kinship (Ekeh, 
2004: 27) and not left for individuals as in the liberal arrangement or the state 
as in socialism. Africans rarely revert to the state for their basic physiological 
needs rather they revert to their families or community members for such needs 
“due to strong bonds of moral sentiments binding individuals who share a 
common ethnicity” {ibid: 36).
As stated earlier, free market liberal values have devastating effects on 
property rights. The ideology ignores the basic fact that the relationship of 
Africans to land is central to their cultures. Sometimes Africans take covenant 
or oath of allegiance using land as their spiritual witness. For many African 
societies the concept of land goes beyond the physical soil or geographical 
space but the philosophical and the spiritual realms that make land to stand as a 
living entity. This explains why land is regarded as a collective property of the 
community or family. Land belongs to the living, unborn and the ancestors.
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Jomo Kenyatta in his book titled “Facing Mount Kenya, The Tribal Life o f the 
Kikuyu” (1965) clearly illustrates this with the Kikuyu culture.
Africans’ relationship to the land completely differs from liberal 
individualism and whose application to the African societies clearly challenges 
the underbelly of liberal democracy. Given this unique perception of land by 
Africans, it is therefore not surprising seeing communal clashes over land that 
have been legally acquired by the constitutional governments and redistributed 
to individuals. Suffice it to mention here that there were inter-communal and 
inter-tribal clashes, but land ownership had hardly constituted the source of 
such clashes. Where it does, there was a mechanism for its resolution at the 
elders’ council meeting or such other meeting for dialogue and consensus- 
building.
There is history behind the ownership of land and such history is 
respected by every individual and groups. This however does not preclude the 
expansionist agenda of some powerful rulers over the weaker ones but still at 
that, what was actually expropriated from the conquered territories were the 
farm produce and labour, not land ownership. Land clashes where and when 
they occur, are manifestations of how the social-life of Africans is governed by 
traditions, customs and history, not laws or decrees that focus solely on 
individual equality.
The liberal concept of individuality, access and equality fails to 
consider the primary importance of groups or group rights in relation to 
political power and economic activities in sub-Saharan Africa. That view only 
provides two extreme perspectives -  the state and the citizen-thereby 
subordinating the group. The group, be it age-grade, sex-group or elders 
council, or even trades groups are critical to the analysis of the political 
processes in this part of the continent. The assumption that indigenous group
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rights as opposed to individual rights become irrelevant and do not constitute 
any relevant portion of an individual’s life to make any meaningful difference 
appears to be a wrong assumption of liberalism in sub-Saharan Africa.
The persistence of ruptures and crises in the post-colonial sub-Saharan 
Africa’s polity cannot easily be explained within the rubric of liberal
democratic theory. Any attempt at ignoring the effects of liberalism on the 
social, political and economic structures of Africa will miss out the genesis of 
the sub-Saharan Africa’s political and economic crises. For example, Walter 
Rodney states thus:
Colonial Africa fell within that part o f international capitalist 
economy from which surplus was drawn to feed the 
metropolitan sector.... Colonialism was not merely a system of 
exploitation but one whose essential purpose was to repatriate 
the surplus to the so called ‘mother-country’. From an African 
viewpoint, that amounted to consistent expatriation of surplus 
produced by African labour out o f African resources. It meant 
the development o f Europe as part o f some dialectical process 
in which Africa was underdeveloped (Rodney, 1972: 162-3)
Colonialism served as a process to forcefully incorporate Africa into
liberal political economy which subsequently undermined its traditional
political institutions, resulting in its underdevelopment, marginalisation and 
protracted political crisis. Understanding the historical context of these 
processes is essential for an appreciation of Africa’s protracted political crisis 
and also very critical to the articulation of an appropriate strategy to deal with 
the crisis.
1.4 Research Methodology
Without carefully designed research methods, serious political science 
will be impossible (Burharm et al,: 1). Political Science being a social science, 
requires a systematic assembly of evidence and subjecting such to various 
forms of tests to ensure its reliability and validity, but this does not imply that
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there is a regimented or deterministic approach to its research like its natural 
science counterpart, rather it is enriched by a variety of approaches (Marsh and 
Stoker, 2002: 4) without losing its characteristics of debate, controversy and 
disagreement that lie at its heart (Marsh and Stoker, 1995: 4).
Though different ‘approaches’ (Leftwich, 1984; Zuckerman, 1991) 
emphasise different methods of data gathering but this thesis is primarily a 
theoretical and conceptual study. In such a situation, as elucidated by Marsh 
and Stoker (1995: 4), arguments are grounded in textual analysis. Taking into 
consideration that politics is the melting-point of all the social sciences 
especially with its drawing on the insights of sociology and economics, the 
thesis cannot but take into consideration, that issue of political crisis in the sub- 
Saharan Africa occurs within ‘social and economic contexts’ (Dearlove and 
Saunders, 1984). Any analysis of this crisis must be guided by appropriate 
paradigm and corresponding methodology. This understanding is achieved by 
subjecting the thesis to the following interrogations.
1. What is the nature or essence of the research topic?
2. Is this social phenomenon objective in nature or idealised by the human 
mind?
3. How can knowledge be acquired and disseminated?
4. What is the relationship of an individual to his or her environment?
5. Is the individual conditioned by the environment or is the environment 
created by the individual?
Unravelling the above posers provides the opportunity to fashion a 
compass for the thesis to navigate with a suitable methodology. The thesis 
engages literature on liberal, popular, social, and socialist democracy to peruse 
the foregoing questions. It also engages the Africanist and African debate on 
democracy. It critiques all these in the context of democratic praxis in post­
cold war Africa. In doing this, the thesis sought to examine why Africa has had 
enduring and fractious democratic outcomes, beginning with highly flawed 
elections
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Based on the above perusal, it becomes compelling for the thesis to 
rely on textual and contextual analysis as its methodology. This approach 
becomes more suitable as it provides the opportunity to peruse the historical 
forces that do not only restrict the traditional process of democratisation and 
state-building in the sub-Saharan Africa but also to question the colonial 
transition strategies of the sub-Saharan African colonies to independent states.
At the heart of the analysis of political crisis in the sub-Saharan Africa 
is the significance of culture, values and history in a democracy. Moreover this 
thesis is primarily a study of the effects of non-African values on the sub- 
Saharan Africa’s politics and economy; and how this has created seasons of 
political and economic crises that have transformed the continent into a theatre 
of conflicts and genocides with little or no hope for stability.
1.5 Research Design
Research design normally serves as the structure or plan of the research 
investigation. It is usually used to obtain answers to research questions. The 
research questions and hypotheses are stated in this section along with the 
design used to obtain the answers. The key concepts that constitute the focus of 
the research are also clarified. These are liberalism, democracy, 
communitarianism and political crisis. Being a theoretical study, secondary 
data and library materials, books, journals and other periodicals were 
thoroughly perused
1.6 Theoretical Framework
The thesis rejects the pessimism which sees Africa as politically 
doomed and also rejects the liberal scholars’ optimism which celebrates free 
market democracy as the rational and universal prescription for every nation’s 
political and economic perils. This analysis is situated within the post- 
modemity theoretical framework taking into consideration the problem
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national question partly arising from the greed of the leaders, grievance of the 
followers and struggle for ethnic identity. This framework is considered to be 
broader than economic determinism that concentrates on economic relationship 
to explain the social processes that shape society and history.
The theoretical framework makes allowance for the historical analysis 
of the interplay of social forces that combine with economic relationship to 
propel the national question and socio-economic processes that shape society 
and history. The approach being principally about the people and their 
historical, social and cultural relationships makes it more appropriate for the 
focus of study.
It is argued in the thesis that we can correctly capture the genesis of 
Africa’s political crisis through the history, identity, economy and degree of 
independence of the African nations in relation to other continents in the world, 
and the prospect of what they produce in the global market. It is argued further 
that the root of any social situation or conflict does not only lie, as identified by 
Marx and Engels in the economic relationship but when such relationship 
combines with other social forces such as acute deprivation of some groups or 
a class within the state, oppression of the people and opposition, religious 
intolerance or ‘clash of cultures’. Acute deprivation breeds more grievances 
against the state and leaders. When the deprived groups are displeased with 
their economic situation or compare their level of political inclusion in 
governance with other group(s) within the same state and if relatively they 
found themselves much worse off, empty and frustrated, this will automatically 
serve as a frame of reference to define themselves as moral beings that have 
something worthwhile to fight for. They are therefore bound to seek reasons 
for why they are not equally treated as others.
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If this feeling of inequality is great enough, civil war and conflict can 
be the outcome. In this type of situation, it is possible that a leader of a conflict 
may be acting out of greed, but the people fighting may have justified 
grievances. While we need to agree that greed begets grievance, we need to 
understand as well that people’s reasons for fighting can be as numerous as 
root causes of the conflict itself. Where we fail to dissect the situation correctly 
by examining all possible options to determine whose greed and whose 
grievance, we may end up forcing the root causes of every conflict into one 
category.
In essence, the chosen theoretical framework guides the examination 
of the behaviour of the economic agents and institutions, the cultural, political 
and environmental processes that shape African societies and their histories in 
both colonial and post-colonial forms. The approach is principally based on 
social ontology that argues for the significance of social and natural processes 
in the determination of the need to problematise the legacy of colonialism, 
global political economy and the disarticulation of African cultural values by 
colonialism and impact of such disarticulation in Africa. This study examines 
three key issues:
I. The current debate and concerns about democracy in general and its 
efficacy in explaining the African political crisis.
II. The role of liberal democracy as the grand narrative and its uses in the 
current political practices in Africa
III. The quest for an alternative model of democracy, using neo- 
communitarianism as a veritable option open to African countries
The thrust of the study is how, through a critical examination of 
existing literature on democracy, and through the weight of evidence, a new 
conception of democracy, state-building and economic development based on 
the neo-communitarian model and speconomy can be evolved. The emphasis 
on market and pluralism in liberal democracy over-exaggerates its heuristic 
value in Africa. As argued by Cliffe and Seddon, the appearance of multi party
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politics does not necessarily mean appearance of democracy (1991).
1.7 Conceptualising the Context of the Post-colonial developments
The argument that the genesis of African political crisis lies 
primarily with the elites and governments is a common argument of the World 
Bank. Berg Report of 1981 being the most influential of such interpretations. 
The report which was highly ‘Internalist' singled out the African elites, bad 
governance with ‘bad policies’ and excessive state intervention as not only 
undermining development processes but also most responsible for the African 
crisis (Arrighi, 2002). As a way out, currency devaluations, substitution of 
private for public enterprises in both industry and provision of social services, 
dismantling the protective policies of local industries, price incentives for 
agricultural production and exports etc were given as ‘good policies’ that could 
rescue African states from their woes.
Robert Bates in his 1981 follow-up Report also singled out the 
African state officials who were part of the elites pinpointed by Berg as the 
responsible factor for Africa’s growth tragedy (Easterly and Levine, 1997). 
Bates systematically alleged the state officials as major anti-growth syndrome 
that stultifies Africa’s development. In Roberts Bate’s view state officials in 
the newly independent African countries used the powerful instruments of 
economic control that they had inherited from colonial regimes to benefit urban 
elites and, first and foremost, themselves. He therefore suggested state 
minimalist policies and leaving the peasantry free to take advantage of market 
opportunities.
However, the cooperative experiments with the cocoa farmers by 
government of the Western Nigeria from 1954 to 1966 proved Bates 
suggestion to be a very weak argument. The government was fully involved in 
organising the farmers into cooperative groups, supported their farming with 
farming technique trainings, supervision from the Ministry of Agriculture, 
provision of fertilizers and insecticides, taking storage burden off the farmers, 
immediate purchase from the farmers in local currencies and government
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exporting to foreign market. It was a win-win situation for both the farmers and 
the government. The proceeds from the exports were used by the government 
to provide free education, construct the first stadium (Liberty stadium) in 
Africa, to establish the first television station in Africa, establish University of 
Ife (now Obafemi Awolowo University), construct durable roads, to build the 
first sky scraper- Cocoa House, in Western Nigeria with office 
accommodations for businesses etc. If the state had not intervened, these 
achievements that are yet to be surpassed by any successive government in the 
region could have been missed. Bate’s interpretation of the crisis was both more 
pessimistic and more radically anti-statist than that of the World Bank.
Never the less Bates’ Report was celebrated as the ‘new ’ political 
econom y and the demise o f  state intervention in underdeveloped countries. 
Berg’s Report also opines that solutions to Africa’s crisis lie in the dismantling 
state power and leaving the peasantry free to take advantage o f market opportunities. 
This suggestion bed rocked World Bank’s subsequent reports on Africa (World Bank, 
1984; 1986). Bate’s anti-state posture not only canvassed to set the market free 
from governmental control and regulations, it also aimed at check-mating the 
grip o f  the post-colonial leaders on their econom ies who were largely seen as 
committed to bad policies.
It is therefore not surprising to see all the anti-growth syndromes 
identified by the World Bank, Berg and Bates Reports having their origins to a 
significant extent, in serious governance problems. These problems are 
identified by Ndulu and O’Connell (2006) as:
1. regulatory regimes that severely distort productive activity and 
reward rent-seeking
2. regimes of ethno-regional redistribution that compromise 
efficiency through resource transfers to sub-national political 
interests
3. regimes of inter-temporal redistribution that transfers resources 
from the future to the present, and
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4. State breakdown, which refers to civil or marked political 
instability.
Both the internalist and minimalist state views did not go 
unchallenged. The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in its Lagos Plan of 
Action (LPA) signed in 1981 at Lagos, Nigeria, reacted by tracing the origin of 
Africa’s crisis to a series of external shocks which include deteriorating terms 
of trade for primary products, growing debt service commitments, soaring 
interest rates, growing protectionism among the developed countries.
The LPA which implicitly reflected the influence of Dependency 
theory canvasses for energising the African states’ capacity to mobilise their 
natural resources and foster national economic integration and cooperation 
rather than relying on the world-market mechanisms as way out of the crisis.
The vision ensconced in the LPA could not last long because shortly 
after its promulgation, the unabating deterioration of the socio-economic 
situation forced the African Leaders back to the drawing table in 1982 to 
develop Africa’s Priority Programmes for Economic Recovery 1986-1990 
(APPER) for consideration by the UN General Assembly.
APPER clearly states: “While reiterating our full commitment to the 
principles and objectives of the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos 
which are more valid today than ever, we have focussed... on a five year 
programme which consists of:
i. measures for an accelerated implementation of the LPA and the 
Final Act of Lagos;
ii. special action for improvement of the food situation and 
rehabilitation of agriculture;
iii. measures to alleviate Africa’s external debt;
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iv. measures for a common platform for action at sub-regional, 
regional, continental and international levels; and
v. measures for action against the effects of the destabilisation 
policy of South Africa on the economies of Southern African 
States.
The document points at the external factors responsible for the genesis of Africa’s
woes including the shape of the debt burden. The document asserts:
The dramatic increase in the volume o f Africa’s external debt 
and the heavy debt burden is another source o f our profound 
concern .... “We are aware o f the fact that shortcomings in 
development policies have contributed to the present debt 
crises. However, it is evident that the major causes o f our 
country’s debt servicing problems are external ones and such 
causes are unfortunately beyond our control. These include, 
inter alia, the deteriorating terms o f trade and the consequent 
reduction in export earnings for debt servicing, the 
unprecedented rise in interest rates, sharp exchange rate . 
fluctuations, deteriorating terms o f borrowing and the reduction 
in the flow of concessional resources, the combined effects of 
which resulted in net capital outflow from most o f our member 
states. In this regard the 26 African LDCs have been most 
seriously affected (OAU, 1985: 5).
APPER, while pointing at external factors also endorses Berg’s Report 
(Fantu Cheru, 1999). The African leaders accepted responsibilities for the 
economic crisis and social disorders in their respective states and the 
limitations of actions taken by them to resolve the crisis. They therefore agreed 
to implement all the policy reforms as outlined in the World Bank Report while 
at the same time expected the international community to take action that could 
ease the crushing effects of Africa’s external debts, stabilise and increase the 
prices paid for their products. APPER invariably prepared the foundation for 
United Nations Programmes for African Economic Recovery and Development 
1986-1990 (UNPAAERD) which was a compact between African states and 
the international community (Sawyerr, 1990).
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The greatest defect of UNPAAERD was the side-tracking of the 
character of inter-elite competition that characterises the post-colonial
leadership thrown up by colonialism as part of the problem than the solution to
• 2 •  •it . It was on the shoulders of these same elites that the responsibility to revamp
Africa’s social disorders was placed. The elite-leaders continued to deepen the
clientele’s relationships between their states and the global capitalist leaders
through the rentier economic arrangement (Bush and Szeftel, 1999: 168). As
argued by Arrighi (2002)
...the most central o f these problems was a pattern of surplus 
absorption that fostered the conspicuous consumption of urban 
elites and sub-elites in bureaucratic employment, the relatively 
high mass consumption of labour aristocracies and the transfer 
abroad o f profits, interests.... By restraining the growth of  
agricultural productivity and domestic markets this pattern 
perpetuated the dependence o f African economies on the 
growth of world demand for primary products. Unless the 
pattern changed ...an acceleration of economic growth in 
tropical Africa within the existing political economic frame 
work is highly unlikely and as the phase o f easy import 
substitution is superseded, a slowdown may actually be 
expected (Arrighi, 2002: 11).
Africa’s collective experience in the global political economy could be 
situated in four different phases. These are:
(i) contact with international community in the pre-colonial era,
(ii) forced integration into the world capitalist economy during the 
colonial period,
2
Two cover stories of the Economist provide good insight into the character of sub-Saharan 
Africa's leadership. Just three years after claiming in a cover story that 'Sub-Saharan Africa is in 
better shape than it has been in a generation', on the cover of its May 13-19, 2000 issue the 
Economist declared Africa to be 'The Hopeless Continent'. In excoriating Africa's 'poor crop of 
leaders', who by 'personalizing power' have 'undermined rather than boosted national 
institutions' and turned their countries into 'shell states', with the trappings of modernity but a 
hollow core, the magazine asked: 'Does Africa have some inherent character flaw that keeps it 
backward and incapable of development?' Noting the contrast between the two cover stories, 
Johannesburg's business magazine Financial M a il retorted: 'Do the editors of the Economist have 
a character flaw that makes them incapable of consistent judgement?': see 'The Hopeless 
Continent', World Press Review, October 2000, pp. 24-25
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(iii) import substitution and unequal trade in the neo-colonial era 
up to 1980 and
(iv) the era of systematic marginalisation since 1980 (Jaffe, 1980).
Explanations of these phases are situated in Chapters Two and Three. There is a 
need to clarify the concern for liberal democracy in the social disorder in post­
colonial Africa. The fundamental issue that requires further clarification is 
whether liberal democracy plays any role in the disarticulation of the economy 
that underpins political crisis in post-independent Africa. In clarifying this issue it 
is apposite to point out here that the period of 1950s to 60s was very significant 
for the sub-Saharan Africa. This was the period when most of the colonies were 
granted independence and also the period that witnessed the prominence and 
dominance of modernisation theory that drew its theoretical inspiration from John 
Maynard Keynes and practical insights from the success of the Marshall Plan, as 
the road map for development (Olowu, eds; 1999: 11). It was an era in Africa that 
witnessed the imposition of the capitalist ideology of the ruling colonialists. The 
influence of finance capital grew by leap and bound with the emergence of 
budding capitalists, professional groups and intellectuals who were wedded to the 
capitalist ideology and the bourgeoisie conception of democracy.
From 1960s to the late 80s, most of the literature on African political 
developments drew inspiration from the modernisation theory but the discourse 
only took a different dimension with the African critique of the 90s which 
highlighted the exceptional nature of African states and politics. African and 
Africanist scholars started to reconceptualise the African reality, which 
according to Keet, (2002) partly as a result of sub-optimal results of policies 
based on the modernization theories, as well as their conclusion that 
imperialism in general "has actively underdeveloped the peripheral societies" 
(Martinussen, 1997: 86).
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The free market democracy theorists perceived these newly 
independent African states as poor due to lack of capital, technology, 
professional skills, rational administration, finance, etc and could only catch up 
with the advanced nations notably the west by allowing human and private 
capitals from the west. This was the dominant view of economic and political 
development between 1960s and late 80s.
Beneath this suggestion was the breaking of barriers to ease 
penetration of capital without restraint. This penetration was accompanied by 
the promotion of liberal values in the guise of multi-party democracy. Africa 
was further saddled with the implementation of the ‘design development’ 
(Tinbergen, 1962) comprehensively planned by the liberal west to ‘strengthen’ 
the newly independent states for the reception and implementation of the 
imported ideas and capital. The level of each state’s receptiveness to the 
imported ideas and capital determines the categorisation of her democracy as 
liberal or not.
The fault-line of this approach is the neglect of the history of the 
African societies. The grafted political institutions of Europe and the 
corresponding capitalist ideology further strengthened the dependency 
relationship through acquisition of western consumption patterns without 
accompanying local production techniques and skills. Unlike the pre-colonial 
period and as discussed elsewhere, neo-patrimonial leadership as practiced in 
many post-colonial African states, which encourages personalisation of power 
by the new political elites who capitalised on the multi-party democracy to 
float interest-based political parties, is an extension of the kind of autocratic 
and alien tyrant rule that the colonial master’s initiated (Alemazung, 2010).
There is therefore a need to explain the process through which 
colonialism affected the social and political structures of African societies.
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This need is compelled, if only to underline how political rights value of 
liberalism was introduced into the sub-Saharan Africa, and how the political 
elites personalised power at the expense of the democratic majorities. The 
process which has been severally stressed by many social scientists who 
studied sub-Saharan Africa in historical perspective is the outcome of new 
political arrangements employed by the colonial powers to destabilise the 
traditional political institutions. As Platteau (2007) posits, the colonial rulers 
generally reinforced the power of new local-level authorities over communities 
at the expense of pre-existing political institutions such as kinship. Typical 
examples of this destabilisation strategy were the deliberate attempts by the 
French colonial rulers to weaken the authority of the Mogo Naba in Upper 
Volta (now Burkina Faso) in order to foster divisions among the lower level 
authorities within the ancient Mossi kingdom, or its move to break up old 
political units in the highly centralised political system of Guinea’s Fouta 
Djalon (Boone, 1994: 114; Tordoff, 1997: 32).
The reinforcement also carried along with it, discretionary 
authoritarian powers given to the new ‘henchmen’, to maintain law and order 
on behalf of the colonial state, including powers to fine, conscript, imprison 
and banish any offender or perceived enemy, and to advance colonial economic 
agenda with accountability only to the colonial authorities.
The local ‘henchmen’ were also vested with powers in allocating 
resources distributed by the colonial state as well as in coercive labour 
resources mobilisation and tax collection (Bayart, 1999: 99-101; Boone, 1994: 
115-119; Skinner, 1989). This development led to a situation where the local 
chiefs quickly learned that ‘political power was absolutely crucial for economic 
advance’ (Kennedy, 1988: 55). They perfected a strategy that whenever the 
colonial authorities requested for labour resource, they would arrange for more 
than the numbers requested so that they can convert the excess labour to their 
own personal use such as in farming (Bayart, 1999).
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The crucial point is that with the discretionary powers given to the 
local chiefs who were directly accountable to the colonial authorities rather 
than their own people, the traditional checks and balances on chiefly powers 
were seriously undermined, giving rise to a form of ‘decentralised despotism’ 
(Mamdani, 1996; Kennedy, ibid: 52-55; Berman; Eyoh and Kymlicka, 2004: 3)
Attempt to under-estimate the character of relationship between Africa 
and the developed countries in the analysis of African tragedy was radically 
challenged by Andre Gunder Frank and his colleagues. They pointed out that 
the poverty of the African nations arises from their dependence on the 
. wealthier nations. Frank in particular stressed Rodney’s argument that 
integration of the peripheral states into a global political economy dominated 
by the imperialists, trapped the poorer nations at the bottom of global economy 
for capitalism to produce wealth and further development in the “core” 
countries while it creates poverty in the satellites (Roberts and Hite (eds;) 
2002: 60). The ‘core’ countries needed access to cheap raw materials, large 
markets, cheap labour and compliance government to increase its wealth and 
sustain development at home.
With the access to the local economy usually in an unequal 
relationship, there emerged what Alain de Javry and Carlos Garramon referred 
to as “disarticulation” of the local economies and societies (Javry and 
Garramon, 1977). It is this disarticulation that provides a fertile foundation for 
socio-political crisis in the post-colonial African states. The disarticulation as 
earlier indicated promotes mutually exclusive goals of market and democracy 
to put the sub-Saharan Africa on fire. Democracy adopts a different meaning in 
capitalism where majority of the people are hardly involved in political 
decisions, that is, ‘decisions affecting the whole collectivity’ (Bobbio, 1978: 
17).
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The central question that arises from the simultaneous promotion of 
goals of market and democracy is which decision affects the generality of the 
population more than the economic decision of what to produce, how to 
produce, where to produce and sell. These decisions are unfortunately made by 
private capital powers that are outside the political domain thereby 
undermining the sovereignty of the people. Two antithetical forces are 
consequently bound to emerge in the liberal market democracy. These are the 
democratic majority and the market dominant minority which are today mostly 
transnational. It is the collision of these two opposing groups that produces a 
backlash against democracy because the will, as to be revealed later, of the 
democratic majority never prevails in any electoral contest. Chua (2003) aptly 
explains:
...often the anti-democracy backlash takes the form of “crony 
capitalism”; corrupt, symbolic alliances between indigenous
leaders and a market dominant minority  The indigenous
regime protects the market-dominant minority’s wealth and 
businesses. In turn, the World Bank and IMF supply
loans the result is a boom in foreign investment, economic
growth, and riches for the rulers and their cronies At the
same time, however the country’s inner furies begin to
boil and it is usually sooner -  the situation explodes (Chua,
2003: 147).
A deep look at both APPER and UNPAAERD confirms Chua’s 
observation of the genesis and perpetuation of political crisis in Africa through 
the integration of sub-Saharan Africa into global political economy.
1.8 Limitations of the study
Research of this nature is bound to encounter some challenges. These 
include synthesising ideas from economics, philosophy and politics to explain 
state, power and cooperation, social, economic and political institutions within 
cultural explanations. The researcher being an African, by implication a victim 
of dependent economy and underdevelopment, expressed views are bound to 
experience a challenge of objectivity while reconciling the values of African 
traditional communalism with the reality of post-colonial liberal universalism.
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However, with pungent supervisory guide all the challenges were surmounted 
leaving an insignificant effect on both the internal and external validity of the 
thesis. Also, the scope of the study requires more time and space but due to 
space limit and time frame to conclude, it took extra efforts and energy to meet 
the deadline.
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Chapter 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.0 Introduction
This chapter reviews existing literature on African traditional political 
structures, states, democracy and economy in Africa. Interpretations of African 
state crisis from various perspectives, notably modernisation, neo-Marxist, and 
post-modernist theorists are thoroughly examined with their effects on our 
understanding on the genesis of the crisis in the sub-Saharan Africa. Why the 
prescriptions of these interpretations were unable to address the political and 
economic crisis are also given sufficient consideration in this review. Debates on 
democracy with special focus on liberal democracy being the ‘end of history’ and 
African debate on democracy in its various forms are also engaged. This is done 
in other to show the relative weight of each in the understanding of the nature and 
genesis of the state and economic crises in the sub-Saharan Africa or the solution 
to such crises.
It is demonstrated in this chapter that because the post-colonial sub 
Saharan African states as pointed out by Hall (1996: 246) are not post-colonial in 
the same way, does not mean that they are not post-colonial in any way. The ghost 
of colonialism still looms over all the post-colonial states irrespective of their 
colonial path to independence, Colonialism reconfigured the colonial societies. 
Colonial legacies combining with the pre-colonial heritage and the post-colonial 
experiences remain a major influence on politics and economy in the sub-Saharan 
African states.
The impact of colonialism was more of transformative than transitory 
as it reshaped the economic and political forms and institutions which 
subsequently transformed the way people, especially the educated urban elites, 
came to perceive the world. It is further demonstrated in the review that the
[33]
political and economic crises that engulfed African states emanate from their 
integration into designed templates of grand theories that failed to take the 
indigenous grains of African political-economy into consideration. The bigger 
challenge posed by all these, is whether these grand templates can or should be 
rejected wholesomely or whether they should be modified to accommodate the 
specificity of the political, cultural and historical circumstances of African states. 
Will such accommodation reduce the historically-derived liberal democratic 
blame-game? What does civic political participation confer on citizens as 
entitlements, and what broader political rights are a transcendental approach to 
politics, democracy and group rights likely to confer? The review also takes into 
consideration the type of leadership thrown up by the colonial legacies. In so 
doing it examines the rise and effects of post-colonial dictatorship in Africa by 
focusing on one-party model, military rule and how liberal and illiberal 
democracy were used as proxies in the cold war and post-cold war development of 
such regimes in post-colonial Africa.
Reactions to these dictatorial styles of leadership are examined under 
the popular struggles for democracy and crisis of transitions in Africa that 
followed the dictatorial regimes in the sub-Saharan Africa. These struggles and 
transition crisis are critically engaged with a concentration on illuminating the 
blind spot in the contemporary discourse of democracy in Africa for three main 
reasons. Firstly, the need to show that popular struggles for democracy in Africa 
did not commence with the post-cold war multi-party struggles or end with the 
attainment of independence by the colonial African states. ‘They continued, albeit 
in different forms’ (Shivji, 1987). The popular resistance of the African peoples 
against the IMF and the World Bank’s SAP economic strategies, the rise in ethnic 
and religious identity struggles, violence reactions to the results of general 
elections etc are identified in the review as various forms of struggles for 
democracy that failed to attract recognition because they hardly take the forms of 
modem struggles of civil society, hence they are condemned as ‘primordial, 
illegitimate, or backward (fundamentalist, tribalist etc) (Shivji, 2002b: 8).
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This condemnation not only prevents us from understanding the forms 
and ideologies of the peoples’ resistance to their daily oppression and 
marginalisation and how this resistance affects the politics of the state but also 
deprives us ‘of an important piece of locally generated knowledge, values and 
cultures’ (ibid). The boomerang effect of this neglect is well represented by the 
crisis upsurge in the North Africa starting from Algeria and spreading to Egypt 
and Libya.
Secondly, the attempt was also informed by the need to halt the post­
cold war trend in neo-liberal discourse of democracy which tends to ‘emasculate 
democracy of its social and historical dimensions and present it as an ultimate 
nirvana’ (ibid) using civil society as the propeller of the democratisation drive in 
Africa. The civil society in the forms of the modem NGOs, workers’ unions, 
students’ associations etc provided the platforms for the articulation of the 
peoples’ resentment but the main drive of the struggles for democracy lies in the 
spirit and determination of the people to reject all forms of oppression and enforce 
their ineffable rights to control the decisions that determine their daily lives and 
future prospects. As a corollary to this view, how liberal democracy lubricates the 
involvement of the civil society groups is also considered.
Thirdly, the need to show the contributions of African scholars and 
why they failed to address the issue of democratisation earlier than the post-cold 
war period also informed the attempt.
2.1 African Traditional Political structures and evidence of Modern state 
Institutions
There is demonstrable evidence of sophistication in the African pre­
colonial political institutions with defined separation of powers before 
colonialism. These institutions were propelled by the values of traditional social 
life that was nurturing a system of government suitable for the African political 
ecology. More importantly, these pre-colonial institutions shared some salient
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features of modem government with, for example, British liberal democracy. 
Features such as British system of legislative council, dialogue and representative 
principles existed in the pre-colonial Africa’s political institutions. In other words, 
the parliamentary principle of decision-making, debate and discussion of different 
points of views expressed by duly accredited representatives of the people were 
prominent features of African traditional politics.
Williams (1994) and Totemeyer (1978) record the Owambo peoples 
of north-central Namibia as consisting of seven related communities: the 
Ondonga, Uukwanyama, Ongandjera, Uukwambi, Ombalantu, Uukwaluudhi and 
Uukolonkadhi. All of these except the Uukolonkadhi were politically organised 
into kingdoms (Keulder, ed; 2010: 155). In early times, the King was selected 
from the royal clan, and during his reign he was assisted by a number of 
Councillors. These were appointed by him, not strictly from the clan structures, 
but from his age group3. The highest authority (after the King) was the King’s 
Council. The Council consisted of six senior Councillors appointed by the King 
after consultation with the elders (Williams, 1994: 6). This Council acted as the 
chief executive, as well as the judicial and legislative body, and all its decisions 
were kept secret. One member of this Council acted as the King’s closest advisor, 
his Chief Minister. Usually, the kingdom was subdivided into a number of wards 
(often as many as 57 wards existed). These were headed by Under-councillors 
appointed by the King.
They, in turn, formed the District Council, a second-tier authority that 
presided over ward affairs and made inputs to the King’s Council. A number of 
less significant bureaucratic positions existed in the kingdom, most of which were 
allocated to the running of the royal court. Among these were the courtiers, the 
bodyguards, attendants, messengers, herdsmen and cooks.
3 This was done during his young days, when a prospective King would observe his playmates for 
certain special qualities such as bravery, diligence and hard work. It was the custom of those 
times that a newly appointed King would "inherit" his predecessor's Councillors.
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If the pre-colonial African kingdoms and empires showed evidence of 
modem government, what was therefore responsible for the failure of the post­
colonial Africa’s states to operate modem institutions of liberal constitutional 
government such as parties, parliaments and civil services immediately after the 
colonial enterprise? Tordoff, (2002), wrestles with this poser only to portray the 
post-colonial African leaders as lacking in the pre-requisite experience to operate 
a national scale governmental system.
This argument, on its face value seems appropriate but its sufficiency 
becomes dubious if we consider that most of the post colonial African leaders 
were involved in the governance of their various states through some 
constitutional developments before the final political disengagement of the 
colonial administrations on independence. For example in Nigeria, regional 
governments headed by Nigerians, and with Nigerians in the legislatures, were put 
in place in 1954, six years before independence. Before 1954, Nigerians were 
involved in the legislative functions of the colonial Nigeria as far back as 1922 
with the establishment of the Clifford Constitution. The period 1946 to 1951 saw 
phenomenal increase in the involvement of Nigerians in the administration of the 
colony, and in the politicking of the political parties. Moreover deliberative 
principles that were very prominent in the pre-colonial governance were also put 
into use during these constitutional periods. Rather than putting the entire blame 
on the post-colonial leaders, perhaps the need to have a deep look at the 
foundations of the post-colonial states towards a reconfiguration deserves 
attention.
Ake in ‘Democracy and Development in Africa’ (1996) traces the root 
cause of the problem to the authoritarian political structure of the African states 
derived from the previous colonial entities. He provides alternatives that may 
configure a new paradigm for Africa’s development. These are economic 
development based on traditional agriculture, political development based on the 
decentralisation of power, and reliance on indigenous communities that readily
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provide some measure of refuge from the coercive power of the central state. To 
Ake, development in Africa has not failed as it was not really on the agenda of the 
colonialists or the neo-colonialists. He forcefully asserts Africa’s political 
conditions as the greatest impediments to Africa’s development.
Going by Ake’s observations, the reconfiguration becomes apparent in 
the face of the prevalent socio-political crises that characterise the post-colonial 
sub-Saharan Africa states which have created doubts over the ability of these 
states to either serve as instrument of coercion or platform to reconcile the 
divergent views. Political upheavals in Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Cote D’voire, Benin 
Republic, Togo, Sierra Leone, Egypt, Algeria, Libya etc could not be suppressed 
by the state in spite of its monopoly of instruments of coercion. The failure has 
further lent credence to the same agitating question of whether the state in any 
sense of it actually exists in the sub-Saharan Africa.
Joining Ake to boldly challenge the dominant paradigm of democracy 
and development in the post-colonial sub-Saharan African states, Rita 
Abrahamsen in her ‘Disciplining Democracy, Development Discourse and Good 
Governance in Africa’ (2000), launched attacks on the conventional explanations 
of democratisation in sub-Saharan Africa and the ‘good governance’ discourse 
which she argues to have legitimised the right of the North to develop and control 
the South. She dismissed the inherent assumptions in the good governance 
discourse adopted by the IMF and the World Bank to wrongly gauge the mood of 
popular struggles for democracy in Africa as struggles for multi-party liberal 
democracy. In her view, those popular struggles were actually for better standard 
of living of the people, and an end to poverty and suffering as against the 
misconception of the neo-liberal institutions that fuses democracy and economic 
liberalism together. This wrong notion according to Abrahamsen illiberalises 
alternative conceptualisations of democracy that could have reconfigured 
governance and development based on popular participation and promotion of 
social and economic rights of the poor.
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The post-Cold War emergence of ‘New World Order’ that heralded 
the unipolar dominance of neo-liberalism in the political sphere (Adelman, 
1998: 75) was accompanied by some economic and political conditions dubbed 
liberalisation policies which imprisoned democracy within the capitalist 
ideology. The institutional home of this trend is the World Bank, IMF and the 
WTO hiring significant number of African economists to operationalise the 
liberalisation, marketisation, privatization policies and de-statisation of African 
countries’ economies taking the form of either imported or home-grown 
Structural Adjustment Programmes (Shivji, 2002b).
Liberalisation, according to Adelman and Paliwala (1993) is often a 
cipher for the imposition of modernisation in contemporary form, and the 
manner in which it robs Africans of genuine choice and control over their own 
lives, is but a new form of imperialism. The liberalisation programmes forced 
many African countries to move away from one party state towards a system of 
multi-party-ism in the late 1980s. Though this was initially resisted in most 
countries by one-party and dictatorial leaders, but hailed by the majority of the 
populations as the new wave of “revolution of rising expectations” (Gentili, 
2005: 3). Going by Gentili’s records (ibid: 6), between 1990 and 1994 the first 
multiparty elections took place in 29 countries. Between 1985 and 1989 only 
nine countries had had multiparty suffrages, but between 1990 and 1998, 42 
countries had such elections. Between 1998 and 2001 there were 55 elections 
and 8 referenda. Everywhere electoral laws, the redrawing of constitutions, and 
elections became a terrain of confrontation, but all these have not always 
resulted in the establishment of true democracy. Many scholars and 
commentators in the west regarded these changes as the ultimate triumph of 
liberal democracy in the Cold War. Fukuyama in particular wasted no time to 
assert that what we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War but 
the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalisation of 
Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government (Fukuyama, 
1989).
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In ‘Constitutionalism, Pluralism and Democracy in Africa ', Sammy 
Adelman’s veils response to the hegemonic posture of Fukuyama thus: “that 
more than ever before, there is a widespread tendency to equate democracy 
with liberal capitalism in a way that reinforces cultural imperialism to which 
the developing world has long been subjected” (Adelman, 1998: 75). He 
explains further that individualism thus takes the precedence of the more 
communal histories of African societies, with civil and political rights accorded 
priority over social, economic and cultural rights (Adelman, ibid). Perhaps it is 
germane to posit that the concept of individual rights in particular, springs from 
the liberal perspective that is at odds with the history of Africa.
Moreover the insistence of the West on ‘good governance’ and SAP 
as conditionality for granting aid and loans; and the persistence of structural 
inequalities in the global political economy did not only aggravate the political 
instability in the post- colonial Africa but also as reported by Adelman (ibid) 
diverts attention from the intransigent problems concerning Africa, such as 
class inequalities, the legitimacy of the liberal state, the role of external 
agencies in economic and social policy, and the continuing colonial heritage in 
ethnic and tribal conflict. The Republic of Benin presents a classic example of 
a multi-party democracy achieved on the heels of popular struggle between 
1989 and 1990. The new regime was severely limited in its policy choices by 
debt and liberalisation programmes, and rapidly distanced itself from the 
workers and students who brought it to power (Allen 1992).
The role of external agencies in the post-colonial Africa cannot be 
ignored in any discourse of the popular political struggles because liberal 
democracy and its associated enormous levels of indebtedness (Adelman and 
Espiritu, 1993) of the new African states prepared the ground for imposition of 
neo-liberalism that is ‘asserted to be the basis for democracy in Western eyes’
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(ibid). Rather than deepening democracy, it merely perpetuates the history of 
top down autocratic rule instituted by the colonial powers. Adelman averts:
Those powers corrupted and destroyed local customs and 
traditions while reinforcing cleavages between rural and urban 
Africans, leaving vacuums that their clients and compradors 
sought to fill by transplanting the contradictions o f liberal 
democracy or the illusions o f Marxism-Leninism into fertile 
soil. They violently disrupted prevailing social relations and 
reconstructed them as a customary law that bore little relation to 
African history (Ademan, 1998: 76).
The central element of neo-liberal discourse of democracy in Africa 
has been the dichotomy between the state and the market. This characterises 
the post-Cold War finance manifesting in the growth of Western capitalism and 
modernisation dubbed globalisation which is ensconced in neo-liberal jargon. 
Critical perspectives on this discourse according to Mafeje (1995) could be 
classified between those which are explicitly political and constructed around 
the ideologies of resistance and those who are of a more scholarly kind with 
their genesis in the theoretical frameworks of neo-Marxism.
The attempts in these critical perspectives are geared towards 
highlighting the sharp ‘polarisation, inequalities and inequities generated by the 
process of globalisation and the ruinous effect it has on the livelihoods, 
environment and ecology of the planet’ (Brecher and Costello, 1994; Korten, 
1995). The salient point in globalisation is the demonstration of concentration 
of wealth, power and control over the political processes, production and 
communication in the hands of a few urbanised elites while the popular votes 
rest with the majority but marginalised poor and groups. Globalisation, in the 
process of capital accumulation, accentuated the marginalisation of the wide 
majority of the people from any productive activity and subsequently created 
not only reserve army of adults and children but ‘disposable population of 
street children’ (Marcos, 1997) and ‘totally unemployed human wreckages’ 
(Bercher and Costello, 1994).
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Liberal scholars such as Fukuyama were unable to explain why liberal 
values and certain kinds of democratic institutions which have become deeply 
embedded in North America and Europe failed to be embedded in post-colonial 
African and Asian states. Firstly as explained by Macey and Miller, (1992) 
there is need to accept that democracy and liberalism are separate concepts. 
Liberalism is a rights-bound concept that recognises that human beings, as 
autonomous creatures, are entitled to certain rights especially property rights, 
religious rights and political rights. So long as people confine their activities 
within this sphere of rights, they are entitled to act as they choose and to be 
free from governmental interference. Democracy on the other hand, refers to a 
system of government under which citizens may participate in governmental 
decision-making either directly or through representatives. But, Liberals are 
prompt to viewing democracy as a manifestation of liberalism in the sense that 
political rights like property and religious rights are among the basic rights that 
most conceptions of liberalism embrace. All liberals like Fukuyama fail to 
appreciate the tension between liberalism and democracy. There is a basic 
tension that exists between liberalism and democracy. The ‘liberal conception 
of the primacy of rights inevitably comes into conflict with the democratic 
conception that majorities be able to control policy’ (Macey and Miller, ibid).
Liberals are yet to accept that there is a relationship between 
democracy and culture which prevents Western democratic institutions 
including political parties from taking roots in cultures that do not share the 
same material, social, or psychological conditions with Western-type 
democratic states. The liberal values failed to be domesticated in sub-Saharan 
African societies due to different contexts that provide resistance to such 
domestication.
There is nothing more that provides the greatest challenge to liberal 
democracy in the sub-Saharan Africa than the failed post-colonial states with
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failed liberal values and institutions arising from the ‘best practice’ approach 
adopted by the departing colonial powers to construct democratic state with 
free market within the context of liberalism. To invoke Hoffmann’s famous 
phrase ‘international affairs have been the nemesis of Liberalism’ (Hoffmann, 
1988: 396). In spite of the impossible task of domesticating liberal ideas and 
institutions in the sub-Sahara Africa, those who believe in the liberal project 
still remain convinced that power politics is a product of ideas, and crucially 
ideas can change, therefore if the world is inhospitable to liberalism, this does 
not mean liberalism cannot be re-made in its image (Dunne, 2008: 110). We 
concede to the fact that power politics is a product of ideas and ideas do 
change. The challenge arising from this assumption is which ideas are 
preventing liberal democracy from being re-made successfully in its own 
image in the sub-Saharan Africa? Importing liberal project into countries that 
are fundamentally different in terms of culture and social structures from the 
Western European countries remains a daunting task for the proponents of the 
ideology.
It is compelling to highlight Michael Doyle’s four dimensional 
definition of liberalism (1997). This becomes necessary to highlight the core 
values of liberalism. Doyle declares that the principles of liberalism are firstly; 
all citizens are juridistically equal and possess equal basic rights, equal access 
to opportunities and religious toleration. Secondly, the legislative assembly 
must be established on the mandate of the people and whose rights it is not 
permitted to abuse. Thirdly, there should be a guarantee and protection of the 
liberty of individuals including the right to own property which includes the 
productive forces. Fourthly, the most effective economic exchange system is 
the one that is largely driven by the market and devoid of any subordination to 
bureaucratic regulations and control. As earlier argued when the values of the 
market and democracy are taken together we see a stark contradiction inherent 
in liberal democracy.
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Combining democracy with liberalism can hardly hybridise with each 
other without breeding crisis. Niger-Delta crisis in Nigeria, land crisis in 
Zimbabwe, etc; are contemporary examples. In both situations the market 
dominant minority protected by the principle of liberalism found themselves in 
conflict with the numerically powerful impoverished majority who are at the 
receiving ends of the economic activities of economically powerful minority to 
produce a backlash against liberal democracy. The idea of seeing democracy 
and Liberalism as natural counterparts remains one of the fatal errors of liberal 
democracy. It is this misconception that leads Fukuyama to ‘survey the world 
and reach the bizarre, counterfactual conclusion that liberal democracies are 
bursting out all over’ (Macey and Miller, 1992: 281).
Although many liberals tend to treat liberalism as a theory of 
government but what is becoming increasingly apparent is the glaring failed 
connection between liberal democracy and the market on the one hand, and 
replacement of issue-area interests with ethnic-issue interests on the other. The 
thesis therefore examines the underlying universal assumptions of liberal 
democracy and argues that nothing further exposes the divergent fortunes of 
liberal democracy with its values and institutions in post-colonial sub-Saharan 
Africa than ethnic violence rooted in a deeply entrenched culture that 
constantly prevents the emergence of non-indigenous bureaucratic liberal state.
Every ethnic group wants to protect its interests and where possible, 
use the state institutions to ensure and sustain such protection. Where this fails, 
they employ violence to repress marginalisation by other ethnic groups. Every 
ethnic group in the sub-Saharan Africa sees political self-determination as a 
right that should not be tampered with by other groups. Tampering with such 
right by the post-colonial leaders partly accounts for democratic paralysis in 
the sub-Sahara Africa. All regions in the sub-Sahara Africa have witnessed 
mass struggles for political reforms demanding a return to democracy which 
Liberals like Fukuyama erroneously identified as requiring liberal democracy
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with the assumption that number of choices that countries face in determining 
how they will organize themselves politically and economically has been 
diminishing over time.
Ayitey (1992) offers an insight into part of the reasons responsible for 
the inability of the sub-Saharan Africa to successfully operate the institutions of 
liberal democracy. He posits that after independence most African states assumed 
an interventionist role in economic development, though their degrees of 
intervention varied from weak intervention as in Botswana, Cameroon, and 
Mauritius, to massive intervention as witnessed in Algeria, Angola, Benin, 
Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Zambia. In the spirit of state interventionism, a 
principal factor that could have accounted for their failure was the ideological 
posture of the post-colonial leaders which in itself was a product of the 
misconceptions that emerged from the national liberation struggles against 
colonialism. Colonialism was exploitative but its abhorrence was transformed into 
an ideological aversion to its economic philosophy -  capitalism on the premise 
that if the colonialists were exploitative, capitalism, too, must be (Ayitey, ibid).
Abrahmsen (2000) offers a clear reason for the state intervention. She 
argues that the inability to the post-colonial governments to successfully fulfil 
the independence electoral promises was based on the fact that they were 
confronted with two fundamentally conflicting challenges. These she asserts to 
be allegiance from the state leaders to the external donors and creditors in other 
to continue enjoying access to funds and support for their sustenance in power; 
and the second is, drawing democratic support from the poor domestic 
populace. This conflicting situation compels Chua (2003) to aver that
...when a poor democratic majority collides with a market 
dominant minority, the majority does not always prevail.
Instead o f backlash against the market, there is backlash against 
democracy” (Chua, 2003: 147)
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Avoidance of the effects of this conflicting situation dominates the 
actions and pronouncements of some African leaders like Nkrumah of Ghana, 
Modibo Keita of Mali, Nyerere of Tanzania, Kaunda of Zambia, and Mugabe of 
Zimbabwe. In the views of these anti-capitalist leaders, free markets, free trade, 
private enterprise, and the parliamentary system of democracy were all Western 
capitalist institutions that should be rejected by Africa. For example, Nkrumah 
warned Africa against the assertion of the colonialists that states ’Western 
democracy and parliamentary system are the only valid ways of governing; that 
they constitute the only worthwhile model for the training of indigenous elite by 
the colonial power” (Nkrumah, 1980). In place of capitalism, highly centralised 
and interventionist socialist systems were established by Nkrumah and other 
African leaders to spur development. This in itself was another error that failed to 
take the traditional values into consideration. Capitalism was rejected mainly on 
the basis of colonialism without looking at the possibility of altering its process to 
suit the traditional African economic system which was not socialist but a 
mixture of state and private capitalism as illustrated by Ayittey in “Indigenous 
African Philosophy: concepts o f wealth in traditional Africau(200&). The idea of 
jettisoning capitalism or embracing socialism by the post-colonial leaders is just a 
manifestation of their ideological orientations and nothing to do with African 
culture.
2.2 Traditional Leadership
Traditional leadership in Africa as reported by Khoza (2007) is driven 
by the spirit of ‘ubuntu’, that is, tenets of consultation, persuasion, 
accommodation and cohabitation devoid of coercion and domination (Khoza, 
2007). These principles are deeply imbedded in African humanism and are part of 
the pre-colonial governance system of sub-Saharan Africa. African humanism 
promotes social cohesion through sufficient consensus that leads to a process of 
social arbitrage in the settling of differences.
[46]
Though public offices are sometimes held for life but this is subject to 
good conduct and behaviour of the office holders as they are expected to be 
transparent, honest and upright, have integrity and the ability to serve the basic 
needs of the people. This traditional model in Ghana and Uganda as observed by 
Jeffries, provided some promising experiments in effective governance (Jeffries, 
1993). Mamdani called our attention to the nature of the traditional model as not 
in consonance with the periodic elections of liberal democracy where the political 
parties and groups are orientated with the narrow conception of political rights 
regarding the essence of democracy, as a multiparty system with free and fair 
elections (Mamdani, 1987). Succession to political offices according to him was 
done according to the established traditional rules that always produced 
acceptable results to all. Dissents were amicably resolved through consensus. The 
omission of this vital feature of governance during colonial state-building partly 
accounts for the broken linkages between the people and the state on the one hand 
and the reduction of liberal democracy to multi-party elections.
The failure of these post-colonial states to successfully operate 
modem institutions of liberal democracy justifies Ake’s identification of their 
inherited political institutions as responsible for such failure. This also brings to 
attention the bankruptcy of the ‘universal best practice’ political institution 
employed by the colonial mentors of the post-colonial states. The local political 
and economic grains of the pre-colonial communities jeopardised the 
entrenchment of the universal institutional templates of liberal democracy. Booth, 
in affirming Ake’s argument for alternative model asserts that the right approach 
to governance is ‘best fit’, not ‘best practice’ (Booth, 2011). The urge for ‘best fit’ 
naturally elicits curiosity over the ‘ideological forces, vested interests and political 
pressures that promote institutional mimicry’ (ibid) in the colonies.
The failure of the colonial authorities to firstly rely on ‘the grains’ of 
the pre-colonial society while building the post-colonial states and their sole 
reliance on western ideas which Turner refers to as “notion of individualism”,
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contributed to the recurring political crisis (Turner (ed;) 2006: 81-3) in the sub- 
Saharan Africa. Mazrui had earlier called attention to the effects of the notion of 
individualism. He observes that the values of living together in kin-centred social 
processes with patterned extended families system, the values and collective 
responsibilities of traditional social life that prevailed in the pre-colonial period 
were all replaced by the ‘notion of individualism’ imported from Europe (Mazrui, 
1986: 7). The general consequence of Mazrui’s observation was that the ethnic 
groups that were originally relating and maintaining friendly relationships in 
trades, communal support and social contacts suddenly hardened indigeneity into 
exclusiveness. Bush (2007) articulates this consequence with a submission that 
the traditional political system that once combined with other traditional 
institutions to serve as bastion of justice and equity in the state was replaced by 
neo-patrimonial system. This combination according to him, produced a 
dependent economy that dissolved the self-reliant nature of pre-colonial system 
and created a disarticulated structure of production geared towards the need of the 
colonial home countries (Bush, ibid).
The effect of the disarticulation was that as in colonial period, the 
succeeding neo-patrimonial leaders perceive people as mere disposable objects of 
governance that could be used and discarded. The neo-patrimonial arrangement 
created a system where the leaders demonstrate lack of affection and insincerity 
towards the people and the people in turn see themselves as outside the 
government but for which they contributed to its sustenance. A major 
consequence of adulterated patrimonial political arrangement was the 
personalisation of power by the elites. This development encouraged politics of 
divide and rule where the power elites employ nepotism and religion to sustain the 
neo-patrimonial system geared towards liberal philosophy. Access to power now 
became a major source of social strife as those in power determine the distribution 
of resources and who gets what.
Driven by the desire to sustain their grip on the power levers, the post
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colonial leaders were unable to unify the people for nation-building. They were 
unable to create favourable environment for the articulation of contending 
interests to unify the state. They subjected the traditional chieftaincy institution to 
the control of the modern political authority, and sometimes turn chieftaincy titles 
into reward for political loyalty with little or no regard to the traditional 
procedures. The neo-patrimonial genesis of this strategy has hardly been given a 
deep scientific consideration. It was the adoption of the chieftaincy institutions by 
the colonial rulers that those institutions acquired new orientations and became 
distanced, sometimes alienated from their peoples with their values and 
aspirations. Their legitimacy derived more from the colonial state authority. The 
post-colonial leaders just continued with the strategy of not letting the traditional 
institutions remain unguarded by the state and also ensured that the institution 
continue to derive their legitimacy from the state authority.
In general, Adedeji (1999) explains, ‘Africa experienced the 
phenomenon of alienation between state and society’ -  a social reality that was 
described by him as ‘cohabitation without marriage’ (ibid). The gap between 
indigenous cultures and the new forms of government has its destructive 
consequences on the governance, peoples and search for political stability and 
development. The rulers vainly try to operate institutions and processes that were 
built by the colonial authorities to serve foreign interests and values. While they 
continue moulding their populations and making them develop as their foreign 
models, they also manipulate the new political system to serve and protect their 
personal desires and interests.
2.3. Paradigm interpretations of post-colonial crisis
At the peak of decolonisation, both the departing colonisers and the 
anti-colonial nationalists were disposed to strike a positive note (Chiriyankandath, 
2007). This was evident in the submissions of the colonial historian Margery 
Perham that ‘Britain on the whole was the most humane and considerate of 
modem colonial nations and did most to prepare her subjects for self-government’ 
(1963: 99). This view was corroborated by Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana’s first
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leader, after power was handed over by the British last governor of the Gold 
Coast. Nkrumah declared confidently, ‘We have won independence and founded a 
modem state’ (Nkrumah, 1965) only for the realities of the independent facade 
dawned on Nkrumah few years after.
On the eve of his losing power, Nkrumah’s summed up his misgivings 
about the reality of independence in “Neo-Colonialism”, ‘The essence of neo­
colonialism is that the State which is subject to it is, in theory, independent and 
has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty. In reality its economic 
system and thus its political policy is directed from outside’ (Nkrumah 1965: ix). 
Jackson, an international relation theorist came several years after Nkrumah with 
a coinage of ‘quasi-states’ to describe the majority of the post-colonial states 
(Jackson, 1993). More recently, as observed by some scholars such as Ferguson, 
Cooper, and Lai, there has been a resurgence of interest in the West in the idea of 
a liberal empire, if not the actual restoration of formal empire, as a solution to the 
continuing political and economic crises that many post-colonial states, especially 
in Africa and the Middle East, appear to face (Cooper 2004; Lai, 2004)
As explained earlier, from 1960s to the late 80s, most of the literature 
on African political developments drew inspiration from the modernisation 
theory but the discourse only took a new dimension in the 90s when African 
and Africanists scholars started highlighting the exceptional nature of 
supposedly African states and politics as well as reconceptualising the African 
reality.
2.4. Debates on African Democracy
This section examines the discourses on African democracy focusing
on the type of leadership such debate has thrown up in an attempt at resuscitating
the African states. The engagement is done in the context of democratic praxis in
post-cold war Africa. The section seeks to explain why Africa has had enduring
and fractious democratic outcomes, beginning with highly flawed elections. If we
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really want to understand the morphology and basis of democratic crisis in Africa 
we must be interested in the political economy of the African states. Inherent in 
this logic as have been severally mentioned, is the colonial inheritance. The 
discourse on African democracy and states as earlier indicated, took a different 
dimension when the Africanist literature of the post-80s started highlighting the 
exceptional nature of African states and politics.
African scholars particularly started to develop their own theories, 
which according to Keet, (2002) was partly due to 'sub-optimal' results of policies 
based on the grand theories, as well as their conclusion that imperialism in general 
"has actively underdeveloped the peripheral societies" (Martinussen, 1997: 86). 
This conclusion influenced by the post-colonial reality reinforced the passionate 
desires of anti-colonial idealists such as Fanon that Africa should not just for 
modernisation rush; imitate Europe (1967: 252). The reality revealed to them as 
well that colonialism actually provided the template for state-building and 
governance which determined the path of the post-colonial transformation of the 
colonies into independent nations and dependent economies. According to 
Cooper, it became glaring to the anti-colonialists demanding independence that 
they had little choice but to buy into colonial state-building strategy, since it was 
the only option that was imaginable to their rulers (2003: 67). It was this strategy 
of co-habitation that ensured that pan-African dreams remained unrealised and at 
the same time guaranteed the sustenance of the liberal values in the post-colonial 
states.
These new states in the view of Clapham, faced unprecedented 
challenge of fashioning ‘a peculiarly modem form of statehood’, modelled not on 
pre-colonial patrimonialism but on the elaborate modem Western state model that 
had been developed in Europe over centuries (2000: 6-7) for no other reason but 
to facilitate a colonial objective of extracting raw materials from Africa to Europe. 
So right from the colonial days, the sub-Saharan African colonies and their post­
colonial states were fashioned as instmments designed by the colonial authorities
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for the realisation of the colonial objectives. In his submission, Lonsdale pointed 
out the involvement of violent construction of liberal structures that ruptured the 
pre-colonial political dynamics and patterns and elongated the colonial control of 
both the politics and economies of the colonising territories (1986: 145).
Though Africa is not a monolithic entity but a geo-political space 
made up of peoples and countries of distinctive histories, endowments, and 
political systems. There were evidences that African societies were on different 
trajectories towards statehood from their unique forms of governance that predate 
both the liberal and the socialist democracies before the interruptions by 
colonialism. While the African peoples agitated and fought for independence with 
the spirit of genuine notion of democracy, they, especially the countryside, never 
contemplated abandoning their communual values for the notion of individualism. 
Equality, consensus and communitarian values were traditionally rated higher in 
African societies than individual gain and competition.
The theology of extreme individualised market or political 
competition or extreme socialisation of the means of production and wealth 
distribution is an unnatural idea to Africans because most of the African societies 
relish their religious, ethnic or tribal affiliations that are anti-liberal and anti­
coercion, therefore there was no traditional base for liberal or socialist democracy 
to flourish in the colonial Africa talk-less of consolidating in the post-independent 
state forms. As a result, the basis for the emergence of a system that allows multi­
party competition for political power or a single dominant party with an 
overriding sense of national community was glaringly absent in the traditional 
African political space either during or after independence (ECA, 2007).
Though we may assume that ideas and theories of scientific values 
have no territorial limitations but new ideas that arise out of the assessment of the 
old ones always bear the birth marks of the different epochs and cultures of the
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concerned society. This is why it is vital for every society to search into the 
experiences of her human history to develop ideas that have answers to her 
specific situations rather than been coerced into what Boege et al (2009) refer to 
as hybrid political order. This hybrid is a mismatch between indigenous cultural 
values and the Euro-centric liberal or socialist model of a state that hardly exists 
outside the Europe but which both West and East according to Schmeid and 
Kaokhail, forcefully sold to the African territories with ‘pret-a-porter mentality’ 
(Schmeid and Kaokhail, 2009).
The Cold War theorists, the ideological and the National Interest schools, fail to 
accept that individual’s actions in politics as in everyday life, is governed by their 
assumptions and beliefs. The most natural action resulting from their constant 
practice of these assumptions and beliefs constitutes their ideology. So what we 
refer to as liberal democracy today is a democracy that was liberalised by the 
western liberal states. The import of this is that before democracy was accepted as 
a form of government, it was transformed into a suitable ideology that would 
conform to the liberal values. Every ideology claims to subscribe to the fact that 
rights and opportunities remain useless if not transformed into concrete realities 
for individuals. The means of transforming, assuring and protecting such rights 
and opportunities constitute the ideological pathways for various brands of 
democracy with all claiming maximum guarantee of rights, justice, freedom and 
equality contents within their brands of democracy. This perhaps informed 
Obasanjo and Mabogunje (1992, eds) to emphasise that democracy must always 
take due cognisance of our lived reality and whatever structures and institutions 
that would sustain democratic practice must also reflect the peculiarities of our 
environment. This posture dominates the Africanist view of democracy.
To discuss democracy implies discussing people or a political 
community constituting itself into self-governing society. In essence democracy 
represents what Oloruntimehin describes as an open, public realm, to which 
citizens in general have free access and in which they can contribute to the well­
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being of the polity through the school of experience (2007: 22). As Tocqueville 
remarks:
...democracy describes ‘....the slow and quiet action of society 
upon itself. It is a regular state of things really founded upon the 
enlightened will of the people... .Representatives acquire its 
meaning as it interrelates processes of collective choice and 
collective action....In a “democratic society”, citizens leam the 
rudiments of democracy by their direct participation in the 
governance of their own local community as essentially an open 
realm public...(Tocqueville, 1980)
Most grand theorists of democracy fail to take into considerable 
accounts this unique nature of democracy before integrating sub-Saharan Africa -  
into the world of liberal or socialist democracy. Any description of democracy 
within the domains of grand theories remains a weak description because 
democracy has no meaning for an aggregate of the people without taking into 
accounts two key elements of the people which are ‘relationships’ and 
‘institutions’. It is these two key elements that bind the people and the state 
together, hence any description of democracy must give sufficient attention not 
only to the people but their relationships and the institutions that sustain such 
relationships. The political crisis in Africa must therefore be related to the social 
formation or mode of production of which Bangura (1988) identifies three co­
existing modes:
Monopolistic production, the primitive accumulation of capital 
and petty commodity activities (which) encourage the growth of 
authoritarian values, political malpractice and patron-client 
relations (Bangura, 1988)
Bangura asserts that this kind of social formation is conducive for
accumulation in the neo-colonial economy. The role of the state is to unleash
authoritarianism which would guarantee law and other such that it would
facilitate the accumulation of capital. The development of a new mode of
capitalism opened the gateway for the penetration of imperialism which
completely transformed the political and economic structures of the continent
into the very structures of the developed capitalist economies (ibid: 34). With
[54]
the structural dependence, the state apparatus was fully adapted to serve the 
monopoly-capitalist system. This subsequently laid the foundation for what Leys 
refers to as "African Tragedy" (1994). Ahluwalia (2001) sheds more light on 
African tragedy with an explanation that the continent got entrapped within a 
discourse of power play whereby foreign institutions and agencies such as IMF, 
World Bank and several other non-governmental organizations now determine 
and dictate policies that map out her future (Ahluwalia, 2001: 54). Bayart had 
initially pointed out the futility in liberal experiment in Africa. He argues that all 
efforts to combine the requirements of market economy with the demands of 
popular sovereignty ended in failure (Bayart et al, 1999).
In an attempt at addressing the problem, there emerged a group of 
scholars led by Sandbrook who engaged in schematic development of democracy 
(1998) or better still the celebration of democracy. The argument of the group is 
that liberal democracy never existed in Africa. Though the popular agitation for 
democratic reforms by the African people shows a clear predilection for 
democratic governance but the pattern and the modalities of such reforms did not 
produce any significant result that meets the expectations of reforms to transform 
the social sphere. Bratton and va de Walle (1992) gave an account of the desires 
of the African peoples for democracy. They counted between 1985 and 1990, no 
less than 20 authoritarian regimes were forced to liberalise the political arena, 
while multi-party elections were held in eight countries (Bratton and va de Walle, 
1992). By 1997, about three-quarter of African countries were under “democratic 
rule” (ibid). The liberal democratic project in Africa for which the people were 
mobilised through the civil societies remains wobbly and qualitatively stunted. In 
countries like Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Togo, Gabon and Kenya one 
could at best, according to Luckham (1995), talk of a "facade" democracy in 
which massaged elections were grudgingly arranged, with the perpetuation of civil 
political autocracy under the guise of democratic rule (Luckham, 1995: 49-50).
Facade democracy was also noticed in Ghana, Uganda, Equatorial 
Guinea, Niger, and Gambia, where according to Momoh and Adejumobi (1992)
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yesterday's military dictators suddenly became "bom again" democrats, re- 
institutionalising their power mostly through a corrupted electoral process. In 
Nigeria and Algeria, the duo explained the authoritarian rulers that were reluctant 
at disengaging from power deliberately subverted credible electoral processes 
through election annulment.
The Sndbrook group offers a valid explanation that liberal democracy 
is not simply about majoritarianism but it has a class basis and economic 
connotation. They see the liberal definition of democracy as too formal, too 
legalistic too mechanical and above all too restrictive. Turok (1991) had earlier 
opined that there is a correlation between development and democracy or at least a 
strong base which facilitates the achievement of democracy and conversely a 
weak base which accentuates the crisis of accumulation and hence 
authoritarianism. Other radical scholars like Samir Amin (1990) had before 
Sandbrook attempted to relate the concept of democracy to the level and nature of 
development of civil society. In this school was Beckman (1989) who was more 
concerned with the correlation between democracy and the nature and character of 
the state following Mkandawire (1988) that had previously asserted that 
democracy could only be justified and pursued for its purpose.
In fairness to the Sandbrook and his group, they have been more 
preoccupied with people’s mass participation or popular democracy but 
unfortunately very little have been done to focus on the role of the social forces, 
their struggles in the attempt to construct democratic systems and the effects of 
such struggles on the stability and order in the existing democracies. The 
Africanist and radical perspectives on the debate of democracy in Africa have 
therefore left big void for us to fill within the context of the state in relation to 
pursuit of democracy.
The argument of whether Africans lack democratic traits or not
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(Ekwe-Ekwe, 1985) or whether their pre-colonial social and political institutions 
are incapable of sustaining democracy, if juxtaposed with the features of modem 
democratic states, can hardly be justified by any empirical test. The argument of 
the modernisers that Africa lacks the prerequisites for the emergence and 
sustenance of democracy may be regarded as weak postulate because the 
departing colonial authorities seem not to have interest in creating a stable 
democratic state at independence, rather they were more concerned about their 
economic interests, hence their desire to hand over power to elites that would 
defend such interests (Mohmoh and Adejumobi, 1999).
Catephores sees these elites as those with entrenched business 
interests (Catephores, 1994) but which Diamond et al describe as vulnerable to the 
whims and caprices of their metropolitan counterparts (Diamond et al, 1998). 
Babu and Ngugi separately observed that in many colonised territories, the 
process of decolonisation ensured that the leaders of the post-colonial states will 
be collaborators of imperialism (Babu, 1981; Ngugi, 1983). Consequently, 
Olorode (2001) following the arguments of Ake and Fanon, explains that the 
contradictions between the interests of the indigenous class which inherited the 
colonial state and the interests of the oppressed who bore the brunt of colonial 
exploitation created strong revolutionary pressures against the maintenance of the 
existing exploitative class relationship. (Ake, 1978: 77; Fanon, 1990)
The ideals of genuine democracy and rule of law which were the 
political outcry during the struggles for independence were tmncated by 
fraudulent elections. One-party arguments whose legitimacy was supported by 
new ‘patriotic history’ (Ranger, 2010) propagated by the African leaders 
portraying the multi-ethnic African colonies as where people lived harmoniously 
as one nation before the disruption by colonialism emerged in the African political 
history.
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The new public history underpinned the independence speeches of 
African leaders portraying the decolonising states as nation-states whose roots of 
homogeneity lays in their pre-colonial history. This development according to 
Mafeje (1995: 31) was led by Nkrumah -1957, Nyerere, Sekou Toure and Tom 
Mboya -1963 but subsequent experience of Africa shows the undemocratic 
character of one party system. Macpherson (1977) however used this assumption 
to conclude that Africa belongs to 'non-liberal democracy' but 'developmental 
authoritarianism'. Perhaps this assumption prompted Ayang Nyang'O (1987) to 
pose a fundamental question of whether there is an African version of democracy.
2.5 Emergence of post-colonial dictatorships in Africa
Classical sociologists such as Herbert Spencer predicted that every 
society will progress along one path towards a state where political restraint, 
peace and lack of internal conflict would be the order of the day were proved 
wrong by the implosions that took place in post-colonial African states. The 
“colonial situation” thesis, as propounded by Thomas Hodgkin (1957) is an apt 
methodology of political sociology of colonial Africa. The assumption of the 
modernisation theorists that taking Africa along the development path of the 
western model will rapidly develop her turned out to be a mirage and an 
impossible desideratum. Little attention was paid to the wide differences between 
the traditional African institutions and the process by which they could 
accommodate external and internal pressures for both stability and change.
The political crises in the post-colonial states became more 
pronounced in Africa just as the toll on human lives and misery soared. As the 
pre-colonial African societies were reconstructed along what Otite refers to as the 
“habits of the heart of the western nations” (Otite and Oginowo, 1981), African 
traditional values and institutions were either manipulated or surpressed in the 
foundation of the new states’ structures. This perhaps informs Peter Ekeh in his 
magisterial and well-celebrated article entitled “Colonialism and The Two Publics 
in Africa” (Ekeh, 1975), to define a new social stmcture in Africa predicated on a 
primordial civil realm and a public civil realm, and Mamdani’s conclusion that the
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crises in Africa are manifestations of the legacy of late colonialism which is now 
hunting the post colonial state. Key to this conclusion is the construction and 
reconstruction of the “settler” and the “native” in both colonial and post colonial 
situations.
In the pre-colonial societies, the traditional institutions played 
prominent role in the religious, political and economic aspects of life, but with the 
amalgamation of the various societies into a single political entity, various 
specialised institutions attained separate existence and new social relationships. 
Peil observed this development to have aided many governmental, religious and 
economic institutions to now have a greater or lesser interdependent (Peil, 1978). 
A significant aspect of the new social relationship was that each of the 
amalgamating societies and their various groups came into the new social 
relationship with specific interests which sometimes bordered on extracting from 
the centre. A major consequence of the extractive tendency was highlighted by 
Cliffe and Seddon. According to them, many of the new political groups, in an 
attempt at maintaining effective control over the new state resorted to deriving 
their strength from their appeals to ethnic, national or religious identities which 
were hitherto non-existent in the pre-colonial societies but have now become 
veritable vehicles for political mobilisation and contests (Cliffe and Seddon, 1991:
5).
Archie Mafeje had before Cliffe and Seddon pointed out that there is 
no cultural or linguistic group in Africa that has an equivalent definition or 
translation for tribe or tribalism (Mafeje, 1971). Hence, to write about ethnicity in 
Africa is to examine a political construction with roots in colonialism. This is a 
historical and factual claim and not myth-making.
Ahluwalia sheds more light on the impact of the colonial 
transformation of the African societies into liberal states. He explains the
[59]
continent as becoming entrapped within a discourse of power play whereby 
foreign institutions and agencies such as IMF, World Bank and several other non­
governmental organisations now determine and dictate policies that map out her 
future (Ahluwalia, 2001: 54). Ahluwalia’s view could hardly be faulted because 
the functions of both the leaders and the state were actually taken over especially 
in the 1980s by these agencies and NGOs and carried out in a manner that was 
discomfortable to the people. For example, as reported by Ahluwalia, IMF and 
World Bank, in their efforts at 'revamping' Africa's economy for Africa and 
introducing 'good governance' to the people, recommended an agenda that 
included devaluation of the local currency, budget cuts, removal of state barriers, 
trimming the state sector, liberalising the economy and a complete erosion of the 
state power (ibid).
The mass reaction to the hardships generated by this agenda pushed 
the leadership to dictatorship. Absolute power of the colonial period was 
reemployed to become a standard bearer of violent phenomenon thereby 
compelling Fanon to see no difference between colonial and the post-colonial 
periods but simply a replacement of one ‘species’ of men by other ‘species’ of 
men (Fanon, 1990: 27). Efforts by the IMF and World Bank to combine the 
requirements of market economy with the demands of popular sovereignty, 
according to Bayart, ended in failure (Bayart et al, 1999). As stated earlier, when 
faced with the massive protests that tended to break the state from capital, the post 
colonial leaders as observed by Szeftel, quickly sought refuge in state repression 
and coercion (Szeftel, 1989: 8) which eventually became a norm that 
characterised leadership of the post-colonial Africa.
As severally pointed above the post-colonial leaders simply inherited 
dictatorial leadership styles from their colonial leaders. They found the oppressive 
style suitable for the protection of their personal interests and that of the western 
monopoly capital. It also according to Olorode, allows power to be constantly 
retained within the hegemonic factions of the ruling class (Olorode, 2001). Brown
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pointedly argues the culpability of the western powers in the sustenance of these 
dictatorial regimes. He asserts:
The arming of African (dictatorial) regimes by the industrial 
powers has had both a strategic and economic rationale... For 
the same mix o f reasons the hideous regime of Mobutu was 
established and sustained by the United States in Zaire (Brown, 
1 9 9 5 :111)
As Torddoff (2002), rightly observes, at independence, the post 
colonial-state rested on weak economic foundation that could not match the 
demands and expectations of the populace. The post-colonial leaders were faced 
with the problems of poor technology and limited manpower, trade imbalances 
and marketing opportunities while at the same time grappling with the problems 
of democratisation. Whereas in the industrialised west, Tordoff argues that:
...industrialisation took place before full democratic practices 
were introduced into the political process, and this meant that 
resources were available to meet the most pressing demands o f 
the workers as they became enfranchised... In Africa, as in Asia 
and the Caribbean, there was no such time-lag: universal 
franchise was granted just before, at, or immediately after 
independence, before economic policies could even be 
formulated (Tordoff, 2002: 5).
The post colonial states invariably inherited economic institutions that 
subsequently produced unsettled political culture. Gentili (2005) highlights a 
major effect of the absence of the time-lag by averring that the structural 
deficiencies of the states and the weight of negative inheritances, made worse by 
hostile international environment, as the Cold War on Africa, one of its main field 
of hot confrontation has been the underlining cause of one-party states “failure” in 
Africa.
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It must be understood that the process of state building in the western 
world since both the Magna Carta4 and the Treaty of Westphalia5, took centuries 
but in the case of Africa, the liberal constitutional model of democracy was 
mechanically foisted within the limited time of decolonisation process in a guided 
manner that reflected the western nation model. The decolonisation process itself 
was influenced by other factors apart from the colonial struggle for independence. 
These were the selective inclusion of the nationalist elites and the fatigue of the 
colonial powers due to prolonged World Wars I and II. These factors accelerated 
decolonisation within a limited time frame.
Critically viewed, history of pre-colonial rule is as not uniformed as is 
being presented by the post-colonial leaders in their desires to rule their territories 
as a nation-state immediately after independence. The people are not known to 
have common cultural identity. This has effect on the distinction between nation­
state and modem state in Africa. Nzongola-Ntalaja graphically illustrates this 
point in his seminal book titled, “Revolution and Counter-revolution in Africa:
4 Magna Carta is document which contains a series of laws establishing the rights of English 
barons and major landowners thereby limiting the authority of the King. The document was 
accepted by King John of England on June 15,1215. The Latin word which means 'great charter' is 
now used as a synonyms of all written citizen's rights and as foundation stones of statutes and 
laws. It serves as the basis of individual rights and considered as a part of the English 
Constitution.
5 Treaty of Westphalia also known as Peace Treaty of Westphalia is a collective name referring to 
the two separate Treaties of Munster and Osnabruck signed on the 24th of October 1648 and 15th 
of May 1648 by the Westphalia Empire with France at Munster and with Sweden and the 
Protestant estates of the Empire at Osnabruck respectively to bring the Thirty Years and Eight 
Years Wars to an end. The Treaty of the Pyrenees, signed in 1659, ending the war between 
France and Spain, is also often considered part of the treaty. The Treaty as a whole is often used 
by historians to mark the beginning of the modern era where each ruler would have the right to 
determine their state's religion. This therefore made the growing Protestantism and the 
Catholicism to be equal in law. The Treaty generally dealt with the internal affairs of the Holy 
Roman Empire. The Treaty continues to be of importance today, with many academics asserting 
that the international system that exists today began at Westphalia. Both the basis and the result 
of this view have been attacked by revisionist academics and politicians alike, with revisionists 
questioning the significance of the Treaty, and commentators and politicians attacking the 
"Westphalian System" of sovereign nation-states. The concept of each nation-state, regardless of 
size, as of equal legal value informed the founding of the United Nations, where all member 
states have one vote in the General Assembly.
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essays on contemporary Africa” (1987). Most of the elites that took over the state 
administration often confused formal independence with modem-state building 
with limited knowledge in state building and state administration.
While one may agree with Nzogola’s observation, it is however 
stressed in this thesis that the desires of the nationalist leaders to develop nation­
state akin to European nation-state or the United States of America blurs their 
sights of the dividing lines between the indigenous nation-states that characterise 
the pre-colonial territories and modem nation-state that developed in Europe and 
the United States of America out of the modem-sovereign states. Hence there was 
generally little preparation for sustainable modem-statehood as the new states 
lacked roots in the traditional societies. The basis for its sustenance and efficient 
operation which are national citizenship and national identity were undermined by 
cultural identity.
Indeed, post-colonial citizenship was reduced to subject hood. Hence 
citizenship in the post colonial era was reconstructed in such a way that the native 
became the native-citizen with all the privileges enjoyed by the settler citizens, 
while non-natives became subjects. Because citizenship was tied to land and 
indigeneity; hence belonging was defined as ethnic belonging. Hence exclusion 
was also tied to this. Belongingness was politically constructed to the date of 
independence, in many cases those who did not settle in a place before 
independence were seen as aliens, and those who were segregated before 
independence such as in settler communities of migrant workers such as the 
Sabon Gari (urban township) were also seen as settlers and non-natives. Hence 
they were alienated (Mamdani, 1996).
Suffice it to mention that at independence, African states searching for 
a new identity as nation-states were daunted with the task of wielding into a 
nation, the multi-lingua societies that were at different stages of socio-political 
development (Nzongola, 1987; Tordoff, 2002: 5). Ethnic groups with their
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different political orientations were brought together under one dominant state 
that rarely corresponded to pre-colonial social, cultural or geographical identity; 
or guided by the values and precepts of the indigenous societies (Clapham, 1997; 
Tordoff, 2002). The colonisers established the kind of territorial structures which 
they assumed to be a necessary or indispensable element of government 
(Clapham, 1997: 31). This had dire consequences for the future political 
directions, leadership and development of post-colonial African states including 
one-party systems, military regimes and adulterated liberal democracy as 
discussed below.
2.6 One Party system in Africa
Liberal democracy as discussed by Almond, Huntington Powell Jr; 
etc; assumes survival of democracy to depend on strong and sustainable political 
parties with the capacity to represent citizens and provide policy choices that 
demonstrate the ability to govern for the public good (Almond, 1960; Huntington, 
1968; NDI, 2005). The party system, according to Powell Jr. (1992) shapes citizen 
participation through the electoral activities. Some of the essences of political 
parties in a democracy according to Powell include building of political and civic 
organisations, safeguarding elections, and promoting citizen participation, 
openness, and accountability in government. Political parties’ dynamics in the 
view of Powell either inhibit or exacerbate turmoil and violence (ibid). In essence 
activities of political parties are portrayed as constituting major factors that shape 
the internal democratic processes including the violent political eruptions that 
plague Africa since the ‘third wave of democracy’.
In its observation of the liberal assumption of the political parties, 
National Democratic Institute (2005) reports that such assumption becomes 
questionable going by the increasing disconnect between citizens and their elected 
representatives on the one hand and between party members and their leaders on 
the other, a decline in political activism, a growing sophistication of anti­
democratic forces and continuous challenge of political parties by individuals and 
groups. This view was initially expressed by Clark when he posited that citizens,
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appeared to be engaged in political activities, but they are mere spectators as they 
only have few engagement opportunities in the political structures to 
communicate with national decision makers (Clark, 2004: 35-45).
In spite of these observed negative roles of political parties in a 
democracy; most of the literatures on the roles of political parties still anoint them 
as harbingers of stable democracy without taking into consideration that political 
context will shape the characters of the political institutions including political 
parties. Political parties in Africa, as argued in Chapter Six under “The Need for 
Neo-communitarian Government without Political Parties” are far from 
deepening democracy due to their autocratic leadership style, ownership, lack of 
internal democracy and sometimes their desperations of not only winning 
elections at all costs but to be involved in post-election government in an alliance 
arrangement. The idea of multi-party system was replaced by single party system 
either in a de facto or de jure forms. Political parties in Africa are observed to 
largely mean to serve the interests of state leaders while internal democracy and 
accountability remain alien to political parties and governance.
A strong factor often advanced by the protagonists for the justification 
of single party system is rooted in histories of African countries as continually 
shaping the political orientation of Africans and their capacity to manage their 
own democracy in a unique manner differently from the European assumptions. 
This, by implication means different from liberal democracy. Clarke nourishes 
this view by opining that most African societies continue to express collective 
cultural and religious identities to which majority of their citizens grant allegiance 
to (ibid: 8).
Clark ignores the fact the allegiance was elicited by the introduction 
of market economy and liberal democracy by the colonial authorities which 
compelled most African countries to galvanise their long standing ethnic, cultural
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and religious identities to confront the effects of the market economy and the 
entire colonialism. Members of these identity expressions readily grant strong 
allegiance to their ethnic and religious groups irrespective of their trades or 
professions. The common factor to all these groups was their political activism for 
independence and against indignity of the colonial rule. They constituted the 
bedrocks of the nationalist movements and political parties during the colonial 
era. After independence as reported by Gentili, the nationalist movements and 
political parties that derived their strengths from these groups substituted them 
with fresh mobilisation through bureaucratized and dogmatic cadres thereby 
closing opportunities for continuous grassroots mobilisation and effective 
participation’ through the ethno-religious groups (Gentili, 2005).
Going by Golder (2004), that there are two types of single party 
systems that developed in Africa. These are de jure single party states and the de 
facto single party states. The former were the countries that changed their 
constitutions so that only one political party was allowed in the country such as 
Moamah Gaddfi’s Libya. The latter are the countries that constitutionally allowed 
multi-party system but in reality there are dominant ruling parties that monopolise 
power and dominate all branches of government since independence. Though 
there are opposition parties but they are too fragmented and weak to pose any 
serious challenge to the ruling parties. In essence this category of countries 
maintains a pseudo-multi party arrangement. Botswana stands out in this wise.
Unfortunately the one-party systems leaders like Mobutu Sese Setko 
of Congo and Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe were unable to assert their legitimacy 
on the structure of power of the state due to what Frtiz and Rocha opine to be their 
inability to enforce policy throughout the state (Fritz and Rocha, 2007). Their 
governments according to Mann, lack the infrastructure power to penetrate the 
various ethnic nationality groups within their territories (Mann, 1986). The 
obvious fact here is that these leaders like their erstwhile colonial leaders ignored 
the history of their societies and continued the state-building project on the
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foundation laid by the colonial authorities. This in effect disconnected them from 
the masses thereby depriving them of a strong base of support. With the one-party 
state arrangement, the state -  building project in most of the post colonial African 
states became frayed.
It is pertinent to add that the single party posture of some of the post­
colonial African leaders could be traced to the fact that during the struggles for 
independence, single dominant political parties or movements were the vanguard 
of the struggles. Whereas, this posture was accepted by the people in order to have 
a united programme of action against colonialism. This exigency of the time was 
misconstrued as a favourable factor for the socialist single party by some 
nationalist leaders. This wrong assumption prompted some of the leaders who 
immediately after independence became patriarchs to start moulding paternalistic 
states from the post-independence societies. This was done by uniting the various 
pre-independence ethnic and religious movements behind the banner of a single 
party. Mamdani argues that such efforts disintegrated the groups and subordinated 
them to state ideology (1988).
The subordination was to ensure that no opposition is brooked and 
nobody could question the leader. Either de jure or de facto, single parties were 
proclaimed as the only legitimate representative institutions, derived from the 
struggle, able to dismantle the inheritance of colonial divide and rule institutions 
and policies. Political plurality and ethnic diversity were instantly defined as 
obstacles to nation building and national unity (Gentili, 2005). Kenneth Kaunda 
91974), a leading advocate of single party system advanced three reasons for its 
justification for Africa. These include, struggles for independence were carried 
out by the peoples with a common overriding will to throw off the yoke of 
colonial and oppressive foreign domination of their territories; the peoples of 
these various societies were not divided along class lines and the urgent desire to 
derive the promised dividends of independence, of “life more abundant”, 
development, economic self reliance and decent human life. Kaunda could
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hardly be faulted because the overriding will of deriving dividends of 
independence no doubt required a strong leader that could be trusted by the 
people.
The leadership of the independence vanguard parties or movements 
proved to be reliable in this direction, therefore the idea of multi-party 
competition immediately after the euphoria of independence was inconceivable. 
Kaunda in his Independence speech buttresses this perception by declaring that:
The people, through their Party, have wrested political power 
and control from foreign exploiters and are consolidating this 
major achievement in their hands. . . . Having attained 
independence, the people, through their Party, have proclaimed 
one-party participatory democracy as the only political system 
that could safeguard it (Kaunda, 1974: 9-11)
Contrary to Kaunda’s proclamation, single-party was observed to have 
failed in promoting democratic regimes. Democracy remained an unfulfilled 
promise, because the mode of power remained basically authoritarian and 
functioned on the basis of a hierarchy of networks and alliances with local tribal, 
ethnic constituencies, or top-down absolute sovereignty of institutions which 
helped to suffocate precisely the grassroots communities that had been the 
backbone of the process of national liberation.
For example, in spite of calls for unity, forgiveness and inclusion of 
all shades of opinions and colours by Mugabe in the new Zimbabwe, hardly two 
years into independence, the Korean-trained Fifth Brigade of the Zimbabwean 
National Army invaded Matebeleland whose inhabitants were denounced as anti- 
government dissidents who had to be crushed at all costs and in the process an 
estimated 20 000 people were killed. Two decades later, Zimbabwean President 
Mugabe denounced white Zimbabweans as enemies of the state who should be 
punished. He lent his support for the violent farm invasions that drove white
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farmers and farm labourers off the land. The same government also vilified Black 
Zimbabweans who were members of the Movement for Democratic Change 
(MDC) an opposition Party formed in 1999. They were labelled by the 
government as ‘sell outs’, ‘traitors’ and ‘puppets of the West’. Effective 
accountability and representation through popular democratic participation gave 
way to personal rule and eventually to single party dictatorships on the one hand, 
and to reliance on bureaucratic controls that fell victim to corruption, itself not 
unrelated to single party domination. At the risk of repetition, in the first thirty 
years of the post-colonial era, more than half of African countries experienced 
military rule except Botswana that maintained a pseudo-multiparty system.
2.7 Emergence of military rule in Africa
The military in Africa was never a part of anti-colonial movement but 
the colonial vestiges created by colonialists as machinery meant for suppressing 
popular anti-colonial resistance and to fight imperialist wars. The military as a 
patriotic national institution could have been an institution that can kick-start the 
reconfiguration of the state and the economic development due to the nature of the 
institution characterised by precise and timely response to situation and zero-level 
tolerance for indolence. However, as explained by Morris Janowitz (cited in 
Ikoku, 1985), and Huntington (cited in Adekanye, 1992) military intervention in 
Africa’s politics arises largely from the military social structures and politicisation 
of the military by the power elites thereby rendering its intervention as an 
aberration.
The newly independent African nations took over what were 
essentially colonial armies. The colonial legacy left the military as an institution 
that was not fully accepted by the African peoples because during the colonial 
struggles for independence, the general public and indigenous political leaders 
‘had developed an almost allergic fear and mistrust for soldiers’ (Wangome, 
1985). W.F. Gutteridge records that:
...nationalist politicians saw them as agents o f imperial rule
suppressing political demonstrations and protecting European
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property. Though they had won glory by serving overseas in 
the two world wars, their imperial activities caused them to be 
regarded in some quarters as armies o f occupation or at best as 
mercenaries in the service of a foreign power (Gutteridge,
1975: 6).
Momoh and Adejumobi expanded Gutteridge’s submission that from 
the onset, the African military was ‘intrinsically reactionary and pro-status quo’ 
(1999: 8). They averred that the military was treated with disdain and contempt 
and was never accorded any special consideration in the Africanisation process of 
the various services in the newly independent states. A visible evidence of this 
neglect reflected in the preference for Africanisation of the civil service while the 
leadership core and sometimes Officer Corps of the military were left for the 
expatriate officers. The initial disregard for the military institution later turned out 
to be the source of military’s consternation and attitude to the civil society and 
grievances against the state.
As Wangome (1965), observes in the entire tropical Africa, it was 
only the Sudan that, as at the time of independence, had a fair number of 
indigenous commissioned officers. This was due to the conscious efforts of the 
British in training local officers since 1918. Further illustrations show that as at 
the time of independence in March 1957, Ghana had the highest standard of 
education in the entire black Africa. In spite of this impressive position, however, 
only 10% of the commissioned officers were Ghanaians. The Belgian Congo had 
a total force well in excess of 24,000 men at independence. Yet there was not a 
single Congolese officer in the entire force. This state of imbalance or rather 
inequality was to contribute towards inciting a mutiny after independence. The 
army mutinies in Tanganyika and Uganda in 1964 were provoked by similar 
situations, besides there was the issue of salaries which Momoh and Adejumobi 
(ibid) reported to be paltry when compared with university and other 
professionals.
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Soon, many post-colonial governments found out that the military 
which had been despised and treated with contempt during the pre-independence 
and thereafter constituted a vital factor in their national unification agenda. They 
realised that the same military could be used to suppress political opposition and 
for projecting personal power. Though there were few occasions when the 
leadership of the military disliked the tendency by political leaders to use the 
military for personal political gains. This posture sometimes bordered on clash of 
personal or class interests of the military’s high command. Some scholars pointed 
to the period when President Nkrumah sent Ghanaian army to the Congo in 1960 
as part of the UN Peace Keeping Force. On several occasions Nkrumah was 
reported to have issued his own instructions to the Ghanaian contingent, and in the 
process contradicting what had already been issued by the United Nations 
Command. This practice was claimed to have frustrated the Ghanaian soldiers 
who saw it as an unnecessary intrusion of their professional responsibilities. This 
forced Nkrumah to withdraw his peacekeepers in Congo. His arguments are 
elaborately captured in his book titled “The Challenge o f the Congo ” (1967).
The military as a colonial legacy, harbours tribal imbalances in its 
recruitment and command structure, due to the colonialists' belief in 'martial 
tribes' or natural warriors. This imbalance was hardly corrected in some post­
colonial states such Nigeria where the Army started as what was known as the 
“Northern Constabulary” or better still the “Hausa Constabulary” and this was the 
nucleus of the British West African Frontier Force (WAFF). Some states 
compounded the situation by recruiting family members, kinsmen and party 
supporters into the military. Nepotism was so much embedded in the military to 
the point of becoming a potentially explosive political phenomenon that was later 
to cause a thirty-month civil war in Nigeria between 1967 and 1970. It also 
facilitated military coups and authoritarian rules in some of the post-colonial 
African states.
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The dreams of freedom and hope that greeted the independence of 
most of African countries in the late 50’s and early 60’s became shattered as 
many of the post-colonial civilian governments fell victims of military coups that 
swept across the continent within a decade of independence. Between January 
1956 and the end of 1985, Hutchful recorded sixty successful coups in Africa, that 
is, an average of two every year (Hutchful, 1991: 183).
In 1966 alone there were eight military coup d’etats and by 1986, out 
of some 50 African states, only 18 were under civilian rule (Nyong’O, 1998: 78). 
By 1975, as reported by Samuel Decalo in “Coups and Army Rule in Africa” 
(1976: 6) ‘approximately half of the continent's states were led by military or 
civil-military governments’. The period became the season of coup d’etat in 
African continent. Indeed, scholars such as Samuel Decalo refer to the first two to 
three decades after independence of most of the African countries as decades of 
coups in Africa because of the alarming spread of military putsch in the continent 
without any restraint.
Military coups became the order of the day in the ‘60s and ‘70s. The 
targets were nationalist regimes, which wanted to carve out an independent space 
and give their sovereignty a modicum of reality. Bloom emphatically stressed the 
manipulation and involvement of the USA and Belgium in the assassination of 
Patrice Lumumba (Blum, 1986: 174). A surrogate regime of Mobutu was put in 
place. The Congo, and its people, including, neighbouring states in Central Africa 
have since seen no peace. The government of Dr. Milton Obote in Uganda was 
overthrown by General Idi Amin Dada in January 1971. The reign of Emperor 
Haile Selassie in Ethiopia was halted by the military in September 1974. Kwame 
Nkrumah, who early realized the importance of continental unity and the curse of 
imperial exploitation through multinationals, was overthrown in a CIA engineered 
coup (Blum, 1986: 223). The regimes, as in Botswana, which for various reasons, 
escaped the fate of military take-over inevitably turned authoritarian one-party 
states under some or the other form of developmentalist rhetoric (Shivji 1986).
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From the second decade of independence it was clear that dissent and 
governments’ falling legitimacy were not only described by a wave of military 
coups d ’etat, but also by various forms of social and political struggles that could 
not be understood only in term of grievances rooted in the colonial past or in neo­
colonialism. By the end of that decade most of the African countries strangled by 
various political, economic and environmental crisis had no other option that to 
negotiate, from a position of weakness, stabilisation and structural adjustment 
programmes inspired by the primacy of market over state led growth.
The new military rulers often accused the political leaders of 
corruption, incompetence and mismanagement of the national economy leading to 
runaway inflation, geometrical increase in unemployment, crime rates and 
unaffordable prices of basic necessities of life. They make promises of returning 
the state to civil rule as if they ‘have something to teach the civilians about 
democracy and transition to civil rule’ (Momoh and Adejumobi, 1999: 5). The 
political leaders themselves also provided veritable opportunities for military 
coups as some of them were self-seeking, power-hungry and ambitious.
The get-rich-quick politicians continue to get richer while poverty 
keeps staring at the generality of the populace reducing the social structure of the 
society into haves and have not’s. Others were out experimenting on new and 
foreign ideologies in the name of African socialism. These were ideologies that 
had no bearing or relevance to the improvement of the lives of the ordinary man. 
Some of these governments started openly courting the Eastern bloc for advice 
and guidance to the irritation of the Western bloc of the Cold War. These were the 
kind of situations to be found in Ghana, Sudan, Somalia, Uganda and other 
countries when their governments fell to the military.
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These coups were justified by their leaders and apologists as the 
custodian responsibilities of the institution to prevent the state from disintegration. 
The ‘custodians of law and order’ argument became a familiar thesis for the 
soldiers to arrogate to themselves the role of watchdog of democracy and good 
governance. They quickly cash on political crisis, instability, simmering 
discontent or perceived malfeasance of the politicians to topple the government. 
In his subtle reaction to growing criticisms against military rule in Africa and 
justification for such rule, Olusegun Obasanjo an African officer and ex-military 
ruler in Nigeria, in “Africa Embattled’ (1988) claims military rule is an inevitable 
and necessary condition for progress and development in Africa. He argues:
We in Africa and the world we live in have to reconcile 
ourselves to the reality of the military as a factor of our nation- 
building process in the foreseeable future. Although our 
population is comparatively high, our utilizable skilled, 
experienced and trained manpower is severely limited...In a 
situation of inherent or recurrent instability, the advent of 
military government may be inevitable no matter what one 
wished in principle (Obasanjo, 1988: 7).
Even when there is no political crisis or instability, opines Obasanjo, 
the military must still be saddled with the administration of the state, nation 
building and development. His reason:
There may be an advantage in singleness of purpose of a good 
military administration in the formulation and execution of 
development programmes but, I do see a substantial advantage 
in the cohesive and integrative force generated from the 
interaction and interplay in active and healthy political activities 
which a military administration may not engender (ibid).
Although Obasanjo paints picture of the military as patriotic and 
required by Africans for progress and development. Unfortunately every available 
record on military government shows that more often than not, every military 
regime in Africa or elsewhere turned out to be more corrupt, oppressive and 
inefficient than the civilian governments they deposed. His misleading reasoning 
therefore tends to border on either historical ignorance or calculated attempt at
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shielding the true character of every military regime including his military 
administration in Nigeria between 1976 and 1979.
Awolowo, the first Premier of Western Nigeria and Presidential 
candidate of the Unity Party of Nigeria in 1979 and 1982 general elections had 
initially denounced progress and development’s justification of the military rule. 
He sees military regimes as oligarchs that derive their power not from the wish of 
the people but from an imposition of their own will on the people backed with 
force. He opines that some Aristocrats or Oligarchs may be dynamic quick and 
precise in taking decisions, and equally swift and thorough in implementing them, 
but what they gained through personal initiatives is completely negated by the 
basis and essence of the very system they operate. Awolowo explains further in 
his castigation of the military regimes that they may start well, but their selfish, 
nepotistic, elitist and corrupt nature will inevitably overshadow them until they 
lose their original mission and degenerate. Jimmi Wangome argues Awolowo’s 
contention of the military further:
...experience in Africa has shown that the military are no better 
than civilians when it comes to running governments. Rather 
than solve African contemporary political and socio-economic 
problems, military coups d’etat in Africa have tended to drive 
the continent into even further suffering and turmoil. This has 
been the case in Uganda, Ghana, Nigeria, Togo, Congo and 
several other African states (Wangome, 1985)
Obasanjo ruled Nigeria as a military leader between 1976 and 1979. His 
justification of the military rule therefore came as no surprise.
All the military regimes have brought about greater political 
instability which inevitably compounds any existing problem within the political 
environment. Having intervened in the political process, the military always fail to 
resolve the crisis of legitimacy and development which they have always accused 
the civilian regimes of. In fact, some of these problems were further compounded
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by the military leaders and this has most cases, led to fierce agitation for military 
disengagement from governance.
Also military regimes, as reported of the CIA engineered coup in 
Ghana (Blum, 1986: 223) and the ouster of Patrice Lumumba in Congo, are 
sometimes encouraged by the international capitalist powers as they are found 
suitable for responding to the demands of external interests and that they easily 
comply with the neo-liberal conditionality (Szeftel, 1989: 3). It is germane to 
explain that the same international community provides the military regimes in 
Africa with financial help even though such help is given with pressure for 
political and economic reforms. Shivji notes:
Behind virtually every coup was the hand of one or the other 
imperial power, and, more often than not, the US. Overthrowing 
nationalist regimes and installing tyrannical dictatorships was, 
then, a “fair game” for today’s champions of democracy and 
“good governance” (Shivji, 2002b)
The irony of the help is that most of the donors and other international 
partners seemingly feel reluctant to criticise the totalitarian postures of the same 
regimes and always willing to go along with them and as such rendering their 
pressure for reforms fake. It is where and when their economic interests are 
threatened by the policies of such regimes that economic and other measures such 
as support for the civil societies and NGOs are applied.
2.8 Liberal and Illiberal democracy in Africa
Understanding of how liberal democracy breeds illiberal government 
in Africa requires an understanding of the dual nature of liberalism. Democracy is 
though riddled with ‘a long and convoluted history’ (Plattner, 2010) but it is also a 
highly contested concept in the contemporary world. Democracy in its 
etymological term means government by the rule of the people which translates 
into government of the majority through free and fair elections in contemporary 
usage. That majoritarianism does not guarantee democracy is an incontestable
[76]
valid statement put forward by Leszek Kolakowski. In his words:
...the principle of majority rule does not by itself constitute 
democracy; we know of tyrannical regimes that enjoyed support 
of a majority... and the Iranian theocracy. We do not call 
democratic a regime in which 51 percent o f the population may 
slaughter the remaining 49 percent with impunity 
(Kolakowski, 1990: 6)
In modem democracy, a government is considered democratic if only 
it could guarantee the protection of individual and minorities’ rights and liberty. 
This guarantee is often stated in the constitution alongside the checks and 
balances mechanism that prevents arbitrary use of power, and ensures compliance 
with the rule of law. Democracy of this form is referred to as either liberal or 
constitutional democracy. The dual nature of liberal democracy lies in its 
protection of individual rights and compliance with majority rule. The feasibility 
of this in practice remains a daunting task especially in the contemporary world 
where ‘majority rule and the protection of individual rights almost always appear 
in tandem’ (Plattner, ibid). Pre-colonial African societies were not liberal in the 
sense of the OECD model, but democratic with checks and balances, and there 
was no evidence to show that they were evolving towards the OECD model of 
democracy with regular multi-party elections.
OECD model of democracy is a liberal constitutional democracy that 
negates the principle of government of the people but a hybrid arrangement where 
majoritarianism is modified by protection of minority and individual rights. This 
implies that liberal democracy while seeking to ensure the government of the 
people, also simultaneously limits the activities of such government through 
constitutional restraints from infringing on the rights of minorities and 
individuals. In essence, liberal democracy in its dual nature simultaneously 
pursues two separate goals that compete with each other and thereby putting it in 
perpetual tension. Plattner argues that ‘the nature of this tension was clearly 
understood at the founding moment of modem democracy’ (2010).
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Liberal democracy had a brief breath in Africa in 1980s when the 
multi-party democratic wave blowing across Eastern Europe and Latin America 
also emerged on the continent. The indigenous authoritarian regimes were forced 
by the popular demands in forms of civil societies supported by the West and 
donor agencies to concede some space for opposition in the political process. 
Unfortunately, the euphoria that accompanied the Africa’s search for ‘second 
independence’ (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1987) was short-lived because it was donor- 
driven. This recession was partly due to the absence of global fiscal munificence 
which made most of African states to slide back into political strife, dictatorship 
and military rule (Samuel Decalo, 1994). Western donors attributed this failure to 
leadership and therefore diverted their attention to the NGOs viewing such as 
catalyst for liberal democracy. They failed as argued by Bayart and his group, to 
accept that their efforts to combine the requirements of market economy with 
demands of popular sovereignty have been producing the noticed failures in spite 
of the substantial achievements in freedom of association and that of the press 
(Bayart et al, 1999).
Even in countries where there were regime change through popular 
movements such as Mali, Benin Republic, Congo and Zambia, once the new 
government was put in place, the element of continuity between the old and new 
regimes resurfaced. The new leaders, in the current system of international affairs, 
as further stressed by Bayart et al (1999), obliged to adhere to existing methods of 
economic accumulation and political control by the donor nations.
The stabilisation and structural adjustment reforms, inspired by the 
conviction that the root problem of African economies was excessive intervention 
of the state, were introduced. Starting at the beginning of the '80s, measures of 
import liberalisation, privatisation, budget stabilisation and financial regulations, 
all prerequisites to increase trade and capital flows. After a decade of structural
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adjustment it became evident that market liberalisation could neither improve the 
economic situation of the African countries but rather widen the gap of inequality 
in the African states. With the end of the Cold War at the beginning of the '90s 
economic liberalisation was to be supported and reshaped by democratisation 
processes and the promotion of institution building, "good governance" and rules 
and norms and capacity building.
Liberalism is thus fuelled by a combination of the requisites of the 
market economy and the conditions for mass governance. But unfortunately the 
market democracy that liberalism propagates, introduces complications in its 
concentration of the nation’s wealth in the hands of the few elites, while 
democracy on the other hand advocates for the mass involvement of the people in 
the governance of the state. The backlash of this development is the emergence of 
market-dominant elite and their foreign partners controlling the economy and 
numerically powerful but impoverished majority holding the key to political 
leadership. The relationship between the two groups sometimes in an antagonistic 
manner has always been detrimental to the survival of democracy and 
contributively to the political instability in Africa.
Africa has witnessed series of ethno-religious political crisis where the 
political elite have appealed to the ethnic or religious sentiments of the 
impoverished people of their regions to unleash attacks on the state or to subdue 
opposition from the ‘outsiders’ within the same state. The general antagonistic 
posture of the people irrespective of social background to the harsh effects of the 
SAP and IMF programmes has led to the collapse of governments and emergence 
of multi-party democracy in some post-colonial African states.
A prominent feature of democracy in liberalism is the periodic 
election on multi-party basis. Unfortunately the multi-party elections in Africa are 
based on the survival of political parties whose leaders have access to tremendous
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amount of material wealth and social influence. This therefore signals the fact that 
the appearance of multi party politics is not necessarily the same as democracy, 
but rather what Shivji refers to as ‘party-state’ (2002). Political parties are only 
concerned with securing victories at elections though unorthodox methods. The 
actual mobilisation of the citizen for specific demands is done primarily by social 
movements.
The integration of Africa into liberal political philosophy by the 
colonial administrations and later sustained by neo-colonialism, was perhaps for 
the breaking of the empire/kingdom power and opening of the economy and the 
societies for capitalist development. The neo-colonial sustenance of this intention 
was reinforced by Cliffe and Seddon’ submission that what the colonial 
administration really had in mind was that:
when western ‘donors’, the IMF and the World Bank, demand 
political pluralism and ‘good governance’ along with economic 
liberalism as conditions for assistance, as they are now doing, 
they have in mind the breaking of the state power and ‘opening 
up’ of the economy and society for capitalist development... 
what is required for the kind of capitalist development 
envisaged, however, is political stability rather than democracy 
(Cliffe and Seddon, 1991: 10).
Achieving political stability in the post colonial states was of 
paramount concern to the neo-liberal leaders, than democracy. This will require 
some force backed up by capital resources and an administrative capacity that also 
requires some deals with the local elites whose major preoccupation is primitive 
accumulation of capital in order to bolster their positions in the state. The two 
groups through this process established what Clapham (1997: 32) refers to as 
clienteles relationship with each other with the local elites becoming the eyes of 
the neoliberal operators in the post colonial states thereby deepening the reliance 
of local political authority on external resources.
The term illiberal democracy first appeared in the political lexicon 
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through Fareed Zakaria in his “The rise o f Illiberal Democracy” (1997) to 
describe the rise of a disturbing phenomenon where the ‘elected’ governments 
around the world are observed to be routinely ignoring the limits on their 
constitutional powers and depriving their citizens of basic freedoms. 
Characteristics of this phenomenon include shielding the activities of the ruling 
elite from the knowledge of the citizens either due to lack of civil liberties, 
deliberate ignorance of the constitutional provisions or lack or insufficient of legal 
constitutional frameworks to prevent such violation. Illiberal democratic societies 
are not societies where accountability is considered necessary or where 
deliberative policy is adopted for public issues. Even though regular elections are 
held to choose the political leaders but restriction on freedoms of speech, 
assembly and centralisation of powers in the hands of the leader and controlled 
media are all features of illiberal democracies. Illiberal regimes use economic 
pressure, red tape or violence to suppress opposition.
Holding of regular, free and fair elections remain the major bench 
mark by the west to determine whether a regime is liberal or illiberal democracy 
but there are situations where parties that were not pro-west won elections and the 
winners were prevented from ruling. Nigeria, Algeria and Afghanistan remain 
typical examples. There are also situations where pro-west political parties won 
elections whose results were sharply contested, and such regimes were judged to 
be democratic. Mobutu Seseseko’s regime in Congo clearly exemplified this. So 
what makes a regime liberal or illiberal goes beyond wining elections, it largely 
has to do with the degree of the fulfilment of all conditions set by the OECD 
model of democracy.
The pro-west condition heralds the second wave of illiberal 
democracy in the post-colonial African states where obsession for free and fair 
elections in a multiparty democracy, separation of powers and protection of 
freedom of speech, religion, assembly and property has ended up to produce low 
density democracy, failed states, professional civil societies, and political crisis.
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Halperin et al (2005: 10) raised a vital objection to the classification of 
regimes as illiberal democracy by stating that a democracy that lacks or stifles 
opposition could not be judged illiberal but non-democratic. Levitsky and Way 
(2002) wrestled with such classification and registered an objection. They 
emphasise that classifying some states as illiberal is faulty because it gives the 
impression that these states desire to be democratic but something went wrong 
with the process. Most post-colonial African states that could be classified as 
illiberal democracy are never truly democratic and not developing towards such 
because they are force-based and always employ series of strategies including use 
of the state repressive apparatuses to destabilise, suppress or hack opposition in 
spite of conducting regular elections. Nigeria serves as a veritable example of a 
‘democratic’ state where democracy has been replaced with ‘competitive 
authoritarianism’ (Levitsky and Way, ibid).
Africa being a weaker actor in the global political economy but 
considered by the superpowers to be of strategic importance to the cold-war bi­
polar competition between USA and USSR, made the continent to be subjected to 
various external influences that shape the leadership orientation and direction. The 
two superpower blocs sought to establish monopolising spheres of influence 
within Africa in a manner that will prevent their opponents from doing so. As 
argued by Wiseman, ‘in pursuit of this aim, both superpowers were willing to 
reward compliant regimes with economic support, and military hardware even 
those regime chose to act in oppressive manner towards their domestic 
population’ (Wiseman, ed; 1995: 3).
The exit of the USSR from the international arena created a post-cold 
war trend of unipolar dominance of neo-liberalism with an unrestrained super­
power that undermines the very basis of democracy. This trend represents the 
renewal of colonisation of Africa in a neo-colonial form. It is a trend accompanied
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by some economic and political conditions that imprison democracy within the 
ultra capitalist ideological paradigm. While colonialism installs autocracy in 
Africa, the neo-colonial project consolidates such rule by maintaining the 
economic relationship that preserves unrestrained flow of wealth from Africa to 
the West. The post-Cold War unipolar World Order, though shares anti­
democracy posture with, but more ferocious in its political agenda than, classical 
colonialism.
The emergence of dictatorship regimes in post-colonial Africa 
summarised above appeared to have resulted from the conjunction of wide range 
of factors which combined to promote such leadership style. On a critical look, it 
becomes clearer that the global political economy in which the struggle for 
democracy in Africa has taken place remains the underlying factor for the rise and 
sustenance of the post-colonial dictatorships in Africa
2.9.0 Popular struggles for democracy and crisis of transitions in Africa
This section concentrates on illuminating the blind spot in the 
contemporary discourse of democracy in Africa for three main reasons. The 
section brings to focus the mis-presentation of the civil society groups’ struggles 
for multi-party democracy in Africa as the only entry point into understanding of 
struggles for democracy by the African peoples. The popular protests against 
undemocratic policies, ethnic militia or religious insurgencies, violence reactions 
to election results etc are yet to be seen as worthy entry points to discourse of 
popular struggles for democracy in Africa. They are rather condemned as 
‘primordial, illegitimate, or backward (fundamentalist, tribalist etc) (Shivji, 2002: 
8). This condemnation not only prevents us from understanding the forms and 
ideologies of the peoples’ resistance to their daily oppression and marginalisation 
and how this resistance affects the politics of the state but also deprives us ‘of an 
important piece of locally generated knowledge, values and cultures’ (ibid).
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The boomerang effect of this neglect is well represented by the crisis 
upsurge in the North Africa starting from Algeria and later spread to Egypt and 
Libya. This error of misconception is a product of post-Cold War neo-liberal 
discourse of democracy, which of course tends to ‘emasculate democracy of its 
social and historical dimensions; and presents it as an ultimate nirvana’. The 
section corrects the wrong impression by arguing for a consideration of the 
current trends of religious riots, violence reactions to electoral injustice, 
emergence of ethnic militia demanding for equitable distribution of national 
resources and services to the neglected areas of the state etc as forms of popular 
struggles for democracy. This correction is followed by an explanation of how the 
wrong perception contributes to crises of transitions. The central argument here is 
that although democratic transitions remained endangered in Africa, there is 
nothing that makes democracy un-African or that makes Africans ungovernable as 
long democracy is allowed to germinate from the grains of best-practice as against 
the imported ‘best-fit’ principles of the grand theories.
The civil society in the forms of the modem NGOs, workers’ unions, 
students’ associations etc provided the platforms for the articulation of the 
peoples’ resentment but the main drive of the struggles for democracy lies in the 
spirit and determination of the people to reject all forms of oppression and enforce 
their ineffable right to control the decisions that determine their daily lives and 
future prospects. As a corollary to this view, how liberal democracy lubricates the 
involvement of the civil society groups is considered. Contributions of African 
scholars and why they failed to address the issue of democratisation earlier than 
the post-cold war period also constitute a major part of the section. Finally, the 
section explains the crisis of transitions and the challenges of the African states in 
their attempt at coping with these crises.
There is need for us to appreciate that the battle for people to have 
control over their own lives, destiny, and information has been in an ongoing 
collision course with authoritarian instruction in human history. The popular
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struggles for democracy in Africa are no exceptions to this collision course. They 
are emancipatory political struggles aim at state reconstitution, participation and 
self determination that never terminated in the struggles for independence or the 
‘second wave’ of democracy. These struggles represent emancipatory demands 
that arise from the spirit of nationalism through which every identity group 
demands for equal economic, social and political opportunities and active 
promotion of the welfare of their people.
As argued about two hundred years ago by Mancini (1851: 65) that 
the nationalities which do not have the opportunity to determine how they are to 
be governed but are subjected to laws imposed upon them from outside have 
become means for the purposes of others and, therefore mere objects. Mancini’s 
argument remains relevant in our contemporary world as every nation strives to 
attain self determination, i.e. the right that constitutes a consistent expression of 
struggle against all forms of oppression and exploitation. The popular struggles 
for democracy in the African states are in line with Mancini’s position as they 
reflect the spirit of the innermost life in man, which according to Post (1991: 36) 
is to enjoy the ineffable right without distinction of gender, race, nation or class 
and to control the decisions that determine their daily lives and future prospects.
In the light of the above and going by the colonial heritage, it is 
apparent that the democratic deficits in the colonial and post-colonial African 
states provide the determinate conditions for these popular struggles in the first 
instance. As discussed somewhere else, African traditional societies were 
gradually evolving into modem states in the forms of empires and kingdoms 
during pre-colonial period, the post-colonial African states did not result from the 
sequence of these ‘historical developments and cumulative experiences’ 
(Nyong’O, 1987: 17) rather they are “a ‘hand-me-down’ phenomenon in many 
respects” (ibid). In essence, the post-colonial states being artificially created by 
the colonial rulers, sustained the institutions and apparatuses used by the 
preceding colonial regimes to exercise political powers and the kind of social
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relationships required for the daily reproduction of liberal capitalism which has 
been equated with democracy in the neo-liberal discourse.
The post-colonial states could hardly stand up to their own traditional 
historical analyses because their structures are mostly heirs of liberal capitalist 
democracy that has nothing to do with communal values of African traditions. 
Their political realms as recorded by Gentili, (2005) witnessed the promotion of 
the rules of plurality in the form of liberal democracy through multiparty elections 
and building of the “appropriate” institutions such as the adoption of the rule of 
law and promotion of civil society as sine-qua-non for the democratisation 
processes. This approach was regarded as the ‘best practice’ of democracy.
Mundy and Murphy (2006) nourished the argument of ‘best practice’ 
further with a submission that democracy requires more than formal establishment 
of certain rights, institutions and procedures - important as these are - but also the 
consolidation of the social relations which support these. Such support according 
to Mundy and Murphy includes the development of an educated middle class and 
a framework of civil institutions. The best practice assumption of liberal 
democracy however seems to ignore that to be different in democracy does not 
necessarily mean to be right or wrong. Democracy is very flexible and it is this 
flexibility that makes it highly complex.
Every system develops the mechanism to manage context with 
knowledge in a peculiar manner. The idea of developing educated middle class 
and a framework of civil institutions for the purpose of establishing democracy 
cannot be assumed out of context. The process of developing this class and its 
usage is determined by the context which may not necessarily be uniform. Any 
popular struggle for democracy that adopts the ‘best practice’ approach outside 
the context of the community even when the people think that ‘this is not the way 
we do it here’ will end up disconnecting the people from their peculiar context.
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This is where the free market institutions becomes inappropriate by 
forcing the idea of liberal democracy on African states with a compliance strategy 
of the IMF and World Bank using civil societies to orchestrate the process. The 
states are therefore left with the feelings that their opinions and thought do not 
matter. And they are right to feel that way. The problem of liberal democracy lays 
in its global exchange of best practice ideas to determine the brand of democracy 
relevant to the collective ‘us’.
Development of educated middle class may be relevant in some 
contexts and it may be irrelevant in others. There should be collaboration, which 
is the flow and placement of our knowledge within the context of our community. 
This is where ‘best fit’ surpasses the ‘best practice’ assumption of liberal 
democracy. It is also the best-fit that accounts for different strategies and 
outcomes of popular struggles for democracy in Algeria, Egypt and Libya. 
The Libyans unlike the Egyptians and Tunisians completely dismantled the 
former regime’s apparatus through a six month bitter fighting and popular 
struggle that gave the rebels control of the country having defeated Col. Gaddafi’s 
security and military forces with the support of NATO. The destruction of the 
regime’s security and military forces, capturing of the weaponry and military 
equipment and the total takeover of the country rather than the toppling of its head 
as in Algeria and Egypt makes the Libyan struggle a revolution as opposed to the 
revolts in Tunisia and Egypt. This view is further reinforced by the fact that the 
country’s new leadership have opportunity to control the nation’s economic assets 
and be able to shape economic policies unlike Egypt and Tunisia where the former 
economic players remain in place and retain their operations while protesters 
struggle to ensure that their dream of political freedom and enhanced economic 
opportunity becomes reality.
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The toppling of Messrs. Zine El Abedine Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak 
respectively was relatively quick and peaceful compared to the drawn out and 
bloody battle that ensued between the forces of the TNC and Col. Gaddafi’s. The 
struggles in Algeria and Egypt left the infrastructure of the former regimes in 
place and in the case of Egypt put the military which has been part of the 
country’s political power structure for the past six decades in charge of its 
transition to democracy. As a result, both Egypt and Tunisia are still struggling 
with limited success to limit, if not block, elements of the former regimes and 
political forces that operated under it from playing dominant roles in their 
country’s future.
2.9.1 African scholars and popular struggles for democracy in Africa
Political crises in African states have proved wrong the assumption of 
liberal democracy that having regular multi-party elections will guarantee the 
establishment of a democratic state. In the liberal democracy parlance, no state 
can be said to be democratic if it does not hold these regular elections according to 
a set of rules that are regarded as fair, especially by the ‘international observers’ to 
the political parties involved.
Even when these rules, processes and institutions of the elections are 
manipulated to advantage of the ruling party and the elections are fraught with 
ffaudulence. Once the elections are conducted as and when due by the state 
regardless of these deformities, multi-party democracy satisfactorily endorses the 
results with pomp and pageantry. African scholars are not favourably disposed to 
this view. Mafeje in his submission in “Democracy, Civil Society and Governance 
in Africa‘\\9 9 9 ) roundly debunked the assumption of equating multi-party 
elections with democracy in Africa. He based this submission on the fact that 
popular struggles for democracy in Africa have been subjected to the ‘perversion 
or appropriation by more articulate interlocutors who ranged from imperialist
[88]
agents, liberals of all sorts to intellectual opportunists’. In his words, he explains 
that
...it is important to note that the ordinary citizens who were 
responsible for what became known as “the popular movement 
for democracy in Africa” knew exactly what they were 
objecting to, but they did not know with the same clarity what 
they wanted. Thus their popular slogans were open to 
conflicting interpretations, depending on who the interlocutors 
were. For instance, objection to one party autocracy got 
interpreted as “multi-party democracy” democratic pluralism 
got construed as “liberal democracy”, and local autonomy as 
“participatory democracy”, which got associated with 
development without saying what type of development 
(Mafeje, 1999: 4).
These misinterpretations by the various careerists’ civil society groups 
as argued by Mafeje provided some advantages such as providing ground for a 
socially-informed debate among the African intellectuals from 1986 to date.
Taking a queue after Mafeje was Jephias Mapuva who in “Challenges 
to the Democratisation Process in Africa” (2010) drew attention to the fact that it 
was not until the intensification of popular struggles for democracy in the 1970s 
and 1980s that African scholars started paying sufficient attention to the question 
of democracy in Africa. Initially, African scholars were not unduly worried about 
“one-party state” or “parti-unique” but more about the failures of the African 
states to deliver the promises of independence (Mafeje, ibid). Before 1980 most 
African scholars were pre-occupied with the Cold War effects on the 
underdevelopment of Africa, ideological competition between capitalism and 
Marxism and the role of workers and peasants in development (Mafeje, 1998).
The Cold War confrontation not only “disfigured” the liberation and 
democratic discourse in Africa, it turned the newly and fledging independent 
states into pawns, and the continent into a chessboard, of proxy hot wars. The
[89]
consequences of those hot wars have been devastating for the continent. Though 
these scholars were completely oblivious of the growing disillusionment that were 
associated with these failures but the disillusionment reached an articulated 
crescendo in the 1980s when the euphoria that greeted independence had 
completely evaporated with enactment of draconian ‘legislations and policies 
reminiscent of the colonial period’ (Mapuva, ibid).
Prior to these events, it was generally believed that the ‘progressive’ 
African leaders who were commonly referred to as the ‘Monrovia Group’ 
comprising of Kwame Nkrumah, Sekou Toure, Modibo Keita etc could bring 
independence to its fruition irrespective of whether they were advocates of one- 
party state or multi-party. The underlying reason for this conviction was that the 
independence movements led by these leaders were popular, diverse and mass 
based movements that gave the people rays of hope in an independent state. A 
salient point to be emphasised here is that these social movements especially the 
ethnic groups were not as homogenous as the African leaders assumed them to be. 
The unifying factor for the various movements in the independence struggles was 
the desire to be free from bondage and not to escape the foreign bondage and be 
trapped in its domestic variance.
It was when the popular trust in these leaders began to dwindle due to 
some remarkable economic and social events between 1970s and 1908s that the 
African scholars began to examine the democratic credentials of their states and 
leaders. Somewhere else the issue of Africa’s statelessness is fully addressed. This 
becomes vital as it compels the examination of why the states failed to prevent the 
popular struggles for democracy after independence.
The remarkable events of the 1980s were unprecedented since the 
colonial struggles for independence. These events swept through the Africa
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continent forcing changes in political arrangements and leading to multi-partyism, 
and political pluralism, a new emphasis as stressed by Hyden and Bratton and 
corroborated by Mamdani and Wamba dia Wamba, on the importance of human 
rights, dialogue between political opponents, and the liberalisation of the post­
colonial politics (Hyden and Bratton, 1992; Mamdani and Wamba dia Wamba, 
1995). The events included the reactions of the people to the attempts by the post­
colonial rulers at protecting their profligacy.
In achieving this, Shivji (1989), explains that the post-colonial rulers 
put in place laws and policies to protect themselves and their illegitimate financial 
squeeze. Wamba dia Wamba (1991) and Mafeje (1999), see such protection as 
resulting in governments not only losing legitimacy but shrinking the support base 
of the rulers to a narrow circle of trusted friends, kinsmen and ethnic associates all 
of whom had survived on the political patronage of the ruling elite. This situation 
as argued by Mafeje (ibid) effectively elicits large-scale upheavals and struggles 
for democracy from below. Democracy from thereon assumes a new dimension in 
Africa with challenges. The popular struggles are articulated by the civil society 
groups to revolve around three major issues. These as highlighted by Mafeje 
(1998) are, the quest for multi-party democracy as against one-party arrangement, 
power devolution and decentralisation from the centre to greater local autonomy 
and respect for rule of law and human rights by the African governments.
Although, these demands reflect the level of revulsion of the 
generality of the African peoples against the states governments whose leaders 
have become progressively oppressive and ruthless dictators (Mafeje, 1998), 
plunged their economies into crisis and their states into political abyss (Mapuva, 
ibid). If the military is an aberration, why can’t the civil societies fill the vacuum 
by being the vanguard for the state and economic reconstruction? African scholars 
were unanimous in their conclusion as put forward by Mandaza and Sachikonye 
(1991), that democracy is any phenomena based on participation of common
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citizens in political debates and consultation on democratic decision-making. 
There is a vital point left unaddressed by Mandaza and Sachikonye, which is how 
the citizens are to be involved in the decision making process. Whether they are to 
participate directly or through political parties make their conclusion a little bit 
unclear. However the conclusion still serves as a contrast to bureaucratic or 
technocratic decision-making based on the assumption that those that are affected 
by a given decision have the right to participate in the making of such decision. 
Bingu Wa Mutharika (1995) points out a likely hitch in this assumption that
...the masses can still be oppressed by the system or excluded 
from the decision-making process by the same system they have 
installed and that human right abuses can still take place even 
under plural democracy’.
The fear expressed by Bingu Wa Mutharika was what Mapuva (2010) 
opines to have taken African democratic debates to a level resulting in the 
incorporation of civil society as the most appropriate catalyst and promoter of 
democratic institutions. But does this solve the problem? In line with Mutharika’s 
(1995) expression, the multi-party democracy creates some democratic challenges 
to post-colonial African states due to its inherent contradictions and the class 
structures in the liberal state. For example, the conventional first-past-the-post 
method of determining the winner in an election assumes a new dimension with 
supplementary or run-off elections appearing in the African political lexicon. This 
is a situation where a winner is regarded to have won an election but not with 
sufficient votes to be declared the winner. This was the case in Zimbabwe in 
March 2008 when the opposition won the elections and the same scenario was 
observed in Nigeria May 2011 when an opposition won a governorship election in 
Imo state and another opposition candidate won a Senatorial election in Enugu 
state but their elections were declared inconclusive by the Independent Electoral 
Commission.
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A new political jargon dubbed Coalition or Government of National 
Unity (GNU) appears in African political dictionary. This is a political 
arrangement that exposes a weak side of liberal democracy. GNU which is most 
visible in Zimbabwe, Kenya and Nigeria (federal level only) is an arrangement 
where both the winners and losers of an election combine to form the post­
election government. This arrangement is evident in Zimbabwe with ZANU-PF 
and Movement for Democratic Change, also in Nigeria in 1999 between PDP, AD 
and ANPP. This arrangement does not only short-changed the electorates but also 
forced the winners to share the stage with losers (Mapuva, ibid) thereby depriving 
the electorates the right to determine their ultimate leaders and representatives 
through the ballot box. The GNU is a ploy to relief the ruling government of 
vibrant opposition and to turn the state into another form of one-party 
arrangement.
These amendments to liberal democracy are parts of the responses of 
the African elites to the failures of liberal democracy in addressing the political 
peculiarities of the African societies. They are also a reflection of the basic 
agreements among the elites in spite of their disagreements, on the fundamentals 
of the existing economic system and vision of a democratic order. Allocation of 
offices and resources, as evident in their formation of alliances and governments 
of national unity is more paramount than deepening democracy.
2.9.2 The role of civil societies in democratic process
The overall goal of this section is to examine the significance of the 
civil society group in the democratisation process in order to determine whether it 
represents a new dawn or false hope in Africa’s democratic actuality and state- 
building. Much of the section tends to focus on (and question) the influence of 
civil society, both as it directly influences democratic development, and as it 
constructs a global interpretation of, and set of responses to worldwide democratic 
needs. This becomes necessary because of the dwindling fortunes of the African 
states in spite of the changing nature of the political space with convincing
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evidence that an increasingly strong and complex array of non-governmental 
actors and new non-governmental organisations both at domestic and global levels 
is emerging and sometimes assumed to be shaping the democratisation process in 
Africa.
Critique of the state domination of public life, the renewed interest of 
the economic superpowers in the global democracy and globalization, the 
persistent agitation by the domestic societies for economic and political changes 
and the transfer of the determination of political initiatives from the state actors to 
non-state actors have collectively brought the concept of civil society and its role 
in democratisation process and governance into prominence in social theory. This 
development reflected in the democratic wave that blew across sub-Saharan 
Africa in 1980s where mass organisations effected changes in governments in 
Benin Republic and Cameroon and of recent in the Arab Spring.
What are actually propelling the popular struggles in Africa are not 
the civil society groups as being presented by the liberal and neo-liberal scholars 
but the frustrations of the people by the failures of the liberal states to provide the 
basic necessities of life several years after independence. Civil society groups 
only catch on the opportunities provided by the aggregate of angers of the peoples 
against the state to provide pseudo-professional or professional platforms where 
such angers could be better articulated.
Civil society became prominent in Western social sciences when the 
contemporary social scientists first used the term to describe the democratization 
wave blowing across the globe immediately after the demise of the Soviet Union 
which in itself signals the end of the Cold War. In fact, some neo-Tocquevillians 
affirmatively concluded with the cliche: no civil society, no democratization 
(Perez, 1993; White, 1996; Bermeo and Nord, 2000). Their claim emanates from
[94]
the hostile conditions of authoritarian rule with energetic associational life 
comprising independent, voluntary organizations distinct from the state, economy 
and family which would trigger democratic development by challenging 
autocratic leaders and forcing the state to accept liberal reforms (Sean, 2005). The 
bedrock for this assertion was the mass protests against the long years of 
repression by the authoritarian rulers in Central and Eastern Europe, Latin 
America, East Asia and Sub Sahara Africa. These protests were accompanied by 
spontaneous bouts of political actions by civic groups who persistently organized 
mass resistance against authoritarian regimes.
The persistence and the force of the popular forces compelled the 
power elite to initiate some populist changes and pacts that eventually snowball 
into full-fledged institutional transition towards electoral democracy (Diamond, 
1999).
Some political theorists such as Bunce, Lewis and Koo traced the role 
of civil society in the collapse of autocratic regimes all over the world and 
concluded that civil society facilitated and orchestrated democratic development 
by restraining state coercion and seeking international support for democratic 
reforms (Bunce, 2003; Koo, 2000; Lewis, 1992). Hence by the middle of 1990s, 
as revealed by Freedom House, there emerged consensus among the liberal 
political theorists that a dynamic civil society remained a sine qua non of 
democratization because available evidences indicated that civil-resistance (non­
violent opposition in form of protests, strikes and boycotts) played a prominent 
role in driving out 50 of 67 transition governments from authoritarian rule 
(Freedom House, 2005). By the turn of twentieth to twenty-first century, the 
development of civil society has become a significant criterion of the development 
of democracy. Now let me go back to Africa to explain the pre and post 
independence nature of civil society groups.
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In spite of its pre-eminence in the political discourse in Western social 
sciences immediately after the Cold War, activities that could be described as civil 
society in the African political discourse it could also be traced to various social 
forces in the struggles against authoritarianism and colonialism. It is apposite to 
posit here that civil society in Africa has long been associated with decolonisation 
and subsequent independence of the colonial states. They were then characterised 
by the development of powerful popular movements in most African colonies 
when large number of organised workers entered the arena of political activity 
(Mamdani, 1990) in collaboration with other ethnic based social movements.
Immediately after independence many of the civil societies in the 
post-colonial Africa were co-opted, suppressed or out-rightly outlawed by the post 
colonial leaders (Kafsir, 1976). The current explosion of the civil society therefore 
seems novel because of the “protests season” against authoritarian dictatorships in 
Africa from the late 80s which provided the opportunity for political activism in 
the ‘third wave of democratization” (Huntington, 1991). Civil societies now 
become the most vocal opponent to authoritarian regimes and also the “cutting 
edge of the effort to build a virile democratic order” (Diamond, Linz and Lipset, 
1985; p.26). Some observers believe that the survival and consolidation of the 
new democracies is predicated on a civil society that is active in delimiting the 
state dominance (Harberson, et al; 1994; Gymah-Boadi, 1996).
Unfortunately most contributors to the debates of civil society in the 
African democratisation process are not free from the liberal dispensation. They 
concentrate more on the sustenance of the present post-colonial states with the 
active involvement of civil societies without giving sufficient attention to the 
characters of such states and the civil societies. The liberal dispensation 
emphasises liberal democracy's condition for the state to regularly produce 
government through free and fair election, while civil society should be able to 
enjoy civil and political rights and associational autonomy (Mercer, 2002).
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Edwin Madunagu in his “Dialectics o f Structures and Governance” 
published in the Guardian of 11 August, 2011 explicitly states the two sides of the 
liberal dispensation as a near-fully-privatised and commercialised, capitalist 
economy that progressively deepens and spreads mass poverty; and competition 
between large political parties that often lay claim to series of democracy. These 
two sides of the liberal dispensation are inseparable. Because of the Siamese 
relationship between liberal capitalism and liberal democracy, it becomes 
extremely necessary for us to be careful when picking any of the sub-elements 
such as civil society in articulating a programme of radical transformation. Why? 
Madunagu provides an answer that however “democratic” or “reasonable” any 
element of this economic and political dispensation may appear, it will still be 
affected by the liberal value.
Any radical social transformation must therefore be insulated from 
this effect of liberal value. Contributions of the civil society groups to the 
democratisation process are unfortunately heavily underpinned by the liberal 
capitalist ideology. A strong and plural civil society is regarded as a sin qua non 
for the protection against the excesses of state power and also to legitimize the 
authority of the state when it is based on the rule of law (Diamond, 1994).
Most contributors seem to ignore the fact that the nature and character 
of civil society will also be shaped by the character of the state. They sometimes 
confuse the phenomenal growth of nongovernmental organizations in Africa in 
the 1980s with the desire of the African peoples for democracy. They, in the 
process, got infected with the liberal virus which blind their view from seeing that 
it was the shift of attention of the western nations from the state (after it has 
become glaring that the client-state could no longer effectively protect the interest
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of capital as envisaged on the eve of independence), to non- governmental 
organizations for multi-party democratisation process.
The shift of attention became part of the conditions for financial 
support by the donor agencies. These two factors especially increased availability 
of large scale donations and funding, collectively account for the sudden 
emergence of so many non-governmental organizations in Africa since 1980s. So 
taking a deeper view of the global recognition of civil society as the institutional 
vehicle for democratic actuality will reveals the real intention of neo-liberal 
institutions that mediate through their collective instruments of intervention -  
IMF, the World Bank and donor agencies (Mercer, 2002) which of course is the 
consolidation of liberal multi-party democracy. However the assumption of the 
liberal scholars that civil society aids democratic process because it expands and 
strengthens political sphere by bringing more actors into the political arena 
became suspicious in Africa because the mere existence of civil society does not 
translate to involvement in the democratic process.
Presently the World Bank recognises the role of civil society in 
articulating the people’s aspirations and mounting pressures on government to 
yield to popular demands (2000: 43). Civil society is seen as playing different 
roles at different stages of democratic development such as democratic transition 
and democratic consolidation (Diamond, 1994; Diamond et al, 1995; 1997). In the 
former, civil society’s chief role is to mobilize popular pressure for political 
change; hence it constitutes a crucial source of change (Diamond, 1994: 5), 
whether this takes place quickly and dramatically as in the assertion of ‘peoples 
power in the Philippines in 1986 or whether the transition is a lengthy, negotiated 
process, as in South Africa as in early 1990s (Mercer, 2002).
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In consolidating democracy, civil society is considered to have a 
crucial role to play especially in checking abuses of state power, preventing the 
return of authoritarians to power, creating room for wider citizen participation and 
public scrutiny of the state and these enhance state legitimacy. This crucial role 
perhaps informed Diamond (1994: 7) to emphasize that a vibrant civil society is 
more essential for consolidating and maintaining democracy than for initiating it. 
It is on this basis that the World Bank premised its assumption that an active civil 
society will aid decentralization, encourage wider participation at the grassroots 
and across all sectors of society especially in an ethnically divided society and 
reduce the scope for autonomous government actions (2000). Civil society could 
in this wise be regarded as a force that underpins an effective and streamlined 
state, ensures legitimacy, accountability, and transparency and effectively 
strengthens the state’s capacity for good governance (Mercer, 2002).
In the light of these arguments it is evidently clear that liberal 
democracy allows both state and civil society though as separate but essentially 
complimentary to each other. This therefore implies, as Baker concludes, that civil 
society can only exist in relationship to the state and not a potentially democratic 
sphere in its own right through which alternative ideology might be pursued 
(Baker, 1997). The ideological differentiation between the public civic realm and 
the private realm (Schumpeter in Oyewole, 1987) blurred the social configuration 
of the civil society. It is a captive of state ideology. The post-colonial civil society 
groups in Africa were mostly engaged in the pursuit of democratisation projects 
(Ikelegbe, 2001) that are mainly liberal multi-party democracy, through persistent 
struggles against the oppressive, dictatorial, repressive regimes and more 
importantly against the state violation of individual and collective rights 
(Makumbe, 1998).
The most important factor underlying the popular struggles for 
democracy in Africa but which the liberal interlocutors fail to address is the
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production and reproduction of the existing conflict laden class system by the 
post-colonial states and the socio-economic structure that underlies the post­
colonial liberal states (Abdelali Doumonu, 1987: 48). Any attempt at analysing 
these popular struggles from the civil society perspective, without taking into 
consideration the analysis of the liberal states and their inherent social classes will 
result in a deformed opinion.
Point must be taken of the fact that in any society, social 
differentiations do not emerge from ‘relations within civil society but from 
relations with the state’ (ibid). Post-colonial African states are victims of ‘double 
historicity’ which increases their vulnerability to crisis in any form. Firstly, they 
still accommodate the histories of their pre-colonial political societies which are 
living products of their own particularism and secondly, the history of their 
integration into the free market economy and liberal democracy that guide the 
transition of the colonial to post-colonial states and exerted the liberal state 
structures over the pre-colonial political structures.
Civil society cannot be exonerated from having damaging effects on 
the consolidation of democracy especially where there is severe socio-economic 
inequalities, corruption, an ineffective legal system, lack of democratic culture, 
ethnic or regional differences etc civil society would be weak and become a 
potential problem for the consolidation of democracy (Diamond eat al, 1995; 
1997). All the assumptions on the positive roles of civil society groups in the 
democratic struggles will become problematic whenever they are confronted by 
the ideological underpinnings and sometimes the complex realities of the 
organisations in the civil society and their relationships with the wider social, 
economic and cultural contexts. These factors alone make it very difficult for the 
generalization of the political roles of the civil society as assumed by most of the 
liberal scholars.
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2.9.3 Crises of transitions in Africa
African states are still undergoing crisis of development which other 
continents had gone through. In addition to this the continent is also facing the 
challenges of political transitions in general and regime transition crises in 
specific. Regime transition refers to a shift from one set of political procedure to 
another or from an old pattern of rule to a new one as the current situation in 
Libya. Indeed, it is the most colourful aspect of political transition because it adds 
activity and glamour to the whole process; yet it can be the most stressful, 
turbulent, tensed period. This is because it results in uncertainties among 
individuals and groups, through the opening up of new opportunities for political 
access, ascent and competition, as well as for venting grievances, conflicts, hatred 
and seeking redress of some hitherto perceived injustice, such as marginalization.
Transition crises in Africa are rooted in both the internal and external 
causes. Internally, transitions in Africa are caused by inter-ethnic conflicts or 
ethnic grievance against the state. Externally, the interference of some super 
powers before, during and after the Cold War remains a strong factor. Therefore, 
transitions crisis in Africa may not be entirely blamed on identity conflicts as 
many contributors will want the world to believe, but the external forces’ “voice 
of Esau and hand of Jacob” manipulation and collaboration
Transitions in the Africa have thrown up two types of rulers. These 
are those over-staying and those under-staying their tenure. The over-staying 
leaders are those that used their privilege of power to endlessly elongate their 
rules in the state. For instance, Tanzania President, Julius Nyerere, ruled for 24 
years (1961-1986); Kenya’s President, Jomo Kenyatta, ruled for 15 years (1963- 
1976); followed by President Arap Moi, who had 24 years (1978-2002). Julius 
Nyerere of Tanzania also ruled for 24years before getting tired and retired. Mr 
Mugabe has been ruling Zimbabwe since independence in 1980 (31 years). Libya’s 
Ghadafi ruled from 1969 before being swept aside by the NATO backed militants.
He ruled for 42years. In Uganda, the first 24 years after Independence (1962- 
1986) witnessed five abrupt changes that involved eight transitions (eight 
Presidents), implying an average of three years’ tenure per President, until when 
Mr Kaguta Museveni came to power. He is now in his 25th year as president and 
had just (on 20/02/11) won an additional term of 5years. In Nigeria, transitions 
have, until recently, never been peaceful, right from the days of Premier Tafawa 
Balewa (1960-1966). The list continues to include Algeria, Sudan, Tunisia, 
Egypt, DRC, Niger, Mali, Somalia, Guinea, Gabon, Cameroun, to mention but a 
few. There is a need to point out that the idea of overstaying is not peculiar to 
traditional Africa’s rulership. If a ruler remains in the good books of the people, 
he rules till he or she dies while the ruler that falls out of grace has the option of 
committing suicide or be force to exile by the people regardless the period he or 
she has spent on the throne.
Can the transition difficulties in the African continent find solace and 
be interpreted as undergoing a team-building process? Probably yes, if we 
mapped the continent into the phases of team-building. The first phase of team­
building is the formation/familiarization phase that is characterized by group 
awareness and relationship-building, including passive conduct, laying down 
ground rules (Constitutions), and less activity. Africa has passed this stage during 
the first 25 years after Independence. The second phase is the storming / charge 
phase, which is dominated by more activity, power play, confrontation, 
ambiguity, negativity, finding faults and recognition of the need for dominance 
and attempts to achieve same. This is the phase most countries in Africa are in; 
hence the crises. The other later phases include forming or constructive phase and 
performing or freezing phase.
This is where the mission of this thesis becomes relevant as it provides 
the pathway for the constructive phase through neo-communitarian democracy, 
neo-communitarian state and speconomy while it diverts the course of the 
democratisation from the path of freezing phase engineered by multi-party liberal
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democracy. Following the neo-communitarian pathway will provide an alternative 
model of governance that may enable African states to grow into the productive, 
constructive and performing phases and escape the recurring crisis of transitions.
Reflecting on the setbacks to the transition projects in Africa, some 
have concluded that democracy could not in the first instance have a good chance 
of survival in Africa because there are some cultural values that inhibit its 
emergence and sustenance. They are wrong. They failed to explain whose 
democracy and which democracy failed to survive in Africa. As discussed earlier 
that external factors in the process of imposing best practice ideology that makes 
Africa susceptible to crisis of various kinds, could not be exonerated from the 
transition crisis in Africa. If we look at the political changes which occurred 
between 1980s and 1990s in Africa, it will be seen that those changes were 
essentially donor-driven prompted by the donors collective instrument of 
intervention -  IMF and the World Bank.
The intervention further driven Africa to the periphery of the 
periphery of the global economic calculations and this did not only stultified the 
economic development of the African states but also the democratic projects. The 
overall effects of this were the series of uprising from the people clamouring for 
regime change, power devolution or decentralisation. The uprising in turn elicited 
extreme autocratic measures from the rulers whose leadership credentials were not 
only questioned but threatened. As Samuel Decalo argues “...the majority of 
Africa, in the absence of global fiscal munificence may...once the international 
vogue with “democracy” recedes -  be cut loose to drift their own way, sliding 
back to their into political strife, dictatorship and military rule” (1994), Along this 
line of thought in some occasions for different reasons, some contributors went to 
the extreme of suggesting that what Africa actually requires is a “Second 
Colonisation” as it appears that most countries in Africa cannot take charge of 
their own destiny (Mafeje, 1995).
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For the progressive African scholars, the above submission remains a 
factor of lack of understanding of the African politics and governance on the part 
of those clamouring for the re-colonisation of Africa. The position is that although 
democratic transitions remained endangered but there is nothing that makes 
democracy un-African or that makes Africans ungovernable. Democracy as a 
concept is universal but it does not endorse the imposition of liberal idea rather it 
gives room for best-fit approach. There is nothing to suggest that the basic values 
of democracy are alien to Africa or diametrically opposed to African social values 
and culture but rather it is the disconnection with those social values by the 
imposition of liberal democracy that put democracy on fire in Africa.
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Chapter 3
COLONIALISM AND ITS IMPACT ON THE PRE-COLONIAL
STRUCTURES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
3.0 Introduction
This chapter does not set out to romanticise the past, but to reveal the 
impact of colonialism on the pre colonial structures, how it facilitated the 
transportation of liberal values into the politics and economy of the sub- 
Saharan Africa and the subsequent contributions of such values to the current 
political crisis in the sub-Saharan Africa. Culpability of colonialism in putting 
the post-colonial sub-Saharan Africa on foreign founding philosophy cannot be 
ignored in any analysis of the region’s political crisis. Following Aseh’s 
contention in . ‘Ideologies, Governance and the Public Sphere in Cameroon’ 
(2011), the post-colonial sub-Saharan African states have no indigenous 
philosophical basis of existence evolving from their indigenous perception of 
reality. As most of the independent African states were delivered during 
colonialism and the Cold War; their pre-colonial political structures were 
flooded with ideological mechanisms that could transform them not only to 
achieve the foreign economic objectives but also to reproduce either liberal or 
socialist democratic state fashioned after their mentoring European states.
When discussing colonialism, we should not ignore the historical 
background of the colonisers, which of course was of state-organised racial 
discrimination. This chapter addresses two major issues. The issue of colonial 
governance as it relates to the socio-economic transformation of the sub- 
Saharan Africa with the emergence of neo-patrimonial system in the region. 
The chapter demonstrates that the issue of colonialism, and the market, 
political and military agenda-oT the colonising countries must be considered 
together if  we desire to loom out of the murk of colonial contributions to the 
post-colonial states’ crises. The essence of this consideration is to lay bare the 
reasons for the European scramble for Africa. The need to understand why
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they decided to colonise is vital to this study. Critical examination of the 
following questions to gain a clearer picture of the impacts of colonialism on 
sub-Saharan Africa becomes imperative. What types of governments were 
developed in pre-colonial Africa? What type of relationship exists between 
economic systems and political practice in Africa? What was the political 
legacy of the colonial political system for independent African governments? 
What types of governments were developed in Africa in the first three decades 
after independence? Once these questions are properly addressed, we will 
among other outcomes have;
1. A clearer understanding of the diverse nature of the traditional 
African political systems and practice.
2. An appreciation of the impact of the colonial legacies and the 
colonial political economy in shaping contemporary African 
politics.
3. A better understanding of the complexity of political issues 
confronting contemporary sub-Saharan African states.
The effects of colonialism on Africa’s socio-political structures like its 
progenitor, slave trade and its off springs - neo-colonialism and globalisation, 
can hardly be discussed without taking into account their economic and 
political objectives which of course destabilised the pre-colonial structures. 
Colonialism provided the pathway for liberal democracy as a decolonising 
strategy which did not only provide state building blueprints but offered the 
few urbanised and Western trained political elites who, under pressure from or 
by acquiescing to colonial forces, further undermined the pre-colonial 
structures with a model of ‘modem’ behaviour.
The second issue borders on how the pre-colonial structures of the 
African kingdoms that ruled over some parts of sub-Saharan Africa were able
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to cope with the internal problems and demands of their people and why such 
kingdoms were unable to cope with the external pressures of the time. Almost 
all political issues in contemporary Africa have deep roots in the colonial and 
immediate post-colonial experience (impact of the Cold War and 
Globalization). The capacity and reach of the African states, the absence of 
democratic structures and practice, the ethnic, religious, and regional rivalry, 
that plague post-colonial sub-Saharan Africa are reflections of the legacy of the 
practice and structure of politics and governance in the colonial era.
This chapter also seeks to explain the issue of checks and balances as 
embedded in the pre-colonial structures for checking the excesses of the rulers 
or disciplining an erring rulers as well as the traditional perception of 
leadership and governance in the sub-Saharan African societies. The aim is to 
show how governance in the pre-colonial kingdoms was mediated by the 
traditional control systems. The impact of Europe’s relations with Africa is 
presented here under international factors and actors. To permit ease in 
analysis, they are separated into four different phases. Two of the phases shall 
be fully examined in this chapter, namely, contact with European traders in the 
pre-colonial era and the incorporation into the world capitalist economy during 
the colonial period. The phases of import substitution and unequal trade in the 
neo-colonial era up to 1980 and the era of systematic marginalisation since 
1980 (Jaffe, 1980) are examined at Chapter Four.
3.1 Pre-colonial African Political Structures
Prior to the arrival of the Europeans in Africa, African kingdoms and 
empires had their forms of governments that were peculiar to their social 
systems. These peculiarities which enabled the indigenous peoples to cope with 
their various social relationships, failed to provide sufficient roots for the 
germination of the liberal style democratic institutions and values. The peculiar 
social and political traditions of the sub-Saharan Africa are generally
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benevolent authoritarian in nature, but not without checks and balances 
mechanisms embedded to curtail the excesses of any erring ruler.
The horizons of the people were accustomed to local or village level 
with deeply embedded traditions which maintained a passive and submissive 
rather than the individualistic liberal state or command-like socialist state. It is 
therefore not surprising that there was a lack of familiarity with the liberal or 
socialist political institutions derived from an entirely different background by 
the mass of the people. Only a few urbanised and Western-trained elites are 
familiar with these traditions. For example, political parties which constitute a 
major institution of the liberal style free institution or socialist institution were 
largely creations of these urban elites with little organisation at the local level, 
hence they became far too removed from the daily lives of the people. The 
nature and character of political parties in Africa truly represents what Mair 
(2005) describes as democracy in the ‘absence of the demos’. Regrettably, 
there are lean literatures from party scholars on the cartel nature of political 
parties in Africa.
The traditional understanding of the political processes and structures 
by the sub-Saharan African peoples was propelled by the values and collective 
responsibilities of the traditional social life derived from their social contract. 
The pre-colonial societies erroneously described as tribes by the colonialists 
were actually people of historically structured diverse origins inhabiting a geo­
political space through social contracts and amalgamation of differences to 
develop a common identity for themselves by themselves. As a result they 
came to share one worldview in their similarity and differences (Aseh, 2008).
These pre-colonial societies had their unique systems of governments 
with a set of customs and conventions guiding their peaceful co-existence and 
how they form part of the larger group. Unfortunately, these pre-colonial
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systems were erroneously classified into two broad categories as centralised 
and decentralised political systems. Classification of the traditional societies 
into these two broad categories only serves as an analytical entry point, beyond 
this; the typology does not represent true classifications of the pre-colonial 
political institutions. It lumps the various political systems with differing 
degrees of accountability together, therefore makes it difficult to distinguish 
the significant characteristics and similarities of each type of traditional 
institutions. For us to have a fuller understanding of the characteristics and 
dynamics of the traditional institutions, we need to align more with the 
Economic Commission of Africa’s (ECA) typology (2007). This typology 
provides us with an insight into the intricate characteristics that are lost in the 
simplistic categorisations of centralised and decentralised systems. These 
categorisations are as follows:
1. Centralised Systems with Absolute Power, Abyssinia (Ethiopia), 
Rwanda, Swazi
2. Centralised Systems with Limited Checks and Balances, Nupe, 
Buganda, Zulu, Hausa, Yoruba, Igala
3. Centralised Systems with relatively Well Defined Systems of 
Checks and Balances, Ashanti, Busoga of Uganda, Lesotho, Tswana 
of Botswana
4. Decentralised Age-Set Systems, Oromo, Kikuyu, Masai
5. Decentralised Village/Kinship Systems, Ibo village assembly, 
Eritrean Baito, Tiv of Nigeria, Owan society of Nigeria, and the 
council system of the Berbers
3.2 Centralised political systems
The centralised systems were large empires with well established
systems of governance governed by kings and monarchs with near absolute
power. Examples of such societies include ancient empires of Egypt in North
Africa, Nubia and Axum in North East Africa, Ghana, Mali and Songhai.
These empires had a complex system of government comparable to similar
kingdoms and empires that were in existence in Asia and Europe during the
same time periods. Kings like Mansa Musa of Mali and Sonni Ali of Songhai
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were rulers with near absolute powers with no separation of powers. These 
kings together with their councillors and advisors performed the executive, 
legislative, and judicial functions. In view of this fusion of powers and 
functions, in the hands of a few political elites, political scientists often refer to 
these societies as centralised states.
However there were variations in the level of centralisation of power 
in such societies. These variations were primarily determined by the degree of 
accountability of the rulers to the people. For instance, in places such as 
Abyssinia, (now Ethiopia) and Rwanda, the rulers enjoyed absolute powers 
while in some other cases the powers of the rulers were restrained by some 
measures, including the institution of councils (Beattie, 1967; Osaghae, 1989). 
The control measures were not uniform as their development and application 
varied from society to society. In some cases, such as the Buganda in Uganda 
and the Nupe in Nigeria, the formal institutions of checks and balances and 
accountability of leaders to the population were rather weak (Beattie, ibid). In 
other cases, such as the Ashanti of Ghana, the Tswana of Botswana, and the 
Busoga of Uganda, the systems of checks and balances were relatively better 
defined with constitutional provisions and customary laws authorising a 
council of elders, religious leaders, and administrative staff of the chiefs to 
check the power of the leaders and make them accountable (Busia, 1968; 
Jones, 1983; Coplan, 1997).
If subjected to the litmus test of liberal democracy, these pre-colonial 
centralised political institutions will be emphatic democratic failures. The 
mechanisms for accountability -  a crucial element of democracy appears to be 
non-existent due to fusion of executive, legislative and judicial powers, and 
absence of periodic elections, especially in societies where the rulers enjoyed 
absolute control. However the weakness of this type of liberal assumption is 
that there were various informal control mechanisms that also ensure 
accountability. For example the ability of the people to shift their allegiance 
away from a despotic chief to other chiefs was, for instance, an important
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mechanism that mitigated the autocratic tendencies of chiefs. Where the chief 
fails to meet with the aspirations of the society, he could be de-stooled 
(removed) or abandoned by his people. In case of the latter the people would 
simply ‘have rapid dialogue’ with their feet and relocate elsewhere. Kikuyu of 
Kenya refer to this as ‘itwika’, meaning breaking away. This factor accounted 
for series of migration in the history of pre-colonial Africa.
The broad categorisation easily ignored that the centralised systems 
are characterised by a great deal of decentralisation at the bottom. Generally, in 
Africa’s indigenous system of government, the chief was typically chosen or 
appointed either by the appropriate Council or ‘by a queen mother with the full 
approval of a council of elders’ (Ayittey, 1991). At the grassroots level, chiefs 
often act primarily as facilitators, who preside over a consensual decision­
making process by the members or elders of their communities. The 
chieftaincy system overlaps in many respects with the decentralized consensus- 
based systems. The administrative structure of the Ashanti of Ghana, for 
example, allows each lineage, village or subdivision to manage its own affairs, 
including settling disputes through arbitration by elders (Busia, 1968). In 
Botswana also, the powers of the chiefs are regulated by the consensual 
decision-making process in the Kgotla. Without the Council of Elders, the 
chief is powerless. The chief could not make any law without its approval. 
Even the powerful Zulu king could riot dictate a law without the approval of 
the Ibandla, or state council. Council positions are hereditary, which means that 
the chief could not remove the councillors and pack the assembly with his own 
appointees.
The council is an independent organ of government. The chief and 
the councillors had to reach unanimity on all important matters. Any adult 
could participate in the council meetings, called Ndaba by the Zulu and Kgotla 
by the Tswana. In Senegal, even slaves, djam, sent their representatives to the
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king's court. The Angolan king, Alfonso, allowed the Portuguese merchants to 
send their representative, Don Rodrigo, to his court (Ayittey, ibid).
Traditional African political decision making was noted for its culture 
of protracted debates. If the chief and the elders were deadlocked on an issue, a 
village meeting would be called and the issue put before the people for debate 
until a consensus was reached. This aspect of democracy in Africa is well 
illustrated in David Maillu’s “Cultural definition of Democracy” (Maillu, 1997: 
255) For Maillu, African societies were socially and politically structured so 
that “everybody participated according to his ability, ages-status, and wishes... 
everybody was invited to offer the cooking of his mind” (ibid). This type of 
democracy according to Nwauwa, (2005) transcends the realm of politics; it 
constitutes an integral part of the peoples’ culture, which allows everyone a 
sense of belonging.
3.3 Decentralised political systems
The other categories of the pre-colonial political systems were the 
decentralised societies that were often referred to as stateless political societies 
by many political historians e.g. Potholm (1970), Ohaegbulam (1990), and 
George Ayittey (1991; 1992). These societies were classified as stateless 
because they did not have well defined centralised political systems as found in 
the bigger kingdoms or small city states. Decentralised societies were 
sometimes mistakenly referred to as small mobile or nomadic bands of hunters 
and food-gatherers. This impression led to the wrong assumption of such 
societies being classified as stateless. Though these types of societies were 
politically decentralised but they did not truly represent decentralised societies. 
Large parts of sub-Saharan African pre-colonial political systems were highly 
decentralised with law-making, social control, and allocation of resources 
carried out by local entities, such as lineage groupings, village communities, 
and age-sets. The system was largely based on consensual decision-making 
arrangements with variations from society to society.
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As noted by Legesse (2000; 1973), the fundamental principles that 
guide the consensus based (decentralized authority) systems include curbing 
the concentration of power in an institution or a person and averting the 
emergence of a rigid hierarchy. The decentralised system is based on mutual 
respect for the rights and views of individuals. While individuals can disagree 
with the opinions of majority, such individuals must however respect the 
wishes and interests of the community by accepting compromises. Failure to 
respect this reciprocal gesture from the community by the individuals may 
attract various forms of sanctions from the community, including social 
isolation. This control mechanism serves to protect the accommodation of the 
minority views in other to prevent conflict between minority and majority. 
Decentralised systems have mechanisms that prevent the existence of social 
gaps between the governed and the leaders. All eligible members of the 
community participate in the creation and enforcement of rules and regulations.
Hardly can a winner or a loser emerge from conflict resolution 
because the consensual arrangement requires narrowing of differences through 
negotiations rather than arbitration. A typical example of such societies in the 
sub-Saharan Africa is the Igbo speaking people of the contemporary Eastern 
Nigeria. The Igbo live in politically autonomous villages with each village 
being politically separate and not connected to the neighbouring villages. Each 
village is governed by a headman assisted by council of elders who 
responsibilities include selection of the headman.
In addition to the village authority, there are religious organisations; 
lineage groups and secret societies that provide rules and regulations to govern 
peoples’ relationships and lives. These organisations serve as mechanisms for 
checks and balances by ensuring that no institution or group gains too much 
power or abuse the privileges of power. In most of the decentralised 
communities, the elders wield tremendous social, economic and political
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powers which compel some historians to classify the system of government as 
‘democracy of age’. It is important to note that the decentralised African 
traditional political institutions allow the leaders to be mandated by their 
people before any commitment to a major decision unless they have been 
initially granted with such powers, or the issue borders on the defence of the 
state of which the king or the paramount chief must act on behalf of the people 
with little or no consultation (Iyela et al, 2002: 269-78).
Either chiefly or non-chiefly communities, most of the workings of 
the council of chiefs in the pre-colonial societies, were done on committee 
basis which are sometimes institutionalised or ad-hoc. This salient feature is 
akin to the contemporary representative government that allows principle of 
decision-making by all, after the fullest debate and discussion of different 
points of views and decisions are made largely in a consensual manner.
In the economic sphere, the means of production were owned by the 
African people, not by their chiefs or tribal governments. Even land was not 
owned by the chief. It belonged to the ancestors, and the chief merely acted as 
custodian. Whatever was grown on the land was private property, belonging to 
the farmers, not to the chief. Peasants were free to choose whatever occupation 
they wished. They did not queue in front of the chiefs hut for permission to 
engage in trade. Pre-colonial Africa was characterised by considerable freedom 
of movement of people and goods. The continent was crisscrossed by a dense 
web of trade routes (for example, the Trans-Saharan) along which the natives 
moved freely and engaged in trade.
The African peoples have an ingrained cultural propensity to trade. 
Throughout their history, they travelled great distances to purchase goods from 
"strangers” at cheaper prices to sell at higher prices to make a profit. Much of
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that activity was free from state controls and regulations. State intervention in 
trade, commerce, and markets by the traditional rulers was an exception and 
not the rule. There was no native African law that forbade Africans to enter 
into businesses of their wish. The market was the nerve centre of traditional 
African societies, and market activity was dominated by women.
From the above analysis, it is apparent that the pre-colonial African 
political-economic structures had a clear vision of governance and 
accountability that could have provided their post-independence states with an 
indigenous philosophical foundation to govern their public spheres and support 
their own reality if not for colonialism and its imported foreign values (Casely- 
Haford, 1922, Montagne, 1931; Aplort, 1954; Alport, 1964; Beattie, 1967; 
Busia, 1968; Jones, 1983; Osaghae, 1989; Coplan, 1997; Legesse, 2000; Aseh, 
2008).
3.4 Transformation of the pre-colonial political structures by colonialism
The defining contact between sub-Saharan Africa and the Europe 
originated with the era of non-slave trade that started about 15th century. As at 
17th century, Africa was also showing some knowledge of technological 
breakthroughs as exemplified in the inventions of writing on the papyrus in 
ancient Egypt and mathematics at the University of Timbuktu (Diop, 1976). As 
at this time, and like every other advancing continent, Africa was also 
gradually climbing the ladder of technological progress.
The Industrial revolution which started in Europe about 1750 changed 
the trade relationship between the sub-Saharan Africa and Europe (Robertson, 
1986). The tide of events changed around 1445 when the Portuguese arrived in 
Senegal and the first set of slaves were viewed on sale in Lisbon, Portugal 
(Onimode, 2000: 71). This was in response to the demand for manual labour in 
the shipyards and textile mills in Europe, cotton, tobacco and sugar cane
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plantations in North and South America, and European owned plantations in 
Mauritius, Seychelles and the Middle East. The slave trade cost the pre­
colonial Africa a huge loss of population and decimation of manpower in 
addition to physical destruction of property, rise of Islamic slavery, decline of 
African trade in the world, proleterianisation of African workers for European 
industries (Lovejoy, 1989; Amin. 1972). All these led to the technological 
stagnation and severe dislocation of and distortions of Africa’s pre-colonial 
economy (Amin, ibid; Lovejoy, ibid; Onimode, 2000: 72).
The horrendous losses from slavery according to Onimode (ibid) bled 
African countries so terribly that at the next European onslaught in the form of 
colonial invasion, Africa was already prostrate. The continent had almost lost 
the will to fight after some 425 years of slave raids of ‘over twenty-one 
million’ able bodied men and women (Lovejoy, 1989: 387), physical 
destruction, depopulation, technological de-mobilisation and the most 
unimaginable destitution in human history. Due to decimation of manpower, 
African communities averaged a loss of up to 120,000 people per year 
(Lovejoy, ibid: 388). The sex ratio of captured male slaves to female slaves 
was always higher reducing chances of population reproduction. The 
population loss weighed heavily on the local communities due to their inability 
to continue with farming or trade as successfully as before reducing them to 
poverty, which to this day has not been alleviated. Following Lovejoy’s 
argument of assessing Trans Atlantic slave trade to be adverse, capturing slaves 
mainly from one region in West Africa upset the internal balance and dynamics 
of local regions and changed the African political scenario forever.
As explained by Lovejoy (1989) and Amin (1972), the devastating 
effects of the slave trade on particular ethnicity such as the Gbe and Congo, 
destabilised the local kingdoms because the whole communities were wiped 
out. Amin submits that wiping out of the local communities eliminated the 
traditional boundaries of African kingdoms and created room for the creation
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of a power vacuum which allowed the European colonial powers to divide and 
rule the weak and fragmented African states and societies.
One of the consequences of this, according to Amin, was that the 
boundaries carved by European rulers did not match the traditional boundaries 
and dynamics of African society. This caused a great deal of gerrymandering 
and balkanisation as evident in the amalgamation of North and South 
Protectorates of the post-colonial Nigeria. The boundary adjustments provided 
the Europeans with the opportunity to implement various political, economic, 
and social policies that enabled them to maintain or extend their authority and 
control over different territories in Africa with little or no challenge from 
within. It was this thoroughly dispossessed, paralysed and traumatised Africa 
that was forcibly incorporated into the capitalist economy from about 1850 on 
the basis of unequal trade (Rodney, 1980).
The process of colonisation involved exploitation of the resources of 
the colonies to strengthen and enrich the economies of colonising nations 
(Alemazung, 2010). Colonialism commenced with the defense of the economic 
interests of the colonisers which in the first instance was the propelling factor 
for colonisation. For the sake of emphasis colonisation was adopted as a 
strategy to purposely exploit the natural resources of the colonised. This 
process as reported by Meredith, left bad legacies on the exploited colonies 
(Meredith, 2005: 95-97). Alemazung (ibid) avers that:
...besides the economic imbalance (Western profit at the 
detriment of the weak: Africa) resulting from colonialism, the 
social, cultural and political lives of the people and societies in 
Africa were greatly interrupted and transformed by the policies 
applied by the colonial masters during the colonial period. An 
instrument of this transformation on the social and cultural life 
style of the African people was the policy of Assimilation 
(Alemazung, 2010: 63).
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The policy of assimilation, championed by France meant complete 
eradication of African cultural values and total transformation of Africans in 
French colonies into black French men and women (Eko, 2003). To 
Alemazung, (ibid) ‘assimilation implies the social process applied by the 
colonial masters to absorb the cultural entities existing in their colonies’. The 
policy was meant to transform the colonised peoples to think and behave like 
the people in the coloniser’s homeland.
The collective view of the French, the Belgians and the Portuguese 
colonisers was that an African who had received their kind of education and an 
understanding of their culture and life style stood the chance of getting 
assimilated into their culture (Rodney, 1972: 247). Education therefore became 
a major tool for recasting the indigenous Africans into a superior Western 
cultured person. Anyone who had attained this level became an assimilee for 
the French, or assimilado or civilisado for the Portuguese (Rodney, 1972: 247; 
Shillington, 1989: 357). The French colonial policies were to eliminate the 
African culture in their colonies. For example only French censored and 
approved newspapers were allowed in the colonies for the “frenchification” of 
Africans (Eko, 2003).
Mahmood Mamdani (1996) offers a further insight into the impact of 
colonisation on the pre-colonial structures. While wrestling with the 
submissions of many writers who only understood the colonial rule as either 
direct (French) or indirect (British) and with apartheid as the third and 
exceptional variant, Mamdani argues that the benign terminology only masks 
the fact that these were actually variants of the same despotism.
Direct rule was the main mode of control attempted over the “natives" 
in the 18th and early 19th centuries by the French. It was a rule based on the 
presumption of a single legal order formulated in terms of the colonial 
‘modem’ law (Mamdani, 1996). This implies total rejection of the existing pre­
colonial ‘native’ institutions by the French. Though direct rule claims equality
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of civil rights as its primary foundation but a closer examination reveals 
equality of civil rights does not translate into equality of political rights. 
Political rights were grounded in the ownership of property which separated 
‘civilised’ from the ‘uncivilised’ or better still, separation of the ‘citizens’ from 
the ‘natives’ - a problem that was generally referred to by Mamdani as the 
"native question" (ibid). The social prerequisite of direct rule involves a drastic 
comprehensive sway of market institutions i.e. appropriation of land, 
destruction of communal autonomy, and total annihilation of local populations. 
Given that background, direct rule meant the reintegration and domination of 
"natives" in the institutional context of semi-servile and semi-capitalist agrarian 
relations (ibid).
While direct rule denied rights to subjects on racial grounds, indirect 
rule incorporated them into a "customary" mode of rule, with state-appointed 
Native Authorities defining customs. This was a mode of domination over a 
"free" peasantry. Here, land remains a communal - "customary" - possession. 
The market was restricted to products of labour, only marginally incorporating 
land or labour. Peasant communities were reproduced within the context of 
spatial and institutional autonomy.
The tribal leadership was either reconstituted as the hierarchy of the 
local state, or freshly imposed where none had existed as in the "stateless 
societies". The political inequality went alongside civil inequality. Both were 
grounded in a legal dualism. Alongside the received law was implemented a 
customary law that regulated non-market relations in land and in personal 
(family) and community affairs. Indirect rule became the form of colonial rule 
elaborated by the British in equatorial Africa early in the 20th century by 
Frederick Lugard in Nigeria, Uganda, Cameroon, and Tanganyika. It was later 
emulated by the French after World War I, the Belgians in the 1930s, and the 
Portuguese in the 1950s.
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By tapping authoritarian possibilities in culture and by giving culture 
an authoritarian bent, indirect rule (decentralised despotism) set the pace for 
the post-independent Africa’s political development. Colonial rule wiped out 
the dependency of the traditional chief on his councillors, which characterised 
pre-colonial rule and replaced such dependency on the colonial superiors and 
later foreign powers (Nugent, 2004: 107-108). Alongside with this dependency 
was autocracy in its extreme.
Explaining the post-colonial situation, Ndirangu Mwaura (2005; p.6) 
submits that nothing in Africa changed after the colonisers left apart from the 
replacement o f ‘colonial governors with colonial ambassadors’. This statement 
contains some truth judging from the ways and manners the post-independence 
leaders personalised state powers and assumed ‘fathers of the nation’ status. 
For example, the Democratic Republic of Congo was King Leopold’s personal 
property (Shillington, 1989: 312; Meredith, 2005: 95). In the like manner after 
the DRC gained independence in 1960, and the murder of Partrice Lumumba, 
President Mobutu Sese Seko ruled the state as if it were his personal property 
(Young 1986). Mobutu’s cult of personality rose to such heights that for weeks 
at a time, Zaire's official press was forbidden to mention the name of any other 
Zairian than the president himself (Howard, 1997).
The selfish and exploitative character of the master-colony 
relationship that reigned during the colonial time, continued in different forms 
after formal colonial rule had ceased. All the administrative and economic 
structures installed during colonialism were left intact to preserve the flow of 
wealth from the continent to the West (Mwaura, ibid).
This situation led Mwaura to assume that all the national leaders who 
took over after the colonisers left “were traitors, with ... false patriotism”, who 
upheld a political network that exploited the African people to the benefit of 
the ruling elites and their western patrons (Mwaura, ibid). Nothing could 
justify this assumption than the disappearance of all the post-colonial sub- 
Saharan Western type representative governments within the first decades of
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their independence and replacement of such with either military rule or some 
form of oligarchic domination. What Mwaura ignores in his sweeping 
generalisation are the international forces of the global economy that shape the 
characters of the political economies of these African states and the Cold War 
pressures from both the East and West axis of the War.
William Easterly, while stretching Mwaura’s assumption opines rather 
inaccurately that “colonial administration re-enforced autocracy in Africa” 
(2006: 273) and opened the flood gate for bad governance and extremely 
selfish and cruel governors in the likes of Mobutu in Zaire, Idi Amin in Uganda 
and Bedel Bokassa in Central African Republic (Meredith, 2005). On the 
contrary, it was the removal of the traditional control measures through the 
replacement of the traditional political institutions with the liberal or socialist 
values that actually facilitated the emergence of autocracy in Africa. 
Colonialism only remodelled patrimonialism in Africa to produce hybridised 
patrimonial leaders with personalised powers within the context of liberal or 
socialist values. This does not remove the fact that there were autocratic 
leaders in the pre-colonial Africa but such leaders were also adequately taken 
care of by the traditional measures.
3.5 Colonial Legacies and the post-colonial states
Following the rupture of the dynamics and patterns of the African 
pre-colonial political and economic institutions by colonialism, a different set 
of instruments of political and economic control was constructed by the 
colonisers, sometimes, ‘violently’ (Lonsdale, 1986: 145). These instruments 
were also violently employed to provide the much needed stability for the 
colonial administrations. Stability was provided with the use of coercive force 
to facilitate economic exploitation, social deprivation, political exclusion and 
cultural oppression, the combination of which left negative legacies on the 
political structures and processes of both the transiting state and its post­
colonial form.
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Colonialism could therefore be argued to be a continuation of slavery 
that further destroyed Africa’s chances of progress, and channelled the political 
and economic direction of the continent towards dependency. The period left 
legacies that negatively impacted on the pre-colonial Africa’s political 
structures and the general polity which are still affecting contemporary Africa’s 
politics and states till now. One of such legacies was the authoritarian colonial 
ruling style of oppression which the post independent African leaders applied 
to governance without any option of choice or consent of the people. This style 
of ruling has been erroneously referred to by many such as Richards (1996), 
Keen (2005) etc; as patrimonial style of governance.
The colonisers ruled without the consent of the people: they deposed 
and executed traditional rulers, when the latter failed to implement the 
instructions of colonial administrators or failed to serve the needs of the 
colonial government (Shillington, 1989: 354-357; Hochschild, 1998). The 
authoritarian ruling structure, which was based on control by a few, through 
oppression and the use of force, laid a basis for despotic and unaccountable 
leadership in post-colonial Africa.
My classification of “patrimonialism” follows the distinction made by 
Roth in 1968 taking into consideration the ways and manners, the colonial 
authorities manipulated the patrimonial traditional values to pave way for the 
emergence of personal rulership that superintended the economic and political 
agenda of colonialism in the sub-Saharan Africa. Roth (1968) distinguished 
between “traditionalist patrimonialism” and “personal rulership” - a de- 
traditionalised form of patrimonialism that could be described as ‘personalised 
patrimonialism’ which Theobald (1982: 549) later characterised as “modem 
patrimonialism”. Roth used the term neo-patrimonialism as a synonym for 
“personal rulership” or “particularistic personal rulership” (Roth, 1978: 18).
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For Roth (1968: 196), “personal rulership” operates “on the basis of 
loyalties that do not require any belief in the ruler’s unique personal 
qualifications” or any traditional qualifications or inputs, but are “inextricably 
linked to material incentives, rewards” and closeness to the colonial powers. 
This type of leadership became an ineradicable dominant component of the 
bureaucracies in post-colonial Africa.
This is where Richards’(1996) and his patrimonial adherents such as 
Boas (2001); Conteh-Morgan and Dixon-Fyle, (1999); Reno (2000); Clapham 
(1996); Keen (2005); and Medard (1996) generalisations on the roots of Sierra 
Leone civil war as based on the nature and collapse of patrimonial system of 
governance without a distinction between traditional patrimonialism and 
colonial patrimonialism becomes weak.
Though one may not agree less with their observations that the 
dramatis personae in the Sierra Leone war did so largely based on a 
combination of desire for political power (Abdullahi, 1998) and desire for 
wealth stemming from natural resources such as diamonds and grievances over 
the failure of the patrimonialist state (Richards, 1996; Boas, 2001; Keen, 
2005). However they failed to realise that colonial patrimonialism indeed 
altered the traditional patrimonial governance to produce the failed patrimonial 
states despite possessing the formal structures of modem bureaucracies, 
operating on patrimonial principles but characterised by personalised political 
authority, weak checks on the private appropriation of public resources, and 
pervasive clienteles (Callaghy 1987; Jackson and Rosberg 1982; Me'dard 
1982).
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There is a huge gap between traditional patrimonialism of the pre­
colonial period and the personal rulership that characterised the colonial period 
in the sub-Saharan Africa. The traditional patrimonial system, in contrast to 
Max Weber’s assumptions, rests on the traditional mandate, and obedience is 
owed to the office and the person who occupies the position of authority by 
tradition.' It is not as impersonal or that “the servants are completely and 
personally dependent upon the lord” (Weber, 1968: 4), as Weber assumes
Neo-patrimonial leadership as practiced in many African countries is 
an extension of the kind of autocratic rule that the colonial master’s had 
initiated (Alemazung, 2010). There is a need for caution not to affiliate post­
colonial hybridised patrimonialism with the African traditional patrimonialism. 
Eisenstadt (1973) was the first to call our attention to this fact using the 
concept neo-patrimonialism to describe the new form of patrimonial leaders. It 
will be wrong to perceive the traditional patrimonialism as a continuum of the 
neo-patrimonialism with some modifications, or to equate the traditional 
patrimonial rule with authoritarian rule. The usage of the term has considerably 
changed over the years. In the 1970s “patrimonialism” was employed in terms 
of social capital as a way of explaining political cohesion in African societies 
(Theobald 1982: 555) but in its contemporary form - “neo-patrimonialism” 
serves as a threat to the peaceful political development of African states and 
the development of societies in general.
Another major difficulty African states have to deal with as part of the 
colonial legacies, which has repeatedly been mentioned by many African and 
non-African Africanists (Amoo, 1997; Rodney, 1972; Dumont, 1966; Nugent, 
2004; Meredith, 2005), is the problem of ethnic divisions and the state conflicts 
resulting from ethnic rivalry (Blanton et al. 2001). Ethnic division is one of the 
leading legacies of colonialism assessing the colonial impact on the continent. 
African authors as well as non-African scholars concerned with African 
politics blame the ethnic divisions and rivalries amongst the nations in Africa
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among other considerations, on the arbitrary boundaries and cultural 
differences created and imposed upon these peoples by the colonial masters 
(Mahoso, 2010). Sufficient considerations were hardly given to the religious 
dichotomies among the ethnic groups.
Colonial administrators failed to take peculiarities of the traditional 
societies into consideration before using legal and political rights to introduce a 
generalised notion of liberty that chastised most of the African cultural values. 
They only promoted liberal values at the expense of the peculiar communal 
values. To achieve this, the traditional leadership institution was subjected to 
many changes in its procedures and rules of appointment, in its roles and 
functions and in its jurisdictions and powers. Their strengths that used to derive 
from their communities became firmly rooted in the colonial policies. 
Traditional leaders were vested with extensive powers, especially powers of 
coercion. They became local-level lawmakers, tax collectors, police 
commissioners and judges. Customary law became a mechanism for upholding 
the colonial order: perhaps even to the extent that the colonial order became the 
“customary”.
Colonial authorities frequently intervened in matters that were 
traditional and customary. They regularly appointed chiefs where there were 
none and deposed those traditional leaders that opposed them. For example a 
feature of colonial rule that was to have far-reaching consequences for the post­
colonial Africa was what Nicholas Dirks (2004: 1) describes as a ‘cultural 
project of control’, one that ‘objectified’ the colonised, and reconstructed and 
transformed their cultural forms through the development of a colonial system 
of knowledge that outlived decolonisation. It was an approach that reified 
social, cultural, and linguistic differences, causing the colonial state to be 
described as an ‘ethnographic state (Dirks 2004). As reported by Geschiere, 
(1993) local chieftaincies were re-organised by both the British and the French 
and graded according to importance (first to third degree chiefs) In some cases,
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these changes reinforced the role of previously accepted traditional authorities, 
while in others chieftaincies were simply created in order to organise labour 
and collect taxes.
Though, contrary to Mamdani’s conclusion, some traditional leaders 
like Jaja of Opobo in the contemporary Nigeria resisted the colonial authorities. 
However Mamdani’s compelling argument of decentralised despotism had 
some significant consequences for the institution of traditional leadership 
during the colonial and in the post-colonial periods which contributed to the 
pervasiveness of liberalism over the traditional values. The consequences were 
identified by Keulder (1997a) as follows:
I. Many traditional leaders effectively transformed themselves from 
custodians of their people into custodians of the colonial order. This not 
only eroded their support base, but also overemphasised their coercive 
functions.
II. Frequent interventions by the colonial authorities in matters traditional 
and customary, coupled by the strategy to employ customary law as a 
mechanism to enforce the colonial order, transformed the customary 
into a site of contention and struggle.
III. Decentralised despotism meant that traditional leaders were 
incorporated into state structures. They were paid by the state and 
performed State functions; hence, they became civil servants in most 
respects.
IV. That many traditional leaders acted for the colonial interests pitted them 
directly against other social forces that resisted that same order. This 
paved the way for an inter-elite strife in the postcolonial order.
V. That the “tribe” was used as the political base for the colonial order,
and that the subsequent development of tribalism became the dominant 
socio-political ideology, ensured that ethnicity would remain an 
omnipresent ingredient of the postcolonial political order.
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A new set of traditions or what Hobsbawm and Ranger (1994) classify 
as “invented traditions” replaced the old traditions to pave way for the 
entrenchment of liberalism. According to Hobsbawm and Ranger (1994: 1), an 
invented tradition constitutes -
... set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly 
accepted rules of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to 
inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, 
which automatically implies continuity with the past. In fact, 
where possible, they normally attempt to establish continuity 
with a suitable historical past.
Traditions are likely to be invented when and i f -
... rapid transformation of society weakens or destroys the social 
patterns for which “old” traditions have been designed, 
producing new ones to which they are not applicable, or when 
such old traditions and their institutional carriers and 
promulgators no longer prove sufficiently adaptable and 
flexible, or are otherwise eliminated (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 
ibid: 4-5)
The essence of the invention was to give “rapid and recognisable 
symbolic form to developing types of authority and submission” and “to allow 
Europeans and certain Africans to combine for “modernising” ends” 
(Hobsbawm and Ranger 1994: 237). This colonial thought of invention arose 
from the condemnation of the pre-colonial authorities as autocratic, corrupted 
and undemocratic systems that need to be remedied by creation of 
constitutional state and exercise of reason.
The notion of remedifying the traditional values as expressed by 
Turner (eds ;) became a major factor in the political crisis (2006: 81-3). The 
traditional social systems and culture of the colonised territories that initially 
hampered smooth realisation of sufficient volumes of agricultural produce and 
mineral resources were overcome through series of invented strategies. These 
strategies, according to Olateju, (2006: 55) include gerrymandering the 
subjugated territories to become viable periphery of the centre, introduction of 
private property in land where such was not in existence, expropriation of land 
for the use of white settlers and for plantation agriculture, coercion of labour
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through wage trap, stimulation of use of money and commodity exchange by 
imposing money for payments for taxes and land rents, and where the annexed 
territory had already developed industry, production and exports by the 
indigenous manufacturers were curtailed.
On top of this, declares Magdoff, (1982: 12), came socio-political 
innovations designed to support and perpetuate such radical economic 
transformations. Local elite strata that would benefit from co-operation with 
the foreign rulers were activated. Suitable administrative techniques were 
introduced. New or amended legal codes were installed to facilitate the 
operation of money, business and private property economy. Above all, police 
and armed forces were developed to assure social stability and sustain 
environments conducive to the new social order. The imposition of foreign 
language and permeation of the culture and ideology of dominating power tied 
all these together leading to a social psychology based on the presumed 
superiority of the colonisers and inferiority of the colonised.
The values of living together in kin-centred social processes with 
patterned extended families system which prevailed in the pre-colonial period, 
the values and collective responsibilities of traditional social life were all 
replaced by the liberal I-feelings values (Mazrui, 1986: 7). Liberal doctrines 
were promoted through systematic attack on traditional leadership using 
unfettered freedom of individuals to pursue their own preferences (Held, 1987) 
as a gateway to promote market economy based on respect for private property 
(Sorensen, 1998).
Invariably the traditional social and moral continuity and consensus of 
the communal values became weakened. The colonisers created and stressed 
the differences amongst the various ethnic groups within the same nation even 
where the differences did not exist, only to facilitate colonial domination and 
exploitation of a divided people. As argued by Shillington (1989: 356),
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colonial administrations emphasised the differences between the different 
ethnic groups which invariable intensifies rivalries between those groups and 
preventing them from forming a united opposition against the colonial 
administration. Keulder, (1997b), sharing Shillington’s (ibid) position, came to 
the same conclusion that the “colonial authorities invented ‘tribalism” which 
invariably reflected in the formation of the political parties along ethnic lines 
and consequently giving way to ethnic division and rivalries among the power 
contenders.
Nnoli (2008) succinctingly summarised Shillington’s and Keulder’s 
observations on how colonialism invented tribalism. He argues that the 
indigenous ethnic groups that were once relating to each other in a non-ho stile 
manner, that maintained friendly relationships through trade and social contacts 
suddenly hardened indigeneity into a theory of exclusion which invariably 
became a strong negative force in Africa’s political developments.
Alemazung (2010) expands Nnoli’s submission that when scrutinising 
problems and causes of ethnic conflicts in Africa, the conventional explanation 
is that the polarisation of ethnic communities and the outbreak of ethnic 
violence are a legacy of colonialism which ignored cultural differences during 
the creation of artificial state borders (Taras and Ganguly 2002: 3; Clapham, 
1985: 57-58). As if the “creation” and insistence of the differences between the 
African peoples (separatist feelings) by the colonisers who compounded these 
different ethnic groups in one nation together was not enough, successive 
colonial constitutions in Nigeria for example, “entrenched political power on 
regional lines” (Ogunbadejo, 1979: 86).
One of the worst examples of colonially-constructed ethnic rivalry 
was the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda characterised by the ruthless massacre of 
the Tutsi ethnic group and moderate Hutu in the country by the extremist Hutu 
ethnic group (Scherrer 2001) The death toll which was estimated at 800,000 by 
various accounts could be traced to the divide and rule tactics of the Belgian
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colonising authority. The minority Tutsi group was accorded the aristocratic 
status with leadership positions by the colonisers over the majority Hutu 
groups. Identity cards were issued to the Tutsi illustrating their superiority over 
the Hutus in the same country. The result was hatred and the nurturing of 
feelings of revenge by the Hutus, which culminated first in the 1959 
“revolution” and then in the 1994 genocide with massacre of over 800,000 
people within a period of four months. Ethnic conflicts are not only rampant in 
contemporary Africa but are also very severe compared to those of other 
regions in the world. This could be traced to the high diverse nature of the 
continent. That Africa has several thousands of ethnic groups is a well 
documented fact. Each ethnic group has its own distinct language, traditions, 
arts and crafts, history, way of life and religion.
In “Ethnic Conflicts in Africa” (Nnoli, ed; 2000), Nnoli was able to 
convince us that there is a consensus over the genesis of ethnic antagonism on 
the continent and the effects of colonialism on inter-ethnic relations. In line 
with this argument, the fact that the ethnic division is ubiquitous precursor to 
political instability strongly distorts the democratization processes on the 
continent. The impact of ethnic division and rivalry has unfortunately not been 
properly addressed by the state-constructors of these nations, a factor which 
cannot be underestimated in assessing the failure of liberal state-systems in 
Africa.
This failure, though may not be intended, but in the process of 
facilitating colonial administration, colonialism got entrapped in the 
destruction of the foundation for potential autochthonous state building process 
in Africa (Nnoli, ed; 2000). This unintended goal developed from the adoption 
of divide and rule strategy by the colonial administration which set ethnic 
groups against each other. In regions where there were no chiefs, Europeans 
invented chiefs and imposed them on the people, and always stressed tribal 
differences to create differences amongst the people The post-colonial leaders 
did not do much to address this volatile issue of ethnic divisions rather they
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continued with the manipulation of ethnic groups in other to perpetuate their 
own grips on the power leverage.
Another legacy of colonialism is the legal dualism in the application 
and practice of rule of law which now serves as major indicators for measuring 
democratic performance of governments by donor countries and international 
institutions. The practice of legal dualism could be traced to the contention 
between positive and negative conceptions of liberalism. While those operating 
with positive conception favourably disposed to strong interventionist foreign 
policies, those with negative conception incline towards non-intervention and 
toleration. This lack of uniformity in what kinds of institutions are required to 
deliver the liberal values in a decentralised multicultural society is bound to 
reflect in the activities of the colonial administrations in the colonies. As 
reported by Alemazung (2010), the International Commission of Jurists in 
1959 in New Delhi drew up the “Declaration of Delhi” which stated that rule of 
law “should be employed to safeguard and advance the civil and political rights 
of the individual”. The Economist magazine added that the Declaration was 
also to create “conditions under which individual’s legitimate aspirations and 
dignity may be realised” (The Economist, 13/03/2008).
A salient point to be noted here is that the rule of law from this point 
of view is inextricably linked to liberty and democracy. On the contrary, the 
torch bearer of the rule of law, A V Dicey, only stressed property rights and 
efficiency in the administration of justice. His explanation clearly emphasises 
the role of laws in the society, which is provision of stability for the society. 
The rights of individuals are to be determined by the legal rules and not the 
arbitrary behaviour of authorities. There can be no punishment unless a court 
decides there has been a breach of law. Everyone, regardless of his/her position 
in society, is subject to the law.
The critical feature to the Rule of Law here is that, while individual 
liberties depend on it, its success depends on the role of trial by jury and the
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impartiality of judges. Juxtaposing the colonial administrations with the above 
reveals otherwise. The colonial administrations implemented none of the above 
requirements of rule of law in their colonies. There was a legal dualism that 
placed the operation of modem law side by side with the customary law. 
Mamdani avers that "Modem law" governed relations between "non-natives," 
and "non-native" relations with any "natives." Customary law, on the other 
hand, governed relations between "natives" (Mamadani, 1996). The customary 
laws were supposed to be the unwritten customs of a distinct tribal or ethnic 
group with its source being the traditional tribal authority. Under the colonial 
authorities, the supposedly customary laws were purely invented administrative 
laws administered by the colonial native chiefs -  not a ‘holdover from the pre­
colonial era’ (Mamdani, ibid). These native chiefs were selected not in line 
with tradition but according to loyalty to the European administrator. This 
paved the way for the emergence of what Mamdani (1996: 37) as 
“decentralised despotism”
The principle of separation of powers that safeguards against absolute 
power by an individual in the dispensation of justice was clearly absent. The 
chief did not only have the powers to make rules or bye-laws, he also executed 
the laws and administered justice in his domain. The authority of the chief thus 
fused in a single person all organs of power and governance - judicial, 
legislative, executive, and administrative. There was neither property nor 
citizens’ rights for the people and in many cases the people were not citizens 
but subjects (Shillington, 1989: 354).
In addition to the legal dualism in the application of the rule of law, 
colonial laws were by their nature, very harsh and in many cases entitled 
colonial “administrators to imprison any African subject indefinitely and 
without charge or trial” (Shillington, ibid: 355). Chiefs had to enforce forced 
labour, ensure compulsory crop cultivation, recruit labour, collect taxes and 
fulfil other state requirements (Easterly, 2006: 275). These chiefs were made to 
rule as if they were the law and the people were under their jurisdiction. The 
only higher authority was the colonial authority from they received instructions
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and command. The chiefs were prosecutors as well as judges, who employed 
the jailer to hold their victims in custody as it pleased them. The chiefs had 
more powers than any oriental despot (Easterly, ibid).
The conclusion is that, the method of rulership of the colonial 
administration with its decentralised despotism which abolished the traditional 
checks and balances, prepared Africa safely for autocracy (Easterly, ibid). The 
traditional political system that once combined with other traditional 
institutions to serve as a bastion of justice and equity in the body politics was 
replaced by the liberal political culture to lay the foundation for a dependent 
economy which dissolved the principle of pre-colonial self-reliance and created 
a disarticulated structure of production geared towards the need of the colonial 
home countries (Bush, 2007).
Obasanjo and Mabogunje (1992, eds.) highlighted the extractive 
nature of colonialism as the driving force of the replacement of the traditional 
institutions with liberal values. The duo underlined that the colonial 
administration was predisposed to extracting resources from the colony and 
therefore geared the political administration to this direction. This praetorian 
character formed part of the colonial legacy inherited by the succeeding 
political elites, who subsequently see nothing wrong with the centre extracting 
from the periphery that comprises the masses. As in the colonial period, the 
succeeding African political elites also perceive people as mere disposable 
objects of governance that could be discarded when seen to be no longer 
useful. This created a system where leaders demonstrated a culture of impunity 
and lack of accountability and insincerity towards the people. The people also 
feel alienated by the political elites.
From the above analysis, it is glaring that colonialism through the 
creation of personalised form of leadership successfully constituted what 
Oloruntimehin (2007) refers to as a ‘veritable revolution’ in the lives of the 
colonised territories that were subjected to individualistic liberal values. 
Colonisation as a process involves profound transformation of the world-view
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and values of the colonised, which Obasanjo and Mabogunje describe as the 
underlying force of colonialism. Its direct or indirect style involves a deliberate 
cultivation and reorientation of the colonised towards the goals and value 
systems of the dominant people.
The identity and self-worth of the dominated suffer degradation. Such 
institutions of the dominated that find acceptance with alien rulers, largely on 
account of their utility in facilitating alien control such as patrimonial 
leadership, are subjected to modifications that transform them into new entities, 
with new significance and relevance for their own peoples. This, according to 
Mamdani (1996), explains why some the traditional leadership institutions that 
were adopted for indirect rule by the colonial rulers in Africa, were able to 
acquire new orientations and became distanced, sometimes even alienated, 
from the peoples, their collective values and aspirations. The legitimacy of 
such institutions started deriving more from the colonial state authority and, 
later neo-patrimonial leaders in the post-colonial states rather than from the 
societies that originally created them.
Generally, through colonialism, Africa experienced the phenomenon 
of alienation between individuals and state -  a social reality that Adedeji has 
variously described as ‘cohabitation without marriage’ (Adedeji, 1999). The 
effect of this separation is fully discussed under ‘speconomy’ as an alternative 
economic model in Chapter Seven. However suffice it to mention here that the 
gap between the pre-colonial indigenous cultures and forms of colonial and 
post-colonial governments created by policies of liberalisation, civilisation and 
modernisation, has its destructive consequences on the governance, peoples 
and their search for political stability and developments. The Iimpact of this 
gap on the pre-colonial African political, social and economic structures and 
development are negative.
Godowoli summarises the effects of these policies of liberalisation, 
civilisation and modernisation on Africa’s traditional political space. He 
describes African politics as now characterised by competition and conflicts
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between individuals and interest groups with each struggling to ensure that its 
interest prevails (2002: 2). The impacts of the separation of individuals from 
the state were more pronounced in the economy as evident in the economic 
crisis that plagued the continent. By the end of 1970s, many African states, 
regardless of the nature of their states or their economic policies or ideological 
orientation, found themselves in deep economic crisis with high debts, low or 
negative growth rates, hyper inflationary trends and massive transfer of 
surpluses through various ways, to the developed nations.
Political liberalism on the other hand, that calls for equal treatment of
all persons without regard to race, ethnicity, religion or language. It therefore
failed to address problems of real divisions by birth among the peoples of
various ethnic groups. Glazier and Moynihan (1975, eds ;) robustly pointed out
this deficiency of the liberal assumption with an emphasis that:
...when those bearing a distinctive identity make claims for 
their group or demand protections for their religion or culture 
that in some way violate the equality of persons or individual 
rights that liberalism entails (Glazier and Moynihan, eds,
1975)
Democratic majority principle of liberalism ignores the fact that in 
Africa, equal treatment for individuals will result in an unequal condition for a 
given group. The greatest flaw is the non-consideration of population 
advantage which makes it hard for minority groups to escape from the 
periphery of both the regional and national political equations. The majority 
groups always dominate the leadership positions. Examples of this domination 
are Tswana domination in Botswana, Kikuyu domination in Kenya, Hindus 
domination in Mauritius, Creole domination in Cape Verde, Southern 
domination in Cote D’Ivoire, Northern domination in Cameroon, Oromo and 
Tigrean domination in Ethiopia, Southern Sudan marginalisation in Sudan, and 
Jadu marginalisation in Libya.
Colonial methods of administration and domination in which patterns
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of penetration and concentration of socio- economic activities and the dual 
practices of Direct and Indirect Rule etc; discriminations between and among 
the ethnic groups in the various ethnic communities, as in the case of Hutu and 
Tutsi, consequently constituted the basis for identity politics. Colonialism has 
created more national disunity in Africa than any other single factor in Africa. 
Governments have tended to be more tribal than national in structure, with 
inter-tribal oppression becoming common practice. On balance, this in effect 
created more societal tension and turmoil.
Tribal politics as captured by Post and Vickers (1973) prevails as the 
virtue of the new African states’ politics while regionalism replaces 
nationalism as ethnic bloc and groups were sensitised to the advantage of being 
at the centre of power by the power elites who tactically developed emotional 
ethnic symbols and perfecting the art of ethnicity in order to cling to political 
power (Ako-Nai, 2004). Cases in point were Buthelezi’s Nkatha Freedom Party 
Movement in South Africa, UNITA in Angola, KANU and KADU in Kenya, 
NPC, AG and NCNC in Nigeria. One-party state adherents whose legitimacy 
was supported by pre-colonial African political values also emerged on the 
African political turf led by Nkrumah (1957) Nyerere, Sekou Toure and Tom 
Mboya (1963) (Mafeje, 1995: 3). This perhaps compels Macpherson (1977) to 
conclude that Africa belongs to 'non-liberal democracy' and 'developmental 
authoritarianism'.
3.6. Existence of State in post-colonial Africa
Discussing whether state exists in Africa in the first instance requires 
understanding of what a state is. The state has throughout the nineteenth and the 
early part of twentieth century’s received considerable attention among scholars 
most of whom were of law, philosophy and history backgrounds. These 
backgrounds explain why the state was initially conceptualised as a formal legal- 
structure based on constitutions, government structures, legislatures as epitomised 
by European democracies in the period leading to the World War II. Immediately 
after the World War II, a new wave of interpretation and representation of the
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state especially among American scholars took attention away from the formal 
legal structures to the “informal” politics within “society,” because the juridical 
approaches were thought to be too legalistic and too narrowly focused on state 
structures (Opello and Rossow, 2004: 4). The new focus adopts a pluralistic 
approach to investigate the ways in which various social interests such as political 
parties, pressure groups, civil societies, and professional groups influence the 
production of public policies.
The pluralists with their new interpretation firstly assumed the society 
to be separate from and prior to the state (ibid) and also that state could only do 
what the various interests groups within the mirage of societies wanted it or 
pressured it to do. In essence state is being driven by the interest groups, who are 
sometimes competing, for the prioritisation of their interests with the scarce 
resources available to the state. In short, unlike the formal legal-structural school, 
societies explain the politics in the state, following the pluralist approach.
This pluralist view championed by the political scientists in the United 
States perceives society as an integral part of the state. In order to project the 
Western model of state and society, United States political scientists sought a 
“general” theory to explain how societies could function well, if their economies, 
polities, and social structures were integrated and balanced. The view dominated 
the study and interpretation of the state up to the 1970s when some significant 
developments cast doubts on the society-interest theory of the pluralist school. 
Before delving into these developments, it is germane to briefly explain factors 
that aided the dominance of the pluralist school. These factors include the 
successful management of the economic prosperity and advances in the welfare of 
the people by the state in the capitalist countries. More importantly the Western 
Europe states and the Japanese state had successfully transformed the war-ravaged 
economies into prosperous, dynamic capitalist power houses (Opello and Rossow, 
2004: 7). In this wise the state did not attract any serious analytical attention from 
political scientists.
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Part of the development that brought the pluralist theory under 
interrogation and challenge was the emergence of some mainstream political 
scientists who developed ‘policy analyses’ as a new subfield of political science. 
They cited the US insistence o carrying on the Vietnam War against the 
disapproval by the American society as a valid example of the weak point of the 
pluralist theory. Though they identified a major weakness in the state-society 
theory but they still accepted the pluralist model of the state but with a 
concentration on the activities of government. Without any explicit concept of the 
state, policy analysis theorists applied game theory from mathematics, social 
psychology and cybernetic engineering to develop a focus on theories of 
organisational behaviour and decision-making. Sharing the same goal of 
promoting order and efficiency with their pluralist counterparts, the policy 
analysts opine that this goal could be achieved without the messy indeterminacy 
and contingency of politics.
This development prompted the need to re-envision state without 
politics. The Marxian theorists were the first set of social scientists with renewed 
interest in the state (Jessop, 1982; Clyde, 1993). They sought to explain why 
neither the buoyant capitalist nor the welfare states could sustain their economic 
prosperity nor advance the welfare for the common good of the people. This 
failure, they traced to the dwindling revenue of the state occasioned by the 
capitalist economy arising from the additional burden of the Cold War Military 
budgets on the one hand and the erosion of the state legitimacy by social 
inequality created by the capitalist economy on the other (O’Connor, 1973; 
Herbermas, 1973; Offe, 1975). The Cold War budgets were seen as necessary to 
ensure a hitch free passage for capital and sources of raw materials in the 
production-outsourcing quests of the MNCs.
These schools of thought on the state did not go unchallenged. The 
statist theorists presented a challenge with a focus on how the state had functioned 
historically either as an organisation of domination or as promoter of reforms that 
might make good on the promises of the welfare state (Tilly, ed.; 1975). The
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major argument of the statist theorists was the way in which the state has been 
subordinated to society by the preceding schools (Skocpol, 1985). The statists 
view state as an independent agent of action-taking or decision-making 
autonomous entity that is institutionally different from the society. The statist 
theorists successfully integrated historical sociology with political science in the 
study of particular states.
These are the divergent views in the analysis of the state that Hyden 
categorises into those who opine that the essence of the state is to constitute itself 
into an instrument of power and control; and those who believe that state should 
be a tool for solving societal problems (Hyden, 1999: 8). Hyden argues that while 
the first group sees the state as an instrument of oppression and exploitation, the 
second group views it as a mechanism for reconciling the divergent views in the 
society and providing a forum for finding solutions to the pertinent problems 
facing the societal members.
All the above explanations of state can be broadly discussed as 
empirical and juridical views of the state. The empirical view focuses mainly on 
the external environment of the state, while the juridical view concentrates on the 
internal environment of the state. Most of the empirical definitions draw their 
strengths from the Weber’s definition of the state as a corporate group that has 
compulsory jurisdiction, exercises continuous organisation, and claims a 
monopoly of force over a territory and its population, including all actions taking 
place in the area of its jurisdiction (Weber, 1964: 156; Jackson and Rosberg, 
1983: 1).
The underpinning assumption of the Weberian definition is the
sociological definition developed by Niccolo Machiavelli, who emphasised the
use of force, and force alone, as the foundational element of the state. In Weber
and Machiavelli‘s definition, the basic test of the existence of the state is whether
or not its national government can lay claim to a monopoly of force in the territory
under its jurisdiction (Jackson and Rosberg, 1982: 1). If the state is to exist, the
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dominated must obey the authority claimed by the power that is (Fritz and Rocha, 
2007: 11). Saskia and Stefaan simplify the state centric view of Machiavelli and 
Weberian school with an argument that the strength of the state has to do with the 
recognition and acceptance of its authority (Saskia and Stefaan, 2002: 575). In 
essence if an external or internal organisation such secessionists or rebels can 
effectively challenge a national government and control part of the territory and 
population for itself, such rebellion or secession will acquire the essential 
characteristic of statehood. Weber further establishes that statelessness arises once 
there are rival groups within the same territory claiming statehood and none of 
them could establish permanent control over the contested territory (Weber, 1964: 
156).
By this state-centric view, most of the post-colonial African states can 
be considered as being states for being able to claim a monopoly of the coercive 
instruments throughout their territorial jurisdictions, even though they need to rely 
on the foreign forces to accomplish this. However, cases of statelessness in this 
regard are well established in Liberia, Sudan, Somalia, Sierra-Leone and Burundi.
The juridical view as stated earlier, expresses state as a legal 
institution, recognised by international law, with the following attributes: a 
defined territory, a permanent population, an effective and independent 
government, or the right —to enter into relations with others (Brownlie, 1979: 73- 
76). This view emerged after the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and 
Duties of the State. Statehood does not require diplomatic recognition by other 
states, but rather a recognition that it exists. Once the existence of a territory has 
been recognised by the United Nations as sovereign and autonomous without 
necessarily meeting claim to monopoly of the coercive instruments as explained 
by Machiavelli and Weber and Mann (Fritz and Rocha, 2007: 12), such territory 
stands as a state. Using Brownlie’s definition to characterise states in the sub- 
Saharan Africa reveals that these empirical conditions are highly variable in spite 
of their meeting the juridical conditions (Jackson and Rosberg, 1983).
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Brownlie‘s definition of the state requires a stable community sharing 
common norms and values which of course there are nationality groups in the sub- 
Saharan Africa sharing common cultural values but no single state can be 
identified as resting solidly on an integrated culturally homogenous nationality 
groups. Sub-Saharan Africa is not a homogenous entity. The region is well 
documented as divided into many distinctive ethnic nationalities whose desires for 
self determination have being at the centre of bitter ethnic conflicts as explained in 
the thesis. Political tensions arising from these ethnic conflicts that have crept into 
the distribution patterns of state resources among the ethnic groups and the 
developmental patterns of the state in an unequal and unbalanced manner have 
seriously affected national political stability of the sub-Saharan African states and 
weakened the capacity of their governments to control their territories.
One vital issue Brownlie brings to attention is the insufficiency in 
using monopoly of force by the state within their juridical territory to describe 
statehood. A state should be able to combine both the empirical and the juridical 
properties before it could answer the state appellation. Jackson was able to point 
at this basic condition by asserting that statelessness can still manifest itself in a 
situation where the state is unable to have effective control of all of the important 
public activities within its jurisdiction; in some, the government is perilously 
uncertain, so that important laws and regulations cannot be enforced with 
confidence and are not always complied with (Jackson, 1993: 1).
Adopting Jackson’s definition means every post-colonial sub-Saharan
African state lacks existence due to the absence of what Michael Mann (1986;
1993) calls infrastructure power to penetrate their societies with state
bureaucracies and state-sponsored programmes (Mann, 1986) or to posses the
ability to enforce policy throughout their territories (Fritz and Rocha, 2007: 11). A
few indicators will suffice to illustrate the absence of states in Africa after
independence and that what are commonly referred to as states are ‘hand-me-
down’ political organisations with some public authority which lacked the
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capacity to intervene in the economic development as envisaged in the Lagos Plan 
of Action.
The trajectories of dependency of the African states on their colonial 
or Cold War mentors, assume different interpretations in different discourses. 
Some contributors such as Ahluwalia opine that the post colonial states are new 
institutions of their colonial forms that only continue the strategies of 
administration and adaptation of the new institutions to modernisation principles 
of development and progress (Ahluwalia, 2001: 67-71). Bayart (1993: 265) had 
earlier highlighted the extraneous strategy of the colonial and Cold War mentors 
of the post-colonial state which he sees as a vital window of looking at what is 
negatively described as tribalism or instability in Africa.
Instability is not just a case of adaptation but a reflection of the local 
appropriation of alien institutions. Following this trend of argument, Wallerstein, 
(2002: 164) stresses that whichever form dependency takes, it is glaring that two- 
thirds of the world’s people do not have liberal states simply because the structure 
of the capitalist world economy makes it impossible for such a state to emerge. 
The idea of unified nation-state constitutes a “post-colonial misery” (Chartterjee, 
1993: 11) for some of the post-colonial leaders who found it extremely difficult to 
reconcile this idea with their ethnically and religious diverse societies. To 
accomplish this means to place the modem states on shallow foundations that 
relapse into high level of violence that sets persistent pattern of crisis for the post­
colonial governments.
Building of modem states in the sub-Saharan African is truly on a
shallow foundation. They all manifest increasingly deficiency in facing the
challenges of the burgeoning complexity of the contemporary social world. These
challenges have not only affected the traditional forms of government but the
stmcture of individual identity as well (Gergen, 1991; Turkle, 1984). As Alvin
Toffler declares, ‘today’s businesses simply lack the requisite variety to make it in
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the 21st century’ (Toffler, 1990: 190), same is valid for states in sub-Saharan 
Africa. The ‘crisis of governance’ that has plagued the region since independence 
cannot be isolated from the deficiencies of these states which are practically weak 
to serve either as instruments of coercion or arena for solving divergent interests 
due to loss of control. Political crisis in Zimbabwe, Cote D’Ivoire, Benin 
Republic, Togo, Sierra Leone, Egypt, Algeria, Libya, Nigeria etc. could not be 
managed by the state in spite of its monopoly over instruments of coercion. By the 
late 1980s, limitations of African states -  reflected in weak policy formulation, 
ineffective public administration, and corruption -  featured prominently in official 
diagnoses from both sides of the structural adjustment debate (UNECA 1989; 
World Bank 1989). These failures further strengthen the argument that state, 
either in the sense of mechanism for resolving divergent views, or as instrument 
of control and power is yet to exist in post-colonial sub-Saharan Africa. This 
forms part of the conclusion that earned sub-Saharan African states the failed 
states label by most donor agencies and some political analysts.
African societies like every other ethnic societies start with imagination 
and common linguistic features including language and cultural practices to 
underlie their creation. Members use these features to identify themselves with 
specific nations. Anderson (1983) sees linguistic features especially language as a 
key factor in the creation of national identity which he claims to be ‘one of the 
inspirations to national consciousness’ (Anderson, 1983: 45). Every African 
society recognises these linguistic connections and uses such to refer to 
themselves as nations or groups. Each of the society has its own history of origin 
and independent rulers (Laitin, 1986: 110) which was adopted in the formation of 
their various pre-colonial city-kingdoms.
This form of cultural and social empowerment has been linked to 
nationalism by scholars such as Hobsbawm and Anderson, who argue that both 
communities and nations are a product of imaginations. In “Imagined 
Communities”, Anderson argues that the development of nations is “distinguished, 
not by their falsity or genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined”
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(Anderson 1993: 6). David Graeber expands this line of thought with argument 
that the development of nations has travelled along the road of anarchist musings. 
To him, nationalism is a form of revolution which he defines as:
...a matter of people resisting some form of power 
identified as oppressive, identifying some key aspects of 
that power as the source of what is fundamentally 
objectionable about it, and then trying to get rid of one’s 
oppressor in such a way as to eliminate that sort of power 
completely from daily life. (Graeber 2004: 33)
This revolutionary struggle as identified by Graeber is reinforced by 
the thesis’s search for how a democratic state could be achieved and stabilised in 
sub-Sahara Africa. The state, however, cannot be viewed in isolation and a clear- 
cut distinction has to be drawn between three main concepts: state, nation and 
nation-state. As stated earlier Weber defines the 'state ’ as ‘a human community 
that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical 
force within a given territory’ (Weber et al., 1979: 78). Guibemau refers to 
nation as ‘a human group conscious of forming a community, sharing a common 
culture, attached to a clearly demarcated territory, having a common past and a 
common project for the future and claiming the right to rule itself (Guibemau, 
1996:47).
Guibemau attaches five characteristics to any group before such could 
be regarded as a nation. These are psychological (consciousness of forming a 
group), cultural, territorial, political, and historical. Going by Opello and Rosow’s 
argument (2004), people who share these characteristics are referred to as having 
a common national identity. Opello explains further that it is the sharing of a 
common national identity, expressed in terms of culture, language, religion, ways 
of life, common memories, shared past experiences and territory that makes 
people feel they belong to the same community and have a certain degree of 
solidarity towards their fellow-nationals (Opello and Rosow, 2004). Most of the 
pre-colonial sub-Saharan Africa societies shared these five characteristics and 
they were gradually nourishing modem state institutions of government in their
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Kingdoms and empires before they were truncated by the colonial policies and 
administrative styles to produce what Reno (2000) refers to as shadow state or a 
hand-me-down’ political organisation.
A shadow state according to Reno (2000) is a parallel governance 
system that operates outside formal state institutions and is founded on ‘the 
ruler’s ability to manipulate access to resources...to enhance his own power’ 
(Clapham, 1996: 250). In the shadow state, the leader restricts the provision of 
public patronages and services to “obedient” citizens as a way of cultivating 
sustained allegiance from the people. He does this by limiting the distribution 
of such goods to himself and a few loyal followers (Zack-Williams, 1999). 
This was exactly how Siaka Stevens ruled Sierra Leone (Lord, 2000) and 
Kwame Nkrumah ruled Ghana, Julius Nyerere ruled Tanzania, Sekou Toure 
ruled Guinea (Mafeje, 1995: 31) and lately Olusegun Obasanjo in Nigeria 
between 1999 and 2007.
A major consequence of the transfer of legitimacy is that most post­
colonial African states inherited colonial forms of government that are, most of 
the time at variance with the pre-colonial social and existential realities of their 
traditional societies. Unfortunately these forms of government being products 
of alien cultures, their values and their world-views, are sometimes not 
understood by the same post-colonial leaders who conduct public affairs as 
state actors. The meanings and importance of public institutions as 
embodiments and expressions of the history and collective experiences of the 
societies which built them are often lost upon the new leaders as they rely on 
mechanically running state institutions without an understanding their origins.
The desire of anti-colonial idealists, such as Frantz Fanon, to avoid 
imitating Europe was belied by the post-colonial reality (Fanon, 1967: 252). 
Since colonialism provided the template for the shadow state building and 
governance, African territories were guided to independent nations but 
dependent economies. The anti-colonialist therefore had little choice than to
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operate within the framework of the foreign state-building dynamic provided 
by the withdrawing colonial authorities (Cooper, 2002: 67). This dynamic did 
not only suppress the pan-African dreams of the indigenous anti-colonial 
groups it also ensured the prevalence of the liberal values in the post-colonial 
shadow states. The effect of the suppression was the unprecedented challenge 
from the aspirations of indigenous people. Their aspirations threatened the new 
state model due to the failure of the withdrawing colonial authorities to 
acknowledge the values of pre-colonial patrimonialism (Clapham, 1985: 57- 
58) in either the democratisation process or in state building.
In short, the post-colonial shadow states did not differ much from their 
progenitors. They were fashioned as instruments of control and power designed 
by the colonial authorities for the realisation of colonial objectives. They were 
built to serve the same purpose for dependent economy. In this process, the 
new structures that were entrenched further ruptured the pre-colonial dynamics 
and patterns in the process of strengthening the political control and economic 
interests of the colonisers (Lonsdale, 1986: 145).
Though there were challenges from the traditional leaders but such 
leaders as Jaja of Opobo, in Nigeria, were banished while the compliant rulers 
were rewarded (Nugent, 2004; Elkins, 2005; Meinertshagen, 1957; Ellis, 1981; 
Lapping, 1989; Berman, 1996). The ruthlessness with which recalcitrant 
traditional leaders were dealt with provided the colonial administrations with 
stability and consistency required for economic exploitation, social deprivation, 
political exclusion, and cultural oppression. This draws violence into the 
domain of legacies that the colonial administration left for the ex-colonial 
territories in Africa. This legacy later became a tool in the anti-colonial 
struggles to right the wrongs created by colonialism.
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3.7 Ethnic violence and rivalries in post-colonial states
After independence, African leaders applied the inherited instruments 
of coercion to unleash terror and violence on their people (ibid). Ethnic 
divisions and the intra-state conflicts became rife and prevalent challenge for 
the post-colonial African states (Amoo, 1997; Rodney, 1972; Dumont, 1996; 
Meredith, 2005; Blanton et al, 2001). Differences among the ethnic groups 
were also stressed especially religious dichotomies in order to facilitate access 
to power and hegemonic domination. The legacy of tribalism which according 
to Shillington (1989: 354) was originally invented by the colonial authorities, 
was fully exploited by the post-colonial leaders to perpetuate themselves in 
power.
Perpetuation of all these separatist sentiments had serious implications 
for the structures of post-colonial states, which already stood on weak 
foundations. The strategy made it almost impossible for the leaders to unite and 
mobilise the array of ethnic groups towards nation-building. Generally, the post­
colonial African states were not autochthonous, guided structures, political 
arrangements, and functional governance procedures for the rational and 
appropriate distribution of state resources and power. These are largely 
responsible for quick resort to violence among ethnic groups when competing for 
power and resources (Harris and Reilly eds., 1998: 9).
One of the worst examples of violence was the 1994 genocide in 
Rwanda (Scherrer, 2001) which according to BBC report titled “Rwanda: How 
the Genocide Happened” (2008) saw the slaughter of more than 800,000 
Rwandans, including moderate Hutus, within a period of four months.
Ethnic conflicts are not only rampant in contemporary Africa, but they 
are also more severe compared to those in other regions of the world. To some
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observers, post-independence tribal politics was inherent in the systems that 
created the post-colonial states (Post and Vickers, 1973). Others contend further 
that the systems paved the way for nationalism to become regionalism (Ako-Nai, 
2004). Each ethnic group was sensitized to the advantage of being at the centre of 
power, with leaders developing ethnic symbols and highlighting their ethnicity to 
gain and hold political power. Rather than reducing negative facets of social life, 
post-colonial African politics fostered them, thus exacerbating the problems of 
citizenship and nationality.
3.8 Stunted Autochthonous State in Africa
The foundations for autochthonous state was stunted by the colonial 
practices and legacies Ethnic divisions were not only applied for administrative 
purposes but also used to prevent unified actions of all ethnic groups against the 
colonial administrations. This practice turned out to breed animosity among the 
ethnic groups which destroyed the foundation for any genuine state-building 
project (Nnoli, 2000). There is demonstrable evidence of sophistication in some 
African pre-colonial political institutions, including defined separation of powers. 
These institutions were supported by the values of traditional social life, which 
nurtured a system of government suitable for African societies. Of note, some pre­
colonial institutions had some features of modem government similar to British 
parliamentary government. These included legislative councils, dialogue, and 
principles of representation. In other words, the parliamentary principles of 
decision making, debate, and discussion of different perspectives and preferences, 
expressed by accredited representatives, were features of traditional African 
politics and not peculiar to liberal democracy.
If pre-colonial African kingdoms and empires had features similar to 
parliamentary government, what was responsible for the failure of post-colonial 
African states to embrace modem institutions of liberal constitutional government, 
immediately after the de-colonisation? Some who have addressed this issue 
contend that post-colonial African leaders lacked requisite knowledge for 
operating government on a national scale (Tordoff, 2002). This argument, on its
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face value may look plausible unless one considers that most post-colonial 
African leaders had been involved in the governance of their various states 
through imposed constitutional arrangements before the physical disengagement 
of the colonial administrations. For example regional governments headed by 
Nigerians, and with Nigerians in legislatures, were established in 1954, six years 
before independence. Prior to that, Nigerians had been involved in the legislative 
functions of the colonial state as far back as 1922, during the Clifford 
Constitution. The period 1946 to 1951 brought an expansion of Nigerians 
involved in the colonial administration and in political party activities. Limited 
deliberative principles were put to use during these constitutional periods.
After gaining independence, the new African shadow states assumed 
primary roles in economic development, although the degree of state intervention 
varied from weak, as in Botswana, Cameroon, and Mauritius, to strong, as 
witnessed in Algeria, Angola, Benin, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Zambia. A 
major factor that further compounded the failure of post-colonial shadow states 
was the ideological posturing of leaders that was in itself, a product of the Cold 
War orientation. Colonialism was exploitative, but its rectification in the post­
colonial context was transformed into an ideological aversion to the economic 
philosophy of the colonisers.
Capitalism based on the views that since the colonialists were 
exploitative, capitalism must be as well (Ayittey, 1994). Such reasoning 
characterised the actions and pronouncements of Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, 
Modibo Keita of Mali, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, 
and Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe went the opposite direction to capitalism which 
was socialism. According to them, free markets, free trade, private enterprise, and 
the parliamentary system of democracy were all Western capitalist institutions 
that should be rejected by Africa. They ignored the fact that there were some 
features of parliamentary system in most of the African traditional political 
structures. For example, Nkrumah warned Africans against believing that ‘western
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democracy and parliamentary system are the only valid ways of governing; that 
they constitute the only worthwhile model for the training of indigenous elite by 
the colonial power’ (Nkrumah, 1980).
As a reaction to colonial economic structures, Nkrumah and some 
other African leaders chose to establish highly centralised and interventionist 
socialist systems to spur development, which was a reflection of their own 
personal ideological leaning in the Cold War. Capitalism or socialism was 
rejected or accepted by the post-colonial leaders mainly because of their 
relationship to Cold War mentors without any consideration of the effects of such 
acceptance to governance.
The failure of the post-colonial states to successfully operate modem 
institutions of government brought into focus the bankruptcy of the universal 
application of the grand theories to governance globally. The impracticability of 
this universal application is what Booth (2011), addresses by suggesting that the 
proper approach to governance is the adoption of suitable system which he labels 
as ‘best fit’, rather than the best-practice conditions stipulated by the grand 
theories. Insistence on any best-practice template by their proponents such as the 
IMF, World Bank requires an examination of their vested interests in such state 
(Booth, 2011).
The indigenous grains in the state-building were abandoned by the 
colonial authorities and why did the neo-colonial institutions insist on every 
nation to accept liberal democracy and free-market as the ‘end of history and 
terminus for all ideologies’ (Fukuyama, 1989). The prominent culprit for Africa’s 
political crisis was the unwillingness or inability of colonial authorities to build on 
the ‘grains’ of pre-colonial society when laying the foundation of post-colonial 
states.
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The ‘notion of individualism’ that elevated best-practice over best-fit 
contributed to recurring political crises in post-colonial Africa (Turner, 2006: 81- 
83). This notion, imported from Europe, replaced the communitarian values of the 
pre-colonial period derived from living together in kin-centred social structures, 
with members of extended families, engendered a sense of collective
responsibility (Mazrui, 1986: 7). Traditional political systems that once combined 
with other traditional institutions to foster justice and equity in the society were 
replaced by neo-patrimonial systems to produce dependent economies with 
disarticulated structure of production (ibid).
. The post-colonial political leaderships promoted liberal, 
individualistic values at the expense of communal values. The traditional 
institutions that had played prominent roles in the religious, political, and 
economic sectors were superseded by the amalgamation of various ethnic 
societies into a single political entity and the introduction of multi-party 
competition. In the process, new, specialised institutions emerged to replace the 
indigenous institutions and systems and create new social relationships (Held, 
1987). The same doctrines were also used to entrench private property (Sorensen, 
1998).
Post-colonial African state building process witnessed attempts by the 
post-independence leaders to evolve a nation-state by accommodating the various 
ethnic nationalities. Members of these nationalities were subjected to the rules of 
the nation-state by means of creating a common culture, symbols, values, reviving 
traditions and myths of origin, and sometimes inventing them (Opello and Rosow, 
2004). Attempts were made to evoke a sense of belonging among the citizens by 
demanding for loyalty and identification with the national aspirations and symbols 
of identity. These efforts were encouraged by the successful consolidation of all 
the pre-colonial nationalities behind the single banner of struggles for democracy
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which the leaders wrongly assumed to be an acceptance of nation-state and the 
preparedness of the different nations or ethnic groups to accept a single culture 
and lingua franca under a state’s protection. The internal struggle between Kenya 
African National Union (KANU) and Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) 
is a classical example of misconception of African independent leaders about the 
aspirations of each ethnic group that queued behind the banner of struggles for 
independence
In the process of building the nation-state the post-independence 
leaders assumed the role of father figure with massive control of state institutions 
and laws, the national media and the national education system. They variously:
... sought to nominate and promote a single official 
language, sometimes a single religion, and disseminated a 
specific version of the nation-state’s history based on 
remembering, ignoring or forgetting certain key events, 
and recovering and inventing national symbols, 
ceremonies, rituals, heroes, sacred places and 
traditions(Opello and Rosow, 2004: 7).
These strategies were employed to create and sustain a homogenous 
national identity among the citizens however numerous examples proved that 
none of the imagined nation-states in sub-Sahara Africa have successfully 
homogenise their populations. Differences have prevailed in spite of the nation­
state's historical strategies to instil a common identity among the otherwise 
diverse citizenry.
The attempts at creating new states by African founder presidents
based on the assumption that there was a positive relationship between economic
development and greater social and political integration initially compounded the
stage for conflicts in the African societies due to “conflict between the traditional
authorities and the modernizing politicians” (Drake, 1965: 150-158). The
modernising politicians ignored the fact that relations between traditional and
modem political power develop from very different starting points that are mostly
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parallel to each other. Skinner explains:
With the exception of Botswana and Swaziland the emerging 
African leaders opted for the political cultures of their 
metropoles: the Westminster model, and the Belgian and French 
presidential and premier systems. These men ignored that the 
governmental processes they cherished had evolved in 
economically, industrially, politically, and socially complex 
state systems (Skinner, 1989: 18-19).
Post-colonial African leaders ignored what Pearl Robinson refers to as 
the "cultures of politics" that had developed during the colonial period, and used 
by the colonial authorities, as stated by Gramsci, to maintain "hegemony protected 
by the armour of coercion" (Gramsci, 1971: 243). During independence, most of 
the African nationalists easily abandoned their anti-colonial cliches and anti-racist 
philosophies such “African Personality” by their systematic rejection of any 
compromise with African traditional leaders for fear of derailing the drive for 
independence (Chazan; Mortimer; Ravenhill; Rothchild, eds; 1992: 7). For 
example, Kwame Nkrumah had a bitter conflict with the Asantehene and other 
traditional leaders in Ghana who objected to being excluded from government. In 
Ouagadougou, a frustrated traditional emperor, the Mogho Naba of the Mossi 
people, attempted to use his traditional army to dissolve the Territorial Assembly. 
Sir Edward Mutesa II of the Baganda quarrelled with Sir Andrew Cohen, Britain's 
last colonial governor, about the future government of Uganda and was exiled to 
England where he died in poverty. These are incontrovertible evidences that were 
legion (Wilson, 1994).
In their desire to integrate the states in the face of plethora “ethnic
collectivities” (Skinner, 1989; p. 19), with their usual mono-economies, some of
the new African leaders such as Julius Nyerere espoused "African Socialism"
where the state controlled the economy. Insisting upon the need for "national
integration," they in the process introduced into the African political lexicon
through imposition a single party system which they erroneously claimed to be
close to the African "palaver." As later explained by Decalo, (1989) there was
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often some justification for these actions, since competitively engaged in the Cold 
War, the protagonists did attempt to profit from African ethnic competition (ibid).
The “Africa’s Tragedy” failed to succumb to any ideological 
permutation ranging from Marxism-Leninism, African and non-African socialism, 
capitalism or mixed capitalism espouse at various times by African leaders. 
African leaders never gave a thought of compromising their ideological 
orientation with the advice offered to Nkrumah by Sir Arthur Lewis, “that the 
political-economy of the new African states should use agriculture to build their 
economies and should employ ethnic-based coalitions for government” (Lewis 
1967: 64). The outcome of this monumental failure was the “African Tragedy” 
expressed by Leys (2004) where confusion and crises enveloped both the African 
economies and governments.
Those who are quite familiar with African multi-ethnic societies and 
the influence of traditional institutions on African politics and economies 
especially the anthropologists were never taken by surprise like their western 
political theory counterparts, over the socio-political crises that characterise the 
post-colonial Africa. For example Peter Lloyd, a specialist in Yoruba kingdom, 
observed that while
...the chiefs have not been in the van of the national movement, 
at least in recent decades ... the picture so often painted of a 
straight fight between elderly illiterate chiefs, living in the past, 
and modem Western-educated politicians is not in accord with 
the facts (Lloyd, 1970, pp.382-412)
Lloyd and his fellow anthropologists saw the danger in the practice of 
the modem African political leaders who tried in vain to turn the allegiance of the 
people from “their ethnic groups to the state, and from their traditional rulers to 
the parliamentary leaders” (Skinner, 1989) — “especially when members of the
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new ruling class, by training and ways of thought, and in styles of life, were 
divorced from the masses” (Lloyd, 1970).
It was on this basis that Lloyd took a queue behind Sir Arthur Lewis 
to offer an advice that politicians need to recognise the loyalty of the people to 
their traditional leaders, and to involve the latter in the governance of the country. 
Moreover, the modem politicians should avoid the danger of using traditional 
leaders only for symbolic purposes, thereby running the risk of "destroying the 
prestige of the rulers just as did too close an association with the colonial 
administration in past decades" (Lloyd, ibid).
Norman Miller added his voice against the danger in relegating the 
traditional institution in state building project. On the need to harmonize the role 
of Tanzanian traditional rulers in development and governance so as to avoid 
ethnic conflict, Miller declares:
Viewed from the higher echelons of government in the new 
nations, the rural leader is an insignificant individual who goes 
about managing his local affairs and carrying out—with varying 
degrees of success-the policies and hopes of the government.
Viewed from below, from the inner recesses of the village, the 
leader is a man of authority; a man who has used wealth, 
heredity, or personal magnetism to gain a position of influence.
(Miller, 1970: 185-198)
He argues that the rural leaders were the key to development plans in 
the rural areas, and warned that any "lack of initiative ... would entrench the status 
quo and doom the modernization plans before they begin" (Miller, 1970: 185- 
198).
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Skinner also observes the negligence of the modem state officials in 
the then Upper Volta -  now Burkina Faso, in neglecting the traditional institutions 
and devoted much attention to the integration of their new states into the global 
economy. Skinner presents his observations right from the decolonisation period 
that many traditional leaders in the Upper Volta
...feared for their positions, when faced with disinterest from 
the capital, in 1968, they simply pitched in and helped their 
subjects. The politicians in Ouagadougou were too busy 
quarrelling to deal with rural problems, with the result that the 
military replaced them (Skinner, 1970: 199-201).
Bond observes the same phenomenon in the Northern Rhodesia -  now 
Zambia during the transition from the colonial rule to independence. In a vivid 
account he explains that:
...disagreement about development pitted the royal houses and 
the "new men." When rural villagers wanted economic 
development, but were reluctant to pay for it, this put pressure 
on all those chiefdoms leaders whose power ... [was] based 
primarily on popular support (Bond, 1976: 160).
Bond sees the chief and the royal clan as an alternative source of 
leadership that can always fill the vacuum created by the party-leadership in terms 
of attention to the needs of the local people. Bond’s observation became 
manifested in Zambia when in the early seventies a one-party structure was firmly 
put in place with all the local politicians moving to the centre for party patronages 
thereby leaving the rural people in the limbo.
Joining the debate for the recognition of traditional elements 
institutions, Owusu stresses the need to recognise and satisfy the aspirations of the 
different ethnic groups and their leaders as a panacea to solving the problem of 
governance in the contemporary Africa. This need, according to him is based on
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his observation of different African societies and their types of governance based 
on compromises between the groups and individuals (1991: 369 - 396). Skinner’s 
observations of political change in Upper Volta, now Burkina Faso, reveals that 
the failure of the modem politicians to compromise with the traditional leaders in 
the interest of all the groups as suggested by Owusu, contributed to the political 
crisis (Skinner, 1974) in Burkina Faso. This failure was evident in the manner of 
reaction of the populace to change of regimes starting with the regime of the first 
president, Maurice Yameogo in January 1966 through subsequent military 
regimes and terminated in the assassination of Thomas Sankara in October 15 
1987 (Otayek, 1985). In an eloquently written obituary of Sankara, Skinner 
laments that
...wishing to break too quickly with the 'old order’...’ Sankara 
did not understand that the ’disinherited masses,’ was still 
caught up in the yoke of the ancestral hierarchy. The ’working 
class' who until recently only listened to the emperor of the 
Mossi, ... did not know that they needed to be liberated 
(Skinner, 1989: 434-455).
Learning from this pitfall Blaise Compare -  Sankara’s successor- 
though introduced multi-party democracy but quickly sought the support of 
traditional rulers (referring to them as representative of different national 
cultures). In order to retain the support of the traditional institutions, Compaore 
offered to create a third parliamentary chamber to give representation to a large 
number of groups (Skinner, 1989: 434-455). This in Compaore’s argument will 
address the problem of economic inequality emerging from the notion of inherent 
individual differences and unbridled political and economic competition 
associated with western notion of democracy and development.
Stemming the tide of challenge from the quest of the people for the 
resurgence of the traditional institutions in governance, President Yoweri
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Museveni of Uganda among other measures, on July 31 1993, installed the son of 
Mutebi II in person of Ronald Muwenda Mutebi II as the new Kabaka of the 
kingdom of Buganda to signal the “rebirth of Buganda Kingdom” (Pierre 
Englebert, 2002; pp.345-368). He also gave full support to a parliamentary bill 
restoring monarchies to governance and also opening of Lukiiko -  Buganda’s 
parliament. This according to him will preserve local languages and culture which 
are under serious assault from external forces and also address issues of national 
unity, mobilisation, and the welfare of society. Many Ugandans who bought into 
the cultural rebirth project of Museveni opined that revival of the traditional 
institutions carries the potential for getting greater participation because of a more 
natural sense of self-belonging. Ugandans are reportedly seeing the European type 
of state as alien and the old set-up of kingdoms and chieftainships as more organic 
(Skinner, 1989; Pierre Englebert, 2002: 345 -  368; Obasanjo, 1989).
For the sake of emphasis, democracy according to Hindess is “ a 
medium and form of political struggle...” (Hindess, 1983:11); and a special form 
of self-government where people as a whole exercise power and have equal 
political standing in the state (Hindess, 1989). The principles of self-government 
and equal political standing were conspicuously missing in post-independence 
sub-Sahara African states. Whereas these principles of equal political standing are 
vital in the modem state building process due to the impact of culture-mix.
Culture-mix remains a dynamic part of human history that can hardly 
be halted. This mixture is however not sufficient to erode the unique features of 
each culture which provides their members with group identity. Each culture 
retains its unique traits and features distinctively from any hybridised form. This 
retention helps the societies and groups with their culture to remain localised 
within ‘territorised’ spatial boundaries sharing their unique values and norms and 
see themselves differently from ‘others’. Pre-colonial African Kingdoms were 
groups that were “tightly territorialised, spatially bounded, historically self- 
conscious and culturally homogeneous” (Appadurai 1997: 49).
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The non- localisation of ethnic-group identity within the grand 
theories of liberalism or socialism which provided the template for the post­
independence state building project undermines the post-colonial states. This 
challenge arose from the omission of knowledge of how the ethnic groups identify 
themselves as a social, political, and cultural group on the one hand and how they 
see others on the other. This understanding is crucial to the group’s perception of 
‘other’ which helps them to nurture cultural sensitivity and acceptance. This 
omission poses a serious erosion of the stateness of many African polities and 
limits their scopes of effectiveness. It also opens the door for a complex web of 
civil conflicts between the indigenous groups and the state with a renewed 
saliency of informal politics.
From the above analysis, it is glaring that any analysis of state in 
Africa needs to accommodate the knowledge of the various ethnic groups 
identifying themselves and seeing themselves as social, political and cultural 
groups. The essence of this is to get the state to function more effectively in 
collaboration with ethnic nationalities. This does not only strengthen the state 
institutions but also strengthen the various nationality groups and enhance their 
capacity to underpin healthy nation-state relations. It must be noted that in Africa, 
nations antedated modem sovereign state or contemporary nation-state.
Historical evidence according to McCandless and Schwoebel (2009) 
has convincingly demonstrated that in almost all cases in Europe, with the 
exception of the Balkans (an exception that may provide the clue to the current 
violence and strife in that region), the emergence of the modem sovereign state 
was the precondition for the formation of the nation-state. This is not the same in 
Africa. The pre-condition for modem state-building in Africa is the understanding 
and accommodating the nationality groups as semi-autonomous entities within the 
larger state. This is where it is essential to analyse states in Africa, according to 
Olukoshi (201 l),_primarily in terms o f ‘Africa’s dynamics’
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It is in view of this fact that neo-communitarianism holds state as a 
superstructure that derives its legitimacy from the ethnic nationalities which are 
semi-autonomous entities but control coercive instruments for domestic security 
only. This recognition will help our understanding of how cultural, social, 
political and class alienation can lead to rupture resulting in struggles of social 
movements. This understanding is essential for the creation of political space that 
allows the cultural groups to converge within a context where each group can 
have an equal footing and where identity and power can aid in the reconstruction 
of our cultural selves within the state.
3.9 Disarticulation of Africa’s economy and politics by the decolonisation 
strategy
Political turmoil and economic crisis replaced the optimism and 
euphoria of the 1960s. Independence did not herald prosperity envisaged 
during the independence struggles. Five decades of independence and 
"freedom" from the colonial rule, have witnessed a steady increase in the 
incidence of poverty and a systematic deterioration of living standards across 
Africa. As argued earlier, the economic exploitation and political oppression of 
the African people intensified at the hands of the same elites and nationalists 
who denounced the colonial powers for exploiting Africa (Ayittey, 1994). With 
few exceptions like Patrice Lumumba of Zaire, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, 
Julius Nyerere of Tanzania; the nationalists who took over were worse than the 
departing colonialists.
The argument that the failing democratic project in sub-Saharan 
Africa is a reflection of a wrong decolonisation process could hardly be 
ignored in any political discourse of Africa’s politics and democracy. This 
strategy includes Choudhry’s vital observation of constitution making 
processes in the post-colonial states. Choudhry observes:
...many imperial powers drafted the post-independence
constitutions of colonies as part of the process of
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decolonization. A foreign power would design the institutional 
and legal architecture of another political community without its 
consent. The constitution was presented as a fait accompli. 
Local participation—there was usually some—did not entail 
meaningful, substantive decision-making power. Rather, it was 
directed at ensuring the acquiescence of local elites, with 
fundamental questions of constitutional choice safely remaining 
in foreign hands (Choudhry, 2005: 933)
The greatest effect of decolonisation on constitutional making strategy 
is the constant threat it poses to the post-colonial states because there remains a 
continuous challenge to the imposed liberal values by “the deep and 
irreconcilable tension between the outside imposition of a constitutional order 
and the right of all peoples to self-determination” (Feldman, 2004). The spirit 
of self-determination which Choudhry rightly notes:
...encompasses more than merely the right o f a political 
community to exercise power within an extant constitutional- 
legal order with democratic features. Rather, that right extends 
down to the very structure within which a community exercises 
its power o f self-government, encompassing the most basic 
questions o f institutional design. This is what is meant by the 
phrase that the right to self-government is the right o f rights 
(Choudhry, 2005: 933).
One basic issue Choudhry brought to the fore is the issue of national 
question in the sub-Saharan African states. Addressing the issue of national 
question makes it compelling to conceptualise a nation. Clarification of this 
concept will illuminate the manifestations and origins of national question, 
which has remained at the root of political instability in the sub-Saharan 
Africa.
The idea of treating nation as simply as people of various cultural
backgrounds coming together on the basis of simple choices while preserving
the various elements of diverse cultural backgrounds is weak. It is weak in the
sense that choices and forms of human behaviours as argued by Laughland
(2008) are partly determined by factors such as ethnicity, nationhood and
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parenthood -  very often without people being aware of it. Those choices are 
sometimes beyond our personal control. They all formed part of our social 
beings and without them we remain biological beings. The experience of 
second and third generation immigrants in Europe whose parents or 
grandparents have chosen to come to a new country, and chosen to remain in it, 
often shows the truth of this. In spite of their individual choice, people’s 
behaviour often remains ethnically based and culturally separate from that of 
the host nation, especially if they are of a different race. A nation which is a 
vital constituent of a state is summarised by Laughland (ibid) as not just a 
community of shared values or an impersonal social construct governed by 
certain laws as the word suggests. It derives its membership from family of 
procreation.
Nations can certainly welcome into their midst people who are not 
originally members of it, just as a family can expand to include in-laws. 
Nations like families are bodies of people related to each other by blood. 
National question arises from the spirit of nationalism through where ethnic 
groups that have been subjected to acute deprivation within a polity demand for 
equal economic, social and political opportunities and active promotion of the 
welfare of their people.
Some post-colonial leaders attempted to respond to these challenges 
by either drafting new constitutions or imposing one party state structure in the 
guise of African socialism. Some also see themselves, like their predecessors, 
as trustees of the ethnic groups holding in trust the right to self-determination 
for the various groups. All the leaders virtually took upon themselves “to 
produce order in the very literal sense of monopolizing violence” (Feldman, 
2004: 79) and “to preside over the formation of the basic institutions necessary 
for a stable, democratic state” {ibid: 81) by allotting more powers to the central 
governments. They unfortunately in the process, ended up in deep 
commitments to the protection of the artificial liberal state which on several
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occasions denied the people to freely draft and adopt the constitutions of their 
choice, which means denial of an autochthonous state-building process.
The post-colonial state-building process could hardly be distinguished 
from the colonial process except that the former was an imperialist enterprise 
that was motivated by colonial interest of extraction (Choudhry, 2005). The 
post-colonial process though not imperial, was designed to sustain the colonial 
legacies and therefore lacks the space for the principle of self-determination. 
Ignatieff observes that,
...although superficially justified by appeals to the right to self- 
determination, the new nation-building as currently practiced is 
imperialism under a new guise—an “empire-lite” in which the 
trappings of self-government mask a new form of “imperial 
tutelage (Ignatief, 2003)
Ignatieff reveals the similarities of weakness in both the colonial and 
post-colonial state-building processes. He underlines the absence of 
opportunity for the indigenous cultural groups to decide what kinds of 
democracy, rule of law and stability of property that can be successfully 
absorbed in their culture and context (2003). This absence could be traced to 
the ready-made templates of liberalism with pre-determined terms of 
association among the various ethnic groups that coexist within the post­
colonial states. No room was left for the indigenous groups to determine what 
was culturally appropriate to them, and what should be the boundaries of the 
ethnic requests for self-determination within the context of the post-colonial 
state. The recurring failure of the liberal democratic institutions arises from this 
fact. The prepared templates enabled the withdrawing colonial powers to retain 
the capacity to orchestrate and manipulate the decolonisation process 
sufficiently through constitutional arrangements. In addition to the templates, 
ethnicisation of military institution, and excluding where possible the most 
uncompromising, the most intransigent and the most stubborn aspiring leaders
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in the colonies (Obasanjo, 1998) were all applied to ensure the retainership of 
dependent relationship.
The decolonisation strategy like its colonial source, further 
contributed to the instability of the post-colonial states. Babawale (2006) sheds 
light on the how the contribution was effected. He explains that the departing 
colonial powers instituted a social arrangement that would make the economic 
and political policies of the sub-Saharan African states be dictated to them by 
the metropolitan powers. Szeftel had earlier explained that repercussion for 
deviation from these dictates, as later observed by Babawale, would be met by 
a fierce hostility either in form of sanctions and/or destabilisation of such state 
and regime (Szeftel, 1989: 7). Such repercussion was not only meant to serve 
as a warning signal to any ‘erring’ nation but to ensure that the post-colonial 
leaders remain ‘obedient’ and strictly adhere to the liberal multi-party 
competition. It is the ‘responsibility’ of the post-colonial leaders to avoid 
programmes that would derail the states from maintaining an obedient regime 
to the wishes of the foreign monopoly capitalism (Szeftel, ibid) even if it 
causes a war weary population to ‘give in’.
In the late 1980s, many African governments, including those of 
Cameroon, Chad, Ethiopia, Liberia, Malawi, Nigeria, Mozambique, Sudan, 
Togo, and Zaire, typified this responsibility by declaring wars against their 
own citizens in their obsession with political stability. In Mozambique as 
observed by Ayittey (1994), ragged government troops and a shadowy guerrilla 
army took turns terrorizing villages and stealing their meagre crops. Guns 
instantly became a source of income for many people (Ayittey, ibid).
The impact of political instability deriving from the colonial legacies 
as earlier indicated was enormous on the African economy. From 1965 to 1987 
Africa's annual rate of growth of GNP per capita averaged a dismal 1.1 per cent
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(African Economic and Financial Data, 1989). Agricultural growth was 
negligible, with output growing at less than 1.5 per cent after 1970. Food 
production failed to keep pace with population growth. Food production per 
capita fell by 7 percent in the 1960s, 15 per cent in the 1970s, and continued to 
deteriorate in the 1980s. In 1987, for example, it dropped by 4.9 per cent (ibid: 
154).
Though net foreign direct investment in Africa as a whole has fallen, 
the drop has been sharpest in sub-Saharan Africa. Foreign investment dropped 
dramatically from $1,222 million in 1982 to $498 million in 1987. The French 
seem to have been especially disillusioned. "French direct investment in sub- 
Saharan Africa ran at $1 billion a year in 1981- 83; by 1988 that had translated 
into a net outflow of more than $800 million"(The Economist, 1990). The 
overall picture is even more distressing when compared with other regions of 
the Third World. Social and economic indicators of development, such as 
growth of output, health, and literacy, have shown the weakest performance in 
sub-Saharan Africa.
A fundamental issue arises from the UN/World Bank package for the 
African countries and that is the issue of democratisation. This democratisation 
process is programmed along the OECD6 model of democracy. . The democratic 
transition crises which characterise Africa evolves from the integration of African 
states into the ‘conventional process’ of democracy that promotes democracy and 
state building along the lines of western OECD state model without taking into 
consideration, the historical and cultural peculiarities of these African states and 
peoples.
6 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development There are 32 member countries of 
OECD in which Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Trieste, Turkey and United Kingdom are 
founder members
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The influence of economic liberal values on the African economies 
grew by leap and bound with the emergence of budding capitalists, professional 
groups and intellectuals who were wedded to the capitalist ideology and the 
bourgeois conception of democracy. The free market democracy theorists 
perceived the newly independent African states as a poor continent that has a lot 
to catch up with due to lack of capital, technology, professional skills, rational 
administration, finance, etc and could only catch up with the rest of the world 
especially the west by allowing human and private capitals from the west to have 
an unfettered access to their resources and space. This was the dominant view of 
economic and political development thinking between 1960s and late 80s.
Behind this facade was the penetration of capital without any restraint. 
This was also accompanied by the promotion of liberal values designed in the 
guise of multi-party democracy where majority of the African people lack the 
wherewithal to compete effectively in the monetised multi-party democracy. The 
grafted political institutions of Europe and the corresponding capitalist Europe 
opened the floodgate for the acquisition of western consumption patterns without 
accompanying local production techniques and skills. Power became personalised 
by the political elites who capitalised on the multi-party democracy to float 
interest-based political-economic associations. Many of the political parties 
assumed the role of limited liability companies that offer political platforms to 
political merchants who pay either in cash or kind, or both to the party leaders in 
other to secure space in the political enterprise dubbed elections or secure public 
appointments.
Conclusion
From the foregoing, it is clear that the roots of current political crisis in
Africa lie in history. These problems, originate in the colonial period. That is
not to say that post-colonial Africa states have not changed profoundly in the
last few decades. Colonial powers remodelled the territory for their purposes,
establishing plantations, inducing population movements and creating the
beginnings of modem urban life. But the reflexes, habits and methods of the
[166]
post-colonial state rule are a product of colonial regime continuity. The 
centralised authoritarian state that emerged from the colonial structures 
justifies this continuity. As in the colonial period, post-colonial leaders 
continue with the state building project at the expense of pluralism. This failure 
continues to produce significant dialogue deficit between the majority ethnic 
groups and the minorities on the one hand, and between the state leaders and 
opposition on the other. This invariably results in lack of regime legitimacy 
from the various post-colonial elections. The rejection of pluralism, as reported 
in Crisis Group Africa Report (2010: 2) constantly leads to a deficit of dialogue 
and an inability to accommodate discontent or minority views. This 
development has produced a situation in which genuine democratic reform is 
obliterated. The consequent frustrations account for violence in a pattern 
synonymous with the independence struggles.
The colonial legacies are well pronounced on the economy and politics 
of the pre-colonial societies through its impact on land and traditional 
leadership institutions. Land that was collectively owned by communities and 
families became personal property. Disputes over land are now common place 
between individuals or between indigenous communities in the post-colonial 
states. The urge to claim traditional title also became a source of fierce battle 
among contenders. The character of the post-colonial state and leadership was 
laid during the colonial period through the alterations of the pre-colonial 
structures and liberalisation of the African politics and economies. The crisis 
was particularly trenchant in sub-Saharan Africa. The decline has been 
especially calamitous in Nigeria, which could not translate its oil wealth into 
sustainable economic prosperity.
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Chapter 4
POST-COLONIAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA AND 
THE NEED FOR ALTERNATIVE POLITICAL AND ECONMIC 
MODELS
4.0 Introduction
Post-coloniality as explained by the anthropologists is the relations 
between colonisers and the colonised (Fischer-Tine, 2011). These relationships 
produced some political and economic developments in sub-Saharan Africa that 
could hardly be ignored in either the explanation of the political or economic 
crises that plagued the region or in any justification for alternative models that 
may be adopted for fixing the broken linkages created by these developments. The 
broken linkages are many, but as briefly discussed in chapter two, the major ones 
that underlay the vulnerability of the region are: unchanged perception of the 
colonised by the colonisers, tide of decolonisation, democratisation in the absence 
of state, disarticulation of the pre-colonial economy and state systems, legacy of 
violence and ethnic rivalry, stunted autochthonous states, and legal aberrations 
through the constitution.
4.1 Unchanged perceptions and the tide of decolonisation
The colonial practices of ‘othering’ (Fischer, 2010: 6) and the 
subsequent classification of the traditional African world as underdeveloped and 
defective continued to influence the West's foreign policy and their developmental 
aid towards Africa. These colonial assumptions and stereotypes underlie the 
engagement on the present and future of the post-colonial states by the West. 
Changing this perception requires a reconfiguration of the states and the 
economies of the post-independence African states.
In contrast to the long history of colonisation, the tide of 
decolonisation came in fast beginning in Asia rolling through the Middle East, 
Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific. The decade following the Second World
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War witnessed the tsunami of decolonisation in North Africa and covering most 
of sub-Saharan Africa within a few years of Ghana (formerly the British Gold 
Coast) became the first independent black African state in 1957. By 1980 it had 
covered most of the rest of the erstwhile European colonial empire in the 
Caribbean, the Persian Gulf and South Arabia, and the Pacific.
The speed of the decolonisation process was influenced by factors 
including the weakening of European power following the two world wars, the 
emergence of the United States and the Soviet Union with each competing to win 
over the anti-colonial movements, thus serving as pivots of the bi-polar world or 
Cold War. In addition to these were the increasing pressures from anti-colonial 
nationalists who were also inspired in part by the independence of India in 1947.
Did the decolonisation bring any developmental change? The answer 
is negative. As explained in chapter two, the decolonisation processes were 
affected by the conditions in which power was transferred. These conditions were 
far from optimal in spite of the fact that in some cases the process involved the 
use of violence or war as in Kenya, South Africa, Mozambique etc; in the 
majority of cases, independence was accompanied or preceded by negotiations 
and conferences as witnessed in Nigeria, Ghana etc;. Whichever path the process 
took, it was disfigured by a transfer of administrative powers characterised by 
unsustainable political compromises, economic dependence, and self-interest 
based democracy in the garb of multi-party democracy and neo-patrimonialism.
After a careful observation of how colonialism fatefully structured 
political choices along regional and ethnic lines in Britain’s most populous 
African territory, Nigeria, Sam Nolutshungu submits:
...the political systems of post-colonial societies ‘carried . . .  in 
their genes—the heritage of the colonialism that designed them, 
authoritarian in its day, but also, invariably, in its retreat, a
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champion of elitist and paternalist notions of democracy 
(Nolutshungu, 1991: 100).
In Nigeria for example, six years after independence the post­
independent government quickly gave way to military putsch in 1966 followed by 
thirty months of civil war. Whichever path the transition to independence took, 
either negotiated constitutional conferences or liberation war, appeared not to 
make much difference to the institutionalised destabilising legacy of colonialism.
Even the colonies that achieved their independence through the war of 
liberation especially Algeria and the ex-Portuguese colonies of Guinea Bissau, 
Angola, and Mozambique, as well as Zimbabwe, Namibia and Eritrea were also 
caught up with “inertial forces” (Young, 2004: 29). These forces not only made 
them to retain their colonial bureaucratic and legal legacies but also made it 
impossible for them to remove the long shadow cast by their colonial legacies. 
The path of most of the post-colonial governments of 1960s could be traced to 
their colonial progenitors however the post-colonial forms were more vulnerable 
to dependency due to what Mamdani refers to as “bifurcated” colonial state that 
mutated into two forms. Multi-party democracy that was assumed to open the 
political space could not transform the neo-patrimonial decentralised despotism 
into a competitive game of multi-party politics. Most of the countries still remain 
under the firm grips of their nationalist presidents such as Robert Mugabe in 
Zimbabwe or under political parties such as Botswana National Party in 
Botswana.
Cooper (2002) addresses the disparity between gatekeeper state and its
predecessor indicating the former as lacking its predecessor’s external coercive
capacity, financial resources and largely dependent on either their former colonial
masters or their Cold War mentor. The state easily hybridises with the economic
and political interests of their former colonial powers or ideological mentors to
reproduce the pre-colonial trading posts in form of neo-trading posts to perform
the functions of a modern state. This was evident in the Francophone states where
the former colonies remain members of the French Community of Africa with
[170]
their currencies pegged to French franc and Euro, after 1999. France remained a 
vital source of their economic and military support in times of crises as witnessed 
in Cote D’Ivoire in 2010.
Though British government still maintained relationship with its 
former colonies but to muddles less in their affairs and only intervenes militarily 
perhaps to stop civil wars as done in Sierra-Leone in 2000 -  2002. However as a 
way of maintaining the dependent relationship, political independence of the 
colonies was designed to place the resources of the colonies in the hands of few 
locals rather than allowing the total overhauling of the system. The enormous 
influence of power over politics and economy, according to Cooper (2002: 200) 
intensified the power struggle among the elites who use every known and 
unorthodox tactics including ethnic sentiments to capture the “gate” sometimes 
with support from the external agencies and aids.
4.2 Democratisation in the Absence of States in Africa
At the end of the cold war, prominent issues in the political discourse 
include the global prospects of democracy and state failure. While the full 
prospects of democracy are yet to materialise, state failure has become a global 
phenomenon, surfacing in several regions. Pointing to cases such as Liberia, 
Sierra Leone, and Somalia, some researchers have argued the existence of a broad 
trend towards the disintegration of state institutions, especially in so-called third 
world countries. The state failure discourse has bearing on the prospects for 
democracy in Africa (Olateju, 2012a).
A great deal has been written about the democratisation process and 
failed states in Africa, two issues that continue to engender intense debate (Herbst’ 
2000; Zartman, 1995; Beissinger and Crawford, 2002; Rotberg, 2003; 2004; 
Fukuyama, 2004; Cooper, 2002; Wallerstein, 2002; Helman and Ratner, 1993) 
International organisations, including the World Bank and United Nations, have 
commissioned research on state failure and published policy recommendations for
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avoiding it. The European Union, African academics, and international donor 
organisations have also given considerable attention to democratisation and state 
failure, and much has been written on the dependency inherent in the African 
political economy. All these studies were however carried out with the mission of 
improving structures of governance and democratisation processes, reducing 
poverty, improving or reducing aid, stimulating or sustaining economic 
development projects, and so on within a neo-colonial framework (Olateju, 
2012a). Some of the studies engage in critical analysis of African states’ fragility 
stemming from a liberal economic approach that has plagued political economies 
through the state-building strategy adopted by administrations during the colonial 
enterprise.
Picking from Hagg and Kagwanja (2007: 21), it is evidently clear that 
African states are becoming irrelevant in the eyes of many of their citizens as the 
IMF and SAP imposed economic reforms diminished the ability of governments 
to provide the essential social infrastructure and services, such as health and 
education for their citizens. Devastation arising from the greed of international 
corporations, such as Western oil companies, also undermined the livelihoods of 
local people, creating grievances as fertile grounds for the proliferation of militias 
in places like Nigeria’s Niger Delta region (Akpan 2007). Several studies point to 
the role of international actors in the proliferation of small arms in Africa’s 
hotspots, which has intensified conflicts and increased tensions and deaths 
(IANSA/Oxfam 2007).
The problem with the democratisation process in Africa is two-fold. 
Firstly, there is the absence of autochthonous states to guide the process and, 
secondly, there is the problem of combination of market with democracy. 
Prevalent political crisis in Africa lend credence to doubts raised in the thesis 
about the abilities of the contemporary African states to resolve problems created 
by divergent interests - one of the primary roles of a state. The post-independence 
prevalent political crisis in Algeria, Benin, Cote d’Ivoire, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria,
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Sierra Leone, Togo, and Zimbabwe, are put forth as exemplifying the inability of 
the post-colonial state to manage affairs despite having the monopoly of the 
instruments of coercion -  another primary role of a state. Failure of the post­
colonial African state in these vital qualities further strengthen the view expressed 
in the thesis that the post-colonial state can hardly be described as state in the true 
sense of a state.
Most of the post-colonial states as indicated earlier are hand-me-down’ 
political organisations that could be best classified as ‘neo-trading posts’ that share 
same characters and nature with their pre-colonial forms, established for the 
sustenance of extractive trade economy. Picking from Stuart Hall, because the 
post-colonial African states are not all post-colonial in the same way, does not 
mean that they are not post-colonial in any way (Hall, 1996: 242- 60). The ghost 
of colonialism still looms irrespective of a state’s path to independence or how 
stable they may appear to be. This therefore makes it compelling for us to expand 
the discussion of failed states beyond the security benchmark discourse that has 
remained popular since the end of the Cold War. It is expressed in this thesis that 
‘good governance’, which has been fashionable since the 1990s, will better 
explain the genesis of the failed state in Africa better than the security paradigm 
(Weiss, 2005).
The hypothetical questions that beg for answers here are that given a 
situation where state-building strategies are designed to omit the indigenous 
elements, is it appropriate to consider such states as failed or is it the state- 
building strategies that have failed? More importantly, can the superficial neo­
trading posts euphemistically referred to as state in Africa sustain democracy? Is 
the state meant to sustain democracy or sustain the dependent relationship 
between the colonised and the colonisers? Should Africans reject liberal 
democracy or modify it to incorporate indigenous aspects of their societies? These 
challenges are critically investigated in the thesis because they hold the potentials 
to reveal the limits of external intervention in Africa’s political development
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(Fischer and Schmelze, 2009). The conclusion here suggests that state building as 
a means of social engineering, social control, and resolution of divergent views is 
yet to emerge in Africa.
4.3 Explanations for Failed states in Africa
Labelling states as “failed” or “fragile” implies that liberal state model 
is the normative reference by which all states are categorised, along the broad 
spectrum of “strong” or “collapsed” (Hofmann, 2009: 79). Helman and Ratner 
(1993) were for instance more concerned about a state being ‘utterly incapable of 
sustaining itself as a member of the international community’. Michael Ignatieff 
(2002: 118) adopts a Machiavellian/Weberian understanding of state failure to 
argue that state failure occurs when ‘the central government loses the monopoly 
of the means of violence’. Zartman in a wider sense of state failure, Zartman 
(1995) develops the idea of state failure along the lines of when the basic 
functions of the state are no longer performed as well as referring to a situation 
where the structure, authority (legitimate power), law, and political order have 
fallen apart. These concepts and measurements of failed states are not generally 
helpful in understanding the economic and political realities in the sub-Saharan 
Africa. Efforts are geared here toward seeking to differentiate the post-colonial 
from the post-colony in the way Edward Said, Pal Ahluwalia and Achille 
Mbembe assert it in the literature of third world politics. Herein lays the 
underbelly of the crisis of post-colonial dictatorship. The African societies were 
either totally subordinated or extricated from playing any significant role in the 
development of the post-colonial states. The post-colonial states have been 
measured against the OECD type of liberal constitutional democracy based on an 
industrialised market economy which is regarded as the model for a stable state 
(Boege, Brown, Clement and Nolan, 2008: 18).
Boas and Jennings (2005), explain a failure in the post colony, by 
measuring and comparing one post colonial state against/to the other. Hameiri 
posits that ‘state failure’ talk refers to comparing the various states to the classical 
model of liberal democratic sovereign state benchmarks through which a state is
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judged from its approximation to such benchmarks (2007: 138). The content of 
these benchmarks means the existence and acceptance of westernised liberal state 
values which unfortunately, have never existed in most of the African states, and 
therefore have little or no relevance to them. As argued by Boege et al (ibid), 
promoting the liberal state as the ultimate model is to ignore the historical context, 
which is vital to understanding of the persistence of political crises in Africa.
Helman and Ratner (1993) were among the first analysts to use the 
term ‘failed state’. As stated earlier, they were more concerned about the 
incapability of a state sustaining itself as a member of the international 
community. Such a state according to them will not only imperil their own 
citizens but also threaten their neighbours through the outflow of refuges political 
instability, and random warfare. It is very germane to emphasise here that state 
failure cannot be categorised by just one definition as all the concepts discussed 
above did. There are many dimensions such as political, economic, governance, 
development, security etc; to analyse state failure and each dimension has its 
unique genesis. It is possible for a state to succeed in one dimension and fail in 
another while in some cases, as witnessed in Liberia and Somalia a state can fail 
in all dimensions. It is thus imperative as avers by Jonathan Di John (2011) for 
any definition of ‘failure’ to be explicit in which dimension a state fails. Given the 
variation in state capacity across sectors, aggregate measures or categorisations of 
‘failure’ can be misleading.
The concept of the failed state became popular in academic and 
policy-making discourses after the end of the cold war. Arguments about the 
genesis of state failure and political crisis took on a new dimension in the 1990s 
when the state became a central theme in the economic and democratic discourse 
on post-colonial Africa. As John Hoffman points out, the paradox of the state 
derives from the fact that it is:
...not just a product of divisions; it is also a producer of
divisions. It embodies and perpetuates divisions in its everyday 
[175]
working, for a state can be said to monopolise legitimate force 
only because it institutionalises a division between rulers and 
ruled. . . . Why the state constitutes such a challenge to the 
concept of democracy is the fact that it sharply dichotomises the 
social order into those who have and those who do not 
(Hoffman, 1988).
One striking feature in Hoffman’s paradox of state is the allocation of 
central role to state in terms of possession of coercive instruments. This situation 
hardly exists in Africa since 1970s when most of the states were unable to protect 
themselves against military coups and 1980s when some regimes collapsed under 
the pressures of popular demand for change. African states are today the most 
vilified for their weaknesses and dependence on foreign powers for stability. As 
argued by Chazan and Rotchild, state in Africa has become ‘dysfunctional in 
terms of the management of larger societal issues’ (Chazan, 1988a; Chazan, 
1988b; Rothchild, 1994).
The state in the first instance as explained in Chapter Two does not 
exist in the post-colonial Africa considering the fact that the gradual nourishment 
of modem state institutions by the nationality groups in their kingdoms and 
empires was truncated by the colonial administrative styles and the decolonisation 
philosophies. If this historical background of the state-building process in Africa 
is inserted into the failed state analysis, it will be clear that pre-condition for 
modem state-building in Africa which is the accommodation of the nationality 
groups as semi-autonomous entities within the larger state is completely lacking. 
This in essence renders any superstructure put in place to either serve as an 
instrument of coercion or as a mechanism for reconciling the divergent views to 
lack the capacity for the delivery of such function.
The flaws of the current failed state discourse reveal a tmth about the 
failure of Western liberal political thought that has no bearing with the African 
political reality. The notion of the failed state only manifests in the West’s
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inability to give the correct interpretation to Third World political crisis, and 
disenchantment with its own state institutions. It is the loss of trust in the state by 
the West that informs the preoccupation with ‘state failure’.
This development arose from the fact that the post-Cold War 
widespread optimism about the prospects of economic development and 
development of democracy in most parts of the world evaporated faster than 
expected. Instead of accelerated economic development and rapid development of 
democracy, a growing number of post-colonial African states were entrapped in 
severe socio-political crisis, leading to spread of the phenomenon of state failure 
between 1980s and 1990s, a period that was dominated by the New Right policies 
of both Ronald Regan and Margaret Thatcher.
It was a period that the neo-liberal advocates nurtured rising internal 
opposition by mobilising behind the banner of ‘civil society’ in their attempt at 
dislodging authoritarian governments (Anyang’ Nyong’o 1987; Harbeson et al. 
1994; Lewis 1992) and “rolling back” the state. The triumph of the neo-liberal 
economic policies was prompted by the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from the 
Eastern Europe in 1989 and its eventual collapse in 1991. These two 
developments brought the bipolar Cold War of the Soviet Union and the USA to 
an end, leaving the USA as the global superpower. With the exit of the Soviet 
Union from the global power contest, the neoliberal agenda of Thatcher and 
Reagan was able to spread across the globe without any hindrance thereby making 
neoliberalism the dominant ideology within the global order.
The rapid success of neoliberalism prompted some assumptions about 
the superiority of the ideology over all others; and its classification as the 
terminus of all ideologies (Clarke, 2001; Falk, 1998) For example President Bush 
Senior assumed that the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the 
United States as the world’s only superpower represented something more
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profound than just the ending of hostilities between two superpowers. For him, it 
marked the end of an Old World Order and the beginning of a New World Order 
(Bush and Scowcroft, 1998).
Francis Fukuyama, a deputy director of the Department of State’s 
policy-planning in George Bush Snr administration, followed the line of thought 
of his boss, to assume that the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of 
the USA as the global power proved that liberal democratic states, such as the 
United States, represented a kind of terminus toward which all states were 
evolving and at which all states would eventually arrive. In furtherance of this 
assumption, Fukuyama claims that the gradually forming global consensus around 
the New Order meant that history, manifested in ideological conflict, was coming 
to an end (Fukuyama, 1989).
Samuel Huntington, then a professor of government at Harvard 
University, who saw these events as the beginning of a new phase of global 
history in which the fundamental conflicts will not primarily be ideological or 
economic but rather the source of conflict will be cultural. For Huntington, nation­
states will still remain the most powerful actors in the global politics but the 
principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nation-states and groups 
of different civilisations. In essence clash of civilizations will dominate global 
politics in the future (Huntington, 1993). If Huntington’s clash of civilisations 
theory is applied to Africa, it will be glaring that the nation-states which 
Huntington predicts to remain as principal actors in the world affairs are yet to 
emerge and the real source of conflict in Africa is not clash of civilisations but 
clash between ethnic nations and the post-colonial super-structures put in place by 
the departing colonial administrations.
The state, rather than mediating conflicts in society, is unable to serve
the ruled and, instead has an organic and penetrating relationship with capital, the
[178]
arena of social contradictions and class struggle. According to Peter Hitchcock, 
the contemporary concept of the failed state originated in an article by Gerald 
Helman and Steven Ratner in Foreign Policy. (Hitchcock, 2008; Helman and 
Ratner, 1993) In the early 1990s, Helman and Ratner looked at Haiti and saw a 
similarity in Cambodia, Liberia, Somalia, Sudan, and the former Yugoslavia—a 
form of state ‘utterly incapable of sustaining itself as a member of the 
international community’. Their common characteristics included ‘civil strife, 
government breakdown, and economic privation’. Africa certainly has failed 
states in the context described by Helman and Ratner.
However, it is germane to note that these states were not designed to 
survive the onslaught in the first instance if their foundations as explained earlier 
were taken into consideration. Helman and Ratner partially recognised this basic 
fact when they concluded, though insufficiently, that most of these states had been 
doomed to fail from inception due to the high number of nation-states tied to the 
process of decolonisation after World War II. The high number argument is not 
sufficient to explain why the states are doomed to fail but the ways and manner 
these nation states were amalgamated to produce client-states with imposed best- 
practice constitutionalism. Most of these states owe their survival to aids, loans 
and military support from their colonial and/or ideological mentors especially 
during the Cold War. Once the support was halted all the dependent states were 
shaken to their foundations.
Most analysts who shared the neoliberal view persistently cited poor 
governance, political instability, geographical features, and historical conditions 
such as colonialism as different reasons for Africa’s economic malaise. None saw 
the weak foundations of the states as a major contribution of such malaise. 
Consensus emerged that dysfunctional political institutions and governance bear 
much of the blame for the region’s disappointing economic performance, 
hindering the successful pursuit of any development strategy -  whether oriented 
towards capitalism or socialism, self-reliance or global integration (Mkandawire
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& Soludo, 1999; Ndulu & O’Connell, 1999; Sandbrook, 1986; van de Walle, 
2001). Whereas the inability of these post-colonial states due to their weak 
foundations, to assimilate the foreign policies and integrate such into their social 
relationships are yet to be fully explored as causes of poor governance and state 
failure in sub-Saharan Africa. The consequences of this inability exposed the 
fault lines in the modernisation and neo-liberal but which they are yet to accept as 
policy- failures; and rather christened it state failure.
Labelling states as ‘failed’ or ‘fragile’ implies the liberal state model 
as the normative reference by which all states should be judged along the broad 
spectrum from ‘strong’ or ‘collapsed’ (Hofmann, 2009). Furthermore, the 
characteristic flaws of the failed state discourse reveal a truth about the failure of 
Western liberal political thought, not the African political reality. The notion of 
the failed state is only manifest in the West’s inability to construct a sufficient 
interpretation of the developing world political crises. It is the loss of trust in the 
state by the West that informs the preoccupation with ‘state failure’. This 
development arose from the evaporation of widespread post-cold war optimism 
about the prospects of economic development and prosperity through democracy. 
Instead of accelerated economic development and the rapid spread of democracy, 
a growing number of post-colonial African states succumbed to severe socio­
political crises. The crises took the forms of popular revolutions against the state 
and the leaders and bending towards the beginning of a new history in the 
ideological waga.
As a solution to the emerging crises, arising from the failure of the 
post-colonial leaders to provide the political stability required for capital to 
flourish; and to protect the movement of capital, states were considered to “roll 
back”. Attention was immediately turned to civil society as the new force for the 
democratisation in the state. However the sincerity of this assumption appears 
doubtful because the same state is still expected to enact laws and policies that 
will tackle obstacles to inward and outward flow of capital, in addition to creating
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comfortable zones for its operation. Civil society instantly became the alternative 
force that could sustain the multi-party free market liberal values. An important 
issue that remains to be clarified is whether civil society groups represent a new 
dawn or false hope for democracy and state stability in Africa; and whose and 
which democracy are they propagating?
4.4 Conclusion
Weak state remains the greatest challenge to political stability in 
Africa. The weakness of the post-colonial ‘neo-trading posts’ is rooted in the 
faulty decolonisation strategy that could not determine a workable terms of 
association among the ethnic groups within the proposed state boundaries on the 
one hand; and the desires of these groups for self-determination within the 
proposed state on the other. Resulting from this failure is the paralysis of the state 
that infects governance and democracy. Post-colonial leaders are yet to accept that 
the failure of the post-colonial African states and their political crisis lie in the 
history of colonisation and the de-colonisation strategy. Today’s failed states were 
once upon a time the darling or demon states -  depending on the point of view 
one takes of the global hegemonic powers. The overconcentration on these issues 
actually drew away the attention of the African scholars from the daily struggles 
of the people for genuine democracy (World Bank, 2007) while dictatorship 
regimes were on the increase with the concept of ‘life presidents’ becoming a 
trend.
The colonial powers re-modelled the territories for their own 
purposes, establishing plantations, inducing population movements, and creating 
the beginnings of modem urban life. The reflexes, habits, and methods of the 
post-colonial African leaders still reflect the continuity of colonial legacy. The 
authoritarian leadership style, which emerged from colonial structures, 
exemplifies this continuity. The leadership style produces a dialogue deficit 
between the people and the state leaders, and in some notable cases between the
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ethnic groups. There is a lack of regime legitimacy in spite of the multi-party 
elections because democracy is obliterated (Crisis Group Report, 2010) by the 
cartel nature of the political parties. This nature of the political parties casts a big 
doubt on the possibility of the current multi-party system producing genuine 
democratic change.
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Chapter 5
NEO-COMMUNITARIAN DEMOCRACY AS AN ALTERNATIVE
MODEL OF DEMOCRACY FOR SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
5.0 Introduction
Politics is about the possibility of choice out of many options. It is 
also stressed that out of the benefit of historical hindsight, neither the choice of 
socialist nor liberal capitalist democracy has served as appropriate entry point for 
sub-Saharan African states into the arena of democracy, stable state and self- 
sustaining economic development. These underline the point that the ‘end of 
history’ is not yet in sight. The efforts also put up an argument for the availability 
of alternative economic and political models that may assist the people in their 
collective and individual upliftment into democratic actuality and self-sustenance. 
It is with this spirit that neo-communitarianism is designed as a new model of 
democracy. It is not designed as a paragon of ideas that can wholly rectify failed 
democracy or failed state associated with the sub-Saharan African states, but to 
serve as an alternative model worthy of consideration for workable solutions to 
political and economic crises that have plagued Africa for decades.
Before delving into the philosophy of neo-communitarianism as a 
form of democracy, it is appropriate to commence with an examination of 
communitarian7 philosophy and its brand of democracy from whose fountain neo- 
communitarianism draws on.
7
The term communitarianism is of 20th-century origin, it is derived from the 1840s 
term communitarian, which was coined by Goodwyn Barnby to refer to one who was a member 
or advocate of a communalist society. The modern use of the term is a redefinition of the original 
usage. Many communitarians trace their philosophy to earlier thinkers. The term is primarily 
used in two senses: Philosophical communitarianism considers classical liberalism to 
be ontologically and epistemologically incoherent, and opposes it on that ground. Unlike classical 
liberalism, which construes communities as originating from the voluntary acts of pre-community 
individuals, it emphasises the role of the community in defining and shaping individuals. 
Communitarians believe that the value of community is not sufficiently recognized in liberal 
theories of justice. Ideological communitarianism is characterised as a radical centrist ideology 
that is sometimes marked by leftism on economic issues and moralism or conservatism on social
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5.1 The concept of Communitarianism
Communitarianism is a term commonly used in two forms. These are 
philosophical communitarianism and ideological communitarianism. 
Philosophically, communitarianism rejects classical liberalism as an ontologically 
and epistemologically incoherent ideology that fails to recognise the role of 
communities in the determination and shaping of individuals. It also regards 
classical liberalism as faulty for construing the communities as originating from 
the voluntary acts of pre-community individuals. Communitarianism therefore 
represents a thick conception of individuals and their communities as explained by 
Charles Taylor, Michael Sandel, Alsdair MacIntyre and Michael Waltzer.
The communitarians challenged the individualism inherent in the 
liberal opposition to the concept of common good (Turner, 2006: 81; Etzioni, 
1998: ix). This group of political philosophers in their critical reactions to “A 
Theory o f Justice” (Rawls, 1971) pioneered the contemporary communitarian 
theory whose major flaws draws neo-communitarian thinking into the terrain of 
alternative model of democracy. Drawing on Aristotelian and Hegelian 
philosophies, they debunked Rawls' assumption that the major goal of government 
is securing and distributing fairly, the liberties and economic resources required 
by individuals to live their freely chosen lives (Bell, 1997).
The communitarian perspective according to the communitarians 
recognises both individual human dignity and the social dimension of human 
existence. Preservation of individual liberty depends on the active maintenance of
i the institutions of civil society where citizens learn respect for others as well as
!
| self-respect; and where each acquires a lively sense of personal and civic
[
I responsibilities, along with the habit of serving others and not just self. Though
I
issues. This usage was coined recently. When the term is capitalised, it usually refers to the 
Responsive Communitarian movement of Amitai Etzioni and other philosophers
[184]
there are variants of communitarianism, but they are all united in their view of 
communities, like individuals having obligations and duties towards their 
members which include being responsive to the needs of their members and 
fostering their participation in social and political life. Picking from the 
communitarians, a communitarian perspective does not dictate particular policies, 
rather it mandates attention to what is often ignored in contemporary policy 
debates which is the social side of human nature and the responsibilities that must 
be borne by citizens, individually and collectively, in a regime of rights. 
Communitarianism serves to point out the ripple effects and long-term 
consequences of present decisions.
Rawls left nobody in doubt of his initial commitments to the universal 
truth in “A Theory o f  Justice” (1971) which the communitarians argued not to be 
in touch with reality. Rawls presents “veil o f  ignorance ” he claims to blind people 
to all facts about themselves and also cloud what their notion of justice is as 
principles that allow each member of society to have an equal claim on their 
society’s goods. Rawls argues that
...no one knows his place in society, his class position or social 
status, nor does anyone know his fortune in the distribution of 
natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the 
like. I shall even assume that the parties do not know their 
conceptions of the good or their special psychological 
propensities. The principles of justice are chosen behind a veil 
of ignorance....They are the principles that rational and free 
persons concerned to further their own interests would accept in 
an initial position of equality as defining the fundamentals of 
the terms of their association (Rawls, 1971: 11)
According to Rawls, ignorance of these details about oneself will lead 
to principles that are fair to all. If an individual does not know how he will end up 
in his own conceived society, he is likely not going to privilege any one class of 
people, but rather develop a scheme of justice that treats all fairly. In particular, 
Rawls claims that those in the Original Position would all adopt a maximum 
strategy which would maximise the prospects of the least well-off.
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While disagreeing with the atomistic image of individuals presented 
by Rawls in the “Theory of Justice”, the communitarians assert the standards of 
justice are peculiar to forms of life and traditions of each society and that values 
and beliefs are formed in public space in which debates take place. Alasdair 
MacIntyre and Charles Taylor argued that moral and political judgment depends 
on the language of reasons and the interpretive framework within which agents 
view their world. It therefore makes no sense to begin the political enterprise by 
abstracting from the interpretive dimensions of human beliefs, practices, and 
institutions (Taylor, 1985; MacIntyre, 1984). Contributing to the argument earlier, 
Walzer asserts that effective social criticism must derive from and resonate with 
the habits and traditions of actual people living in specific times and places 
(Walzer, 1983:8).
Bell summarises the communitarian argument that liberals who ask 
what is just by abstracting from particular social contexts as best-practice are 
doomed to philosophical incoherence and those theorists who adopt this method 
to persuade people to do the just thing using the best-practice template are 
doomed to political irrelevance (Bell, 1997).
Rawls in “Political Liberalism” (Rawls, 1993) eliminates the 
universal presuppositions from his assumptions and admits individuals as 
impartial citizens that provide the best account of liberal-democratic political 
culture. He explains further that the political aim of an impartial citizen is to 
cooperate with others to work out the rules for consensus in political 
communities. He follows this argument in “Law o f Peoples” (Rawls, 1999) to 
clarify that liberalism may not be exportable at all times and places, sketching a 
vision of a ‘decent, well-ordered society’. A decent, well ordered society, he 
concludes, needs not be democratic, but it must be non-aggressive towards other 
communities, and while it must internally have a ‘common good conception of
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justice’, a ‘reasonable consultation hierarchy’ and secure basic human rights 
(Rawls, 1999). It is pertinent to point out that by ‘needs not to be democratic’; 
Rawl refers to liberal democracy as the template for democracy.
To Communitarians, individuals are products of the communities in 
which they live and shaped by values and beliefs of such community.
Communication of those values, mores, norms etc are done through socialisation 
which guides the shaping of the individuals and forms the backdrop against which 
the people formulate and understand reality.
Defining reality through our own values and norms underlies
communitarian philosophy’s emphasis on different societies having different and 
multiple needs which are not wholly compatible with each other and even not 
compatible at different historical times in the same society. Achieving the needs 
of the society is the chief responsibility of a good society. This achievement 
requires constant maintenance of balance between individual liberty and social 
order in accordance with the principle of individuals, severally and collectively 
having lively sense of personal and civic responsibilities, along with the habit of 
serving others and not just self. Therefore communitarians argue that a good society 
could only be achieved through a balance between liberty and social order, and 
between communal and society-wide values with such balance taking place within 
some historical-social conditions.
These conditions account for why a specific society at a particular
period adjusts itself in other to attain the same balance. For example,
contemporary Japan as illustrated by Turner requires a balance that permits 
greater tolerance for individual rights, while the American society requires a 
balance that can curb the effects of excessive individualism (Turner, 2006).
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The main argument of the communitarians that is very germane to this 
study is that contrary to the liberal view, there are social attachments which 
determine the self and thus individuals are constituted by the community. The 
individuals are constituted by the community but the emotional connection 
between the individuals and the community needs to be stressed in any 
explanation of determinism of the individuals by the community. We cannot 
overlook this organic connection as it constitutes the core of the social 
attachments that determine the self. Both the community and individuals are 
socially embedded, organically related and mutually reinforcing. The image of 
individuals as unencumbered selves by Rawls in “Theory of Justice” according to 
the communitarians is ontologically false.
The liberal argument that the good in each community should be 
individually determined and that social institutions and policies required should 
be based on agreements freely entered into by individuals , has no place in 
communitarianism. Turner (2006) elaborates more on this view with a submission 
that the communitarians see these social institutions and policies partly reflecting 
the communal norms and values that are transmitted from generation to generation 
through socialisation. These values become part of self and are also modified by 
persuasion, religious or political indoctrination, leadership and moral dialogue. 
Communitarianism therefore represents a philosophy that offers the view that 
‘individual is dependent on the community’ (Bell, 1993). Millibank summarises 
this view as impliedly placing the importance of the society ahead of the 
unfettered rights of the individuals (Milbank, 2001: 9).
Membership of a community as expressed by the communitarians is 
involuntary. The social attachments that determine the self are not necessarily the 
chosen ones as posited by the individualists but by those provided by the organic 
relationship between the individuals and the community. Sandel (1984) was 
emphatic on the expression of social attachments that make up an individual. He 
sees individuals as having constitutive ends which determine who the person is
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(Sandel, 1984). As argued by Sandel, we need to firstly consider the ends and 
values of individuals before analysing their behaviour. We cannot analyse 
behaviour of individuals as if they were abstract entities or their values existed 
somewhere distance or ‘outside’. The idea of separating who one is and the 
values one has as portrayed by the individualists is faulty in two ways - separating 
individuals from the communities and ignoring the organic relationship between 
the individuals and the community. It is this relationship that generates the social 
attachments to produce self and self-emotions.
Etzioni reinforces this thinking with an emphasis that the ‘assertion of 
the liberals, to treat individuals as free agents when actually, they are, to a 
significant extent, social creations reflecting the communities which they are 
embedded’ (Etzioni, 1998), is faulty. Shlomo Avineri and Avner de Shalit (1992) 
had separated the arguments against atomistic view of man in the society into two 
spheres. The arguments which they regarded to be an important issue in political 
philosophy mostly in the 1980s were divided into methodological and normative 
spheres. They opined that the communitarian methodological argument of liberals 
in favour of individualism as that rational person who chooses freely is wrong and 
faulty.
Instead of the atomistic perception of liberalism, the communitarians 
advanced their methodological argument that the only way to understand human 
behaviour is to refer to individuals in their social, cultural and historical contexts. 
This is a perfect methodological argument that sums up what makes a social being 
a combination of the stated contexts.
In the normative sphere, Avineri and Shalit aver that communitarians 
reinforced their methodological argument, that the emphasis of liberal ideology on 
individualism is responsible for the emergence of morally unsatisfactory
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consequences which promote survival of the fittest values among the people. This 
according to the communitarians produces inequality in the community.
Communitarians view community as a good virtue that people must 
seek for several reasons. They therefore set to address inequality and other effects 
of the market in the community. However they failed to recognise the organic 
connection between the individual and the community as the underlying force for 
the social attachment provided by the community to produce self. In addition, 
redressing the problem of separation and segregation according to the 
communitarians requires the involvement of civil society and entrenchment of 
positive rights in order to make democracy people-oriented. They ignored the fact 
that the nature and character of civil society is been shaped by the nature and 
character of the state itself.
The idea of involving the civil society in management of the state is a 
neo-liberal battle cry for democratisation of African states that is prominent in the 
works of Charles Taylor (1989), Michael J Sandel (1998), Michael Waltzer (1983) 
and Alasdair MacIntyre (1984). Though they all premised their arguments against 
the atomistic view of individual in the society but proffering civil society as a 
form of collective voice required for democratic stability in the community serves 
as the umbilical cord between communitarians and liberal democracy. 
Nevertheless, the communitarians successfully provide another prism for viewing 
the state, people and relationships in the terrain of political philosophy. Their 
challenge of liberalism since 1980 heralded the "Third Way" of thinking (Etzioni, 
1998) as a philosophy that favours social formulation of the public good (Turner, 
2006).
In his accounts of communitarianism as the “Third Way” philosophy 
referred to as “die neue mitte” by the Germans, Etzioni further illuminates the 
ideological status of communitarianism with an explanation that it is a third way
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of thinking, a form of centrist approach which does not view government as the 
problem or see it as the solution but as a partner in the formation of a good 
society. Etzioni goes further to reinforce the point about the relationship between 
communitarianism and free market liberal economy by asserting that 
communitarianism does not see market as a source of all that is good or evil but as 
a powerful economic engine that must be accorded sufficient space to operate 
while being properly guarded (Etzioni, 2000: 13). In essence, market and 
government are partners that must work together to produce a good society.
The implied meaning is that market must be guided by the state in 
order to reduce its evils. How the government is to be constituted was left 
unaddressed by the communitarians. If we considered their argument, we can 
deduce that the market becomes evil once individuals are detached from their 
cultural, historical and social contexts. The underlying force that facilitates the 
process of evil and how to disentangle such evil from the market are 
conspicuously lacking in communitarianism. It is the disentanglement of the evil 
from the market that speconomy addresses within a neo-communitarian context in 
chapter seven.
Lack of explanation for the removal of the evil from the market 
became clearer with Etzioni’s distinction between the classical usage of the 
concept of communitarianism up to the 19th century and its usage thereafter. The 
distinction reflects the Cold War divide where most of the contemporary 
communitarians distanced themselves from the assumed socialist ideological 
undertone of the classical usage. According to Etzioni, the classical usage up to 
the 19th century implied putting the socialist principles into practice in a 
community (Etzioni, 1998). It is not surprising that the contemporary 
communitarians opted for leaving the market intact in order to avoid putting the 
socialist principles into practice. On the contrary, to the contemporary 
communitarians’ assumptions of the classical interpretation, the classical 
interpretation only stresses the significance of social forces, of community, of
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social bonds or social harmony as in the case of Asian communities (Etzioni: 
ibid).
This classical interpretation changed in 1990s to the balance between 
the individual rights and social responsibilities. The swing in interpretation which 
Selznick (1998: 3) claims to have come with the emergence of the liberal 
communitarianism whose philosophy, according to Robert Bellah, (1998: 18) 
seeks to provide a humane context for the market and the state. The distinction 
between the classical and contemporary interpretations is a reflection of the same 
old argument of socialism versus capitalism. This distinction reinforces why the 
contemporary communitarians preferred to leave the market intact and find a way 
the state can ameliorate market’s hardship without necessarily altering the market 
calculus. This is where speconomy as will be explained later differs. While the 
market is retained however its mode of operation is altered for the benefit of both 
the state and the individuals.
The liberal communitarians, who sometimes referred to themselves as 
democratic communitarians to further distinguish themselves from socialist 
communitarians, left no one in doubt as to their acceptability of the values and 
inevitability of both the free market and the liberal democratic state. They only 
insist that the functions of both state and market are to serve in furthering the 
public good which is the main purpose of the state and not to dominate. They 
ideologically depart from the classical communitarians such as Ferdinand Tonnies 
and Robert Nisbet whose major concerns were to stop the perpetuation of the 
adverse effects of industrialisation and modernisation on the mechanical solidarity 
that existed in the pre-industrial communities (Nisbet, 1962). These effects 
included the loss of Gemeinschaft (communal society), and with it, of authority 
and the emergence of Geshelfschaft (associational society).
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The major point of departure of the liberal communitarians from the 
classical communitarians was the fear expressed by the former that the latter never 
explored the possibility of the community becoming oppressive, authoritarian and 
may unduly penetrate the individual’s privacy (Etzioni: ibid). It is the attempt at 
preventing the ‘opposite danger’ of the community, that the liberal 
communitarians came up with the idea of ‘responsive communitarianism’ to 
indicate that the new communitarians are concerned with a society that is well 
founded, attentive to its members and profoundly democratic (Etzioni, 1996: 1- 
11). Profoundly democratic refers to liberal state that is distinct from classical 
communitarianism.
Going by the submission of Robin West, one salient feature of 
communitarianism is the view that collective decision-making process whether 
public or private, should be employed to prevent or correct social injustice and 
other societal ills (Robin West, 1994). This perhaps compels Garfinkle to argue 
that the liberal communitarians provide a value-centred guide to defining society’s 
common goals (Garfinkle, 1997: 1-24).
It is germane to mention that also central to the communitarian 
philosophy is the concept of positive rights. These are rights that enable a member 
of the community to legally enjoy certain benefits such as subsidised education, 
subsidised social services such as housing, transportation, universal health care 
services, safe and clean environment, right to a job etc;. It also includes an 
obligation from the government or individuals to provide these rights and 
services. In essence communitarianism favours a welfare state that provides social 
security programmes that sharpen the consumption aspect of individuals more 
than the productive aspect.
On the ideological plane, communitarianism occupies a centrist 
position in the ideologically contested terrain. It is characterised by left
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domination on economic issues and conservatism on social issues. This 
ideological mixture was noticeable in the works of Robert Putnam (1995) -  a 
leading figure of individualistic philosophy of liberal democracy in the United 
States of America. The effects of separation of individuals from each other and 
from the society became noticeable in the United States at the beginning of the 
late 20th century. Robert Putnam detailed the impact of such separation in
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“Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital” as a deterioration of 
“social capital”9. By social capital, Putnam refers to the collective values of all the 
social networks and the inclinations of the people within the networks to do things 
for each other. As a way of reinvigorating the value of social capital, which 
Putnam and his followers consider as a key component to building and sustaining 
democracy, communitarians seek to boost a partnership arrangement between the 
private and public institutions in the provision of social goals such as housing, 
educational, health-care and social services.
They (communitarians), seek to retrieve the social capital by 
bolstering the institutions of civil society and entrenching the principle of positive 
rights. Though they opine that government should not seek to replace the local 
communities but empower them through technical and revenue sharing support. 
They however emphasise that such empowerment requires the need for the study
8 In ‘Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social’ Capital(1995) Putnam surveys the decline of  
“social capital” in the United States o f America since 1950. Here, Putnam describes the reduction 
in all the forms o f in-person social intercourse upon which Americans used to educate, and enrich 
the fabric o f their social lives. He believes this undermines the active civil engagement which a 
strong democracy requires from its citizens. Part o f the ways identified by Putnam in which the 
Americans have disengaged from political involvement includes decreased voter turnout, public 
meeting attendance, serving on committees and working with political parties. He also cites 
Americans' growing distrust in their government. Putnam accepts the possibility that this lack of 
trust could be attributed to "the long litany o f political tragedies and scandals since the 1960s"
9 In sociology, social capital is the expected collective or economic benefits derived from 
the preferential treatment and cooperation between individuals and groups.
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of and experimentation with the creative use of the structures of the civil society 
in the public-private partnership.
The conceptual strength of communitarianism lies in its ability to 
sustain a social equilibrium between the demands for personal autonomy with the 
need of the society to maintain order through imposition of social authority. While 
maintaining this balance, communitarianism recognises the differences across the 
societies in tolerating personal autonomy and social authority by providing 
flexibility which allows the two social forces meet at the point of equilibrium. 
This strength of communitarianism is robustly summarised by Edward 
Wimberley, as a pragmatic and essentially optimistic approach to achieving 
harmonious relationship between members of a society as well as the willingness 
to do so within the context of the underlying needs and constraints of natural 
ecosystems (Wimberley, 2008). The strength of this balance is conceived by the 
communitarians as the required mechanism for the amelioration of the hardship 
imposed on individuals by the liberal market economy especially from the 1980s. 
This was a period when the citizens of most African countries in their search for 
political truth, were up in widespread uprisings against their various states 
demanding for democracy and an end to dictatorship.
In spite of its conceptual strength there is still a question mark on the 
capability of communitarianism to address the problems of inequality, group 
marginalisation, cultural identity and tension between the individuals and 
corporate actors in the operationalisation of democracy. Though democracy wears 
different garbs in different ideologies but central to democracy is the will of the 
constituents of a community to live harmoniously with each other but which the 
liberal or socialist democratic institutions are not necessarily achieving.
The essence of every political viewpoint is the search for political 
truth that is, public justification. Political truth stresses the reflective and
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collective decision-making concerning the community’s best interests and the 
expression of these interests in terms of the community’s considered judgements, 
which deserves respect from every citizen. Political truth by nature seeks the 
reasons that are internal to both the actual and idealised political and 
constitutional practices of society (Lipkin, 1999). Internal reasons, as explicated 
by Lipkin (ibid), are those principles, standards and rules which have been tested 
in deliberative debate and embraced through consensus of the community. It is in 
the search for this political truth that communitarian democracy endorses the 
integration of individual’s autonomy and responsibility with the standard of 
citizenship and community good.
In spite of their rejection of liberalism, it must be pointed out that the 
1980s communitarians were unable to put forward attractive visions of non-liberal 
societies other than the Aristotelian local community. For example, “/« Spheres of 
Justice” (1983), Michael Walzer pointed to the Indian caste system, ‘where the 
social meanings are integrated and hierarchical’ (Walzer, 1983: 313) as an 
example of a non-liberal society that may be just according to its own standards. 
This example is in contrary to many contemporary Indian thinkers who view the 
caste system as an unfortunate legacy of the past that Indians should strive hard to 
overcome. As Bell (1997) further explains, the communitarian case for the need to 
respect and perhaps learn from non-liberal societies that may be as good as, if not 
better than, the liberal societies in the West may have been unintentionally 
undermined by their own use of (counter) examples. In “After Virtue”, Alasdair 
MacIntyre provides justification for the Aristotelian ideal of the intimate, 
reciprocating local community bound by shared ends, where people simply 
assume and fulfil socially given roles (MacIntyre 1984). Daniel Bell in “A 
Communitarian Critique o f Liberalism” (1997) disagrees with this view by 
offering an explanation that the pre-modem Gemeinschaft conception of an all- 
encompassing community that members unreflectively endorse seems distinctly 
ill-suited for complex and conflict-ridden large-scale industrialized societies (Bell,
1997). He goes further to assert the use of these unattractive examples of caste 
based societies or actually-existing communism as alternatives to liberal societies
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only reinforce the justification of liberal theorists as to whether there could be any 
attractive alternatives to liberalism in complex modem societies.
A salient opportunity provided by the communitarian arguments is 
that their arguments serve to point out the ripple effects and long-term consequences of 
present decisions of using universal arguments based exclusively on the 
generalisation of the moral and political experience of Western liberal societies 
for every society. The communitarians still have the responsibility of filling the 
gap of genuine alternative to free market liberal democracy that Michael Sandel, 
Charles Taylor, Michael Walzer and Alsdair MacIntyre set to confront in the 
1980s. This is where neo-communitarianism becomes relevant as a rectificatory 
alternative to liberalism. Neo-communitarian democracy provides a democratic 
model that can suitably fit into the complexity of the modem industrial and multi- 
ethnically segmented society. The model firstly highlights the connection between 
communitarianism and free market liberal democracy to justify why the 
communitarians are unable to address the problems of segregation and inequality 
which they initially set out to address.
As explained earlier, communitarian philosophy holds a centrist 
position on the social order by mediating between totalitarianism and 
libertarianism. It is apposite to briefly clarify the nature of these two extremes. 
Totalitarianism emphasises collectivism in form of the nation state having 
superior needs and objectives and that the individual only exists to serve these 
collective needs. On the contrary, libertarianism upholds that the autonomous 
individual stands at the centre of the philosophic universe. The larger community 
can make no legitimate demands on the individual except those necessary to 
maintain civil order. There is always the possibility of constant tension between 
the two diametrical opposing forces. Communitarianism therefore seeks to 
mediate the tension between these forces of extreme autonomy and extreme 
centralised authority. This is what is commonly referred to in the communitarian
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philosophy as the maintenance of balance between the social forces of individual 
autonomy and centralised authority.
There is an important omission in this balance. This is the omission of 
tension between the fragile post-colonial state and the traditional societies in 
Africa where states are still struggling to consolidate their democratic 
experiments. While the communitarians are more concerned about how the state 
can guide the market to reduce harsh effects on the people through welfare 
policies, the most important issue that affects Africa mostly, consolidation of 
democracy has no space in the communitarian calculation.
The communitarians believe in the free market, though they strive to 
strike a balance between free market and the public good, between the 
marketplace and the society, between economic freedom and society’s broader 
needs. Though communitarians see free market as a remarkable engine of 
prosperity that is an indispensable foundation of a stable liberal democracy but the 
adverse effects of market occupies the central focus of the communitarians.
One of the adverse effects was politics becoming a money-driven 
activity. Selection of party candidates became an affair for the wealthy while 
candidates are to raise large sums of money for campaigns and election proper. 
Though political parties have become firmly rooted in the established democracies 
and have acquired global relevance (Mair, 2005), but failed democracy in Africa 
cannot be isolated from the characters and nature of their political parties. This is 
not intended as a sweeping statement of generalising all the political parties as 
undermining democracy but to draw attention to the cartel nature of political 
parties in Africa and how their leaders use the platforms to undermine and 
disfigure democracy through personalisation of the party machineries. To 
entrench their personal gains in party democracy, political elites employ state
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instruments to systematically transform political party into a sine qua non for 
democracy (Nodia and Scholtach, eds; 2006: i; 7; 43-59).
Political pluralism is expressed as the raison d’etre for this 
transformation but in reality there is little or no concern for the involvement of the 
citizenry in the democratisation project. Regrettably, there is lean literature from 
party scholars on the cartel nature of political parties in Africa. Most scholars 
often refer to Botswana, Mauritius and Cape Verde as democratic success stories 
(Frankel, 2009; Knutsen, 2010; Leon, 2010) in Africa, leaving their institutional, 
social and civil contexts out of consideration. Democracy is not a given but 
historically constructed. It must therefore have widely divergent meanings and 
ontologies attached to it. Democracy is expressed by Abraham Lincoln as the 
government of the people, for the people and by the people. Under capitalism, 
democracy was designed to become the rule of the bourgeoisie, of the capitalists 
over the vast majority of workers and peasants. In whatever form capitalism may 
take, democracy assumes the rule of the minority rich over the majority poor.
The liberal state which the communitarians strive to protect lays 
claims to being democratic and to being a free world but the foundation of such 
assertion, is the protection of property and prevention of the expression of the 
majority which was assumed will abuse the sanctity of the private property. The 
meaning of democracy in the capitalist world is briefly illustrated in this thesis 
using Bobbio’s (1978) definition. His definition of democracy could be regarded 
as a fair representation of what democracy means in the western capitalist world. 
Ian Adams in “Political Ideology Today” (2001), notes, democracy in the western 
capitalist world refers to a ‘cluster of rules’ that permit the ‘broadest and surest 
direct and indirect participation of the majority of citizens in political decisions, 
i.e. in decisions affecting the whole collectivity’ (Adams, 2001). These rules are 
as follows:
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i)All citizens who have reached legal age without regard to race, religion, 
economic status, sex, etc; must enjoy political rights i.e. rights to express their 
own opinion through their vote and/or to elect those who express it for them.
ii) The vote of all citizens must have equal weight
iii) All citizens enjoying political rights must be free to vote accordingly to 
their own opinions, formed as freely as possible, i.e. in a free contest 
between organised political groups competing among themselves so as 
to aggregate demands and transform them into collective deliberations.
iv) They must be free in the sense that they must be in a position of having 
real alternatives, i.e. choosing between different solutions.
v) Whether for collective deliberations or for the election of the 
representative the principle of numerical majority holds -  even though 
different forms of majority rule can be established (relative, absolute, 
qualified) under certain circumstances in advance.
vi) No decision is taken by a majority
The United States of America, where nearly all the liberal 
communitarians emerged, practices free enterprise, liberty and freedom. The free 
enterprises have given way to monopolies and the right to be elected is 
economically limited to a privileged group of millionaires and their hirelings. 
Democracy in the United States leaves the electorate with choosing between 
parties that are both representatives of the financial oligarchy. The two parties 
share the same economic philosophy of free market capitalism and political 
philosophy of liberal democracy. The two-party system has become a vital 
principle of American tradition that it is so much a part of the government and 
political structures that have become the way American have always done things 
and the way they should always do them. Democracy in the USA though has a 
place for the third party or independent candidates; but this place is well located in 
the periphery of the political system. The place merely serves as outlet for dissent 
symbols of vaunted tolerance and nothing more than that.
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What applies to United States, applies to other neo-liberal countries. 
The variations are related to historical factors. In Britain for example, there is not 
much difference between the Conservative Party, the Liberal Democratic Party 
and the Labour Party. The ruling force of the British Parliament remains the 
liberal bourgeoisie that is totally committed to the rule of the market. Democracy 
has been historically constructed in the USA and UK to be amenable to the liberal 
ethos of competitive, individualist, market society.
In Africa and Asia, democracy was used as revolutionary platform 
against colonialism. These territories saw their struggles for independence as 
interpreting democracy as s government of, by and for the people form. 
Democracy in this sense represents the rule of the majority who were mainly the 
plebeians. This non-liberal construction of democracy has its root in history and 
conventions like its liberal counterpart.
The conviction of the communitarians that societies will remain 
healthy once there is an effective balance between the two forces of extreme 
autonomy and extreme centralised authority; and that with every right there is a 
responsibility may end up begging the issue especially in Africa. Rights and 
responsibilities enhance one another if they are in proper balance. Such balance 
also requires involvement of the majority of the people in the economic decision 
making processes within their political communities. If rights of specific 
individuals and groups impose demands on all other community members and are 
to be effectively upheld once the basic needs of all community members are 
attended to, the right and the basic needs of the political community also impose 
demands on every individuals and groups within the community as the two are 
mutually reinforcing partners. Involvement of majority in decision making 
processes implies applying democracy in such processes. How does 
communitarianism address the issue of democracy?
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5.2 Communitarian democracy
From the foregoing it is glaring that communitarianism sees diversity 
as a social given. It, in view of this acceptance, tries to put in place a political 
system that will render such diversity a positive and constructive force in the 
society. That is, a system that is committed to the perfection or improvability of 
both the individual human-consciousness and the collective-social consciousness 
(Preuss 1995).
The accomplishment of this goal requires the communitarians to seek 
a national community where people as equal citizens interact with each other to 
produce what Robert Lipkin referred to as the ‘appropriate community’ (Lipkin, 
1983). This appropriate community is assumed by the communitarians to possess 
the capacity of providing solutions to social problems and also reducing group 
dissension by drawing support from the involvement of private institutions, civil 
society in particular.
Communitarian democracy advocates a form of democracy that 
embraces certain type of community with a form of political organisation, 
interaction and dialogue devoid of any external reason. It is a brand of democracy 
that incorporates such values as liberty, equality, egalitarianism, community and 
solidarity as defined through the consents of the governed. In line with 
communitarian democracy, citizens are obliged to present arguments in terms of 
reason which is internal to the constitutional culture. If for any reason they have 
external reasons for advocating a particular position, they should be able to find 
suitable translations of their positions in the language of and reason of liberty, 
equality, community and solidarity in the societal politics and constitution.
Principally, communitarian democracy relies more on civil societies 
for significant political and social changes in the society. They believe that the
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survival and consolidation of democracy is predicated on a civil society that is 
active in delimiting the state dominance (Harberson et al 1994; Gymah-Boadi 
1996). Presently the World Bank recognises the role of civil society in articulating 
the people’s aspirations and mounting pressures on government to yield to 
popular demands (2000: 43). On this basis, the World Bank assumes that an 
active civil society will aid decentralisation, encourage wider participation at the 
grassroots and across all sectors of society especially in an ethnically divided 
society and reduce the scope for autonomous government actions (2000).
A pertinent question left unanswered by the liberal communitarian is 
how the character of the state will not affect the character of the civil society. 
Moreover the civil societies are non-profit organisations and most of them rely on 
financial support from the state and foreign organisations to execute their projects. 
The idea of seeing both a strong state and strong civil society though as separate 
but essentially complement each other, implies that civil society can only exist in 
relationship to the state and not a potentially democratic sphere in its own right 
through which alternative versions of democracy might be pursued (Baker, 1997). 
More importantly when we consider the fact that the nature and character of the 
state will impact on the nature and character of the civil society. The character of 
the state is shaped by the nature of its economic philosophy.
Communitarianism especially the liberal communitarians differ with 
the laissez faire conservatives mainly in respective roles of the private sector and 
the state. They are though concerned with the involvement of the third sector in 
governance, that is the civil society to address the effects of segregation on the 
people but the genesis of poverty arising from the segregation was left 
unaddressed. The issue of leadership and how they emerge in the community is 
left intact in the domain of party democracy. The classical communitarians were 
no doubt tending towards communism or what Keane (1998) later referred to as 
socialist republicanism. This represents a situation where autonomy, participation 
and the economy will be placed under the guide of a socialist system. Hindess
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sees this as an inadequate conceptualisation of democracy because both the 
classical communitarians and Keane ignore that socialism and democracy can not 
mix effectively. Democracy according to Hindess will in the final analysis, incline 
towards exercising control over the socialist ideals in other to defend the 
autonomy of the citizens (Hindess, 1995).
The socialist communitarianism is therefore not an all-embracing 
model where every member of the self governing community will have an 
effective say in the governance especially in the leadership process. Management 
of such community is always handled by few bureaucrats that are hardly 
accountable to the generality of the citizens but the ruling single party. 
Communitarians, either classical or responsive, also fail like the liberal democrats 
to address the inabilities of pre-colonial African societies to get committed to 
working with their own local grains that have recognisable benefits as witnessed 
in their kingdoms and empires, to develop modem political institutions. They 
were rather coaxed to mimicry best-practice approach of the western liberal 
democracy.
The belief that once the people through their various communities are 
made to buy into the liberal state project, the community personnel occupy key 
positions in the state and the state becomes a baby-sitter for the people, the effects 
of segregation and poverty will evaporate remains the greatest fault-line of 
communitarian democracy. This is due to the absence of self-governing 
community in their democratic calculation. There is therefore a need for the 
communitarian shortcomings to be rectified by another model that can actually 
provide an attractive alternative to liberalism which the sub-Saharan African 
states can adopt to confront the challenges of the market, globalisation, liberal and 
neoliberal democracy.
At this point it is necessary to explain the concept of community as 
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used in this thesis in other to avoid any ambiguity and misrepresentation. . Also 
there is need to clarify what it is meant by self-governing community before 
addressing why the communitarian philosophy is unable to rescue the sub Sahara 
Africa from political ruination.
5.2.1 Conceptualising Community
The penchant for community in social science discourse especially in 
sociology remains an interesting issue. The classical works of Ferdinand Tonnies 
and Emile Durkheim present community in different sociological perspectives. 
Tonnies in his Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft published in 1887 (Christodoulidis, 
1998: 35) pitted community against society. He uses community to signify the 
organic and cohesive world of traditional society, while society according to him, 
refers to the fragmented world of modernity with its rationalised and 
individualised structures. In contrast, Durkheim as a positivist had no difficulty in 
accepting the burden of modernity and its individualised and differentiated social 
organization which according to him was potentially liberating. To Durkheim, 
society is essentially a community based on cultural values while modernity 
signifies the movement from mechanical forms of integration to organic forms of 
integration. Seeing society same as community as Durkheim does will mislead us 
to lose the essential character of a community which is more than sharing cultural 
values but possessing network of social relationships in a more organic and 
cohesive manner than a society.
Price, while following Tonnies’ line of argument presents a simplified 
meaning of community. He describes it as a network of social relations propelled 
by shared meaning and above all shared values (Price, 1977). The liberal 
communitarians could not accept Price interpretation because it negates the 
universal nature of liberalism. Their rejection of Price’s was premised on the 
assumption that community, if taken in its ordinary meaning will imply the 
abandonment of ethical universalism and withdrawal into closed particularistic 
loyalties (Bellah, 1998: 15). In place of this ordinary meaning, they suggest that 
the scope of community must be viewed as a nestled arrangement where a smaller
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community nestle in the larger and more encompassing community (Etzioni,
1998). Therefore towns nestle in more encompassing regions that also nestle in a 
country wide colony, and invariably in a globalised world that encapsulate all 
settlements. In essence, liberal communitarians see the global community as a 
globalised structure starting from the smallest level and ending up at the global 
level through economic, political, technological and social linkages.
While we may agree with the hierarchical arrangement of the 
communities, abandoning the particularistic context which has been discussed 
elsewhere appears to be faulty. This fault forms part of the essence of clarifying 
what a community is. This is further reinforced by the desire to search for how 
democracy can assume its meaning of government of the people, by the people 
and for the people in sub-Sahara Africa. Doing this, will require resting the 
argument here on Hindess’ argument of what democracy is. This is because his 
explanations are very germane to the principles of neo-communitarian democracy. 
But before embarking on discussion of alternative model of democracy for the 
sub-Saharan Africa, it is apposite to conceptually clarify neo-communitarianism 
and neo-communitarian community as these will become prominent in the 
remaining part of the thesis.
5.3 Neo-Communitarian Philosophy
This section explains the underlying principles of neo-communitarian 
philosophy and ideology, before delving into its community and democracy. 
Before doing this it is apposite to explain why communitarianism is unsuitable for 
resolving post-colonial African states’ political crisis. This arises from its 
assumption of the effectiveness of civil society in the delivery of the state services 
including democracy without taking into consideration the relationship between 
the character of the civil society and the character of the state as explained earlier. 
The relationship between these two characters is further elaborated here with two 
explanatory variables - the state structure and the dialectics.
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In the context of this study and using Madunagu’s argument in 
“Dialectics o f Structures and Governance” (Madunagu, 2011), the structure is the 
“organisation of parts as dominated by the general character of the whole”; or the 
“aggregate of an entity in their relationships to each other”. Dialectics is in the 
same context the “way in which aspects of a situation affect each other”. When 
we therefore speak of a state’s political structure, economic structure, social 
structure, geopolitical structure or governance structure, we are merely looking at 
the state as an organised entity through a particular prism, a prism that attempts to 
isolate a particular sub-structure and pull it out for closer look, deeper analysis 
and, hence, deeper understanding of not just the particular sub-structure but the 
entire superstructure as a whole and how both the sub and super-structures affect 
or influence each other. In this case how the democracy in the sub Saharan 
Africa’s state influences the state and vice versa. It is an “attempt” because this 
“isolating” and “pulling out” can only be approximate, given the intimate and 
inseparable connections, in real life, between the various sub-structures of the 
state.
The corollary to this proposition is that not only are the various sub­
structures of the sub-Saharan African states as structured superstructures 
inseparable, they also continuously impact on each other, and individually and 
collectively -  impact on the quality and process of democracy and governance. It 
is therefore not an accident that the ideology that is dominant in the economic 
sub-structure is also the one that is dominant in the political sub-structure. It is 
also not a mere coincidence that struggles seen in politics are reproduced in, and 
are reproduced by, struggles in the economy.
Alleviating the effects of these struggles requires radical
transformation of both political and economic substructures. This transformation
will emerge from the invention of neo-communitarian democracy and socialised
partnership economic system, which will both serve as an arrangement for the
reconfiguration of the state. The combination of the two models will provide an
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environment that will insulate democracy from liberal effects in Africa, 
reconstruct the state by taking the ethno-nationality groups into consideration, 
launch a democratisation strategy that recognises ethnic groups as semi- 
autonomous entities, and re-organise the market in a socialised partnership 
arrangement devoid of separation of individuals from the state. This is the 
underlying principle of neo-communitarianism that provides decommodified 
character of speconomy to prevent the people from recomodified strategy of 
liberal communitarianism.
Democracy in sub-Saharan Africa today, is understood within the 
context of liberal majoritarian democracy. Giving concession to Africa’s historical 
predicament and the dismal conditions of human life and other spheres of 
existence in the continent, the trend of events appears to be one of a shift of 
political paradigm from autocratic structures to that of majoritarian tyranny. In the 
drive towards democracy in Africa, elite dictators and rulers, both military and 
civilians have for the most part being in alliance with external forces. The turn­
around of these foreign forces in favour of multi-party democracy as currently 
witnessed in the Arab Spring does not imply political freedom for the people. 
Neither does it remove the political domination of one group by the other nor the 
people’s exclusion from the economic decision making process. It is just a process 
of abandoning dictatorial leader for dictator party that will still sustain the market 
and dependent economy. The issue of freedom and how it’s claim by the left, 
middle or right ideologies is weak, and how speconomy plans to rectify this is 
addressed in Chapter Seven.
While it is contentious that liberal democratic system has brought with
it some gains, the fundamental question is, how substantial are these gains, and to
what extent has this majoritarian democratic model built on the strengths of the
non-indigenous institutions and impact on politics in Africa? The predominant
assumptions of liberal democracy is that with the full enthronement of liberal
majoritarian democracy together with its institutions in the post-colonial African
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states, many of the problems bedevilling the continent will be effectively 
challenged and perhaps solved. A lot of these claims remain a false mirage. 
Contrary to these claims, there is the replacement of individual dictators with 
dominant party dictatorships, diminishing values in local currencies, rise in ethnic 
violence, careerist civil societies, electoral frauds and ear-deafening corruption.
Another major flaw of liberal democracy is over representative 
democracy. Always the electorate are made to delegate their sovereignty to one 
elected representative every four or five years. This creates the impression that 
sovereignty ultimately lies with the people and that the people have the final 
authority on government. On the contrary, people only delegate sovereignty to a 
representative who exercises such on their behalf through the institutions of the 
government. The first failure in this arrangement is that it serves as a recipe for 
democratic disaster because it usurps the sovereignty of the people.
Drawing on Athenian spirit, government of, by and for the people, 
democracy means the authority of the people and not the authority of a delegate 
acting on their behalf. Delegates act according to the dictates of their parties and 
which in African context, are dictates of the party leaders. This in essence means 
surrendering sovereignty to a political party or politicians who are at liberty to act 
instead of the people and not the people. This explains why governments and state 
operators take some actions that do not receive the support of the people, yet they 
claim to do such on behalf of the people. A good example of this was Britain and 
USA involvement in the Iraqi war without the support of their citizens. Though 
some Americans and Britons campaigned against the move but the fundamental 
issue here is that the political system of representative democracy with elected the 
leaders had already taken sovereignty away from the people.
Politicians under this arrangement act with impunity without any
recourse to the people. When people complain of their politicians not being
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sensitive to their plight, they all ignore the fact that it is the political system of 
representative democracy that is actually insensitive to their plight. The absurdity 
of the system allows a single representative to usurp the mandate of hundreds of 
thousands of people and act the way he likes or according to the dictates of his 
party and sometimes to the detriment of the people who owns the sovereignty. 
The politician gets away with such act for as long as he has the support of the 
party, most importantly, the party leaders. Liberal democracy through its 
representative political arrangement imposes minority candidates on the majority 
to confirm its status as a recipe for political instability.
Neo-communitarianism insists that the sub-Saharan Africa’s political 
salvation can never come from the present liberal democracy or any other grand 
paradigm. It therefore maintains a particularistic deviation from the universal 
assumption of liberal democracy. Democracy is very flexible and it is this 
flexibility that makes it highly complex. To understand democracy requires 
understanding its context because the context of any object is very important in 
the understanding and usage of the object. Context here refers to the human 
element that brings together and cement the bricks of knowledge of an object 
which in this wise is democracy. How we decide to put the bricks together 
defines the usage of the bricks. Every system must be able to manage its context 
with knowledge. The idea of developing an educated middle class and a 
framework of civil institutions cannot be taken out of the context. The process of 
developing this class and its role will be determined by the context which may not 
necessarily be uniform.
The problem with liberal and socialist democracy lays in their global
exchange of best practice ideas to determine the democracy and knowledge
relevant to the collective ‘us’. That we now live in a world driven by global
exchange of knowledge where we crash against one another’s does not remove
the fact that every community will still need to manage its own context with the
acquired knowledge in its own peculiar way. This argument finds a relevant
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explanation in the Arab Spring. The uprisings brought about regime changes but 
in different dimensions. Development of an educated middle class may be 
relevant in some contexts and it may be irrelevant in others. This is where ‘best 
fit’ surpasses the ‘best practice’ assumption of liberal democracy. It is the best-fit 
approach that separates the popular uprisings in the sub-Sahara Africa in 1980s 
and the Arab Spring especially Libya. As explained earlier, Libyans addressed 
their political problem through their contextual interpretation of reality to arrive at 
a decision that is presently relevant to their community and needs. The Libyans in 
the spirit of communitarian democracy developed their own context for the 
pragmatic conception of political truth to transform their political and moral 
notions into workable arrangement through the reflective consensus of the 
citizens. Their pragmatic conception though still requires further deliberation, 
compromises an empathetic understanding and accommodation of all the 
indigenous groups in order to achieve a neo-communitarian democratic level that 
will serve as the foundation for the construction of an autochthonous Libyan state.
The 1980s protests in places such as Benin Republic and Cameroon 
left the infrastructure of the old regimes in place while the Arab Spring is about 
the state-rebirth with different ideological postures. This is contrary to the 
“intellectual interlocutors” that mid-wifed the popular protests in 1980s in sub- 
Saharan Africa.
Neo-communitarian philosophy endorses the communitarian rejection
of liberalism as an ontologically and epistemologically incoherent ideology that
fails to recognise the deep identity divide amongst nations. Divisions by identity
within nations cannot be overlooked in any democratic discourse. In liberal-
democracy discourse, such divisions are regarded as non-issues because liberalism
as an ideology calls for equality of all persons with no regard for race, ethnicity,
religion or language. The Quebec issue in the Canadian politics has proved wrong
the naive assumption of liberalism on the cultural identity and sovereignty.
Though there is an increased diversity in Canada due to changed patterns of
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immigration, with many more people immigrating to Canada as pointed out by 
Kymlicka in ‘Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory o f Minority Rights’ 
(1995), this does not prevent ethno cultural conflicts between the Quebec and the 
state of Canada. Ethnocultural conflicts are prominent global political violence 
that has been witnessed in Eastern Europe, Yugoslavia, Middle East and Rwanda. 
It is a conflict underpinned by political and social action from individuals or 
ethnic groups who feel that they have not been equitably and fairly treated by the 
state. Kymlicka explains these actions as raising the issue of rights for such 
groups and individuals such as the first nations that occupy Quebec in Canada. 
Liberalism opines that any claim by those bearing distinctive identity for the 
protection of their culture or religion is in some way, a violation of the individual 
rights or equality of all persons. This assumption remains the tension between the 
protection of group identity and individual rights in a multicultural society as 
witnessed in Canada and currently in the northern parts of Nigeria.
The ability of the state to manage this tension without resulting in 
crisis requires the invention of a unique strategy that may not necessarily be 
uniform to all states. It is this variance that poses a defining question for liberal 
democracy and to which it is yet to respond. At the risk of repetition, one of the 
fault-lines of liberal democracy is its failure to accept that equal treatment for all 
results in unequal condition for some people. This view becomes more 
pronounced when we factor in the generally accepted definition of democracy as 
summarised by Lipset, a leading figure of the theory of liberal democracy. Lipset, 
in his book “Political Man: The Social Bases o f Politics ” (Lipset, 1981), 
describes democracy as:
“a political system which supplies regular constitutional 
opportunities for changing the governing officials, and a social 
mechanism which permits the largest possible part o f  the 
population to influence major decisions by choosing among  
contenders for political o ffice” (L ip set, ibid: 2 7 ).
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This is a majoritarian posture that may deprive the minority groups a 
fair chance to influence decision-making process including those affecting them 
as a group. It is a posture that is being threatened by the clash of self and group 
interests. This clash will ultimately, if no solution is proffered, encourage the 
development of self-help strategy that such deprived groups may find suitable for 
the protection of their group interest. Liberal democracy appears to be 
handicapped in providing a workable solution that could prevent the inevitable 
clash between individuals’ rights and group protection in multi-cultural societies. 
This handicap is illustrated by Quebec in Canada and the emerging scenario in 
post-Gaddafi Libya.
The liberal argument of providing the state with a political system 
which supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing 
officials, and a social mechanism which permits the largest possible part of the 
population to influence major decisions by choosing among contenders for 
political office is yet to provide answer to the presence of strong separatist and 
autonomous movements in Quebec region of Canada. Quebec, a Francophone 
region, does not only command a strong economic standing in Canada, it also 
enjoys a respectable social position and influence political power in the country. 
Quebec still nurses the feeling of being exploited and dominated by the 
Anglophone Canadian region. These feelings dated back to the origins of Canada 
as a nation. It is germane to posit that no matter how theoretically sound an 
ideology or the constitutional efforts of a multicultural state like Canada to invent 
a liberal state, the tension between the group identity and individual equality will 
remain. Ethnic groups who felt oppressed are bound to demand for recognition of 
identity rights, fair treatment and equality to other groups.
This type of demand was exemplified by African-American 
recognition through the Civil Rights Movement in the US and Quiet Revolution 
launched by the French in Canada for the protection of French language and 
culture in Quebec. Both the Civil Rights Movement and the Quiet Revolution
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resulted in changing the term Negro to African-American in other to connect to 
their ancestral identity in Africa while in Canada, French-Canadian was changed 
to Quebecois in an effort to define themselves more of the province of their 
forebears colonists rather than that of the country of Canada. The Quebec issue 
poses a defining question for the Canadian Liberal state and liberal democracy in 
general. The feeling of being a dominated, exploited, and disrespected minority by 
many Quebecers is similar to the feelings nursed by the Amazigh of Libya in the 
post-Gaddafi Libya liberal state.
After playing a central role in the revolt that toppled Muammar 
Gaddafi, members of Libya's long-oppressed Berber minority, known in Libya as 
Amazigh, felt aggrieved for not being considered for any cabinet seat in the 
interim government of national unity. This neglect was immediately interpreted by 
the Amazigh people that they may, as witnessed under Gaddafi regime, be 
banished to the side lines of public life. In Ali Mohammed Shetwi’s words, a 
senior member of the Council of Jadu, an Amazigh town of roughly 20,000 
people in Libya’s west, "We do not disagree with the new government, but we 
want to be represented and included with ministerial positions. We feel we are not 
included". The Amazigh see themselves as Libyans and Amazigh at the same 
time. Omar Saeed, in his complimentary remarks to Shetwi’s, emphasised "First 
of all we are Libyan, but we are also Amazigh. Therefore the government should 
be Arab and Amazigh together." "The Amazigh must be represented according to 
their percentage of Libya's population and their share of the fighting”. The tension 
between Amazigh and Arabs is one of the deepest of the many fault-lines inside 
Libya’s assumed unified society that still stands as a challenge to a united and 
cohesive liberal state after Gaddafi's 42-year-rule. The Amazigh’s request serves 
as a testament to the reality that membership in group plays important role for the 
indigenous peoples.
The experience of the indigenous peoples in Chile provides another 
veritable example of the weakness in liberal democracy. The liberal assumption
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based on individual equality fails to appreciate that non-recognition of the roles of 
the indigenous groups and non-provision of constitutional space for such groups 
can lead to a frustration and marks a fatal flaw in the implementation of a 
constitutional government in a multi-cultural society. The basic issue arising from 
these scenarios is the deep divide by identity which liberal democracy tries to 
ignore. This remains a challenge to the universal assumption of liberal democracy 
in every society. The reality in the plural society as shown in Canada, Spain, 
Chile, Libya etc. is that the deep divide by identity compels every group to make 
demands for the protection of its values and identity irrespective of its economic 
status within the state. This is the essence of multiculturalism. Failure to accept 
this reality reduces the universal assumption of liberal democracy or socialist 
democracy to a theoretical naivety. Any political arrangement that fails to take 
this fact of life into consideration by accommodating indigenous groups as 
positive semi-autonomous entities within the state is bound to encounter ethno 
cultural conflict.
Liberal democracy could therefore be regarded as an ideology 
destined to flounder in multi-ethnic non-European societies. The failure of its 
constitutional system to consider how the laws could be shaped to accommodate 
the indigenous groups, not just individuals belonging to such groups but the 
groups themselves, with the legal space they need to act as mediating structures 
between the state and the individual is one of the fault lines of liberal democracy 
in the sub-Saharan Africa.
Managing this type of challenge in a plural society where each group 
is free to make demands for the protection of its values and identity, is at the heart 
of neo-communitarian philosophy. It is the failure of liberal democracy in 
providing a workable solution to this tension that in the first instance draws 
communitarianism into the domain of political philosophy. The argument of the 
liberal communitarians which emphasised the survival of liberal and neo-liberal 
state using the civil societies as the collective voices of the people and turning the
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state into a baby-sitter for individuals, left no room for state or economy 
reconfiguration. Their arguments expose liberal communitarianism as an invented 
strategy meant to protect the state against the backlash of the market.
Neo-communitarianism, departing from both the communitarianism 
and liberalism, maintains that individuals and state cannot be separated from each 
other. Neo-communitarian philosophy emphasises the sustenance of the 
relationship between individuals and the state, and that any attempt at separating 
them will produce a separatist and individualised system that is peculiar to liberal 
capitalist system.
Concern about the society in the West, took the form of rational 
analysis that promotes continuous commitment to rational world view. To 
understand western thinking about society requires the understanding of its 
rational or scientific orientation. The West adherence to liberal democracy as the 
only genuine form of democracy is a product of this orientation. This is an 
orientation that assumes thinking to be an autonomous mental activity explicable 
only in terms of rationality or reason. This view has been radically challenged and 
hampered by the non-rational forces inherent in the cultural and historical values 
of the people both in the Western (as seen in Canada) and non-Westem states.
One of the main weaknesses of the European rationalists is the conceit 
that thinking is an ahistorical, asocial natural process, when in reality human 
thought is a ‘natural process evolving from time-bound, sociocultural ingredients 
and forces’ (Rossides, 1978: 1). Neo-communitarian philosophy stresses that we 
cannot understand the symbolic culture independent of its social contexts. Every 
social theory must of necessity reflect the needs, circumstance and time of their 
contexts.
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Fukuyama’s and Huntington’s assumptions of liberal democracy as 
the terminus of the needs, circumstance and time, borders on lack of cultural 
sensitivity and care for the evolutionary trends of human beings and their society. 
After all, it was the rise of capitalism in the West that produced its own distinctive 
mode of thought called liberalism, which according to Rossides (1978) has 
helped, in various forms, to legitimise and direct the development and sustenance 
of liberal capitalist society. Liberalism essentially refers to the acceptance of 
private property, private economic motives and actions, and political and legal 
equality as central social institutions. This is why there is not much ideological 
differences between the major political parties in the West especially United 
Kingdom and the USA, as they all subscribe to the core values of liberalism that 
is, the validity and superiority of liberal capitalist society, while only disagreeing 
on how to run it.
Neo-communitarian philosophy represents a non-rationalist school 
with the assumption that developmental path of the society must be related to the 
type of society in which people live, rather than piloting such developments along 
the path of a particular theory that follows the capitalist or socialists path of 
development within given national and international contexts. It holds that human 
activity takes place under determinate social and cultural conditions that are vital 
to the understanding of the socio-political and economic processes including crisis 
in the given society. It is a philosophy which takes into account that the term 
liberalism as used conventionally in the field of political science refers to the 
symbols of capitalism, or more precisely to the political, legal, economic and 
social values and doctrines of the middle class. While on the theoretical spectrum 
of complex social systems, it sees liberalism as occupying a position between 
feudalism and feudal-absolutism, on the one hand, and socialism on the other 
which in sociology means a positive, industrial, Gesellschaft, rational-legal, 
urban, or associational society.
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Neo-communitarianism regards the logic underlying liberal society 
that human beings, functioning in large part individually, can achieve both a 
theoretical and practical mastery of the natural and social universes as sweeping 
aside the pre-existing traditional institutions regardless of their ability to 
contribute positively to the emergence of modem state. This posture shows 
liberalism as lacking the focus of ‘working with the grain’ (Booth, 2011) by its 
failure to treat and accept these institutions in the host societies as potential 
resources for democratisation and development.
5.4 Neo-communitarian Community
Neo-communitarianism holds that the global community is an 
aggregate of communities with each having its unique context. A simple 
illustration of this uniqueness goes thus: while there may be global human rights 
in all the communities, the fundamental rights are not necessarily global in all 
ramifications. For example, the right to live is a global human right but right to 
live in a community is a unique fundamental right that differs from state to state. 
Different visas for different categories of people from different countries suitably 
explain this right.
5.4.1 Neo-communitarian democracy
Democracy, Hindess claims as far back in 1983, is ‘a medium and 
form of political struggle, accepting not only the dominance of parliamentary 
democracy, but also the role of popular democratic forms’ (Hindess, 1983). Later, 
in 1989, he puts forward a more succinct definition that upholds democracy as a 
special form of self-government where the people as a whole exercise power and 
have equal political standing in the republic. This accounts for why there are 
many versions or revisions of democracy of which liberal democracy is one. The 
reason for these revisions was encapsulated by David Held in “Cosmopolitan 
Democracy: An Agenda for a New World’ (Archibugi and Held (eds), 1995) that 
since the contemporary conditions have changed, theories and concepts of 
democracy must change accordingly.
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The process of conceptual stretch of democracy made it to lose its 
original meaning (Baogang He, 2011). Neo-communitarianism maintains its 
theoretical depth by sticking to Lincolnian meaning of democracy in other to 
avoid ideological narcissism that characterises most of the democratic revisions. 
Sticking to this meaning of democracy leads us to identifying the significance of 
‘self-governing community of citizens’ (Hindess, 1992) in the democratisation 
process.
As elaborated by Baogang (2011), there are two important features 
attached to the self-governing community of citizens. These features are vital for 
our understanding and usage of community. First, the features presuppose 
identification in terms of a clear political demarcation of territory and of 
population. Secondly, government is conceived as deriving its authority from the 
community. In line with this argument, the theme of a self-governing community 
of citizens could be understood in two perspectives. It could be understood in 
Hobbesian contract terms, as a correlative sphere of autonomy within which 
citizens should be free to act within the framework of rules for which they are 
collectively responsible. It may also be understood as that by which important 
matters of public concerns are decided by some appropriate democratic process 
within the control of the demos or its delegated agencies.
The idea of delegation as an authorisation has been used to bring 
representative government into the model of a self-governing community. It is 
from this idea of delegation that liberal democracy derives its claim to democracy 
as government of the people. What is of particular interest in this thesis is to 
distinguish between the self-governing community that liberal democracy is 
laying claim to and the community of citizens that bedrocks the interpretation of 
community in a neo-communitarian democracy. Community of citizens in the 
thesis refers to a community in which independent persons participate in the
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government of people with equal rights and capacity to action that is not at the 
beck and call or mercy of the state (Hindess, 1992) or political parties.
Though all the theories lay emphasis on the autonomy of the citizen 
but the application of the rule of law is often at the expense of the claimed 
autonomy as citizens ‘are effectively alienated from any control or say in the final 
process’ (Baogang He, 2011). For example socialism tries to assure the individual 
autonomy by bringing capital within the responsibility of an active self 
government (Hindess, 1992) while republicanism on the other, though gives 
sufficient room for individual to participate in the political life of the state as 
independent agents, but allows the state to rightfully interfere in the interests of all 
citizens (Hindess, 1995). The idea of self-governing community remains one of 
the greatest challenges to the universal assumption of liberal democracy and all 
other universal political paradigms.
The parting line of neo-communitarianism and these universal 
paradigms is the issue of who is more significant in the political process within a 
community. While neo-communitarianism holds the view that the most significant 
political actors in a community are the individuals due to the mechanical 
relationship between them and their communities. All other political paradigms 
including communitarianism and liberal democracy, deriving their strengths from 
the universal grand theory lay emphasis on the ‘concept of corporate actors’ 
(Hindess, 1995) such as political parties, state agencies, economic enterprises, 
interests groups, and civil society; They opine that these corporate actors are more 
important than the individuals in the community. These corporate actors are 
regarded in neo-communitarianism as artificial partners of the state whose 
primary goal is to feather the nests of their founders or serve the parochial goals 
for which they are purposely established. This is one of the connecting points of 
communitarianism to liberal democracy. It shares the perspective of corporate 
actors with liberal democracy. It assumes that involvement of the people in the 
administration of the public institutions could only be efficiently done through the
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institutions of civil societies. This assumption when transferred into the 
democratic terrain simply implies that the civil societies as corporate actors are 
more important than the individuals in the operation of democracy.
Dahl, a leading advocate of pluralist democracy, was very emphatic 
on how significant the corporate actors are to democracy. In “Pluralist Model o f  
Democracy’ (Dahl, 1982), Dahl explicates that organisations are necessary to the 
operation of democracy on a large scale and that democracy is mutually controlled 
by a variety of organisations (Dahl, 1982). Dahl, like any other pluralist 
advocates, fails to realise that these corporate actors may not be as efficient or 
effective as assumed for democratic tasks. The assumptions of the pluralists that 
problems pose for democracy by one organisation could be resolved by 
constitutional arrangements involving particular organizations and the relations 
between them, as some of the pluralist writings of G. D. H. Cole and Harold Laski 
appear to suggest (Dahl, ibid) appear to be weak assumptions in African politics. 
There are instances where the Election Tribunals could not solve electoral 
problems pose to democracy by the political parties, electoral agencies and state 
security agencies.
The chapter takes into consideration the liberal arguments that idea of 
a self-governing community is inherently problematic because it is very unlikely 
for the complex society to return to a concept of citizen-based democracy as 
propounded in the communitarian democracy. The argument fails to consider that 
complex society is an aggregate of communities, villages and towns with their 
administrative systems that could provide the necessary grain upon which 
democratic institutions could be constructed. Neo-communitarian democracy 
emphasises commitment to ‘working with the grain’ that is, the indigenous values 
of the host community which Booth (2011) clarifies as building on existing 
institutional arrangements that have recognisable benefits rather than imposing the 
best practise approach on every community. The political truth about democracy 
is its flexibility with best-fit institutional innovations built constructively on what
[221]
already exists. Pre-existing traditional political institutions of colonial Africa 
needed to be treated as a potential resource for democratisation process rather than 
been swept aside regardless of their ability to contribute.
What is actually ‘inherently problematic’ in self-governing 
community as argued by the liberals is the failure of such community to mimic 
what works in advanced capitalist democracies. After-all, as Booth explains in 
“Governance for the development in Africa: Building on what works” (Booth, 
2011), millions of dollars have been spent on programmes to make private 
enterprise work in Africa as it does in the US, elections work as they do in 
Sweden, audit authorities as in Germany and civil society campaigns as in the 
Netherlands -  with results that have been mixed at best.
Also it is assumed by liberal democracy that there are limits to what a 
community can do or control due to the influence of the external effects on the 
activities and changes within the communities and of which the communities 
cannot control or manipulate. Events like global economy are easily referred to as 
one of those factors that are not within the orbit of the community control 
(Hindess, 1995) and yet they have significant consequences on the politics within 
the community. There are also some internal forces such as the forces of the 
market which the community cannot control without violating the rights of the 
individuals. These internal elements invariably undermine the community control. 
In short, they are of the view that democratic self-government and the life of the 
community depend on conditions that cannot be entirely within political control 
(Hindess, ibid). These arguments fail to take into consideration that the 
dependence of supposedly self-governing communities on the activities of the 
corporate actors and the influence of the external factors do persistently generate 
tension between the idea of democracy and the institutions of both the corporate 
actors and the external forces.
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While democracy inclines towards the autonomy of individuals within 
the community, the democratisation institutions and the external forces always 
incline toward the supremacy of the corporate actors. When institutional 
arrangements fall short of greater democratic ideals, a crisis of the idea of 
democracy becomes imminent leading democracy to further abstraction and 
becomes something unattainable. It is therefore not surprising that other rounds of 
conflict may erupt in Libya and Egypt if their new institutional arrangements fall 
short of the envisaged democratic ideals. A salient feature of liberal democracy 
which the governments emerging from the ruinations of the old regimes are 
adopting as the best practice is its provision for the multi-party periodic 
succession of leaders and which does not come that far very often. The attempt at 
combining democracy with capitalism in an unrestrained manner as currently 
being exported into the two countries by the ‘global capitalist leaders in the name 
of liberty’ (Chua, 2003) will still retain the context that promotes personalisation 
of power and politics by the ousted leaders but this time through the emergence of 
dominant political parties in each country.
Democracy can hardly be exported to any society. Rather it has to 
grow from the local grains nurtured by people’s cultural values. Grand political 
theorists perceive the development of political culture as a simplistic change of 
mentality or values. They fail to realise that both morals and values depend on 
structures of economic production and distribution, and on the modes to guarantee 
societal security and reproduction functions as well (Linder, 2004: 4). The 
promotion, practice and vicissitudes of democracy in different parts of the world 
have exposed the concept of democracy to some definitional haze and diverse 
forms of interpretations (Adediran, 1996). The concept of democracy has become 
pervasive in the modem values and political system and elusive in definition. By 
the same word, different theories and ideologies mean many different things. The 
multi-dimensional nature of the meaning of democracy is not unconnected with its 
various typologies which include liberal, socialist, popular, direct, indirect or 
participatory, non-party, consensus and deliberative democracies.
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In view of this pool of democracies, it is no surprise that, it is elusive 
in providing a clear-cut definition that will cover all typologies. However, the 
attempts by scholars at encapsulating some set of principles and elements of 
democracy are more instructive in overcoming the various problems of explaining 
and understanding the concept of democracy. These elements appear to be central 
to these typologies of democracy but on a closer look they are not. The elements 
include free and fair elections, open, accountable and responsible government, 
civil and political and human liberties, and democratic society (Beetham and 
Boyle, 1995). Unfortunately, what makes society democratic remains a 
contentious element. A society can only be democratic in accordance with its 
peculiar principles which can be found in its polity. It is these principles that 
determine the mode of the elections, the process of accountability and nature of 
government responsibility. This is an important analytical tool for an 
understanding of differences in cultures within or between societies.
Neo-communitarian democracy incorporates such central political 
values as liberty, equality, community, economic democracy, popular 
participation, cohesiveness and solidarity of all ethnic groups within the larger 
state. Implicitly, neo-communitarian democracy endorses a constitutional 
relationship between the nationality groups and the larger state where each groups 
has a semi-autonomous power to sustain their indigenous values and determine 
affairs that are peculiar to their ethnic group. Any form of democracy that ignores 
the connection between the human nature and the state in governance may lead to 
a frustrating failure in the implementation of its policies. Central to this belief is 
that neo-communitarianism values the liberty of equal citizens interacting with 
one another to produce an appropriate community.
Consequently, neo-communitarianism and democracy are 
conceptually connected. It is a thick conception of democracy that favours the 
presentation of arguments in terms of reasons internal to the constitutional culture 
of the community. It is through this presentation, that reason(s) which are internal 
to both the actual and idealised political and constitutional practices, principles, 
standards and rules that have conceptual ties to the basic values of the community
[224]
could be tested in a deliberative debate and finally embraced by a reflective 
consensus of the community. This view does not advocate the rejection of external 
views but rather emphasises the subjection of such views to the deliberative 
process of the democratic community which embraces the reflective consensus of 
the citizenry.
Neo-communitarian democracy does not support the idea of using the 
state to impose such reasons in a coercive manner on every indigenous group or 
those that reject certain brand of external reason. In a neo-communitarian 
democracy, the citizenry will be more committed to a broader conception of 
democracy in their economic and political activities within the community. It 
entails, as argued by Lipkin in “Progressivism as Communitarian Democracy” 
(Lipkin, 1999: 229) thus:
a. citizen's stake in democratic self-government;
b. democratic conception as a viable public philosophy;
c. integration of the interests of individuals (qua individual communitarian 
democrats, not necessarily individuals per se) with the interests of (the) 
community (communities);
d. a theory of citizenship according to which integration of interests through 
the establishment of pan-nationality institutions is achieved;
e. communitarian democracy as a theory of the good or a theory of the 
meaning of life;
f. the comprehensiveness of the conception, that is, how public policy is 
formulated not as a zero-sum game, but as also taking the loser's 
concerns into account;
g. the stability in preserving the communitarian democratic institutions, and
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h. the vibrancy in imaginatively changing these institutions in the 
appropriate circumstances
With clear description of the above roles, neo-communitarian 
democracy will be able to create a platform where the people as a collective, 
constitutes the government, retain and exercise the initiative for policy-making 
and governing authority without being subjected to such authority. The values of 
the state are determined by the people and not vice versa. . Government listens 
and complies with the demands of the people. This is made possible because the 
neo-communitarian social order is characterised by popular mobilisation for 
grassroots development and self- activity of the people. In essence it is an idea 
having its roots in political philosophy of populism which embraces the following 
values:
1. Liberty
2. Direct democracy
3. Economic democracy
4. Equality
5. Community
6. Solidarity
This form of democracy stands a chance to correct the identified flaws 
associated with either liberal or socialist democracy that inaugurated political 
crisis in post-colonial sub-Saharan African states with their narrow base for 
participation, representative democracy, zero-sum politics and centralised elites 
command structure. For these flaws to be corrected there is need according to 
McConnachie (2002), for the reform of the political system where powers can be 
meaningfully exercised by the sovereigns instead of representatives, the political 
parties and other vested corporate interests.
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5.5 Neo-communitarian democracy as a way forward
The section addresses the question of whether, or under what 
conditions, socialist and liberal democratic institutions contribute to 
‘developmental governance’ in sub-Saharan Africa. When judged against liberal 
or socialist democracy, democracy in the sub-Saharan African not only has many 
shortcomings but has also sparked many controversies. This is well established in 
both the academic and policy literature including this thesis. While few dispute 
the desirability of democracy and good governance for Africa in theory, many 
remain sceptical about whether in practice the two necessarily go together.
In an elaborate study titled “Democracy and Governance” Richard 
Jeffries (1993) points out that the ‘indiscriminate promotion of multi-party 
democracy’ in Africa through multi-lateral agreements. between the agents of 
liberal institutions and African governments, undermines some of the Africa’s 
most ‘promising experiments in effective governance’ (Jeffries, 1993). He cites 
the non-democratic governments of Jerry Rawlings in Ghana (before the 1992 
presidential election) and Yoweri Museveni in Uganda as illustrations (Alence, 
2004: 164).
Some sceptics have gone further to question whether multi-party 
democracy in Africa is likely to alter the neo-patrimonial governance widely 
blamed for African states’ failure as agents of development. ‘Neo-patrimonial’ 
illustrates African states as in spite of possessing the formal structures of modem 
bureaucracies, still operate on patrimonial principles -  characterised by 
personalised political authority, weak checks on the private appropriation of 
public resources, and pervasive clientelism (Callaghy 1987; Jackson & Rosberg 
1982; Me'dard 1982). Enhancing such states’ developmental performance as 
argued by Alence (ibid: 165) requires the insulation of policymaking and 
implementation from arbitrary political interference.
Thinking of subjecting the African politicians to greater societal 
pressures through democratisation within a neo-patrimonial context may seem at
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best to miss the point (Bienen & Herbst 1996; Callaghy and Ravenhill eds; 1993). 
Indeed, some analysts such as Chabal concluded that democratisation in Africa 
has mainly served to erect a facade of institutional respectability, behind which 
deeply rooted patterns of neo-patrimonial elite governance continue to dominate 
(Bratton & van de Walle 1997; Chabal 2002; Joseph 1997). Fixing the gap of 
democratic deficits created by the ‘big man’ governance constitutes the major 
focus of this section.
It has been established in this study that there is nothing that makes 
Africa intrinsically undemocratic or makes democracy impossible in Africa. The 
failure associated with sub-Saharan African states, politics and economy emanate 
from their integration into templates of grand theories that failed to take the 
indigenous African political-economy into consideration. This integration left a 
challenge of whether these grand templates can or should be rejected 
wholesomely or whether they should be modified to accommodate the specificity 
of the political, cultural and historical circumstances of African states. The 
challenge left fundamental questions regarding which form of democracy is 
suitable for Africa and sub-Saharan Africa in particular unresolved. Does liberal 
democratic contestation or socialist democratic centralisation enhance African 
governments’ responsiveness and accountability to their populations’ needs and 
interests? Are stronger political and institutional restraints on discretionary 
executive authority the key to eradicating neo-patrimonial governance? And, if so, 
can the restraints imposed within democratic regimes -  namely, those grounded in 
the institutional separation of powers and political pluralism -  be the foundation 
for improved governance in Africa?
In response to above questions, sub-Saharan Africa has shown 
demonstrable evidence of sophistication in their pre-colonial political institutions 
with defined separation of powers before colonialism. These institutions were 
propelled by the values of traditional social life that was nurturing a system of 
government suitable for indigenous African states. More importantly, these pre­
colonial institutions shared some salient features such as legislative council, 
dialogue and representative principles of modem government with British
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democratic government. In other words, the parliamentary principle of decision­
making, debate and discussion of different points of views expressed by duly 
accredited representatives of the people were prominent features of African 
traditional politics (see thesis, Chapters Two and Three).
Juxtaposing these features with the principles of neo-communitarian 
democracy reveals a conceptual connection between neo-communitarian 
democracy and features of sub-Saharan pre-colonial democracy. At the risk of 
repetition, neo-communitarian democracy and pre-colonial African political 
systems are thick conceptions of democracy that favour the presentation of 
arguments in terms of reason internal to the constitutional cultures. Through these 
presentations, reasons which are internal to both the actual and idealised political 
and constitutional practices, principles, standards and rules that have conceptual 
ties to the basic values of the community are tested in a deliberative debate and 
finally embraced by a reflective consensus of the community.
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Chapter 6
NEO-COMMUNITARIAN STATE, GOVERNANCE AND GOVERNMENT
6.0 Introduction
The chapter among other things sets out to examine the post-colonial 
state-building process, essence of governance, the processes and relationships that 
produce governance and how neo-communitarian state, governance and 
government can help sub-Saharan Africa cope with the dynamics of multi-polar 
global politics. The processes of state-building and democratisation remain the 
greatest challenge to political stability in Africa.
Colonial authorities only remodelled African territories for their own 
purposes, establishing plantations, inducing population movements, and creating 
the beginnings of modem urban life. The reflexes, habits, and methods of 
governance of the post-colonial leaders remain a product of continuity of colonial 
administration. The centralised authoritarian state, which emerged from colonial 
stmctures, exemplifies this continuity. Like their colonisers, post-colonial African 
leaders further the state-building project at the expense of political pluralism. 
They unilaterally formulated and implemented public policy with little or no 
regards for the pluralistic nature of their countries. The state-building dynamics 
completely rests on state unilateralism. As Nnoli expresses (2008: viii), in pursuit 
of state-building, the state relies on power and not influence, extends its power, 
authority and laws throughout the length and breadth of the country. In doing so, 
Nnoli asserts, ‘it runs into conflict with pre-existing power, authority and laws in 
the society’ (Nnoli, ibid).
The neglect of the pluralistic nature of the countries produces a 
dialogue deficit between the majority and minority ethnic groups on the one hand, 
and between state leaders and the people in general, on the other. This also results 
in a lack of regime legitimacy and inability to accommodate discontent or 
minority views despite the adoption of multi-party elections. It also produces a
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situation in which genuine democratic reform is stunted. The consequent 
frustrations account for explosions of violence in a pattern akin to the 
independence struggles. The need to re-fix the plural nature of African societies 
into the state-building and democratisation process constitutes the major focus of 
this chapter.
The Neo-communitarian state, based on the recognition of group 
identity that can help in the understanding of how cultural, social and political 
alienation can lubricate social movements is recommended for consideration in 
this chapter. It is emphasised that this understanding will create allowance for a 
political space that permits the cultural groups to converge within a context where 
each group has an equal footing and where identity and power will aid in the 
construction of our cultural selves within a state. The chapter also aims at 
explaining how neo-communitarian governance and state can produce political 
leaders that will be able to set out development in terms of goals, objectives, 
directions, and action plans, followed by implementation of the action plans, and 
finally by the realisation of development.
6.1 Leadership and Governance
Conducive environment for human development is an essential goal 
that needs to be accomplished by every political leader but unfortunately only the 
political leader that has the knowledge-skills-ability (KSA) psychology (Eze, 
2005) can accomplish it. Unless this goal is achieved first, all other development 
efforts will be a failure. ‘This is a priority essence of governance’ asserts Eze 
(2005: 1-2). Any society that is of the KSA type10, its leadership may sometimes 
resort to use of force to free the nation and to achieve emancipation-freedom and 
independence which marks the first step towards national development. This is the 
argument put forward by Jeffries in the case of Ghana and Uganda whose 
governments under the leaderships of Jerry Rawlings and Yoweri Museveni 
,respectively were considered as non-democratic but representing Africa’s most
lowledge-skill-ability
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‘promising experiments in effective governance’ (Jeffries, 1993). Each of these 
leaders acquired and applied leadership KSAs, which enabled them to produce 
innovative revolutionary leaderships that were successful in achieving 
emancipation for the people (Eze, 2005: 5). Machiavelli focused on these 
leadership skills and abilities when he theorises that a robust mechanism for the 
selection of leaders is essential for the success of the state because two competent 
rulers that succeeded one another can achieve great things (Bynander and Hart, 
2006: 707).
In every state it is possible to find people who can not only understand 
leadership psychology but can also understand and apply managerial psychology 
for efficient and effective management of the societal resources. People who can 
not only do things right but also do the right things. Great leaders possess dazzling 
social intelligence, a zest for change, and above all, vision that allows them to set 
their sights on the ’’things" that truly merit attention. This rests on the 
understanding that among the essences of governance is the ability of the state to 
reproduce among the citizenry, leaders that can in succession, apply knowledge- 
skills-ability psychology for effective and efficient management of both the 
human and natural resources. This ability requires the political will of the leaders 
to organise planned change, transformation, and total breakaway from any 
obstacle to a free and progressive future. Unfortunately in the history of human 
existence, no state has ever been able to achieve this without passing through a 
cycle of resistance and counter-resistance due to the presence of forces that work 
to suppress and thwart any transformation plan for selfish gains. The mechanical 
relationship between individuals and the state in speconomy will reduce the 
resistance of the people to any planned change and transformation.
The mechanical relationship requires the two (individuals and state) to 
combine and interrelate with the economy (consumption, investment, savings, 
primary industry, secondary industry, tertiary industry, trade, etc.) in a unique and 
specific manner suitable for the two partners. The same principles and unique
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application of knowledge-skills-abilities apply to governance and government of 
the state. No state can mechanically copy another state’s mode of governance 
though they can learn from each other. This is where the congruence between 
politics, economy and culture becomes relevant in governance and government. 
Though their relationship may not be linear, but it plays a vital role in government 
and governance, sufficient enough not to be ignored in any mode of governance. 
Unfortunately the neo-liberal governance template designed for the sub-Saharan 
African governments can hardly allow the nourishment of this vital relationship 
between individuals and the state
The collapse of the Soviet Union as explained by Fukuyama removed 
the superpower rivalry that previously discouraged Western governments from 
linking bilateral aid to democracy (Whitehead, 2003). African governments eager 
to attract financial assistance became vulnerable to pressures to move towards 
more open and competitive political regimes (Clapham, 1996:187-207; Harbeson, 
2000). The pressures for openness include the requests for broader approaches to 
governance by moving the state from the narrow focus on public service reforms 
to include the ‘more ambitious goals of fostering political responsiveness and 
accountability’ (Diamond, 2001; Healey & Robinson, 1992; Hyden, 1992). This 
conception of governance continues to exert profound influence on Africa’s 
development agenda and aids. It features prominently in a collaborative report by 
the World Bank and several African research bodies (World Bank, 2001).
Similarly, the African Union’s New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD) endorses multi-party liberal democracy and good 
governance as essential ‘conditions for sustainable development’ (African Union 
2001; Hope, 2002) without taking stock of the genesis of the states’ fragility. As 
discussed earlier, state in the true sense of its formation and meaning hardly exists 
in Africa, rather what is being referred to as states in Africa are post-colonial 
‘trading posts’ that share similar features with their colonial trading-post 
progenitors. Considerable context analysis has been made by African scholars and
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Africanists in order to draw attention to the dependency-virus inherent in Africa’s 
political economy occasioned by the colonial administrations during the state 
building process. International public and private donor organisations have also 
commissioned studies to increase and disseminate knowledge on the twin issue.
A critical examination of these studies will reveal that most of them 
are often carried out with the mission of improving governance structures or 
democratisation process, reducing poverty, improving or reducing aids, 
stimulating or sustaining economic development projects etc. within a neo­
colonial framework. This chapter underlines one important point, namely, that 
most of these studies hardly engage in critical analysis of Africa’s states’ fragility 
arising from the dependency-virus that plaques its political economy
Elsewhere, it is argued that the effects of amalgamation, imposed 
constitutionalism, economic liberalism and liberal democratisation process on the 
structures of the African local politics are not only a challenge to the forms of 
political transformation of the traditional political structures from colonial to post­
colonial periods but one that also places a special burden on the advocates of 
universalism of state and democratisation process to appreciate the effects of such 
universal framework on the sovereignty of the evolving African empires and 
kingdoms and the subsequent psychic dislocation on Africans as first tracked by 
Fanon (1967). For Africa to overcome these challenges there is need to 
reconstruct African states culturally using their traditional nations as the starting 
blocks.
6.2 The need for neo-communitarian state
The need for the reconfiguration of states and economy in sub- 
Saharan Africa is further prompted by the threats posed by the culture-mix that is 
now being facilitated by globalisation. Globalisation, which stresses 
interdependence of peoples, markets and cultures, is not an even process. Access
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to the technology that facilitates globalisation is restricted to certain nations, 
individuals and groups being dependent on certain means and resources.
Globalisation which, according to Momoh (2006: 1), has been 
variously described as the new found trans-historical recipe for economic, social 
and technological problems of the modem world is not a new economic 
development strategy but a reincarnation of the structural adjustment programme 
meant to provide new rationalisation for the crisis and contradictions of neo­
liberal capitalism. Being a new form of SAP does not mean that globalisation is 
not accompanied by some developments, though these are not necessarily positive 
developments, hence the need for the Afro centric intervention for the purpose of 
preventing the marginalisation of sub-Sahara African states in the global order.
The Neo-communitarian state seeks to facilitate the understanding of 
how culturally-constructed political process can inspire and motivate people to 
participate within the context of social, political, and cultural frameworks to 
improve on the problem-solving capacity of the state and its politics. This is 
progressive politics which as stressed by Tony Blair, serves not the purpose to 
provide solutions from above, but to facilitate citizens in search for their own 
solutions. Politics in this sense is not exercising the ‘directive hand’ of 
government, but about bringing together ‘dynamic markets’ and ‘strong 
communities’ (Blair, 2001).
In view of these features, neo-communitarian state takes into accounts 
the need to firstly stabilise the various ethnic nationalities within the state before 
stressing the need of integration into the state-building project. This is done within 
the framework where the cultural identity of each group will be maintained and 
some degrees of autonomy guaranteed. Doing this, allows the sustenance of 
historical account of each ethnic group which the pluralists, policy analysts, and 
the structural-legalists took for granted in their analyses of the state. This
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communitarian state-building approach is a constructivist model11 that takes into 
consideration the historical genesis of territoriality and sovereignty of the pre­
colonial societies. The adoption of the realist view by the pluralists, policy 
analysts and structural-legalists, that all states are conceptually the same and that 
each state seeks to maintain sovereign territoriality against others in a systematic 
balance of power failed to consider the key elements of the state, that is 
territoriality and sovereignty are products of history of each nationality that makes 
up the state.
The underlying principle of the neo-communitarian state is that 
though states are domestically autonomous (Ashley, 1984: 225-86)) but they are 
not institutionally separated from their economies and societies or from the global 
system as averred by Ashley (ibid). Sub-Saharan African Kingdoms and empires 
were institutionally related to their societies, nations and economies through their 
‘family pots’, ‘ubuntu’12 and communal partnership between the individuals and
11ln the 1980s and 1990s constructivist theories contributed to a more thoroughly historical 
account of the state (Scott Burchill, Andrew Linkleter, et al., 1996) These theories have explored 
how aspects of the state that pluralist and statist theories largely take for granted and do not 
explain historically are themselves historical constructs, especially the two primary aspects of the 
modern state: territoriality and sovereignty. Constructivist theories have also shown how war 
and violence constitute the state, and cannot be analyzed simply as resources or tools used by 
states, as well as how the distinction between the domestic "inside" of the state (a presumed 
sphere of order and law) and the international "outside" (a sphere of presumed anarchy and war) 
are not given ontological categories but are historically constituted of and by states.
12According to Ramose (1999), ubuntu is a multi-faceted philosophical system that involves logic, 
metaphysics, epistemology and ethics; it is a philosophy of life that is concerned with the 
reinforcement of unity, oneness and solidarity among the Bantu people. It is the distinctive 
elasticity and practical nature that makes ubuntu applicable in almost all facets of human life. As 
such, the concept has been wisely exported as an underlying philosophy or code of conduct in 
business, legal system, education, theology/religion, healthy and disciplines such as African 
philosophy and ethics. Historically, the concept of Ubuntu, the philosophy of ubuntu is passed on 
from one generation to the other mainly through oral tradition. This is echoed by Ramose (1999) 
who notes that African law based on Ubuntu is a living law, based on the recognition of the 
continuous oneness and wholeness of the living, the living-dead and the unborn. It is generally 
believed that in pre-colonial African societies, the concept of ubuntu was instrumental in 
maintaining social cohesion, administering peace and order for the good life of everyone in the
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the state. The traditional institutions of the various communities and the economy 
are historically constituted by the communities for the sustenance of its members 
and the communities in general.
The combination of domestic economic crisis and the rise of neo­
liberal ideology collectively rendered many African states vulnerable to IMF- 
World Bank SAPs with their neo-liberal monetarist policies such as liberalisation 
of the markets, balancing of budgets, removal of subsidies, cost-sharing strategies 
in the provision of social services etc. None of the African states was strong 
enough to resist and this further weakened the already fragile economies, states 
and had serious impact on the ‘welfare of the most disadvantaged of their people’ 
(Mwanza ed.; 1992). Shivji argues:
Import-substitution industrialization, which had been one of the 
developmental planks of the nationalist period, was virtually 
wiped out, as industry after industry was bankrupted, unable to 
withstand the imports of cheap goods. Agriculture stagnated.
There was little the governments could do beyond exhorting the 
peasants to work harder. Social indicators such as education, 
health, water and electricity began to decline (Shivji, 1989).
In short, SAPs sapped whatever vitality there was in the fragile 
African economies (Gibbon ed, 1993, Mongula 1994, Mamdani, 1994). The 
moderate social achievements of the nationalist period in education, health, and 
water were swept away. As argued in Chapter Five that part of the objectives of 
this thesis is to firstly deconstruct the universal notion of free market liberal 
economy as the provider of freedom, its assumed triumph as the terminus of all 
ideologies and also to open an intellectual ‘space’ within the genre of ‘histories of 
economic thought’ (Knowles,2004) and through the deconstruction, demonstrate, 
the existence of positive discourse of socialised partnership economic system 
(speconomy) within the domain of histories of economic systems. These
society and even strangers. See Munyaradzi Mawere in (title of article???) Afro Asian Journal o f  
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objectives are pursued with the intention of proving that the matter of social 
change and transformation is not simply of one discourse but complex and many 
discourses.
The struggle for democracy is ultimately rooted in the life-conditions 
of the people accompanied by radical political economy, with its concepts of class 
and modes of production placed on the centre stage of the popular struggles for 
change (Shivji, 1989). It is primarily a political struggle on the form of 
governance, thus involving the reconstitution of the state. The analytical question 
is not why or how is Africa poor, but how long will it take to remove poverty and 
political crisis from Africa. Addressing this question will lead us to understand 
that the neo-liberal discourse is not only blind to history but utterly oblivious of 
agency of change. It is an ideology, the propaganda tool of, for and by the vested 
interests of the status quo. It is against this ahistorical and asocial terrain that the 
neo-communitarian governance emerges as an alternative model for sub Saharan 
Africa.
6.3 Neo-communitarian Governance
The need to expand the frontiers of the concept of failed state beyond 
the popular security debate in the academic and policy-making circles since the 
end of the Cold War, to include ‘good governance’ will further illuminate the 
genesis of the failed state. Even though the concept of governance is not new, it is 
as old as human civilization if we accepted that it is primarily constructed on the 
terrain of power. However, the terminology became popular and fashionable and 
formed part of the global interest in the 1990s (Weiss, 2005). Conceptually, 
governance has brought a new dimension to administration and policy studies and 
planning for most countries, globally. It became one of the important strategies, 
processes, methods and mechanisms for governing countries and achieving public 
demand and interest. Nonetheless, the idea of governance is still widely debatable 
due to the various definitions and understandings of the term. For example, in 
various places, good governance has been associated with democracy and good 
civil rights, with transparency, with the rule of law, and with efficient public
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services. Typically, it is defined as being synonymous with 'government’ (Weiss, 
2005), although in many descriptions, especially the Weberian notion it is a much 
broader notion than government. It involves the interaction between formal 
institutions publicly and privately and those of civil society.
Governance remains a major issue that is subjected to vigorous 
interrogation by the social scientists especially where the focus of interrogation is 
development or poverty. While some did not go beyond emphasising the need for 
good governance as a necessity for socio economic development, others go further 
by designing templates for ‘better governance’, ‘good governance’, ‘effective 
governance’, ‘humane governance’ or ‘participatory governance’ which they 
used to judge the performance of governments especially in the third world. The 
latter development has increasingly turned governance into a crucial concern for 
Africanist scholars and Aids agencies in Africa.
Though societal complexity has further brought to the fore the
question of social control or governance but this does not diminish our
understanding that governance is not a new phenomenon; rather governance has 
been underbelly of the society’s cohesion since time immemorial. For instance, 
Bob Jessop writes,
So-called ‘governance’ mechanisms [as contrasted to
markets or hierarchy] have long been widely used in
coordinating complex organizations and systems. They are 
especially appropriate for systems that are resistant to top-down 
internal management and/or direct external control and that also 
co-evolve with other [complex] sets of social relations with 
which their various decisions, operations, and aims are 
reciprocally interdependent. (Jessop, 2001)
The increasing complexity of industrial society challenges our 
understanding of the processes of governance that were barely adequate in this 
age of post-industrial society but the same increasing complexity are clearly and 
manifestly inadequate in an age of identity. As Scharpf notes:
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... the advantages of hierarchical coordination are lost in a world 
that is characterized by increasingly dense, extended, and 
rapidly changing patterns of reciprocal interdependence, and by 
increasingly frequent, but ephemeral, interactions across all 
types of pre-established boundaries, intra- and inter- 
organizational, intra- and inter-sectoral, intra- and international 
(Scharpf, 1993: 37).
After an extensive review of problems of modem governance, Kooiman 
concludes:
The existence of ‘[functional] interdependence’ between 
formally and/or relatively autonomous [non-hierarchically 
ordered] political and social actors is of the essence. By 
interdependence we mean that no single actor has the possibility 
of ‘doing the job’ [solving a problem or grasping an 
opportunity] unilaterally. No actor is so dominant as to be able 
to enforce a certain line of behaviour, or to place the costs of 
social problem-solving on others and take the revenues himself.
And all actors can be severely hindered in reaching their own 
objectives by other actors. ‘Interdependence’ in itself is not 
enough. The realization of the opportunities within 
interdependence is the central assignment of social-political 
governance (Kooiman, 1993: 251).
Governance cannot be judged solely on outcomes but must also on the 
processes, which is political, and relationships that produce them. Politics is about 
“who gets what" and this often involves conflict due to “political 
competitiveness”. Political competitiveness is seen as an “essential attribute of a 
democracy” (Apter, 1968: 544.). African politicians, largely urban and 
westernised minority, in the late 1950s and early 1960s were primarily interested 
in the issues of "independence", "national integration", and "modernisation" 
(Skinner, 1989). Their major preoccupation was to homogenise and lead their 
largely rural societies who were predominantly governed by their traditional 
authorities and values, within the context of modem nation-state. Their major 
mission was to seek the political kingdom after which everything else will 
automatically fall in line.
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However, deriving from knowledge of the economic, political, and 
social realities of the colonial world, Geertz, like other anthropologists, feared a 
difficult decolonization process. Geertz argues “the persistence of "primordial 
bonds" (based on kinship, blood, language, and religion) could frustrate the 
emergence of a new "political society" (Geertz, 1963: 109). He went on to 
hypothesise that the creation of "new states" bent on "modernisation" and 
"national integration" might initially increase conflicts in African societies (ibid). 
To resolve the envisaged problem, Geertz recommends a "macro-sociological" 
methodology to gain a "holistic or comprehensive" view of the problems facing 
those societies (Geertz, ibid: 119; 535).
This is where neo-communitarian state and governance become vital. 
Without understanding the various groups in their local contexts and accord them 
the necessary space within the state structure and some degree. . The government 
of the state needs to be built on the existing traditional structures in order to create 
the sense of belonging for every group. It is this recognition that forms the 
bedrock of the neo-communitarian government.
6.4 Neo-communitarian Government: Government without political parties
The question whether a state needs government and why the need, 
have been an on-going debate between the anarchists and others. Government is 
considered necessary in neo-communitarian state for the sake of putting some 
moral limits on people’s tendencies towards selfishness. The likeliness of every 
individual following the rules and principles guiding every social relationship is 
almost non-existent but with the presence of government, violation of these rules 
and incidence of crime and prejudice will be reduced. Government being the 
means for the formulation of state policy, as well as the mechanism for 
determining the policies of the state generates some fears that compel the people 
to follow the established rules and principles of social relationship.
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States are served by a continuous succession of different governments 
(Flint, & Taylor, 2007). Each successive government is composed of a body of 
individuals who control and exercise control over political decision-making. 
Governments in pre-colonial African kingdoms and empires were like God- 
ordained institutions that serve as a form of restraint on the office holders against 
any form of abuse of office or misuse of power and regulate their social 
interactions as required by established rules and principles. There are various 
theories justifying the need for government in a state but the major ones are; greed
and oppression, order and tradition, natural rights, and social contract. Neo-
• 1  ^communitarian government is based on social contract for the sustenance of
order and tradition14 within a democratic setting.
Neo-communitarian government represents a system of government in 
which the people rule rather than the political representatives and their political 
parties. Abraham Lincoln captures the fundamental element of democracy being 
government of the people, by the people and for the people. This key to 
democracy lies in the people having the ultimate power as against surrendering 
such to the political parties. Though there is need to elect representatives but the 
elections are to be directly conducted without the interference of the political
13The social contract has been one of the most influential theories on which modern 
democracy and many forms of socialism are established. The social contract theory 
holds that governments are created by the people in order to meet their needs that 
cannot be appropriately fulfilled using individual means. Governments exist for the 
purpose of serving the needs and desires of the people, and the relationship of 
government with the people is explicitly stipulated in a social contract (a constitution 
and a set of laws). Both the government and the people are expected to abide by this 
contract.
14Various conservative perspectives view the government as a positive power that 
conveys order out of chaos, establishes laws to end the war against all, punishes vice 
while encouraging moral virtue, and respects tradition. At times, in this view, the government is 
seen as something ordained by a higher power, such as a king, which human beings have a duty 
to obey.
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parties. The argument here is that African traditional political institutions had in 
the past organised consent in the choice of their chiefs and community leaders and 
avoided violent dissent, without political parties.
Political parties deepen ethnic rivalry in Africa where democracy is 
hybridised within the frame-work of Western multi-party liberal design. They 
promote ethnic hatred, violence, disunity, demagoguery, political centralism, neo­
liberal patrimonial elitism, hybridised governments of national unity and rule of 
the minority. This argument rests on the assumption that every democracy is an 
outgrowth of a certain kind of culture and social system. In view of this, the 
argument draws strength from the views of John Stuart Mill, John Dewy and De 
Tocqueville to express doubts over the possibility of the political parties finding 
nourishing roots in Africa with different cultural grains.
Adoption of selective audition and selective alliances that sometimes 
border on selfish desires of the party leaders are strategies for securing votes by 
the political parties. These strategies however further push majority of the 
population out of decision making process, lubricate spectator democracy and 
sharpen ethnic divisions that breed violence.
Sources of violent dissent have been severally traced to the intolerance 
of the state leaders, undemocratic methods of the ruling parties, shrinking of the 
political space against the opposition, divide and rule tactics by the party leaders, 
marginalisation of the minority groups, imposition of candidates on the party 
members by the party leaders, corruption among the state elites, poor governance 
etc. The outcome of these ‘illiberal’ practises is the outburst of pent-up angers 
from the aggrieved that see such reactions as the last hope of getting justice or as 
the appropriate measure to cope with the situation.
Sight is not lost of the positive roles ascribed to political parties in a 
multi-party democracy, but there is need to remove political parties from the
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democratisation processes in Africa due to doubts on the centrality of political 
parties in deepening Africa’s democracy. To be sure, not all political parties 
undermine democracy, but there is need to draw attention to the nature of political 
parties in Africa as a new cartel and how politicians use them to undermine 
democracy through hate campaigns, ethnicisation and personalisation of the party 
machineries. 1995 and 2000 campaigns and elections in Zanzibar, a semi- 
autonomous archipelago that forms part of the United Republic of Tanzania were 
reflections of this brand of democracy. The National Democratic Institute Report 
(2005) reveals the violence following the 2000 election resulted in more than 30 
fatalities and hundreds of Zanzibaris who fled from the Isles for the safety of 
Mombassa, Kenya. Tensions between the main two political parties, Chama Cha 
Mapinduzi/Party of the Revolution (CCM) and Civic United Front or Chama cha 
Wananchi/Party of the People (CUF), traces its roots back to the pre­
independence era and reflects both geographic (Pemba verse Unguja) and ethnic 
(African verses Arab) divisions.
This leaves a questionable mark on the viability of political parties in 
the promotion of democracy in Africa’s multi-cultural societies where national 
state in form of modem sovereign nation-state is yet to develop.
For political parties to effectively carry out their ascribed functions of 
augmenting citizen participation in the political processes, widening aggregation 
of diverse political interests, facilitating orderly and democratic transfer of 
political power, promoting government accountability, and imparting legitimacy 
to the political system (Matlosa 2003), it will require a reform process that 
includes internal internal democracy (NIMD 2004). Presently there is a wide gap 
between the rules stated in the party books and constitutions and actual practice of 
internal democracy. Most political parties in Africa are characterised by autocratic 
organisational structure where power and decision making are not only centralised 
but highly personalised. This among other factors contributes majorly to lack of 
cohesion, internal disunity, disintegration, decampment, factionalisation, 
diminishing popularity and increase in electoral violence (Meinhardt and Patel, 
2003: 33). There is always a little room for inclusive participation in decision
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making processes involving party membership (Maiyo, 2008). This rigid 
organisational structure is akin to the inherited style of leadership of colonial 
administrators and political elites who used to dictate and make decisions on 
behalf of the native populations without consultation (Malyamkono and 
Kanyongolo, 2003: 273). Political parties in Africa therefore tend to be autocratic 
in their organisational structures where conformity is preferable to critical debate 
of issues, and is enforced through covert and overt pressure, and illegal sanctions 
including suspension and even expulsion from the party Maiyo, ibid).
There have been steady decline in the party membership, general 
public disaffection and the rise of partisan identification (Hopkins, 2012), yet 
crises are on the rise in Africa. Unfortunately there has been little scholarly works 
devoted to the study of contributions of political parties to these developments. 
Some hold multiculturalism as responsible for the violence and apathy that 
characterised political participation in Africa. Ethnic violence by ethnic groups 
such as Tutsi, Zulus, Hausa-Fulani, Biroms, and Niger Delta militants, ethnic 
militias of the Eastern and Western Nigeria, Boko Haram of the Northern Nigeria 
etc have lent credence to this assumption. This therefore mirrored ethnic violence 
as the bane of multi-cultural democracy especially when we factor into the 
picture, the posture of Quebec to the Canadian constitution or the violent breaking 
away of Ireland from the Great Britain etc.
Ethnic violence and desire for independence are weapons employed 
by the political parties to perpetuate their own interest for political control and 
freedom. The interests of political parties remain a major factor that shapes the 
internal democratic processes including violent political eruptions. The party 
system, notes Powell (1980), shapes citizen participation through the electoral 
activities. Their dynamics either inhibit or exacerbate turmoil and violence 
(Powell, ibid). The strategies and commitments of their leaders to democracy are 
crucial elements in any democratic order. However, scholarly writings tend to 
anoint political parties as the harbingers for deepening democracy.
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Advance democracies may claim to be functioning well and stable 
because they are able to form stable governments; their citizens are free to 
participate in elections; discontents are expressed through competitive elections 
and leaders are held accountable through electoral processes. This does not 
obviate the fact that there are instances where regional parties hold sway in a 
region due to its ability to make use of ethnic sentiments of the people in the 
region. King Mangosuthu Buthelezi and the Inkatha Freedom party in South 
Africa stand out in this regard.
The perception of political party as essential and desirable institution 
for democracy (Edna; Jorge; et al eds. 2005: 75; Paloma, 2002: 167) has led to 
crude generalisation of political party as a 'must' for every democracy. This 
perception is evident in the roles allocated by various African governments to 
political parties in every democratic experiment in spite of the decline in party 
membership when compared with the colonial periods. To compensate for the 
decline in party membership subscriptions, Richard Katz and Peter Meir (1995) 
report that mainstream political parties, most of which have experienced 
government, abandoned their declining base in civil society and legislated to 
provide themselves with state subventions.
Party adherents assume that survival of government depends on strong 
and sustainable political parties. These parties are assumed to have the capacity to 
represent citizens and provide policy choices that demonstrate their ability to 
govern for the public good (Almond, 1960; Huntington, 1968; NDI, 2005). This 
assumption according to National Democratic Institute (2005), has been 
witnessing an increasing disconnect between citizens and their elected leaders on 
the one hand, between party members and their leaders on the other. There has 
also been a decline in political activism, a growing sophistication of anti­
democratic forces and continuous challenge of political parties by individuals and 
groups in countries like Nigeria. Citizens are engaged in the political activities but
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they are no better than spectators because the party structures and practices give 
them limited outlets to communicate with national decision makers.
Attempts at rectifying the above deficiency elicited critical challenge 
about the centrality of political parties in the democratisation process by the 
advocates of direct or deliberative democracy. These advocates view political 
parties as biased contaminators of people’s views and contributions to democratic 
processes (Budge, 2001; Elster, ed. 1998; Fiskin, 2011; Ross, 2011). Though 
Clark opines that giving consideration to local parties may create the necessary 
platform for the amendment of ‘broken linkages’ between the citizens and 
national policy makers, he completely made an oversight on the cartel nature of 
the party leadership. As articulated by Schmitter (2001), political parties are not 
what they once were. More specifically, their perceived failure has given rise to a 
debate on the ‘decline’ of parties, underlining the argument that they are losing 
relevance everywhere as vehicles of representation, instruments of mobilization, 
and channels of interest articulation and aggregation.
The argument that “elite party” or “cartel party” (Hopkin, 2012: 3; 
Meir, 2005) led by cartel leaders has replaced “mass” party (Hopkin, ibid) in 
Africa cannot be overlooked in any party discourse of Africa’s democracy. This 
development is responsible for apathy towards politics, democracy and 
government among the populace. The “apathy notion” which Meir refers to as the 
notion of non-sovereignty (Meir, 2005) develops out of the failure of the political 
parties in fulfilling their electoral promises. This directly contradicts Meir’s 
expression of isolating the ‘problem of indifference’ (ibid) from the problem of 
mistrust of politicians, their political parties and governments. As he rightly 
argues, apathy or indifference is one of the under-studied elements in the study of 
the relationship between citizens and politics, and its importance seems to be 
under-theorised by much of the literature on political trust and mistrust that 
emerged in the late 1990 (Pharr and Putnam eds; 2000; Norris Pipa, 1999)
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The main issue that leads to apathy is the failure of the political parties 
and their betrayal of the people’s trust; but the party leaders hardly see anything 
wrong in these failures by re-presenting the same set of politicians for another 
term of electoral privileges. On noticing this sense of delivery failure and loss of 
function by the political parties, de Tocqueville avers that the reason for apathy is 
that the loss of function easily breeds contempt for those who continue to base 
their privileges on its exercise (Meir, 2005; p.2). This contempt underlies the 
apathy of the citizens towards political parties as many have come to see 
politicians as having no meaningful contributions to their live conditions except 
their surrogates.
The perception of the political parties by the people as not relevant to 
their live conditions contributed immensely to the dwindling electoral fortunes 
and voter turn-out except in countries that had just overthrown the old 
authoritarian regimes by mobocracy (being used here as an uncoordinated mass 
protests of the people against the state leaders, where leaders of such protests 
emerge from the spot of action) as witnessed in the Arab spring or violent 
opposition as the case of South Africa in 1994. This development gradually 
denigrates or devalues the political process (Meir, ibid).
The dwindling voter-tumout that was noticed in the established 
democracies since the 1960s (Niemi and Weisberg, 2001: 31) which are attributed 
to a wide array of economic, demographic, cultural, technological and institutional 
factors are not the same as in Africa. Political apathy in Africa cannot be 
exempted from disenchantment, indifference and discontentment among the civil 
populace, which followed the failures of post independent leaders and the post- 
second wave of democracy leaders that rode to power on popular votes.
The nose diving of voters in elections arose principally from lack of 
trust in government and politicians in many African nations due to corruption,
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poor governance, insecurity, electoral violence and fraud, unpopular tenure 
elongation, violent ethno-religious insurgence etc; Different countries in Africa 
have very different voter turnout but as designed several decades ago by Riker and 
Ordeshook in “A Theory o f the Calculus o f  Voting.”15 the basic formula for 
determining whether someone will vote is:
PB + D > C
P  is the probability that an individual’s vote will affect the outcome of 
an election, and B  is the perceived benefit that would be received if that person's 
favoured political party or candidate were elected. Some scholars have expanded 
B to include group interests (Jankowski, 2002; Edling, Gelman, and Kaplan, 
2007). D originally stood for democracy or civic duty, but now represents social 
or personal gratification an individual gets from voting. C is the time, effort, and 
financial cost involved in voting. D is thus the most important element in 
motivating people to vote. For a person to vote, P, B and D factors must 
outweigh C.
Five motivating Ds that determine voters’ turn-out as listed by Riker 
and Ordeshook (ibid) include compliance with the social obligation to vote; 
affirming one's allegiance to the political system; affirming a partisan preference 
(also known as expressive voting, or voting for a candidate to express support, not 
to achieve any outcome); affirming one's importance to the political system; and, 
for those who find politics interesting and entertaining, researching and making a 
decision (ibid). The major D that determines voters turn out in Africa is affirming 
partisan preference due to ethnic allegiance as witnessed with Inkatha Freedom 
Party in South Africa, KADU in independent elections Kenya, AG in Western
I Nigeria’s first Republic, Congress for Progressive Change in Northern Nigeria in
i
| 2011 presidential elections. This allegiance confirms African preference for semi
i  autonomy arrangement in the political process while P is a strong factor that
I prevents voters from voting. The first question that every voter asks is “will my
15The basic idea behind this formula was developed by Anthony Downs in An Economic Theory of 
Democracy published in 1957. The formula itself was developed by William H. Riker and Peter 
Ordeshook published in American Political Science Review. 1968. 62:25-42
vote count or change the result”? This question is borne out of past experiences 
where election results were not true reflections of the voting patterns but a pre­
arranged design by the powerful elites.
Though it is not sufficient to label one factor as responsible for 
elections apathy, in Africa we can hardly accept reasons identified by Fukuyama, 
Schlove and Putnam taking the levels of social and technological development, 
and literacy of most African states into consideration. For example Francis 
Fukuyama in an effort at justifying the supremacy of the liberal market democracy 
castigates the welfare state policies as the major contributing factor to voter 
apathy. Fukuyama in “Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation o f  
Prosperity>\\99S)  argues that the decrease in turnout has come shortly after the 
government became far more involved in people’s lives through actions that 
dissipate the social capital which is essential to higher voter turnout. This is an 
issue for contestation, however most states in Africa have no welfare policy; 
hence the argument of government’s too much involvement in people’s lives 
becomes untenable in Africa.
Richard Schlove in “Democracy and Technology”, (1995) asserts that 
technological development in society such as "auto mobilisation," suburban 
living, and "an explosive proliferation of home entertainment devices" has 
contributed to a loss of community, which in turn has weakened participation in 
civic life (Schlove, 1995: 62). Poor technology is a major factor that Africa needs 
to overcome in order to effectively and efficiently participate in the global 
economic order. Moreover a large percentage of African population lives in the 
rural areas with subsistence economy. Putnam’s argument that the collapse in civil 
engagement is due to the introduction of television, definitely does not have 
Africa in mind, if we consider that the first television station in Africa was 
Western Nigeria Television established in 1954 at Ibadan. Putnam himself made a 
clarification of this African reality by noting that:
In the 1950s and 1960s television quickly became the main
leisure activity in developed nations (emphasis mine). It
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replaced earlier more social entertainments such as bridge 
clubs, church groups, and bowling leagues... as people retreated 
within their homes and general social participation declined so 
too did voting (Putnam, 1995; p.61).
Rosenstone and Hansen’s (1993: 73)_view that the decline in voter 
turnout is the product of a change in campaigning strategies appears to be valid 
but when applied to the African situation; it will not be as a result of the so-called 
new media as they claimed. In Africa, the change in campaign strategy is due to 
the empowerment of a local neo-patrimonial leadership by the party. The 
empowered leaders in turn ensure vote-deals and allocation with their financial 
resources to ‘settle’16 the electoral officers and state agents. Where ‘settlement’ 
fails, ballot stuffing and ballot snatching prevail with impunity. Instead of 
directing the entire party’s resources towards intensive local campaign to secure 
the votes, political parties divert such to sustain the local neo-patrimonial leaders, 
concentrate their campaigns in the cities and use the media to reach where they 
cannot physically attend just to register their involvement in the elections. 
Moreover where ethnic passion is involved, unpopular incumbents do record high 
turnout in their ethnic zones irrespective of the media hypes and mudslinging.
The theology of political party competition is an unnatural idea to 
Africans because African societies relish their religious and ethnic affiliations that 
are anti-liberal, therefore there was no cultural base for party democracy to 
flourish in the post-independent African states. As a result, the basis for the 
emergence of a system that allows multi-party competition for political power or a 
single dominant party with an overriding sense of national community was 
glaringly absent in the traditional African political space either during or after 
independence. Due to the inappropriateness of political parties in African politics, 
it becomes compelling to put in place an alternative model that will improve the 
quality of peoples’ involvement in government and governance.
16 Monetary bribe and/or assurance of elevation through promotion or appointment
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The combination of the party deficiencies and the critical challenge 
posed by advocates of direct democracy necessitate a re-consideration of the pre­
colonial Africa system of citizens directly deliberating on issues that affect their 
lives and governance within their communities. This idea is not novel. Rousseau 
over two centuries ago in “General WilF (Foisneau, 2010) brought this idea to 
attention. He described political parties as sinister interests that are prone to 
undermining, perverting or usurping the will of the people. Rousseau’s idea may 
be regarded as impracticable in modem democracies but failures of the political 
parties to consolidate democracy in Africa are pointers to wisdom in his argument. 
Switzerland’s elections have every element of democracy beyond political parties 
(Kobach. 1993).
In Africa, post-election crises further underline the doubts cast on the 
desirability of political parties as means of communicating politics. If local parties 
could be seen as the bed-rock of legitimacy for modem democracy as Clark wants 
us to believe, then community town hall meetings should also be regarded as the 
foundation block for legitimate decisions by the people. Kgtola in pre­
independent Botswana has proved this to be a viable option. The direct 
deliberation provides the opportunity for the people to address the various issues 
connected with democratic control of the social process. The representatives are 
charged with the responsibility of carrying out the administration of the 
government according to the wishes of the people as against the wishes of the 
party leaders and the political parties.
Neo-communitarian government has a political structure that links to 
the traditional political structures and formally allocates roles other than voting to 
the people, their nations, regions and state as a whole. It rests on the recognition 
of nations in their various special territories as the foundation for the larger 
government stmcture. It has a social order that links political structure with the 
socioeconomic system through speconomy along its four tier-political structures: 
the community -  town -  region -  national tiers.
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Every multi-ethnic state is comprised of communities and towns 
within specific regions around which an indigenous administrative framework 
could be identified and used for the mobilisation of local resources. This 
indigenous administrative framework if properly harnessed and incorporated into 
the government administrative structure will allow the community being the 
smallest political unit to function as the grassroots tier of government with elected 
representatives directly elected by the people.
The strong bond which is the essence of a community is found mainly 
in relatively smaller communities where people know one another to a great 
extent. As a system of government, neo-communitarianism allows the emergence 
of government of, by and for the homogenous people which can reduce ethnic 
acrimonies; restore political and cultural rights of the people, promote 
accountability, increase democratic participation, and pave the way for the 
restoration of genuine democracy and autochthonous state building.
Devolution of power is designed on the basis of Exclusive list for the 
federal, Exclusive Residual list for the region, Residual Exclusive list for the town 
and Residual list for the community while the Concurrent list applies to all tiers, 
with the higher tier having superior power over the lower tier. The national 
government holds the power in the Exclusive List comprising issues such as 
defence, foreign affairs, banking, currency, external trade, company taxes and 
registration, Supreme Court, health policies, education policies, electoral 
policies etc. The regional governments hold those on the Exclusive Residual List 
comprising issues such as natural resources, drivers licence, arbitration, urban 
planning, health, education especially secondary and primary education, trade, 
commerce, bankruptcy, insurance, prisons, evidence, labour relations, water 
resources, pensions, taxes, municipal police, electric power, income security, 
judicial powers and Court systems among others. Towns and communities hold 
those on Residual Exclusive and Residual Lists concurrently. Residual Exclusive
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List comprises issue such as motor parks, cemeteries, trunk c roads, drainages and 
street lighting, urban and town-planning, housing, public library, parks, 
chieftaincy matters, licensing of cooperative groups etc. Residual List takes care 
of issues like land matters, customary courts, primary education, community 
chieftaincy matters, community buildings/centres, primary health services, 
community and recreation parks, registration of community cooperative groups, 
markets, etc. The Concurrent List takes care of issues like health, education, 
labour relations, economic partnerships, elections, etc.
The issue of extractive minerals business should be a partnership 
involving the town, region and national governments. Willing cooperative groups 
or foreign companies are to participate only as partners with the concerned tiers of 
government. Revenue should be allocated strictly on the basis of derivation, that is 
to say, after the national government has deducted tax, own services, the rest 
should be allocated to the regions with such resource endowment . Each region 
should have and control its own police service to guarantee proper policing of 
each region and reduce the politicisation in the police recruitment, promotion, 
posting and reaction to emergencies.
Significant features of the Neo-communitarian government is the absence of 
political parties in the election of state leaders, basis, fusion of the lower tier of 
government with the upper tier through the office of the Leader of each tier 
executive council right from the community to the national level, recognition and 
inclusion of the traditional authorities in government, using the traditional 
demarcating lines of communities/villages, towns and regions as jurisdictional 
territory of each tiers, unicameral legislatures at the community and national 
levels and bi-cameral legislatures at the town and regional levels.
6.5 Political structure of Neo-communitarian Government 
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
Unicameral legislature comprising equal number Senators from each Region 
to be headed by the Senate president elected by and among the Senators.
The Executive is made up of the President/Prime Minister, the cabinet of______
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Ministers and the Regional Governors.___________________________________
REGIONAL GOVERNMENT (UNIT OF THE NATIONAL AL GOVERNMENT)
Bicameral legislature comprising of directly elected Town
Representatives constituting the Lower House headed by a Speaker
elected by and among the members and two most senior Traditional rulers from
town and one nominee of each community traditional council
ratified by the town’s upper chamber, constituting the Upper Chamber. The Cha
is headed by President appointed in the same vein as the
Town’s Upper Chamber
The Executive Council is made up of the Governor/Regional Premier, 
cabinet of Commissioners and the Town Councils’ Chairmen.
TOWN COUNCIL GOVERNMENT
Bicameral Legislature comprising of directly elected Town Assembly 
Members constituting the Lower House and three most Senior Traditional 
Rulers from each community constituting the Upper House.
The Lower House is headed by a Speaker elected by and among the members 
while the Upper House is headed by a President who is the chairman of the r 
Council of Chiefs or the most senior traditional ruler in the absence of the 
chairman
Seniority of the traditional rulers is determined by the existing norms of 
determining such and where there is no clarity, the first to ascend the throne 
stands as the most senior. Where there is a tie, older age takes precedence.
The Town Executive Council is made up of the Council Chairman and 
Cabinet of Secretaries. Community Council Leader is an automatic member 
of the Executive Council of the Town Council Government
COMMUNITY AREA DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL
Executive Council headed by the Council Leader and the appointed Superv 
Councillors.
Unicameral Legislature comprising of directly elected Councillors who will in 
turn elect the Council Leader.
6.6 Justifications for Traditional Institutions in Neo-Communitarian 
Government
As discussed elsewhere, African states are made of nationality groups 
hence the stability of the nationality groups is the stability of state. The main 
argument of the thesis is that since the stability of the state is linked to the stability 
of the local communities, the onus is on the state to ensure the economic 
empowerment of those at the grassroots who are closer to such communities. To 
achieve political stability and economic empowerment, two structures are
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essential. These are the political structure that is constitutionally responsible for 
electing leaders into the community government, town councils, the regional 
parliament and the federal government; and the structure for traditional institution 
to make allowance for the traditional rulers to be involved in policy-making on 
distribution of resources, security and the general well-being of their 
communities. The law makers at each level elect the Executive Head of 
government who in turn forms the cabinet with approval of the concerned 
parliament. The executive heads at the community and town levels are to ensure 
the protection of common interests of their communities and towns and also 
encourage the continued survival of the cultural values and traditional association 
of the communities.
The practical demonstration of this will be the constitutional provision 
of the synergy between the elected governments and the traditional rulers on the 
one hand and between the local areas and the centre on the other. This synergy is 
developed to integrate the energy and roles of the traditional institutions at the 
local communities into the administration of the state. This according to Oyeweso 
(2012) will breed proper administration of local levels to improve political 
integration of ethnic groups into the larger interest of the nation. This inclusive 
administration, Oyeweso avers, will place premium on the relevance of traditional 
rulers to modem governance (ibid).
The colonial project tremendously destroyed the influences and 
powers of the African traditional institutions and that ethnic identities were also to 
a large extent created, widened, and shaped under colonial rule. Villages, towns 
and communities were incorporated into larger administrative units and a wider 
political space (Forrest, 1998: 20). In spite of all these manipulations and erosion 
of traditional authorities, Oyeweso reports that Nigerian traditional chieftaincy 
institution managed to survive both the constricting forces of colonialism and the 
so-called modernisation programmes of the post-independence era. This reveals 
that these indigenous institutions are capable of redoubling their capacities in the
[256]
face of emerging challenges. Traditional institutions are agencies and custodians 
of traditional practices, which include the customary regulatory bodies that 
moderate the ordinary daily life of a particular community.
In the context of emerging political instability in Africa, there is the 
need to re-engage grassroots structures to confront the extraordinary and complex 
challenges facing the African continent. Vaughan in “Nigerian Chiefs: 
Traditional Power in Modern Politics, 1890s-1990s" (2000: 1) adumbrates the 
need for this inclusiveness “ ...the post-colonial state project requires- indeed, 
cannot avoid- an imaginative integration of antecedent structures with the 
agencies of the modem state”. The Yoruba experience exemplifies the dynamism 
of chieftaincy stmctures in modem Nigerian politics. Since the imposition of 
colonial rule in the late nineteenth century, these stmctures have demonstrated 
remarkable adaptability as important institutions of governance. Chieftaincy 
stmctures are continuously regenerated in rapidly shifting socio-political and 
economic contexts.
The resilience and importance of these chieftaincy stmctures have thus 
permitted some fundamental conclusions. First, there is a need to advance and 
promote the status and significance of traditional mlers as veritable expressions of 
communal and national aspirations. Second, that this institution should become 
central to the development of imaginative strategies to combat the problems of 
political instability. Third, that the chieftaincy stmcture must be empowered and 
retained as tools and critical mediums of national development, inter-group 
relations and communal aspirations.
Conclusion
Individual’s assumptions and beliefs govern political behaviour and 
each to examine the society and determine what he or she perceives to be justice, 
freedom or rights. Every ideology claims to recognise the importance of 
individual, rights and opportunities and that such rights and opportunities remain
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useless if not transformed into concrete realities for the people. But unfortunately
the assumptions of African party leaders, judging from the character of their
political parties, are at variance with the assumptions of the people. Rather than
serving as vehicles for the transformation of the assumptions into concrete
realities, political parties in Africa, through their characters have turned out to be
instruments of political decay, hatred and violence. The submission of Awosika
before the Political Bureau in Nigeria (1987) is akin to Rousseau’s view of
political parties as organisations with sinister’s interests. Awosika submits that...
Party politics is poisonous. It is the politics o f war not o f peace; 
o f acrimony and hatred and mudslinging not o f love and 
brotherhood, of anarchy and discord not o f orderliness and 
concord; it is politics o f cleavages, divisions and disunity and 
not o f cooperation, consensus and unity; it is the politics of 
hypocrisy and charlatanism, not o f integrity and patriotism; it is 
the politics of rascality, not maturity, of blackmail and near 
gangsterism not o f constructive and honest contribution 
(Political Bureau, 1987).
In spite of evidence in Cote D’voire, Zimbabwe, Sudan, Algeria, 
Uganda, Nigeria etc to buttress Awosika’s observations, political elites and party 
scholars still religiously hold on to the belief that a no-party political arrangement 
could lead to some form of fascism or pave way for the emergence of political 
factions that will be very difficult to manage for the state than a party system 
government (Oyediran, 1999). The arguments of the party scholars failed to 
accept as emphasised by Obasanjo and Mabogunje (1992, eds) that democracy 
must always take due cognisance of our lived reality and whatever structures and 
institutions that would sustain democratic practice must also reflect the 
peculiarities of our environment. Both socialist and liberal adherents fail to take 
into considerable account the peculiarities of the non-western nations in Africa 
before integrating them into the world of liberal or socialist variant that gives 
prominence to party politics to produce government.
Neo-communitarian democracy holds the view that the interests of 
Africa multi-ethnic groups will be best served in reconstituted and reconstructed 
states along the line of neo-communitarian government structure as illustrated 
above. States so reconstituted and reconstructed will make it impossible for any
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ethnic group to lord it over any other ethnic groups, or to be in a position to 
effectively incite division and disaffection among the members of the other 
national groups. Indeed, a state so reconstituted and reconstructed provides an 
equal platform for every citizen to be involved in the community, town and 
regional politics, and have the opportunity to play an equal role in the affairs of 
the country.
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Chapter 7
SPECONOMY AS AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL FOR SUB-SAHARAN 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
7.0 Introduction
The chapter maps out speconomy as an economic democracy in 
response to free market capitalism and centralised socialist market that stultified 
Africa’s economic growth from independence. It exposes the two diametrically 
opposed economic visions in Africa. These are the ‘internal’ and ‘external’ 
visions. Though the two visions were eventually collapsed into New Economic 
Partnership for Africa’s Development where the external vision was internalised, 
the pre-NEPAD internal visions possessed some elements of pulling the economic 
sector into the terrain of democracy. The thesis written in line with Heilbroner 
(1979) and Khalil (1995) criticisms of the historiography of economic thought as 
inevitably leading to the dominant paradigm of neo-classical economics, presents 
socialised partnership economic system as a paradigm that can pull the economic 
domain away from the grip of the power monopolists and hand same to the people 
through their involvement in reality in the economic structure, decisions and 
direction of the state. While the chapter upholds the historical and anthropological 
contexts within which ideas are formulated or altered (Knowles, 2004 ) it also 
shares Knowles’ concern that it is only by listening to the voices of the past within 
the people’s social and political contexts, and by giving respect to their intentions 
and to the ‘truths’ as they perceived them -  regardless of whether or not we like to 
hear what they said or believed -  that we can approach an understanding of ‘what 
actually happened’(Samuel, 1992).
The chapter shows the contradictions in the universal notion of free 
market economy as the provider of freedom and liberty on the one hand, and it’s 
assumed triumph as the terminus of all ideologies. It then opens up an intellectual 
‘space’ within the genre of ‘histories of economic thought’ (Knowles, ibid) 
through deconstruction to firstly demonstrate the existence of positive discourse 
of socialised partnership economic system (speconomy) within the domain of
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histories of economic systems, and secondly, the under treatment of freedom in 
both the socialist and capitalist economic paradigms (Olateju, 2012b: 14). These 
objectives collectively justify the need for speconomy to stand alongside other 
discourses that compete with the hegemonic liberal and other neo-classical 
paradigms. The deconstruction lays bare liberalism’s grand posture of considering 
only the critiques of capitalism or proposals for the civilising of capitalism as 
worthy of entry into the ‘voyager’s log’ of the course to the ‘Promised Land’
1 7(ibid). Speconomy holds history of economies as being the same for ideologies . 
It provides a response to the problems of poverty, discrimination and increased 
individualism generated by the free liberal market economy.
The chapter draws primarily on the neo-communitarian values to 
articulate Socialised Partnership Economic system (speconomy) as an appropriate 
economic path for the economies of the African states away from the assumptions 
of classical and contemporary economic theories that perceive society as mere 
lump of individuals with shared values. This is done by juxtaposing speconomy 
with the ‘decentralised free market economy’ (Jack Bimer and Rudy Van Zijp, 
1994: 94) being the economic engine of liberal democracy whose rejection 
constitutes the major plank of this thesis . The rejection arises from the fact that 
market economy and liberal democracy are two sides of the same coin that could 
hardly be separated. Any attempt at isolating the two concepts in any political 
economy discourse will render such argument as incomplete. Although many 
liberals tend to treat liberalism as a theory of government, what is increasingly 
apparent, is the glaring connection between liberal democracy and the market.
The main concern of this chapter arises from the Doyle’s fourth 
assumption as highlighted in Chapter Two, which presents capitalism as the most 
effective market exchange system. The thesis differs with this assumption by 
taking the effects of the capitalist market system on African social structures into 
consideration. The persistence of ruptures and crises in Africa’s polity cannot 
easily be explained within the rubric of liberalism. Any attempt at ignoring the
17Schumpeter (1972: 34) asked half a century ago, 'Is the History of Economics a History of 
ideologies?'
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effects of liberal values on the social structures of post-colonial Africa will miss 
out a lot. These structures were reconstructed in anticipation of their expected 
roles in the global economy. For instance Heilbroner writes:
... most contemporary texts on the history o f economic 
“doctrines” judge and grade the works o f the past by the degree 
to which they anticipate the present...From this widely shared 
point of view, the history o f economic thought becomes a 
chronicle o f mistakes and near-misses, a kind of voyager’s log 
as the profession gradually makes its way to the Promised Land 
(Heilbroner, 1979: 192).
Walter Rodney while tracing back the genesis of the effects of liberal values on 
the post-colonial social structures submits that
...colonial Africa fell within that part o f international capitalist 
economy from which surplus was drawn to feed the 
metropolitan sector.... Colonialism was not merely a system of 
exploitation but one whose essential purpose was to repatriate 
the surplus to the so called ‘mother-country’. From an African 
viewpoint, that amounted to consistent expatriation of surplus 
produced by African labour out o f African resources. It meant 
the development o f Europe as part o f some dialectical process 
in which Africa was underdeveloped (Rodney, 1972: 162-3)
Colonialism therefore serves as the conveyor belt for the incorporation 
of Africa’s economies and politics into the global political economy. This 
integration subsequently undermines pre-colonial Africa’s traditional political 
institutions to yield way for its underdevelopment and marginalisation. 
Understanding the historical context of these processes is essential for our candid 
appreciation of Africa’s protracted socio-political crisis and also very critical for 
the articulation of an appropriate response to the crisis. The thesis rejects Afro-
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1 ftpessimism which sees Africa as politically doomed forever and considers the 
Afro-optimism19 which, like Ake, provides alternative developmental path for 
Africa. The ‘third wave’ (Huntington, 1992) of democratisation in Africa in the 
80s and the current political upheavals in the North Africa are all indicators of 
fault-lines in post-colonial Africa’s political structures. The faulty impression of 
the genesis of Africa’s tragedy, (ibid) needs to be corrected and this requires 
deconstructing the contexts of Africa’s political praxis, which constitutes the next 
section of the paper.
7.1 Deconstructing capitalism, socialism and communitarianism
Over the course of history, two main economic models with different 
variations dominated the history of contemporary western economic systems. 
These are capitalism and socialism. Capitalism involves private means of 
production or work, with the revenue derived from the worker’s labour 
appropriated by the capitalist owner, the oft-called exploitation by the capitalist of 
the wage earner. In most variations of socialism, the state owns the means of 
production and all the businesses, with a social class of bureaucrats that serve as 
managers. Though there are variations, some of which allow both the workers and 
the state to hold the ownership of public industries through shares. In either the 
socialist or capitalist model, worker remains a wage earner selling his labour for 
wages based on the law of demand and supply. The revenue generated by the 
worker is either kept by the private business owner or the state, and in other
18The decade of the 1980s which marked the third vision of the OAU was regarded as the Africa's 
lost decade due to the ascending political and social crises with negative growth, collapsing state 
structures, poor economic performances, etc. This was the period the international community, 
especially the liberal capitalist west developed 'Afro-pessimistic' belief based on the assumptions 
of the modernisation theorists' that the African people -  their societies, cultures, mindset and 
structures -  are incapable of running their states and their economies and, therefore, were listed 
to remain in a permanent state of crisis -stagnation and negative growth (Bujra, ibid). However 
African scholars rejected the pessimistic view of the African crisis and traced the genesis and 
persistence of the African crisis back to the exogenous factors.
19With the deconstruction of the liberal-pessimistic view, the African scholars and policy analysts 
developed an 'Afro-optimistic' view that could guide the continent out of the political and 
economic precipice. The alternative view rests squarely on autochthonous initiatives that aimed 
at changing the unequal relationship between Africa and the western nations.
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situations, dividends are paid to the shareholders. The partnership arrangement, 
like both the socialist and capitalist models, does not solve the problem of 
inequality and absence of freedom.
Bolivia made an attempt at addressing this problem by creating an 
opportunity for the farmers to keep their revenues after paying tax to the state. A 
communitarian version of an alternative economic model (Paco, 2011), though on 
a small scale, was constructed in the 36 cultural and linguistic groups that make 
up the majority of Bolivia’s population. This form of communitarian economy 
was limited to rural areas, primarily to agricultural activities and is neither based 
on private nor state property.
The Bolivian communitarian attempt was not the first attempt at 
grappling with the problems of inequality associated with either capitalism or 
socialism. Keynesianism, Monetarism, Classical communitarianism, Liberal 
communitarianism, etc; equally wrestle with these problems but they are unable to 
fix the problem of ‘broken linkages’ identified by Andersen and Torpe (2000). 
They, in addition to sharing the fault-lines of free market capitalism that assumes 
society as a group of people with only defined territory and shared culture, left the 
issue of freedom and liberty unaddressed. This perception of society runs through 
the normative principles of the various economic paradigms starting from the 
classical to contemporary. Speconomy goes a little further. It takes Robert 
Merton’s argument of several decades (Merton, 1938: 672-682) into consideration 
to emphasise society as though, having a defined territory and shared culture but 
its discourse must include the social structures, integration and interactions of the 
people. Robert Merton declares these social structures as the relatively enduring 
patterns of behaviour and relationships within a society. It is therefore misleading 
as assumed in liberalism, that society is a mere aggregate of people without taking 
into consideration the relationships between them, the integration and institutions 
that guide such integration and relationships. The consequence of this assumption 
is the faulty separation of the individual from his or her group.
[264]
In both socialist and free market capitalist economic models, the 
citizens appear to be engaged in economic activities. In reality the economic 
structure gives them little opportunities to be involved in the economic decisions 
and direction of the state. This separation firmly bedrocks the normative 
principles and structures of liberal society to create the broken linkages pointed 
out by Andersen and Torpe (2000) between the society and the state. In this 
instance, the society is reduced to a mere spectator in the economic arena. The 
impacts of these principles could hardly be ignored in the creation of inequality 
within the state characterised by ‘survival of the fittest’ values. A view that liberal 
states such as United Kingdom or United States of America are unequal because 
they are separate and are separate because they are unequal can hardly be removed 
from any explanation of the impacts of the broken linkage between people and the 
state. The traditional bonds that bind people together are eroded by the 
individualistic values of liberalism thereby making the liberal societies to be less 
integrated.
The decentralised free market economy principles like political 
liberalism which advocates strict adherence to analysing human economic actions 
from the perspective of an individual agent, a method referred to by the Austrian
9 0School as ‘praxeology’ fails to give attention to the significance of our social 
fabric in the integration of the society. This failure which arises from its strict 
enforcement of voluntary contractual agreements between the economic agents 
with minimal government intervention or limited imposition of coercive forces is 
in itself rooted in the laissez-faire economic theory that claims that market has the 
ability to operate well on its own, without state intervention. Friedman in his 
I philosophical work stressed this view four decades ago. In a veiled reference to
j  socialism, he argued that the greatest threat to man’s freedom and liberty is the
i
i
20The Austrian School of economics is a school of economic thought which advocates 
methodological individualism and a deductive approach to economics called praxeology. It is 
critical of econometrics and the application of empirical research in economic theory, which are 
commonly used in mainstream economics
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concentration of power (1962). He used this work to expose the socialist lapses in 
economic democracy. According to Friedman,
...Government is necessary to preserve our freedom, it is an 
instrument through which we can exercise our freedom; yet by 
concentrating power in political hands, it is also a threat to 
freedom... By relying primarily on voluntary co-operation and 
private enterprise, in both economic and other activities, we can 
insure that the private sector is a check on the powers of the 
governmental sector and an effective protection of freedom of 
speech, of religion, and of thought... Fundamentally, there are 
only two ways of co-ordinating the economic activities of 
millions. One is central direction involving the use of coercion 
-  the technique of the army and of the modem totalitarian state. 
The other is voluntary co-operation of individuals -  the 
technique of the market place. The possibility of co-ordination 
through voluntary co-operation rests on the elementary -yet 
frequently denied- proposition that both parties to an economic 
transaction benefit from it, provided the transaction is bi­
laterally voluntary and informed. Exchange can therefore bring 
about co-ordination without coercion. A working model of a 
society organized through voluntary exchange is a free private 
enterprise exchange economy- what we have been calling 
competitive capitalism (Friedman, 1962).
In essence the doctrine of economic liberalism is based on the 
assumption that economic actions of individuals are largely based on self-interest 
and that allowing them to act without any restriction is better for the state. 
Protection of private property and contractual relationships between the people 
form the basis for this assumption while the state as according to Friedman, 
serves as a witness and guard for individuals in the pursuit of their economic 
activities. This view is in line with the liberal doctrine of the state which is 
sometimes referred to as the “night watchman state”. The state in liberal doctrine 
is not expected to engage in production or determine what is to be produced by the 
private capitalists.
The individuals owe the state no obligation except to pay for the
services rendered by the state in pursuit of their selfish economic interests and in
fulfilment of the contractual agreement with the state. For Friedman, it is only the
[266]
free market capitalism that can decentralise, disperse and devolve economic 
power through the independent utilisation of man’s talents, exercising his 
initiatives as a free agent in the market place where all transactions are bilaterally, 
voluntarily and fully informed to determine what is produced. Pro-labour 
legislations and workers unions are considered as hindrances and monopolies 
respectively that prevent free competition in the labour market by the economic 
liberals. The economic liberals such as Friedman wrongly assume that the private 
sector of the economy is completely free and democratic.
Ian Adams (2001) came four decades after Friedman with a counter­
claim that that it will be socially naive to assume that if everybody is left to pursue 
his or her economic interest without control from the state, such arrangement will 
lead to a harmonious and more equal society of ever-increasing prosperity. John 
Maynard Keynes was a prominent voice in the defence of free market capitalism. 
He however deferred from Friedman’s position on non-interference of the state in 
the salvation of Depression of the 1930s. Keynes, in his famous book ‘The 
General Theory o f Employment, Interest and Money’21 published in response to 
the Great Depression of the 1930s pointed out the dangers inherent in leaving the 
economy completely free without control from the state. Keynes was very much 
of the opinion that government must run a sufficiently large deficit to make up for 
any shortfall in spending by the private sector. If these were done according to 
Keynes, unemployment will give way to full employment. A proponent of free 
market liberalism, Keynes shared a commonality of vision with the Fabians 
especially on the view of how systematic state action might allow industrial 
society to be run successfully from the top down without engendering perpetual 
crisis. Keynes’ assertion on state intervention in economic activities was primarily 
to underline the aggregate demands of goods as the driving force of the economy,
21The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money was written by the English 
economist John Maynard Keynes The book, generally considered to be his masterpiece, is largely 
credited with creating the terminology and shape of modern macroeconomics. Published in 
February 1936 it sought to bring about a revolution, commonly referred to as the "Keynesian 
Revolution",
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especially in down-tum period, of which government policies could be used to 
promote demand at a macro level, to fight unemployment and deflation.
While Keynes presented a robust argument for state intervention, he 
successfully puts in place, a capitalist reconstruction strategy that uses 
government increased expenditure to jump-start productive sectors and create 
jobs. Bill Clinton, as the President of the United States, adopted Keynesian 
strategy to initially address unemployment problems in USA only to renege on 
this due to negative effects of such strategy on the economy. One of such effects 
was the artificial creation of jobs. This strategy also constitutes a major plank of 
the campaign message of Francois Hollande in the 2012 French presidential 
election but yet to yield the desired results.
There is a need to point out that Keynes with his robust argument for 
state intervention was unable to see government’s survival on deficits will on the 
long run have dire consequences for the economy. In the process of paying back 
the debts, series of austerity measures will be put in place which will invariably 
take away jobs that were initially created artificially. Monetarism of Milton
O')Friedman that assumes modification of Keynesian theory could not save the 
Great Britain during the 80s, the EU and US in the 2010s. Though it shares the 
same definition of recession with Keynesianism but rejects Keynesian solution 
and opts for non-state intervention in the business of expanding or contracting the
22Monetarism today is mainly associated with the work of Milton Friedman, who was among the 
generation of economists to accept Keynesian economics and later criticised it. Monetarism is a 
tendency in economic thought that emphasizes the role of governments in controlling the 
amount of money in circulation. It is the view within monetary economics that variation in the 
money supply has major influences on national output in the short run and the price level over 
longer periods and those objectives of monetary policy are best met by targeting the growth rate 
of the money supply.
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supply of money as suggested by Keynes. This policy of non-state intervention 
was initially celebrated by both the Conservatives and the New Labour as the 
mainspring of Britain’s economic reinvention later turned the people against the 
administration of Margaret Thatcher to usher in the Labour party. The argument 
that government should keep the money supply steady, expanding it each year 
only to allow for the growth of the economy and a few other basic factors such as 
inflation, unemployment and output to adjust themselves according to market 
demands failed to materialise.
Despite the claims of free market capitalism of the capability to 
regenerate wealth and create better opportunities for the people to live a better 
life, most people in the capitalist or peripheral capitalist countries still express 
anxiety about the future due to high level of poverty, soaring unemployment, 
economic depression, galloping inflation, lack of integration and unabated 
separation and inequality. Moreover, the picture of the contemporary free market 
capitalism contradicts the free market view of Adam Smith and Friedman. 
Lazonick refers to this contradiction as ‘the myth of the market economy’ (1991). 
The idea of thinking of free market capitalism as free, anarchistic economic 
democracy, unplanned, spontaneous economic system etc; is negated firstly by 
Keynesian economy and secondly by the recent state intervention in the global 
financial sector to plan, control and protect the sector from the disaster 
necessitated by deregulation and marketisation of the sector. It is therefore a 
misconception to associate capitalism with freedom, anarchistic economic 
democracy where no one holds an illegitimate or coercive power over anyone, or 
everyone is free to choose whatever s/he desires.
Liberalism in its contemporary form - neo-liberalism seeks to reject 
the minimal state intervention in the regulations of the economy and supports the 
full transfer of the control of the economy from the public to private sector with 
the believe that zero-level intervention by the state in the economic activity will
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produce a more efficient government and improve the economic health of the 
state. This view is associated with John Williamson’s 1990 ‘Washington 
Consensus’ policy proposals that enjoyed wide range approval among the 
Washington based international economic organisations such as the IMF and the 
World Bank. It is germane to point out that in spite of wide range approval 
enjoyed by the Washington Consensus policies; nearly all the neo-liberal states 
and institutions had by the 1990s officially abandoned the Consensus policies. By 
this time it had become obvious to them that the policies could not address the 
issues of poverty and unemployment. The intervention of the European Union and 
the United States of America governments in their respective economies further 
confirms the abandonment and that free market economy is not as free as being 
theoretically expressed by the liberals. Free market ideology is an ideology with a 
focus on keeping capital in the political control of the state. The intervention to 
salvage the global financial crisis has proved the non-intervention principle to be a 
facade. Capitalism in any guise is actually a controlled, well managed and planned 
economic system, it is far from being an anarchistic democracy and completely 
moves away from the principles of free market economy as presented by 
Friedman and other economic liberals. Cambridge economist, Ha-Joon Chang, 
also demonstrates the deception of the free market capitalism. He argues that 
economic development depends not on the free market, but rather, on the state 
intervention in the economy including the development of IT, the internet and 
biotechnology (2002). The world still awaits the capitalists in any garb to provide 
a response to the moral credibility of this [in] consistency.
Michael Reagan rightly avers in 1963 that:
23The term Washington consensus was coined by John Williamson (1990) to encapsulate the set 
of policy reforms advocated with a reasonable degree of consensus by international financial 
institutions, the U.S. government, the Federal Reserve Board, and the leading think tanks based 
in Washington. Those policies were deemed necessary to achieve growth, low inflation, a viable 
balance of payments, and equitable income distribution in the developing world at large, and 
especially in Latin America, which was still recovering from the debt crisis that erupted in 1982. 
The policies that defined the Washington consensus included (1) fiscal discipline, (2) increased 
public expenditure on social services and infrastructure, (3) tax reform to broaden tax bases and 
reduce marginal tax rates, (4) market-determined interest rates, (5) unified and competitive 
exchange rates, (6) import liberalization, (7) openness to foreign direct investment, (8) 
privatization, (9) deregulation, and (10) secure property rights
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...from a market-regulated economy we have shifted to one 
directed by the personal, visible hands of governmental and 
corporate managers... the dominant and dynamic part of our 
economy is “free enterprise” only in that firms are privately 
owned... The automatic economy is dead. “The managed 
economy” is the phrase that applies to both the public and the 
private sectors, and it also indicates the specific quality o f the 
mixed economy: that both elements are managed. Once we 
begin to look at our system as one that is consciously planned 
rather than impersonally directed by market forces, some 
essentially political questions come to the fore. Who will do the 
managing? For whose benefit? What will be the goals? Who 
will set them? How? (Reagan, 1963)
Socialism in any guise has not fared better. The goal of socialism can 
be summarised as the state control of the economy under the dictatorship of the 
working class. The commonality of this goal runs through all forms of socialism. 
The left is yet to show any tangible evidence that the working class shares the 
same statist goal with socialism; hence the foundation upon which socialism rests 
appears shaky. If there is any factor that points to the departure between the left 
and working class, it is the continued adherence by the left to undemocratic 
principles of statism, and perhaps the top-down anti-working class method. One 
crucial issue which the left is yet to address is whether there is justifiable reason 
for the right to sweepingly associate socialism with coercion and dictatorship 
taking Roberts Dahl’s 1947 distinction of left wing economic thought into 
consideration. Dahl avers that there are two, potentially contradictory, schools of 
left wing economic thought: one advocating central control of the economy in the 
hands of the state, and the other advocating workers’ control, where “workers will 
no longer be merely passive victims of the productive process, but direct 
participants in the control of productive enterprises” (Dahl, 1947), - a Fabian24
j
| tradition of socialism.
[
I[
I
24The Fabians were an intellectual grouping/think tank formed in 1884 which advocated the 
'gradualist' road to state socialism, and whose key members, Sidney and Beatrice Webb, founded 
the London School of Economics in 1895
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Attempts by the left at sustaining socialism in any variation as the 
dominant ideology after the World War II, further prove the ideology as non­
defender of freedom and democracy. Socialism also failed to extend democracy to 
the economic arena where mass of the people are involved. Rather than 
democratising the economic space, the left justified statism, ignoring the issue of 
freedom and liberty. This failure paved the way for the right to formulate a 
defence of free market capitalism and present such as a form of economic 
democracy even though only the capitalists control the economy.
While socialism primarily concerns itself with equality and fairness in 
the society, its adherence to a ‘teleological vision of historical progress; and its 
attachment to command and control systems’(Giddens, 1994) makes it practically 
impossible for the ideology to address the deficiency of freedom especially in an 
‘increasingly individualised and de-traditionalised’ (Giddens, ibid) liberal world.
The communitarians believe in the free market, though they strive to 
strike a balance between free market and the social good, between the marketplace 
and the society, between economic freedom and society’s broader needs. The 
main argument of the communitarians supports the free market as a remarkable 
engine of prosperity, economic growth and increased productivity. One 
fundamental element that separates communitarianism from liberalism is a kind of 
anthropological claim about the relation between individual and society. Typically 
liberal tradition employs a methodological individualism, assuming that the basic 
elements in the social world are individual human beings, each with the capacity 
to form their own beliefs and life-plans. Society, from this angle, is a kind of by­
product of the practices and decisions of these individuals. Liberals also subscribe 
to a sort of 'atomism': the idea that each individual is a discrete monad, only 
contingently related to others. For the liberals the individual is unattached or 
unsituated. Every individual finds its identity through the ordering of its own 
desires and preferences. Communitarian philosophy, as presented by Michael J.
[272]
Sandel (1982), MacIntyre (1985), and Michael Walzer (1983), tends to argue 
against both liberalism's methodological individualism and the priority it places 
on individual rights over public goods. These theorists insist that we cannot 
understand the individual apart from the particular social contexts in which he or 
she is inevitably embedded - the identities and attributes with which he or she 
finds himself/herself encumbered, his/her language, heritage, ethnicity and 
locality. These individuals are far from being contingent 'baggage' which 
individuals just happen to carry around with them. Our social circumstances are 
an integral part of the meanings of our lives, and the preferences we hold.
The major trouble with the liberal approach is that its concomitant 
assumptions now permeate contemporary western civil society. It has led to an 
erosion of our communal sense that we might have unchosen responsibilities as 
well as chosen ones; that we might 'owe' something to the community whose 
traditions and resources have helped make us what we are. This communal sense 
according to the communitarians constitutes an indispensable foundation for a 
stable community. However the assumptions of liberalism if not checked, they 
assert, may disrupt other crucial dimensions of life. For example industrialisation 
as explained earlier, was noticed in the United States to have weakened the 
traditional family system and replaced such with industrial family where both 
parents need to work in other to cope with the demands and lifestyles of the new 
economy. The transformation of the family institution means that one of the 
society’s most critical tasks -  child rearing and moral formation has been 
compromised. The urge for profit now shapes our relationship, which the 
communitarians see as unsuitable value for socialisation. The profit urge, has 
crept into the state politics, making the political process a money-driven process, 
leaving the privilege to contest election for the rich or their choice candidates 
thereby pulling active participation out of the reach of the less privileged with the 
exception of the right to vote
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Karl Polanyi’s works (1957a, 1957b, 1957c and 1977) offer valid 
entry point into the communitarian economy. It predominantly carves a 
respectable space for Kropotkin’s communitarian anarchism to command a 
focus of attention within the histories of classical economic thoughts. Kropotkin’s 
work like other social thinkers was centred on the failings of the capitalist system 
and through this work made an implicit and explicit call for a return to an 
essentially humanist perspective in production and distribution of our basic means 
of subsistence. Polanyi made strenuous efforts to isolate the ideological from the 
ethnographic dimensions of an essential human ‘economy’ (Knowles, 2004). 
Polanyi’s ‘vision’ was of a ‘free, co-operative, democratic and just society based 
on social ownership and control of economic resources’ and was ‘not grounded in 
technological or economic determinism’ (Polanyi-Levitt 1994: 130). His, was 
entirely a humanist vision aimed towards democratic stability of the society.
Two aspects of Polanyi’s work that opened up the concept of 
‘economic thought’ are his ‘substantive’ definition of the economy, and his 
demonstration of the social embeddedness of all economies (Knowles, ibid). He 
demonstrated this by the consideration of the word ‘economic’ from two 
independent meanings. These are the ‘substantive’ and the ‘formal’ meanings 
(Polanyi, 1957a: 243-4). By formal meaning, Polanyi refers to a definite situation 
of choice, mainly, that between the different uses of means induced by an 
insufficiency of those means’. This is ‘logic of rational action’. It is this ‘formal’ 
definition which underpins the neo-classical paradigm (Knowles, ibid).
25Peter Kropotkin a Russian anarcho-communist. Author of "Mutual Aid and Fields", "Factories 
and workshops" - two books which have been influential on the development of egalitarian 
communities. Kropotkin has been credited with the founding of Communitarian anarchism a 
cultural movement rather than a class interest movement, but not outside the struggle for 
freedom and self-determination and against exploitation and repression. Communitarian 
anarchists are unwilling to wait for a revolution based on the overthrow of patriarchal capitalist 
states. They prefer the pragmatic approach of attempting to create cells of the new society and 
new culture parallel to the current state institutions and social systems.
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Though speconomy is in accord with Polanyi’s formal meaning of the 
economic; his submission on the substantive definition appears to be insufficient 
for the resolution of the problem of inequality created by capitalism. By 
‘substantive’ definition, Polanyi refers to man’s dependence for his survival upon 
nature and his fellows. ‘It refers to the interchange with his natural and social 
environment, in so far as these results in supplying him with the means of material 
want satisfaction’ (ibid). Polanyi’s substantive definition of the economy makes 
no commitment to any notions of choice or scarcity or insufficiency in the way in 
which they are basic postulates of the neo-classical economics paradigm. To 
Polanyi, choice does not connote insufficiency of means or insufficiency of means 
implying choice or scarcity (Polanyi, 1977). The second aspect of Polanyi’s work 
that is relevant to speconomy is his conclusion that the economy is embedded in 
society. He avers that
...the outstanding discovery o f recent historical and 
anthropological research is that man’s economy, as a rule, is 
submerged in his social relationships. He does not act so as to 
safeguard his individual interest in the possession of material 
goods; he acts so as to safeguard his social standing, his social 
claims, and his social assets. He values material goods only in 
so far as they serve this end (1957b: 46).
Polanyi’s assertion on the relationship between individuals’ economic 
activities and their groups is fundamental to speconomy. There can be no 
distinction between the economy and the rest of society, except that which has 
been artificially created by the development of abstract economic theory based on 
the idea of a self-regulating market.
The goal of communitarianism is how a humane society could be 
attained. The Liberal communitarians however still strive to protect the liberal 
capitalist state from being consumed by the fire of resistance it has ignited 
globally. Liberal Communitarianism and economic liberalism share the 
philosophical illusion of market being firmly kept in the private sector with little 
or no involvement of the public sector. A run-through of the liberal 
communitarian arguments reveals the spiritual accord between their economic
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doctrines. Though the liberal communitarians share with Keynes the doctrine of 
state intervention, but not in the manner Keynes prescribes. While Keynes wants 
the government to run sufficiently large deficits in order to create employment 
opportunities, the communitarians are more concerned with government giving 
helping hands directly to the people in terms of benefits.
The left communitarians, while fixing the broken linkages created by 
the free market liberalism, rightly allege that neo-liberalism rests on an atomistic 
platform of individual as an isolated, competitive profit maximiser. They proclaim 
human beings as social creatures that warrant recognition of their 
interdependency. They reiterate the compelling need of a social vision that 
emphasises solidarity and mutuality. This is the "good society". Unfortunately the 
social processes within the good society are left unaltered, even though they 
emphasise economic equality and collective action, albeit with a stronger role for 
civil society than in the past, the market must however be kept firmly in the 
private sector and never in the public sector.
For the new society to emerge, the right communitarians are very 
emphatic on the complete removal of the state. They want the welfare state 
dismantled but the moral vacuum and lifestyle created in the society by the 
combination of liberalism and neo-liberalism must be filled. This task requires the 
rebuilding of a moral civil society to meet social needs that neither the free market 
nor the conventional welfare state can meet. To this end, a new political and 
economic localism must be put in place while the poor must be recapitalised in 
order to empower them to crawl out from under the welfare state, and the welfare 
state itself must be cut back (Polanyi, 1957).
Communitarianism is purely an attempt at filling the moral gulf 
created in the society by the free market capitalism since the period of 
Enlightenment. The reality of the effects of the gulf on the sustenance of the 
market democracy paved the way for communitarianism to emerge as an SOS 
philosophy to firstly, save capital from the barrage of attacks directed at it by the
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impoverished democratic majority. Secondly, to protect our souls from the 
rapacious market and discrimination that is threatening to overwhelm all crucial 
aspects of our lives. Both left and right communitarians successfully drew 
politics and the state back into the domain of religion where we need to be 
morally conscious of our actions towards others having realised the effects of 
individualistic value on the moral bond that binds people together in their various 
communities
Democracy represents the establishment of an open, public realm 
where every citizen is free to contribute to the well-being of the community 
without any form of intimidation using their wealth of experience to make their 
contributions. In this wise to discuss democracy will mean to discuss people of a 
political community or a self-governing society. Communitarianism fails in this 
regard as it does not go beyond explaining the significance of society to 
individual’s life. Speconomy and neo communitarianism canvass perspectives that 
could not agree less with Kooiman (2002) who states that:
...no single actor has the possibility o f  ‘doing the jo b ’ [solving a 
problem or grasping an opportunity] unilaterally. N o  actor is so 
dominant as to be able to enforce a certain line o f  behaviour, or 
to place the costs o f  social problem -solving on others and take 
the revenues him self. And all actors can be severely hindered in 
reaching their own objectives by other actors. ‘Interdependence’ 
in itself is not enough. The realization o f  the opportunities 
within interdependence is the central assignment o f  social- 
political governance (K o o im a n , 2 0 0 2 )
Kooiman’s observations about governance and community have since 
time immemorial been at the centre of societal cohesion especially in Africa 
where every adult irrespective of gender freely participate in the village or 
community development and decision making. As Bob Jessop observes,
...so-called ‘governance’ mechanism s [as contrasted to markets 
or hierarchy] have long been w idely used in coordinating 
com plex organizations and system s. They are especially  
appropriate for system s that are resistant to top-down internal 
management and/or direct external control and that also co-
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evolve with other [com plex] sets o f  social relations with which  
their various decisions, operations, and aims are reciprocally 
interdependent (Jessop, 1997).
7.2 Rectifying Sub-Saharan Africa’s economic crisis with Speconomy
Speconomy shares Polanyi’s ‘vision’ of a ‘free, co-operative, 
democratic and just society based on social ownership and control of economic 
resources’ (Polanyi-Levitt, ibid). While agreeing with Polanyi’s formal 
classification of economic, speconomy however departs from his substantive’s 
classification which he sees as the interchange of an individual “with his natural 
and social environment, in so far as this results to supplying him with the means 
of material want satisfaction”. Polanyi avers: “the substantive definition of 
economic derives from man’s dependence for his living upon nature and his 
fellow men” (Polanyi, 1977).
Though Polanyi provides a leeway for deconstructing ‘economic 
thought’ from the strictures of the neo-classical economics paradigm, speconomy 
however provides a deeper critique of communitarian anarchism to deconstruct 
the expression of individuals as dependants of nature and their fellows for 
consumption required for their survival. An individual becomes a parasite when 
s/he only consumes what others produce, that is, develops consumption as a 
philosophy. A state that measures and sustains the quality of its people’s lives by 
consumption rather than the productive worth is only developing and sharpening 
acquisitive tendencies of the citizenry and suppressing their productive instincts. 
Such a nation will always judge the achievement of its people through materialism 
and property. . The net effect of this is a culture of dependence. This is the nucleus 
of Africa’s economic backwardness.
* *Man consumes for his survival and self-development if he consumes 
what he produces with his labour, technical skills and invariably his technology. 
This simply means man is self-reliant. The quality of man’s production
26 Man refers to individuals with no bias against female gender
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automatically reflects on the quality and quantity of his consumption such as the 
clothes he wears, the cars he drives, the house he lives, his communication system 
etc. Addressing the parasitic assumption of Polanyi’s substantive definition, 
necessitates rectification of the ‘broken linkages’ by speconomy as they 
potentially play vital role in the invocation of the new economic vision that goes 
beyond individual’s equality and fairness but one that is concerned more about 
our social fabric (Olateju, 2012b: 32).
As demonstrated by the African Charter of 1990, speconomy serves to 
elevate us beyond ideologies and isms. Its values are characterised by integration 
of man and state in a manner that will halt the increasing individualism associated 
with liberal market democracy. It is purely a concept of ‘economic’ which is not 
averse to the dependence of man on nature and his fellows but this should not be 
for purely improving the quality of life through consumption that could lead to a 
culture of dependence but for self-sustenance.
In speconomy, man and the state are co-partners in the quest for 
survival. The organic relationship between man and state has been variously 
described by some as patriotism or nationalism. These are just descriptive 
nomenclatures of the relationship. We unconsciously jubilate when our state 
records success. This happens because a part of our person is making progress to 
the delight of the whole body and the whole body goes into sorrow when the same 
part is being afflicted by calamity.
Speconomy stresses that detachment of individuals from the state as 
unsituated or as an idealised shopper is bound to result in the alienation of the 
individual from the community which provides the very conditions of her 
individuality in the first place. The state in neo-communitarian arrangement is an 
aggregate of the nationality groups with their network of relationships. The parts 
constitute the whole as the whole gives meaning to the parts. The nationality
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groups of individuals and the state remain the two sides of the same coin and 
whose separation renders both worthless and ineffective.
Picking from Dewey’s argument (1992), speconomy also sees man 
as a being who naturally responds to the stimuli of his environment, therefore an 
agency of novel reconstruction, reorganising human experiences by making new 
things and reshaping old ones through arts and technology. Following this 
argument, Olateju (2002) submits man as a natural technologist who needs to 
establish and maintain an active relationship with his environment and not just to 
depend on it for his survival as submitted by Polanyi.
Man is daily confronted with hierarchy of needs, whose realisation 
naturally compels him to see life as a struggle of which he cannot be passive 
(Olateju, ibid). Nyerere (1968) once expressed the view that through active 
transformation of the environment, man becomes an architect of his destiny and 
self-fulfilled. In essence, man is not just a mere spectator of his environment or 
indolent but a creative and intelligent being whose collective efforts design a 
suitable society based on the collective experiences of man and his fellows.
The social processes of speconomy transcend the social atomism of 
individuals, and it views the task of neo-communitarianism as that of creating a 
form of politics and state that are appropriate to it. This entails creating a society 
where integration is central to the economic policy through equal opportunity for 
the integration and participation of all citizens in the production and distribution 
of economic goods and services. This underscores its emphasis on the 
reconfiguration of the relationship between the state, market and individuals; and 
diverting such relationship from the direction of predatory capitalism relished by 
liberal democracy. Speconomy uses participatory decision making and control 
mechanism to guide production and distribution of goods and services within the 
state. It does this to seek an economic order that ensures partnership between the 
individuals (sole proprietor, cooperatives, local or international companies) and
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the state through the various tiers of government in the production and distribution 
of goods and services. Speconomic philosophy does not oppose public ownership 
of the means of production and distribution neither does it prevent private 
ownership of some property.
The two partners are entitled to ownership of property but such 
ownership must derive from the partnership. In essence speconomy does not 
support sole public or total private ownership of property. The reason for this is 
simple. Public ownership where state dominates the economic activities or 
ownership does not give room for individual ingenuity and freedom of choice. 
Private ownership where individuals acquire property as much as they can, 
promotes unequal economic relationship and poverty. Poverty turns economic 
relationships into power relationships.
The mandatory collaborative partnership arrangement between the 
state and individuals serves as speconomy’s contrast to other forms of economic 
systems. A major deficiency of other economic models, apart from deprivation of 
freedom and liberty, is the separation of individuals and the state. Claims of 
absence of freedom constitute a major plank that both socialism and capitalism 
rest their opposition to each other. They both, in their variants, claim to stand for 
freedom. Every political party claims to be for it as well. If they are both for 
freedom, then why do they oppose each other? How can they oppose and yet be 
united in favour of the same goal? None of them appears to actually provide 
freedom within their discourses. They both treat the issue of freedom half­
heartedly leaving out its vital aspects. Firstly, they ignore the absence of freedom 
in its natural form and secondly they treat freedom theoretically or as a mental 
construct in isolation of its material base.
Speconomy holds that freedom needs to be addressed holistically 
using a three-fold template before we can appreciate its provision or denial in any
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ideology. These three folds are natural freedom, theoretical freedom and material 
freedom. In its theoretical form, freedom exists in the will-power to choose from 
alternatives. The choice of an alternative is done through our mental construct. 
Every individual is naturally endowed with this will-power to make a decision in 
any material situation. This will-power is an ideal form of freedom that could be 
applied in every situation by every individual irrespective of age. Day-old baby 
can apply this if he or she desires. The baby may decide not to accept the mother’s 
breast or reject feed from the feeding bottle even if he or she is coerced. The baby 
applies the will-power to make a choice out of the available alternatives. The baby 
may decide to smile at some people and choose not to do same to others. It is the 
will-power that is applied by every individual as to ‘what to do’ but ‘where to do 
it’ or ‘how to do it’ does not belong to the realm of ideal freedom but the material 
freedom. In its material form, freedom cannot be taken in isolation of the rules 
and regulations that guide the situation. This is where speconomy differs from 
both socialism and capitalism. The main concern of speconomy is the material 
freedom where every individual has equal access to freedom.
Every situation has norms and relations that produce a set of shared 
values to guide its processes and relationships. These norms include knowledge of 
the relations, mutual understanding and forms of reciprocity from every member. 
Once an individual uses his or her will-power to enter into a situation, the norms 
and values of such situation becomes a moral compass for the individual in his 
relationship with others. Where his or her desires become unaccomplishable 
within the situation due to the requirements of the norms, the same will power 
could be applied to detach himself or herself from the situation or to effect a 
modification of the obstructing norm. What we have been witnessing in the 
discourses of freedom in most ideologies is the search for ideal or theoretical 
freedom in a material situation. Material freedom can only exist in a material or 
physical situation. Most of the fundamental human rights are ideal or theoretical 
forms of freedom which once transferred into physical situation will transform 
into material forms. In this wise they will be guided by the rules and regulations
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guiding the processes within such situation. The same principles apply to a 
country in a committee of an international organisation such as European Union.
A state has the will-power to join an international body and to 
withdraw if the rules and regulations guiding the social processes within the 
organisation are not favourable to its own vision. You do not talk of denial of 
ideal freedom of movement if you got to the train station late and found that the 
train had left or sue the state for not allowing you to be part of a sport team if you 
did not partake in the selection trials. An intending student cannot talk of denial of 
university admission if he or she fails the entrance examination. Material freedom 
becomes applicable when you meet all the required conditions and rules.
Material freedom is lacking in both capitalism and socialism as the 
same social or economic opportunities are not applicable to people in the same 
situation. For example, under capitalism the relations of production allocate 
individuals into different social classes defined by their access to and possession 
of the means of production. Individuals within these social classes have different 
political and juridical powers. Socialism on the other hand embraces between 
centralisation of the means of production and dictatorship of the proletariat. 
Dictatorship as used by Marx means a social system where one social class 
dominates others. By class dominance, Marx referred to the general and pervasive 
powers exercised by one social class to maintain and defend its dominance in a 
social formation. This is the class struggle that Marx and Engel defined as the 
locomotive of history. Any ideology that embraces dictatorship cannot at the same 
time claim to be a promoter of freedom.
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97Speconomy distinguishes itself from Ordoliberalism and Social
9Rmarket economy which premised the operation of the economy on mixed 
economy that combines private enterprise with state intervention through 
regulations. The main element of the social market economy contains free market 
economy such as private property, free foreign trade, exchange of goods and free 
formation of prices. Collective bargaining is often done on national level not 
between one corporation and one union, but national employers organisations and 
national unions. The point of departure here is that the two models also ignore the 
relationship between the individuals and the state where each are allowed 
operating independent of each other.
Speconomy sets to address Reagan’s questions of who will do the 
managing and for whose benefit? What will be the goals? Who will set them and 
how?” (Reagan, 1963) It sets to address these questions by putting in place a 
mechanism for profit sharing between the partners while cooperative groups will 
be the basis for the management of the partnership with the state. The partnership 
allows the partner that initiates the business, the entrepreneurial move, to own 
one-third of the net profit while the remaining two-thirds is shared according to 
the contributions of the each partners.
Speconomy seeks to increase the production base of the state in order 
to ensure political stability and sustainable growth. The state will seek to generate 
funds and minimise leakages and waste. A large quantum of African financial 
resources is committed to recurrent expenditure which has negative implication 
for sustainable development. To correct this, there is need for cooperative 
partnership for prosecution of capital projects and social provisioning.
27 Ordoliberalism is a German variant of neo-liberalism that emphasises the need for the state to 
ensure that the free market produces results close to its theoretical potentials
28 Social market economy remains the main economic model adopted in Germany since after the 
World War II. It is a philosophy that descends from Ordoliberalism of the Freiburg School.
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Commencing Speconomy involves creation of three agencies. These are Research 
Institutes Coordinating Agency, (RICA), Employment Generation Cooperatives 
Agency (EGCA), and Employment Stabilisation Funds Agency (ESFA). RICA 
creates a unifying platform for all the produce, products and technology research 
institutes to synthesise their activities in a complimentary manner, prepare the 
feasibility studies for the production of each item, at least at the cottage level, 
highlights the person’s and location’s specifications for the production of the item 
and provides technical support for each project. The EGCA concerns itself with 
registration of the cooperative groups, receives the research outputs from RICA 
and makes such outputs available to the cooperative groups, organises necessary 
training programmes for selected cooperative groups and liaises with ESFA for 
take-off grants and loans. ESFA provides take-off grants or loans at minimum 
interest rate, sells bond to raise funds, liaises with, and receives funds from 
international agencies. It is germane to stress that cooperative groups can also 
initiate independent business proposals without necessarily taking from Rica’s. 
However such proposal will still need to be subjected to RICA’s investigation.
The initial funds will come from the government through budgetary 
allocation, special levies on certain categories of businesses, political appointees 
and senior civil servants and loans and grants from the international Agencies. All 
the three Agencies under supervision of the Ministry of Labour and Employment 
Generations, will nominate at least one project monitoring officer for every 
project to ensure compliance with the standards and procedures stated in the 
project’s portfolio and guide the business operators towards targets delivery and 
the repayment of loans. It is the responsibility of ESFA to encourage the project 
hosting tiers of government to, as a form of investment, make contributions to the 
business take-off in other to reduce the amount of loans or grants to be granted by 
ESFA. In addition, small and medium scale development banks become vital to 
offer soft and long term loans to the cooperative groups with ESFA serving as 
guarantor.
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Marketing of product should be handled by both the state and the 
cooperative groups. Some products may warrant state purchasing from the groups 
and re-selling to larger markets including foreign markets while some may require 
direct sale to departmental stores and local markets. The role of the Marketing 
Boards will include ensuring fair price for goods and subsidy for market vagaries.
The existing private companies are to be left to continue with their 
operations but may enter into cooperative pact with their host communities and 
towns to reflect the new governance architecture. State will no longer register 
private companies that do not conform to the new regulations and will divert the 
initial support given to private companies to the cooperative companies. 
Multinational companies are by rules of speconomy, expected to enter into 
cooperative pact with their host communities, towns and regions. Each state will 
determine the category of business that the federal government will handle in 
partnerships with the concerned cooperative groups. However, financial, shipping 
or air businesses are to enter into cooperative pact with the federal government 
with no involvement of the communities, towns or regions. For example, a radio 
or television station with regional coverage will need to be in partnership with the 
region concerned and not the town or community. Derivation and value added tax 
strategies will be applied to take care of such communities in the budget 
allocation.
In Africa, speconomy needs to take along with it, reconfiguration of 
the state in a neo-communitarian arrangement where the indigenous communities 
will have both political and economic capacities to develop. Autochthonous state 
building is an essential foundation for speconomy. African multi-ethnic outlook 
needs to be reconfigured to become source of strength instead of being harbinger 
of division and disunity. All tendencies for destructive competition for control of 
power at the centre which exacerbate the primordial instinct in the people to fan 
the flame of the religious and ethnic differences need to be curtailed before
[286]
speconomy can thrive. The state at the regional level determines the minimum 
wage for each region in conjunction with workers associations. This is quite
'JQdifferent from Michael Albert and Robin Hahnel’s participatory economy where 
workers solely own the means of production. Speconomy emphasises the need 
for both the state and individuals to collaborate in the production and distribution 
of goods and services without allowing each to function separately or for any to 
impose hegemony or domination. Two features that distinguish speconomy from 
economic liberalism are the determination of minimum wage by the state and 
involvement of workers’ associations in such determination. While the economic 
liberals see these as causes of unemployment, speconomy stresses their 
involvement in the control and management of the economic relationships in line 
with the partnership doctrines.
Conclusion
Speconomy states that no political economy could set itself above 
social reality; it is a part of the society which it inhabits. Studies have affirmed the 
resiliency, legitimacy and relevance of African traditional institutions in the socio­
cultural, economic and political lives of Africans. There is therefore the need for 
these traditional institutions to be accorded the due recognition in the state- 
building and democratisation processes of the post-colonial African states.
29 Participatory economy, often abbreviated as parecon, is an economic system proposed 
primarily by activist and political theorist Michael Albert and radical economist Robin Hahnel, 
among others. It uses participatory decision making as an economic mechanism to guide the 
production, consumption and allocation of resources in a given society. Proposed as an 
alternative to contemporary capitalist market economies and also an alternative to centrally 
planned socialism, it is described as a form of socialism, since in a parecon the means of 
production are owned in common.
The underlying values that parecon seeks to implement are equity, solidarity, diversity, workers 
self-management and efficiency. (Efficiency here means accomplishing goals without wasting 
valued assets.) It proposes to attain these ends mainly through the following principles and 
institutions:
■ Workers and consumers' councils utilizing self-managerial methods for making decisions,
■ Balanced job complexes,
■ Remuneration according to effort and sacrifice, and
■ Participatory planning.
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Though African states may not have been colonised in the same form but they 
were all the same colonised and colonisation had the same effect on all the pre­
colonial African societies and peoples.
The dislocation of the political economies of all the pre-colonial 
systems and the subsequent integration of these economies into the global 
capitalist economy in an unequal relationship bind the African states together as 
victims of colonisation and neo-colonisation. As Africa collectively desires 
through the pan African vision and later Lagos Plan of Action, to build and 
strengthen democratic states and economies, there is need for the ‘externalists’ to 
allow such visions to be uninterruptedly grounded in the indigenous values as 
canvassed in neo-communitarianism and speconomy. It is through this break from 
the grips of the external visions that Africa can move away from the currently 
imposed ‘spectator democracy’ at home and ‘spectator participant’ in the global 
political economy.
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Chapter 8
SPECONOMY AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
8.0 Introduction
The central objective of this chapter is to explore the possibility of 
using speconomy as an alternative pathway into the world economy. This is to 
place the partnership between cooperatives of individuals and the state at the 
centre of political, economic and social discourses, and see such partnership as not 
only necessary, but as the driving force of politics and economy. One justification 
for this is the global division of labour, inequality, unemployment and unequal 
trade in the world economy, as part of the consequences of globalisation. While 
advancing argument for global economic restructuring, the chapter aligns with the 
submission of Otto Holman, Marianne Marchand et al in their series editors’ 
preface to “Global Unions? Theory and Strategies o f Organised Labour in Global 
Political Economy” (2002: xv -  xvi). They assert, ‘...we must stop focusing on 
global firms as ‘black boxes’ and analyse them as ‘sites of contest’ instead’ 
(Holman; Marchand et al; 2002: xvi). Speconomy advances the possibility of 
providing a domestic production pathway through joint partnership economic model 
between human cooperatives and the state in a manner that will reflect the unique 
characteristics and comparative advantage of each country.
Globalisation, in addition to creating new identities and divisions in 
the world economy, fundamentally alters the perception of governments of the 
developing economies in terms of economic development strategies. This process 
of global economic integration also altered the perception of most sub-Saharan 
African governments in their formulation of economic development policies. The 
dictates of globalisation now loom larger and crowds out the original economic 
vision of the OAU of adopting backward integration strategy, replacing such with 
the global integration, especially in the extractive primary and agricultural 
produce. African governments in succumbing to these dictates have successfully 
widened the gap between individuals and state. The states that are supposed to
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serve the interest of the citizenry, now serve the interest of the capital. The harsh 
effects of capital accumulation further distanced the people and the state away 
from each other. Just when the people need the state as a protector from the harsh 
effects of domineering global capitalist economy such as inequality, 
unemployment and endemic poverty, the systemic pressures are handicapping the 
states to respond appropriately. This situation can only be rectified if the state is 
re-energised and re-focused by the people. This is where speconomy becomes 
significant for the state and the people to re-focus the state towards productivity.
8.1 Principles of speconomy
The partnership arrangement between the state and the cooperative of 
individuals serves as speconomy’s contrasts with other forms of economic 
systems. The state is a product of the relationships among the nationality groups 
of individuals. Without the individuals in their various nationalities and groups, 
the state remains an empty space. While the state gives the individuals an identity, 
the individuals on the other hand, not only provide the state with its unique 
identity but also preserve the identity for the state.
The logic of shifting risks from government and corporations unto the 
individuals through social, cultural, political and economic policies and practices 
that stress individual autonomy as emphasised in free market capitalism is a logic 
of exploiting one partner to sustain the other and to entrench totalitarian rule as 
against democratic system. In either socialist or capitalist economy, there is a 
distinction between the state’s owners and state workers. The workers earn much 
less than the value they create thereby providing space for excess profit that is 
always appropriated by the business owners which could be either state, corporate 
organisations or individuals.
Following Parenti’s analysis of how wealth and want in the United
States are getting more extreme, (Parenti, 2001) corporations in all the
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contemporary models of economy, are ‘organisational devices’ to exploit labour 
and accumulate capital with the working people being society’s real producers. 
Public corporations as the contemporary dominant institutions exist for one 
purpose supported by law. This is to maximise the value of share holders’ equity 
size and dominance or be left behind. Their success is measured by their 
concentrated, virtual-monopoly size. Noam Chomsky calls them ‘private 
tyrannies’. According to Chomsky,
As state capitalism developed into the modem era, economic, 
political and ideological systems have increasingly been taken 
over by vast institutions of private tyranny that are about as 
close to the totalitarian ideal as any that humans have so far 
constructed (Chomsky, 2005: 191).
Chomsky is not alone in this perception. Chomsky’s view only echoes 
Robert Brady who had before Chomsky alerted us to the inverse democratic 
control associated with free market capitalism. In his submission, Brady argues 
that,
...within the corporation all policies emanate from the control 
above. In the union of this power to determine policy with the 
execution thereof, all authority necessarily proceeds from the 
top to the bottom and all responsibility from the bottom to the 
top. This is, of course, the inverse of "democratic" control; it 
follows the structural conditions of dictatorial power (Brady 
(1943) cited in Chomsky, 2005: 191)
Governments are constantly responsive to the needs of the 
corporations through benefits such as subsidies, bailouts and protections by taxing 
the public. For example, Stephen Lendman reveals in review of Parenti’s 
“Democracy for the Few” (2001) that immediately after World War 11 and with 
the emergence of the US as the dominant state left standing, President Eisenhower 
gave the private organisations the equivalent (in today’s dollars) of $300 billion 
worth of offshore oil reserves, public lands and utilities, atomic installations and 
much more in what Parenti and others later referred to as “socialism for the rich ” 
(Lendman, 2007). The situation has not changed in the contemporary free-market 
economies as the big corporate organisations remain beneficiaries of multi-billion 
pounds and dollars support paid for by the public taxes.
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This support comes in forms of tax breaks, price supports, loan 
guarantees, bailouts, marketing services, exports subsidies, R&D grants, free use 
of the public broadcasting spectrum and other government-directed benefits. 
Production costs are socialised but profits are privatised in an enormous 
redistribution of income from the working populace to the corporate rich. The tax 
system is skewed in favour of the corporate capitalists with the corporations 
paying an insignificant percentage of their revenues, with many not paying 
income taxes and many getting tax rebates. From this explanation it is apparent 
that the worker is being exploited to sustain the corporate organisations and the 
state. This is exactly what is being referred to in speconomy as exploiting one 
partner to sustain the other.
A the risk of repetition, speconomy is not a brand of ‘Ordoliberalism’ 
or ‘Social market economy’ which premises the operation of the economy on a 
mixed economic system that combines private enterprise with state intervention 
through regulations. This is a major point of departure of speconomy where there 
is a mandatory partnership between the state and the individuals in their 
cooperative forms.
The mandatory partnership of speconomy rests on understanding that 
the fundamental structural elements of an economy comprising consumption and 
production are natural and vital for the sustenance of both the state and the people. 
They are universal as well. However the particular way in which these elements 
combine and interrelate in any economy is unique and specific both in place and 
time. This is why no country can copy another’s economic policy, though as Ross 
advises, “it can learn from other economies” (Ross, 2011).
For this reason, it is emphasised in speconomy that these elements, in 
very different forms and combinations, are of major importance for economic 
development strategies. The specific forms and combinations in which elements
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are applied are entirely unique in each state and at different points in time. In 
essence the combination and form of partnership will be applied uniquely to each 
state without jeopardising the partnership relationship between individuals and 
state.
Speconomy emphasises the need for both the state and the individuals 
to collaborate, not necessarily cooperation, in the production and distribution of 
goods and services as partners. It represents a model of welfare state based on 
equality and equitable distribution of wealth but with emphasis on the state 
sharpening the productive aspect of the citizenry through collaborative backward 
integration strategies. In doing this, the state will tackle six giants instead of 
Beveridge’s five; the sixth is, ‘Less jobs’. The five giants identified by 
Beveridge are, being Want, Disease, Ignorance, Squalor and Idleness. Less jobs 
with soaring unemployment rate is identified as a major problem synonymous 
with other models especially the free market economy. Some of the after-effects 
of fewer jobs are being want, disease, ignorance, squalor and idleness.
As with every other welfare state, in speconomy, state plays a vital 
role in the protection and promotion of the economic and social well-being of the 
citizens but the protection of the state’s life is also vital. Without life, the state 
cannot protect and promote the well-being of the individual members. The state 
needs to be economically active like its individual members, rather than being 
used by the individuals just for the provision of social protections. While the 
individuals cannot just use the state for their own protection, the state too cannot 
just use the individuals for its own protection. The state needs to protect the 
individuals just as individuals need to embrace and legitimise the state. They both
30 In December 1942, the Report of the Inter-Departmental Committee on Social Insurance and 
Allied Services was published, known commonly as the Beveridge Report after its chairman, Sir 
William Beveridge, proposing a series of measures to aid those who were in need o f help, or in 
poverty. Beveridge recommended to the government that they should find ways o f tackling the 
five giants, being Want, Disease, Ignorance, Squalor and Idleness. He argued to cure these 
problems; the government should provide adequate income to people, adequate health care, 
adequate education, adequate housing and adequate employment. It proposed that 'All people of  
working age should pay a weekly National Insurance contribution. In return, benefits would be 
paid to people who were sick, unemployed, retired or widowed.'
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need to collaborate for the protection of each and to jointly solve the problem of 
‘fewer jobs associated with other economic models.
8.2 Speconomic Welfare state
There are varieties of welfare states with different economic and 
social organisations ranging from ‘Nordic model’, which operates in Sweden, 
Norway, Denmark and Finland with the Swedish model being referred to as 
‘Folkhemmet’ which literarily stands for ‘folk home’. Others are ‘social state’ 
(‘sozialstaat’ in Germany or ‘stato sociale’ in Italy), ‘state of well-being’ or ‘state 
of social well-being’ (‘estado del bienestar’ in Spain or ‘estado de providencia’ in 
Portugal), ‘providing state’ (‘previdencia social’ in Brazil) to Britain’s welfare
n |
state. Saudi Arabia ,(Pawel Zaleski, 2006 ), Brunei, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, 
Oman and the United Arab Emirates are all welfare states but exclusively meant 
for their citizens with no concern for non-citizens , including legal residents and 
legal long term employees who are prohibited from partaking in the benefits of the 
welfare state.
In all these varieties, the only aspect of man that is addressed is the 
consumption aspect leaving out the productive aspect. The consumption aspect is 
well sharpened by the state through the provision of subsidised services or social 
benefits, while the productive aspect is either not sufficiently addressed or 
completely ignored. While the state is expected to provide some social protection 
for individual members, the protection of the life of the state through the required 
responsibilities and duties of individuals are significantly lacking.
For example in the Nordic model the state only transfers funds to the 
services provided for the citizens such as education and health care and also
31The Social Security section o f the Ministry o f Labour provides assistance to Saudi citizens in the 
following categories; the unemployed, widows and widowers, females who have no living family 
members to support them, orphans, the disabled, families o f those serving custodial sentences, and 
victims o f natural disasters.
[294]
provide direct benefits to the people. These provisions are funded through 
redistributionist taxation that is often referred to as mixed economy but how 
the individual can ensure that the state continues deriving energies for the 
provision of these services is completely lacking in this model. Also the Swedish 
welfare state which dates back to 1936 is a compromise between the trade unions 
and the big companies to provide a sort of mixed economy built on strong unions 
and a strong system of social security and universal health care.
The German welfare state that started during the period of Otto von 
Bismarck especially in the 1880s reveals that the welfare policies only covered the 
consumption aspect of the citizens such as old age pensions, accident insurance, 
medical care and unemployment insurance. The policies were specifically 
designed to win the support of the working class for the Empire and reduce the 
emigration of workers to America where wages were higher but welfare did not 
exist (Megginson, and Jeffry, 2001; Hennock, 2007). Bismarck also extended his 
policies to protect the domestic industries by high tariffs policies which protected 
profits and wages from American competition.
^Redistribution o f wealth is the transfer of income, wealth or property from some individuals to 
others caused by a social mechanism such as taxation, monetary policies, welfare, nationalisation, 
charity, divorce or tort law. Most often it refers to progressive redistribution, from the rich to the 
poor, although it may also refer to regressive redistribution, from the poor to the rich. The 
desirability and effects o f redistribution are actively debated on ethical and economic grounds
33 The underlying premise behind the mixed economy is straightforward. Keynes and like-minded 
reformers were not willing to give up on capitalism, in particular two o f its basic features: that 
ownership and control o f the economy’s means o f production would remain primarily in the hands 
of private capitalists; and that most economic activity would be guided by ‘market forces’, that is, 
the dynamic combination o f material self-seeking and competition. More specifically, the driving 
force of the mixed economy, as with free-market capitalism, should continue to be capitalists 
trying to make as much profit as they can. At the same time, Keynes was clear that in maintaining 
a profit-driven marketplace, it was also imperative to introduce policy interventions to counteract 
capitalism’s inherent tendencies— demonstrated to devastating effect during the 1930s calamity—  
toward financial breakdowns, depressions and mass unemployment. Keynes’s framework also 
showed how full employment and social welfare interventions could be justified not simply on 
grounds o f social uplift, but could also promote the stability o f capitalism.
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Generally, the schemes of present-day welfare states concentrate more 
on the provision of both cash-welfare benefits (such as old-age pensions or 
unemployment benefits) and kind- welfare services (such as health or childcare 
services). Through these provisions, welfare states affect the distribution of 
wellbeing among their citizens, as well as influencing how their citizens consume 
and how they spend their time (O'Hara, (ed); 1999: 1245; Esping-Andersen, 1999). 
The emphasis on consumption in the welfare states stems from the notion of 
seeing the welfare schemes as a poverty relief strategy to cushion the effects of 
markets from ‘cradle to grave’ services from the state; and also to swing the 
interest of the working class away from socialism.
It has been argued elsewhere in this study that both state and 
individuals are inseparable partners. The rules of conduct of the state are to reflect 
the desired rules of the conduct by individuals that constitute the state and vice 
versa. Any unequal variation of the rules of conduct of or by either side will 
render both sides weak. The individuals who constitute the supreme authority or 
the sovereignty in the state have the powers to make rules of conduct to be 
executed on their behalf by the state and ensuring that such execution is binding 
on all. The state has the supervisory power to compel the individuals to conduct 
themselves within the confines of the rules of conduct set by individuals for the 
state to act upon. This is a working covenant between individuals and the state to 
provide a robust body politic for the benefit of one and all. As one of its 
fundamental principles, capitalism defends the logic of private property and as a 
corollary to this it defends the logic of consumption.
Democracy on the other hand defends the logic of collective 
construction of the extension of rights to all individuals. The two logics therefore 
make appeal to separate world views. For us to assume that market coexists with 
democracy remains an illusion sustained by manipulation of semantic. What we 
have in a free market democracy is democracy where market oligarchies combine 
the political system and the capitalist market to produce what Michael Parenti 
describes as “Democracy for the Few” (Parenti, 2001). For us to have a situation
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where the political and economic systems speak the same language there is need 
to reconfigure the body politic. Rousseau’s analogy will be used to illustrate the 
meaning of inseparable partnership between the individuals and state. . Rousseau 
explains:
The body politic34, taken individually, may be considered 
as an organised, living body, resembling that of man. The 
sovereign power represents the head; the laws and customs 
are the brain, the source of the nerves and seat of the 
understanding, will and senses, of which the Judges and 
Magistrates are the organs: commerce, industry, and 
agriculture are the mouth and stomach which prepare the 
common subsistence; the public income is the blood, 
which a prudent economy, in performing the functions of 
the heart, causes to distribute through the whole body 
nutriment and life: the citizens are the body and the 
members, which make the machine live, move and work; 
and no part of this machine can be damaged without the 
painful impression being at once conveyed to the brain, if 
the animal is in a state of health. (Rousseau, 1913)
It must be emphasised that Rousseau’s body-politic is akin to state 
that also has a common will that must not fail to preserve the life and the welfare 
of each, and the whole, their unity and relationship, through reciprocal 
responsibilities and duties. The state, through its reciprocal responsibilities and 
duties to the individual members, gives life and identity to the citizens. 
Individuals through their duties and responsibilities to the state also give life and 
identity to the state. Without the individuals there will be no society which by 
implication means, without the individuals there will be no state. State is, in 
essence the summation of all the societies recognisably occupying an organised 
geopolitical space with their members living and relating to each other, guided by
34 The metaphor linking the human anatomy to the system o f government can be found in Plato's 
'Republic'. In Jean-Jacques Rousseau's 'Discourse on Political Economy,' the metaphoric use was 
extended: 'The body politic, taken individually may be considered as an organised, living body, 
resembling that o f a man. The sovereign power represents the head; the laws and customs are the 
brain, commerce, industry and agriculture are the mouth and stomach, the public income is the 
blood, the citizens are the body and the members, which make the machine live, move and work.'" 
See Safire’s New Political Dictionary by William Safire (Random House, New York, 1993) for 
further reading
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some norms, values, legal and extra-legal rules and regulations maintained and 
supervised by the established institutions and authorities. These institutions and 
authorities derive their legitimacy from the duties and responsibilities of 
individuals as agreed upon by the individuals at the onset of the state. The 
fountain of life and legitimacy of the state are therefore derived from the 
legitimacy, duties and responsibilities of the various institutions and authorities 
created by the state with a legitimate authority derived from the sovereigns.
Before the state can protect individual members, it must be in a 
position to render such responsibility. Its effectiveness requires some mandatory 
duties and responsibilities from the individual members which must not diminish. 
These responsibilities are classified in this study as political, economic, social, 
cultural and biological responsibilities. They are not by choice but required for the 
energy and life of the state for it to provide the protective duties and 
responsibilities. This is the basis for the partnership between individuals and the 
state.
The absence of these mandatory responsibilities underlies the 
separation of individuals from the state in other models. For example, in 
socialism, the state is the sole employer of labour. It is also through the profits 
acquired from the employees, provides some forms of social protection to all. 
Both the state and individuals are not partners, they only maintain employer- 
employee relationship with the state having a commanding say. In economic 
liberalism, the state assumes the position of “night watchman”, as it is not allowed 
to engage in production itself or attempt to determine what is produced by the 
private capitalists.
In a mixed economy, both the state and the private individuals are 
allowed to direct the economy, reflecting the characteristics of both planned and 
market economies (Stilwell, 2006). Private individuals own the means of
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production while the government uses some fiscal and monetary policies to 
counteract the market’s tendency towards financial crises and unemployment. The 
state in capitalist or mixed economy collects sums from the private individuals in 
form of taxes for the services rendered. Tax evasion or tax underpayment is 
considered by the state as a serious fraud meant to incapacitate state, and therefore 
attracts serious penalty from the state. In socialism, workers pay the state for the 
protective services rendered to them through their labour and taxes.
In speconomy, political responsibility does not require every 
individual to be a member of a political group, but voting at state elections to 
determine the legitimacy of the state’s institutions and authority. It is mandatory 
for every voting-age individual to be on the electoral register. In the same vein, 
economic responsibility, allows voluntariness in the decision to be an employer or 
employee but the idea of an individual member not working at all without any 
disability becomes an attempt at diminishing the energy and life of the state. Work 
is therefore a required responsibility of every individual member of the state. 
Becoming an employer requires a process, such as development viable feasibility 
studies, possession of relevant skills, belonging to a cooperative group of 
individuals whose skills are complimentary to the survival of the business etc.
The socialisation and integration of a child into society is a parental 
responsibility by obligation. The required responsibilities of the parents towards 
the child include provision of parental care, clothing, feeding, supporting the child 
to access the educational, health, and other social facilities provided by the state 
for the child development. The state still has the responsibility of taking care of 
genuinely sick and honest job seekers. Unemployment support in speconomy is 
not restricted to monetary allowance only, but also includes the encouragement of 
voluntary self-development towards self-employment. However where the job 
seeker opts for employee status, such beneficiary is made to do community 
service or voluntary work around job searching and interviews for a specific 
period.
[299]
Dereliction of any of the required responsibilities by an individual 
becomes an attempt at taking the life of the state and which of course the state 
must prevent as part of its responsibilities and duties to itself and others. The state 
has a responsibility of providing minimum provision of good life to those who 
could not avail themselves with the opportunities for the equitable distribution of 
wealth due to some disabilities. State’s responsibility to those who try to take its 
life by abandoning their required responsibilities is to firstly protect such life from 
being taken away. It is through this protection that it will be able to perform its 
own responsibilities. For instance, the idea of the Universal Child Benefit -  a 
scheme that gives benefits to parents, encouraging families to have children, 
supporting them to feed and support the family, may encourage the abandonment 
of required economic responsibility by the freeloaders in the state if not applied 
with rules and regulations. Child benefit in speconomy will only be adopted when 
there is need for ‘baby boom’ or in a situation of multiple births by in a single 
delivery. In either situation, it will be for a limited period and not necessarily 
monetary allowance in all cases.
The goal of speconomy is to produce a welfare economy that uses 
welfare policies as developmental strategies to develop the productive aspect of 
man rather than restricting such policies to the improvement of the consumption
35Universal benefits paid to rich and poor such as child benefit were particularly beneficial after 
the Second World War when the birth rate was low. Universal Child Benefit may have helped 
drive the baby boom.
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aspect. It encourages the development of what Spencer refers to as “voluntary 
self-improvement” which is the basis for the productive aspect in every individual. 
It is the neglect of this aspect that in the first instance opens the welfare schemes 
to abuse and harsh criticisms from critics like Herbert Spencer who opine that 
coddling the poor and unfit would simply allow them to reproduce and delay 
social progress.
8.3 Speconomy and poverty eradication
The extent to which an economic model affects poverty depends upon 
many factors, but particularly on its structure and policies. The underbelly of 
speconomy’s emphasis is the that productive growth is more likely to lead 
directly to a reduction in poverty when the economic assets of the state are 
distributed relatively equally or when based on the intensive employment of 
factors of production, especially labour and capital. For example, in largely rural 
economies based on small-scale farming, as in many African countries, most of 
the poor are engaged in agriculture. When such a country grows through 
agricultural exports, or when growth in manufacturing increases the demand for 
food and materials supplied by the rural sector, growth benefits both poor farmers 
and the even poorer labourers they employ. In land-poor but labour-abundant 
economies, such as those of East Asia, rapid growth of manufactured or service 
exports creates a large pool of new jobs, absorbs the supply of low-productivity 
workers, and eventually causes a rise in real wages that further reduces poverty.
The comparative advantage of the countries is vital for the 
development of their cooperative groups. This does not foreclose the need for
36 H erbert Spencer in his ‘'The Man versus the S tate’ (\%84), attacked the Liberal Party for not 
defending personal property but promoting paternalist social legislation that provides compulsory 
education, laws to regulate safety at work, prohibition and temperance laws, tax funded libraries, 
and welfare reforms. His main objections were threefold: the use o f the coercive powers o f the 
government, the discouragement given to voluntary self-improvement, and the disregard o f the 
"laws of life." The reforms, he said, were tantamount to "socialism", which he said was about the 
same as "slavery" in terms o f limiting human freedom.
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cooperatives in secondary industries but the primary cooperative groups should be 
predominantly base on the resource advantage of the country to pave the way for 
the emergence of secondary activities.
Speconomy as a unique welfare model modifies the ‘need right’ to 
include the productive aspect to fortify the economic partnership for the protection 
and benefit of both state and citizens. The essence of this, using the required 
economic responsibilities of the two partners to stimulate growth, is to sharpen the 
productive aspect of every individual, energise the state by boosting its productive 
base, create more employment opportunities, provide alternative way of re­
focusing the state to tackle the effects of the market on the citizenry, and reduce 
the incidence of poverty.
There have been arguments about the capability of welfare policies to 
considerably reduce poverty in countries whose welfare policies commonly 
constitute at least a fifth of their GDPs (Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser, 2011: 597; 
Kenworthy, 1999). Do these welfare policies actually work? The major weakness in 
these policies is the sapping of the productive aspect of the beneficiaries, mostly 
the poor which invariably weakens the economy. Some studies that focused on the 
relationship between welfare policies and poverty reduction could not but 
conclude that though the state generosity improves the absolute material well­
being of the poor but no evidence suggests that relatively more generous 
unemployment benefits systematically reduce poverty. It rather reduces economic 
growth and offsetting in the long run any poverty reduction it might have achieved 
in the short run (Kenworthy, 1999: 1119-39).
From the foregoing it could be argued that welfare policies though 
intended to improve the well-being of those at or near the bottom of income 
distribution, but the policies rather than reduce poverty only put in place poverty 
trap as averred by Kenwhorthy (ibid). The reason for this is not far-fetched. 
Economic growth remains the key to poverty reduction, excessive redistribution 
of state income through welfare policies without commensurate production, will 
automatically cripple growth. .
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Most of the welfare states stated below have considerably lower 
poverty rates than they had before the implementation of welfare programs but 
they all record reduction in their GDPs, as will be revealed later, when compared
with China.
Country
Absolute poverty 
(1960-1991) 
(threshold set at  ^
median householc
rate
10% of U.S. 
income)
Relative poverty rate 
(1970-1997)
Pre-welfare Post-welfare Re-welfare Post-welfare
Sweden 23.7 5.8 44.8 4.8
Norway 9.2 1.7 12.4 4.0
Netherlands 22.1 7.3 18.5 11.5
Finland 11.9 3.7 12.4 3.1
Denmark 26.4 5.9 17.4 4.8
Germany 15.2 4.3 9.7 5.1
Switzerland 12.5 3.8 10.9 9.1
Canada 22.5 6.5 17.1 11.9
France 36.1 9.8 21.8 6.1
Belgium 26.8 6.0 19.5 4.1
Australia 23.3 11.9 16.2 9.2
United Kingdom 16.8 8.7 16.4 8.2
United States 21.0 11.7 17.2 15.1
Italy 30.7 14.3 19.7 9.1
Figures from the OECD 2001 and the UNDP (2003)
8.4 Dynamics of Speconomy in the Global Economy
The richness of community-centred life in the rural areas of Africa 
may tempt one to query if it is really necessary for the African nations to take part 
in the global economy that is driven by fierce competition. Historically, Africa has 
for centuries been and will remain part of the global economy. Most of rural 
Africa is as closely connected to the world economy as their urban cities do 
through the manufacturing sector. Most of the agricultural produce such as coffee, 
cotton, cocoa, etc. produced in the rural areas are mainly for exportation to feed
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the industries in the developed countries. Many of the textile farms, assembly 
plants, and large trading companies in Africa are owned by foreign investors.
The ‘second-hand’37 clothes, house-holds equipment, and furniture, 
etc. which compete with the domestic industries, come from the developed 
countries. Most governments in the Sub Saharan Africa are World Trade
t o  #
Organisation (WTO) members or are WTO observers . Thirty-eight members, 
four have established accession working parties and two others have requested 
accession working parties . In addition, three governments have typically been 
granted observer status during ministerial conferences40. ‘These are pointers as 
argued by Taylor that ‘Africa is increasingly important in international relations 
and is more and more attracting interest from a variety of actors at a scale perhaps 
not witnessed since the original Scramble for Africa’ (Taylor 2010: 22). 
Unfortunately, “on many fronts” argues Brown (2012), “African states remain at 
best minor powers” still “hemmed in” (Callaghy and Ravenhill, 1993) by the 
“seemingly immovable structures of international inequality, by high levels of 
poverty and underdevelopment, often fragile economies and weak political and 
military capacity” (Brown, ibid). It is apparent that Africa will remain an integral 
part of the global economy. However, being part of the global economy needs to 
be accomplished by proceeding from Africa’s special characteristics through 
which the African states can blaze their own paths.
37 These are used items sometimes given to charity organisations in the developed nations but most 
o f them are now shipped to African cities for direct sales
38 The following 10 SSA governments are not WTO members: Cape Verde, Comoros, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Equatorial Guinea, Liberia, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Somalia, and Sudan.
39 WTO accession working parties have been established for the following SSA countries: Cape 
Verde (July 2000), Ethiopia (Feb. 2003), Seychelles (May 1995), and Sudan (Oct. 1994). 
Equatorial Guinea (Apr. 2002) and Sao Tome and Principe (Jan. 2001) have requested that 
accession working parties be established for their countries.
40 The Comoros, Eritrea, and Liberia
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This historical pattern of Africa’s involvement in the contemporary 
global economy provides us with an insight to understand the current economic 
situation and the impact of such patterns on Africa’s economic growth. SSA 
countries’ efforts to increase integration into the global trading economy 
continued to be hampered by numerous obstacles. In addition to social and 
political conflict arising mostly from the incapability of the states to provide the 
necessary protections for the citizens, inadequate infrastructure, such as 
dilapidated road networks, congested ports, inefficient customs services, and 
prohibitively expensive air transport, due to bad governance and weak states etc. 
hampered the national and international transport of merchandise. Many SSA 
countries continue to depend heavily on extractive primary commodity products, 
such as petroleum, minerals, and agricultural products (for example, cocoa, 
coffee, cotton, and tea). These primary products are subjected to erratic and 
declining international prices (USITC, 2012: 6-2).
The vicissitudes of African economic visions from Manchester, 1945 
to NEPAD, 2002 had been discussed elsewhere and the need to reconfigure the 
economic architecture also explained. This reconfiguration was also explained to 
require refocusing the state in order to reduce the over-dependence on the 
industrialised countries’ extractive economic relationship. African states are 
grappling with the new dilemmas of openness to trade and capital flows inherent 
in the global trade economy. As queried by Dani Rodrik (1999), what role if any, 
remains for the state in promoting industrialisation? Does openness worsen 
inequality, and if so, what can be done about it? What is the best way to handle 
turbulence from the world economy, especially the fickleness of international 
capital flows? In wrestling with these posers, Dani Rodrik (ibid: 1) argues that 
successful integration into the world economy requires a complementary set of 
policies and institutions at home. States must reinforce their external strategy of 
liberalisation with an appropriate internal strategy that gives the state substantial 
responsibility in building physical and human capital and mediating social 
conflicts.
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There is the importance of openness for economic growth but not at 
the expense of local growth. A necessary condition to participate in and benefit 
from the opportunities available in the global environment is a policy framework 
that facilitates domestic production and growth.
The UK Government’s White Paper on International Development 
(Secretary of State, 2000) provides a particularly useful and balanced view of the 
role of market-opening and other developmental policies in the promotion of 
development. The Paper while recognising the importance of governance, human, 
physical and capital investment policies, it also recognises the central role of trade 
policies of the state in harnessing the forces of globalisation for the benefit of the 
poor. The document explains:
Everywhere it is clear that openness is a necessary -  though not 
sufficient -  condition for national prosperity. No developed 
country is closed. The initially poor countries that have been 
most successful in catching up. in recent decades -  the newly 
industrialising Easter Asian countries and China -  seized the 
opportunity offered by more open world markets to build strong 
export sectors and to attract inward investment. This 
contributed, along with massive investment in education, to the 
largest reduction in abject poverty that the world has ever seen 
(Secretary of State 2000: 17).
The emphasis of the document is that openness is never a sufficient 
condition for national prosperity but inward investment with massive investment 
in education. This emphasis serves as a confirmation to speconomy that what 
needs to be improved upon by the state is the productive aspect of individuals. 
One of the most vexing questions revealed by the document is why, if global 
trade economy is so good for development, why have so many countries,
thespecially in Africa, fallen further behind during the final decades of the 20 
century, during the height of the recent globalization experience? A large part of 
the answer lies in poor domestic development strategies of the African countries 
which depend more on foreign extractive economic relationship.
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With respect of the industrialised western nations, they are afflicted 
with outsource production. Outsourced production is a form of consumption that 
weakens domestic production growth. The corporate organisations move out of 
high production cost to low product cost zones where they utilise more of 
production factors to maximise profits. The corporate organisations derive excess 
profits from the host state due to cheap production cost. The host state provides 
free trade zones, tax reliefs and other infrastructural instruments to aid free flow 
of capitals and profits. The industry provides employment opportunities to the 
locales but it hardly contributes to the domestic production growth of the state. It 
in addition appropriates surplus labour41. The finished products are not essentially 
meant for the local markets, they are to be repatriated to the countries of origins of 
the corporate organisations and other developed countries with high currency 
values. This repatriation expands the need-based consumption of the populace 
while the domestic growth shrinks due to the outsourcing policy.
With the fall in the domestic growth, fewer jobs become available for 
the people in the manufacturing sector and which invariably means less income 
tax for the state. Loss of jobs also means reduction in the prospective buyers of 
the repatriated goods. Supply of goods will increase while the demand diminishes. 
This leads to further job loss in the trade industry and also loss of revenue for the 
state. The loss of revenue by the state automatically affects the state in performing 
its social responsibilities towards the citizens and of which the state must fill the 
gaps created by the revenue loss. The effects are more pronounced in welfare 
states due to their welfare generosities which increase domestic consumption 
while production diminishes.
41 Surplus labour is a concept used by Karl Marx in his critique o f political economy. It means 
labour performed in excess o f necessary labour to produce the means o f livelihood o f the worker. 
It is usually an "unpaid labour" which Marxian economics regards as the ultimate source of  
capitalist profits. The historical emergence o f surplus labour is, according to Marx, closely 
associated with the growth o f trade, that is, the economic exchange o f goods and services; and 
with the emergence o f a society divided into social classes where the strong after defeating the 
weak can live off the labour o f the weak.
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For the state to fill the gap it employs series of austerity measures to 
prevent dwindling revenues and conserve funds. The strategies always include 
reduction in public spending, withdrawal of subsidies, total withdrawal or partial 
provision of some social services, ‘right sizing’ of labour, increment in service 
fees or product prices, expanding the scope of taxable items, high tariffs on 
foreign goods, monetisation of some benefits and privileges, adjustment of 
pension schemes and retiring ages etc. All these measures are taken by the state in 
other to ensure that banks -  the driving force of corporate organisations stay 
afloat. How and why? Banks are sustained by deposits from the state, corporate 
organisations and individuals.
Loss of jobs means reduced taxes and less deposit for the banks, loss 
of prospective buyers for the finished goods and reduced profit for the corporate 
organisations and more expenditure for the welfare states in form of support. With 
fewer deposits, banks are unable to provide financial support for the corporate 
organisations and this will on the long run affect the production scales in the 
‘comfort zones’ with deeper consequences for the home countries in terms of 
mass unemployment. This is what is generally referred to as recession42. 
Recession is characterised by contraction43 in the GDP for a maximum period of 
six months to one year, high unemployment, stagnant wages and fall in retail 
sales. Any contraction lasting more than one year becomes a depression. There is 
a need to expand the frontiers of the consumption theory for the purpose of clarity
42 A recession generally does not last longer than one year and is much milder than a 
slump or depression. Some economists consider recession as a normal part of the 
capitalist economy but its causes is still subject to debates among the economists
43 Contraction is the lowest point in an economic cycle characterised by reduced 
purchasing power, mass unemployment, and excess of supply over demand, falling prices 
or prices rising slower than usual, falling wages or wages rising than usual and general 
lack of confidence in the future. This becomes a slump or depression if it lasted more than 
one year and causes a major drop in all economic activity
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and to further illustrate the elements involved in speconomy.
Consumption in this chapter refers to a process in which goods and 
services are completely used up, incorporated or transformed into a new 
substance. The consumed item may either be goods or services whose 
consumption means the amount of such items used in a particular time period.
The process of consumption is the sequence of interdependent and 
linked procedures which at every stage consume one or more resources such as 
labour time and capital to convert the input to output. The output may either be 
completely destroyed or serve as inputs for the next stage until a desired goal is 
achieved. There is a difference between ‘need-based consumption’ and ‘want- 
based consumption’. An illustration of the two types of consumption is when you 
feel thirsty, obviously you will need water to quench your thirst and re­
hydrate yourself. In this wise water is your need. Therefore, drinking water is 
need-based consumption. Want-based consumption, on the other hand, is when 
you give preference for cool drinks like Pepsi, coca cola, apple juice, etc. to 
quench your thirst. This involves choosing between alternatives for maximum 
satisfaction.
The argument that the level of consumption is determined among 
other factors by one’s budget constraint may not be a strong factor in 
globalisation. Globalising activities of the multinational corporations with big 
wallets and unfettered access to financial resources have proved that profit 
maximisation is the chief driving force for their consumption of better production 
matrix provided by most of the states in the developing third world economies. 
Outsourcing of production is therefore a want-based consumption that provides 
the best option for the MNCs to derive desired satisfaction of high returns on 
investments as against low returns that might have been recorded at home due to 
high cost of production.
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Analysing the issue of consumption in this study is primarily to show 
how the MNCs use consumption to disintegrate production that is, shrink 
production at home and breeds unemployment globally. It also aims to show how 
speconomy plans the refocusing of the state economy targeting domestic 
production for sustainable expansion of the productive base of the state in order to 
address the sixth giant killer of the economy -Less jobs that characterises 
periodical global recession/depression.
A further analysis is made by comparing the European Union 
economy with the Chinese economy and using such to highlight the elements of 
speconomy that improves the Chinese GDP. The essence of using China as an 
illustration aims, in particular, to relate China’s economic performance to Western 
free market economic theory which we are more familiar with and whose 
rejection for African states constitutes one of the cornerstones of the thesis.
The target set of any economic development cannot be isolated from 
specific situation and goal. Speconomy is not an exemption to this. For example, 
for a prolonged period after the commencement of China’s reform and opening up 
process in 1978 the goal was the most rapid possible GDP development as 
explained by John Ross (2011).
Going by Ross submission (ibid), China’s rate of growth of total 
consumption, (household consumption and state spending on items such as 
education, health etc), has risen at 8.7% a year over the reform period compared to 
6.1% for Malaysia, 5.9% for Indonesia, and 5.6% for South Korea. China’s 8.7% 
annual rate of growth of total consumption evidently far exceeds the 3.0% for the 
US, 2.6% for the UK, 2.5% for Japan, 1.6% for Germany etc.
China also has the fastest annual rate of growth of household 
consumption of 8.6% when compared to Malaysia’s 6.8%, Indonesia’s 6.0%,
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South Korea’s 5.6% etc. China’s rate of growth of household consumption is 
evidently far higher than the US’s 3.5%, the UK’s 3.0%, Germany’s 1.6% etc.
See Table 1 below
Annual % increase 1978-2008
GDP
Household
Consumption
Total
Consumption
China 9.8% 8.6% 8.7%
Malaysia* 6.3% 6.8% 6.1%
Indonesia 5.4% 6.0% 5.9%
Korea, Rep. 6.3% 5.6% 5.6%
Hong KongSAR, China 5.5% 5.2% 5.1%
Thailand 5.7% 4.9% 5.0%
India 5.7% 4.6% 4.8%
Chile 5.1% 5.0% 4.6%
Ireland* 5.0% 4.5% 3.8%
Philippines 3.2% 3.8% 3.7%
Australia 3.3% 3.2% 3.3%
United States* 2.8% 3.5% 3.0%
United Kingdom 2.4% 3,0% 2.6%
Canada* 2.7% 3.0% 2.5%
Japan* 2.3% 2.7% 2.5%
France 2.1% 2.1% 2.1%
Germany 2.0% 1.6% 1.6%
Switzerland* 1.8% 1.6% 1.5%
* Consumption annual increase 1978-2007
Source: Calculated from World Bank World Data Tables
From Table 1 above, it is clear that all countries with the highest rate 
of growth of consumption -  China, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, 
Hong Kong, Thailand, and India -  have the highest rates of growth of GDP. 
Countries with low growth rates of GDP -  the US, UK, Japan, France, Germany 
etc -  also have low rates of growth of consumption, although they have higher 
shares of consumption in GDP than China. This is a vital signal of low domestic 
investment in the US, UK, Japan, France, Germany etc. This illustrates that what 
is crucial in the economic development of consumption is its rate of growth, in 
which the determinant is the rate of GDP growth, and not the percentage of 
consumption in GDP. It is the China’s high level of enterprise investment in fixed
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assets that creates the basis for its rapid economic growth, raising its GDP from an 
average o f 29 percent between 1978 and 1993 to an average o f 36 percent 
thereafter. This in turn permits its high rate o f growth o f consumption. The unique 
characteristics that differentiate China from other economies are that it is 
enterprise investment rather than the household or government investment.
EU economy on the hand has for the last four years been recording 
shortfalls in investments with high shares o f consumption in GDP. The 
fundamental trends in Europe's economy are illustrated in Figure 1 below.
European Union - changes in com ponents of GDP
1st Quarter 2008 - 4 th  Quarter 2011, constan t price PPP, $ million annual levels
■ GDP
■ Fixed investm ent
■ Personal consum ption
■ N et trade
■ G overnm ent 
consum ption
Source: Calculated from OECD Q uarterly  National A ccounts
This shows the changes in different components o f the European 
Union (EU)'s GDP since the first quarter o f  2008 -  the peak o f the last business 
cycle and immediately before the onset o f the financial crisis. It may be seen that 
the negative trend in the EU economy is entirely dominated by its fall in 
investment.
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The EU's trade balance has improved during the financial crisis, 
government consumption has risen, and the fall in personal consumption is 
relatively small. But the fall in fixed investment is huge, amounting to 150 per 
cent of the total decline in GDP. This falls far more than offsets the performance 
in other economic sectors. The economic situation in Europe is therefore entirely 
dominated by this investment fall. What could have been responsible for the fall 
in investment? This is what is referred to in the study as disintegration of 
production through outsourcing of production and continuous expansion of need- 
based consumption at home in search of profit maximisation abroad.
The difference in China can be seen in Figure 2, which shows the 
results of the stimulus program launched by China in 2008 to counter the 
international financial crisis. This stimulus programme directly targeted raising 
investment -  in particular infrastructure and housing. The results are evident. 
Rather than falling sharply, as in Europe and the US, China's investment rose with 
its economy expanding by over 40 per cent in four years compared to growth of 1 
per cent in the US and a contraction of 2 per cent in Europe. Majority of China's 
stimulus programme partially targeted investment at home to expand the 
production base of the state and increase exports to international markets (see 
Wen Jiabao’ Sustaining Economic Growth in China, March 2007, pp 105-109).
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Figure 2
China - Changes in Components of GDP
2007-2010 current prices RMB billion
■ GDP
■ Fixed In v estm en t
B P ersonal C onsum ption
■ G o v ern m en t Consum ptioi
■ In ven to ries
■ N et Exports
Source: Calculated from China Statistical Yearbook 2011
As stated elsewhere, the essence o f using China in this illustration is 
to juxtapose China’s economic growth with the European Union, show its global 
impact, and the consequences for the improvement o f the social conditions of 
China and the world’s population. While the EU’ choice is to reinforce the 
speconomy’s assumption that every country is specific and therefore no country 
can or should mechanically copy another.
The Chinese political leaders led by its economic reformer Deng 
Xiaoping stress this uniqueness fondly referred to as ‘Chinese characteristics’ in 
the Chinese economic reform package. It was this uniqueness that formed the 
pillar o f the reform that was more o f backward integration and state-led. Deng 
Xiaoping asserts that ‘to accomplish modernization o f a Chinese type, we must 
proceed from China’s special characteristics.’ (Deng, 1979), therefore China must 
‘blaze a path of our ow n’ (Deng, 1985). This view was later reinforced by Justin 
Yifu Lin, Chinese Chief Economist and Senior Vice President o f the World Bank. 
He argues:
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‘...we can never be too careful when it comes to the application 
of a foreign theory, because with different preconditions, no
matter how trivial they seem, the result can be very different’
(Lin, 2012: 66)
China’s ‘reform and opening up’ process under Deng Xiaoping was, 
of course, formulated in a modified Marxist economic framework. Deng 
Xiaoping's economic reforms of the 1980s were regarded as a “re-instatement of 
economics in China” (Lin, 1981). It includes a critique of Soviet economic policy 
which Deng Xiaoping opined to be an error of confusing the ‘advanced’ stage of 
socialism/communism, in which the regulation of the economy is ‘for need’,
hence not market regulated. Deng felt otherwise by expressing that market
regulation must accompany the stages of development in socialism, during which 
the transition from capitalism to an advanced socialist economy takes place (ibid).
The final formulation arrived at was that China’s was a ‘socialist 
market economy with ‘Chinese characteristics’. This is a model that gives the 
state ownership of the large state firms while the citizens own small ones with 
support from the state. This is a form of socialised agreement between the two 
partners working towards the same goal of expanding the productive base of the 
state for the overall benefits of all. In practical terms, such model accommodates 
the modification of a centrally planned economy to develop a socialist market 
economy where the state controls certain key macroeconomic parameters. In 
terms of ownership it is guided by ‘Zhuada Fangxiao’ -  state maintaining large 
state firms and releasing small ones to the non-state/private sector (John Ross, 
2012).
China became less vulnerable to the mobile investment funds because 
the Chinese state’s control of the capitals and less dependence on the foreign 
investments. This is the melting point between speconomy and the Chinese 
models. The speconomy partnership model provides the state with the opportunity 
to direct the usage of the capital more in the domestic investments than reliance
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on the Foreign Direct Investments. The departing point with the Chinese model is 
that speconomy provides the state with the tool of preventing structural imbalance 
in the economy such imbalance investment in the economic sectors. This is done 
in order to prevent relocation of labour from low-productivity sector to high 
productivity sector. Speconomy takes into account many of the technological and 
scientific advances of our time which the state will play a leading role in 
harnessing to prevent industrial overcapacity that may lead to high productivity 
without commensurate consumer spending.
The state provides the technology the business owner(s) could not 
afford as part of production costs to the business in addition to providing training 
of specialised professionals through educational policies. These skilled 
professionals will in turn be providing innovative technology required for 
business growth.
Though there are instances where land has been divided into parcels 
with individual or sub-family land titles, but the common practice is that 
individuals or families work the land together especially in the rural areas where 
the bulk of the African population resides. This makes cooperative associations 
more appealing as done in the Western Nigeria between 1954 and 1966 to 
organise workers into groups that will form partnerships with the state. The state 
will guide the cooperative groups towards its comparative advantage in 
agriculture and industrialisation. Once the comparative advantage has been 
achieved in any sector and the state is self-sufficient, the sector can graduate from 
subsistence to large-scale that will be more of export driven. Foreign companies 
will be allowed to participate as partners in mostly the large scale companies.
The responsibilities of the state will include stimulating the creation of 
domestic cooperative enterprises, establish domestic markets and locate the 
foreign markets as well; and to develop energy sources and infrastructure to foster 
these enterprises. Because the domestic enterprises which mostly are at their
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cottage levels may not have the capacity to administer the nation’s strategic 
resources, in these cases and in these cases only will state enterprises be created 
but in partnership with the regions, towns and communities hosting such 
enterprises. Revenues from these enterprises will contribute to the society’s 
welfare.
In speconomy, the state takes charge of planning the equitable 
empowerment of domestic enterprises through socialised partnerships and tax 
policies while it continues to guarantee the nation’s security, its monetary policies 
and, basically, will be in charge of consolidating all productive forces oriented 
toward national integration.
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Chapter 9 
Summary and Conclusion
The argument of this thesis is that sub-Saharan Africa and indeed the 
African countries will continue to be dogged by political crisis as long as the post­
colonial nation-states retain the status of 4neo-trading outposts' with no effort to 
reconfigure the state and ensure the equitable distribution of resources in a way 
that will tilt the economy towards high level of domestic investment. The 
emphasis being stressed in speconomy is that every country is specific and 
therefore no country can or should mechanically copy another. Every country 
needs to blaze their own path in the direction flowered by indigenous grains. 
Traditional African economy possesses two salient features that serve as key 
elements in speconomy. Firstly, man is never portrayed only as a consumer but 
also as a producer. Secondly, the development of man’s productive aspect is never 
left for man alone but with the support from his community, of which he shares 
the proceeds with the community through his contributions to the ‘family pot’.
In rural Africa, the extended family and the clan system allows 
members to assume the responsibility for all services for their members, whether 
social or economic. People live in closely organised groups and willingly accept 
communal obligations for mutual support. Individuals satisfy their needs for 
social and economic security merely by being attached to one of these groups. The 
sick, the aged and children are all cared for by the extended family. This system as 
cited by Iliffe, allows the people to be mentally healthy due to lack of insecurity 
while deviation or abnormal behaviour is almost absent (Iliffe, 1987: 3).
The economic model involves the cooperation between the individuals 
and the community. These two salient features are general to every society but 
the communal values of African societies make it more pronounced in traditional 
African societies. One of the main arguments in speconomy is that part of reasons 
responsible for the contemporary economic crisis is the separation of these two
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inseparable partners in all the existing economic models. This is a broken linkage 
that needs to be fixed. Globalisation as it is now, serves as a process that further 
widens the separation of man from the state. Globalisation could still be turned 
around to consolidate the integration of both man and state. The idea of jettisoning 
capitalism or embracing socialism by the post-colonial leaders was just a 
reflection of their ideological orientation which has nothing to do with African 
culture. Africans accumulate wealth just like any other group of people in the 
capitalist countries. The only difference, however, is the form of accumulation. 
Clearly, as emphasised by Ayittey (2008), the general absence of economic or 
pecuniary wealth does not indicate that Africans had no conception of wealth and 
were uninterested in its accumulation (Ayittey, 2008). There is no African norm 
or value that forbids Africans to prosper and be wealthy or any custom that 
indicates Africans as natural socialists. In fact, each king or chief desired 
prosperity for his people. Ritual incantations, religious sacrifices, and invocation 
of ancestral spirits were generally performed to seek the assistance of the gods and 
dead ancestors to protect the tribe and help it prosper (ibid)
In spite of wealth accumulation practice, political power or office in 
traditional Africa was not used as the basis to accumulate wealth. As explained by 
Carlston (1968), the rich in traditional Africa did not owe their wealth to political 
office or connections rather strong emphasis was placed on personal achievement, 
and ways to achievement and leadership were open. The African chief was 
forbidden to accumulate personal wealth. Any such accumulation or gift to the 
Akan chief according to Carlston, (ibid) was regarded as ’’stool property." Many 
social groups, who aided their members as they sought to move upwards in status 
and influence, encouraged achievement. Achievement and initiative were 
permitted within many of the social groups and were facilitated by the number of 
contacts with social groups which were possible. An individual could turn to 
many different groups for land, political support, and other purposes.
Without a political and economic arrangement that ensures “ethnic 
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justice” neither "liberal democracy" nor any other imported specie of democracy 
and government can succeed in Africa (Skinner, 1998: 17). If liberal democracy 
were to have any chance of survival in Africa, it will have to adapt to local 
realities, and its contours need to be shaped by indigenous socio-cultural values. It 
has to be modified to accommodate the historical specificity of the political and 
cultural circumstances of African states.
Africa is in need of relief from poor governance, misgovemment and 
economic collapse but this relief may be difficult to achieve if African states fail 
to have their own unique parades. While reforms to improve governance are 
essential for sustainable economic growth and political stability, such reforms 
require inputs from peculiar grains that can enable each state to blaze its own path 
with its unique characteristics. What has been obtainable in the sub-Saharan 
African states is the acceptance of the liberal market prescriptions without any 
effort at using their unique contexts to define their own political and economic 
paths. The result is the failure that creates the basis for what Skinner (ibid) 
describes as "disemia"44 but which Geertz (1963, p. 109) erroneously debunked 
with emphasis that new political society may be difficult to attain in the face of 
persisting primordial bonds such as kinship, blood, language or religion that are 
ever present to frustrate the emergence of such society. The thesis stresses idea of 
democracy as not exclusively a Western concept. Similarly, the presumption that 
democratic values and practices are alien to the African continent, with the West 
posturing as their cultural bearers and defenders creates the mindset of 
considering Africans as incapable of democratic thoughts. This [mis]conception 
gives the impression of Africa in desperate need of democracy therefore there is a 
need to infuse African with civilised notion of Western democracy. What is 
ignored in this thought is that democratic values and processes have been as 
indigenous to Africans as they were to the ancient Greeks. African traditional 
political cultures and organizations as discussed in Chapter Three would give
44 This is a condition among local power seekers who, to please hegemonies, may either disguise 
those aspects o f social life that conflict with the hopes o f tutelary powers, or create systems out of  
phase with local realities, or cynically manipulate local conditions to gain or remain in power
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credence to this conclusion. Democratic thought and values have never been an 
exclusive preserve of any culture or group. The desire for representation, 
inclusion, and participation in public affairs which are essential elements of 
democracy, are universal to all humans. The difference rests in the methods of 
attaining these goals. To what extent a society “democratises” is incontestably 
dependent on its socio-cultural milieu, whether it is African, European, American, 
Asian, or even Islamic societies.
The pre-colonial African traditional political systems were able to 
function not because of their forms, but because they were able to fulfil the needs 
of their subjects and societies. Those that could not fulfil such needs; not because 
of any cultural value but failure in moral obligations of the leader towards the 
subjects and such leader’s political authority also received equal measure of 
resistance from the subjects. What matters in the contemporary context is creative 
adjustment towards democratic reforms as noted by Whitaker in the case of 
Northern Nigerian politics. Whitaker concluded as noted in Chapter Two, that 
"significant elements of the traditional political system of the emirates proved to 
be compatible in practical terms with significant features of the modem state" 
(Whitaker, 1970: 467).
As emphasised in the thesis, by the 1980s, regardless of ideology, the 
political economies of the African states had so deteriorated to provide a veritable 
opportunity for military coups, political oppression and ethnic strife. While some 
analysts blamed the African leaders of “pursuing economic policies or creating 
public institutions that became impediments to their economic progress" (Kitchen, 
1988: 21), the military were however laying the blame on incompetence and 
corruption of the political leaders. The military hardly considered the political 
economy that subjects the state to being a victim of a changing global economic 
environment. Because African economies were so heavily dependent on the 
export of a few primary products, any recession in the West caused them to
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collapse (ibid: 22). This ignorance contributed to the fatal failure and eventual 
collapse of nearly all the military regimes in Africa.
The failure of both the civilians and the military administrations 
informed, as clearly stated in Chapter Seven, the Afro Pessimistic45 view that was 
challenged by the Afro Optimistic46 view. The end of the Cold War actually 
complicated the Africa’s Tragedy with a subsequent disinterest by both East and 
West in African affairs leading to Afro pessimism. Rather than consider Africa's 
problems as the precipitate of its turbulent change, the practices of the often 
embattled (and often corrupt) African leaders were blamed (Skinner, 1998: 20), as 
revealed in Bates and Berg Reports of 1981.
The IMF/SAP solutions prescribed by the World Bank with the United 
States as the propelling engine for the African states to adopt democracy and free 
market only aggravated the situation. The greatest fault line of the liberal market 
democracy was the assumption of the universality of democracy. The liberal 
proponents assert that democracy everywhere means not only the right of people 
to elect their own government, but that only its liberal variant can guarantee the 
full exercise of fundamental human rights now judged to be universal and 
applicable to all individuals without distinction as to age, gender, descent, 
religion, ethnicity, or race (Bohen, 1987).
Coups and corruption are not issues that could be treated in isolation if 
an end is to be sought. An end to coups and corruption could not be achieved if 
the meaning and practice of democracy are still restricted to its liberal variant with
45 The almost racist notion that Africa and Africans were hopeless
46 The view that there is nothing about Africa that makes it undemocratic or ungovernable but 
Africa’s problems are precipitate o f its turbulent change
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no respect for the indigenous institutions. This thesis emphasised in Chapter Two, 
that western ideas about democracy that are specifically rooted in the notion of 
political and social rights for individuals are anti-African reality. The reality of 
Africa as explained by Skinner (ibid) is still one in which "collectivities", or 
"ethnic" groups, rather than individuals are demanding social justice. There were 
traditional forms of democracy, autocracy, monarchy, and oligarchy in state- 
organised societies as well as stateless societies in their pre-colonial forms that 
could have been explored and not condemned. In this context, the thesis calls for 
respect for African cultures, their traditional institutions and ethnic concerns in the 
distribution of the state or global resources.
From the above summary and analysis, it is apparent that the 
assumptions of the modernisation theory that traditional structures would 
disappear in a smooth process of modernisation quickly evaporated when the 
assumed success of private and state development proved to be difficult (Ezeala- 
Harrison, 1996). Civil societies that were dragged in as key actors in the 
modernisation process could also not stop the dwindling fortunes of the states. 
The reason for this as argued in the thesis was that a large part of the civil 
societies depend on foreign donors and they immediately disappeared once the 
donor money is used up (Holmquist and Ford, 1994; Fagan, 2006). The people 
although are tired of poor economic and political records of the post-colonial 
governments during the past thirty years; they are more disillusioned by the 
modem post-colonial state modelled after western liberal systems. This 
necessitated the emphasis in the thesis on the need for the reconfiguration of the 
African states and economies using the traditional organisations and powers as 
relevant actors in the political economy of Africa.
The integration of traditional authorities into local governance is not 
only a subject for development agencies but also for governments. For example, 
Mozambique’s Frelimo party once rejected these traditional institutions but now
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seeks co-operation with traditional authorities in its decentralisation project in the 
"Autarcias" (Skinner, 1998). This change in attitude did not come until after the 
influence of the traditional authorities gave Renamo the main opposition party, 
electoral victories in 1994 and 1999 general elections in the rural areas threatening 
Frelimo’s hold on power at the centre.
This further confirms how local powers and authorities can and should 
be integrated into governance, especially local governance. The reason for this 
integration is clear; bringing traditional powers and modem governance together 
means trying to avoid a "clash of civilisations" and resolve the potential conflicts 
of the structural divide on the basis of co-operation and compromise. Traditional 
powers may appear to differ in fundamental principles with the liberal market 
democracy and state but the traditional internal structures of decision making are 
not however less democratic or opposed to fundamental human rights as opined in 
most literatures of liberal democracy. What needed to be understood by the 
proponents of either liberal or socialist democracies is that African traditional 
values are neither optional nor to be relegated in governance, but vital for the 
traditional way of production, distribution and reproduction. The way the 
traditional institutions function in the society must be recognised and respected. 
Recognition and not re-invention of this, marks the first step towards the 
reconfiguration of the modem African states and economies. For example the 
non-recognition of the traditional institutions in the post-Taliban Afghanistan 
process of nation-building has rendered the political regime unstable, the 
monopoly of the state is contested, state functions are not implemented, state 
authority not effective in all regions.
Re-invention such as neo-patrimonial leadership is possible within 
socialist or liberal democracy that initially pretends to ignore the relevance of 
traditional institutions in governance but was later confronted by the African 
reality. This is one of the reasons why most of the contemporary micro-economic 
development projects are now being revolved around communal structures and the
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gradual integration of the traditional rulers into government though at the 
peripheral level in some African states
In neo-communitarian democracy, the state is structured along the 
traditional and modem governments in an arrangement that allows regional ethnic 
autonomy in political affairs with competencies of modem statehood but limited 
in some affairs of national and international nature. From a perspective of 
institutional development, such arrangement will have at least two advantages:
1. First, if traditional powers are formally accepted as actors of a 
"mixed" traditional and modem statehood, the fundamental 
conflict between the two sides can be handled in a contractual 
way. This means a more peaceful development.
2. Second, if the solution is federalist - i.e. the traditional powers 
participate in developing and amending a modem constitution 
- there is a chance of a slow but robust bottom-up nation- 
building.
The concrete solution of state reconfiguration requires a careful 
evaluation of the structural divide between traditional and modem governance. As 
explained in earlier paragraphs, the fundamental condition of successful state 
building lies in recognition and tmst of the traditional institutions as vital partners 
in the modernisation of the post-colonial states.
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